Muldrow Court Rejects Eighth Circuit's "Material Significant Disadvantage Standard" in Title VII Claims

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, in which the Court held that “[a]n employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.” The decision reversed the summary judgment that was affirmed for the City by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Title VII prohibits discrimination against any person “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(1). In Muldrow, the employee police officer claimed she was discriminated against when her supervisor transferred her out of the Department’s specialized Intelligence Division so he could replace her with a man. Although her pay and rank remained the same, her job duties, FBI-related credentials, and schedule did not. In the new position, she had less interaction with the Department’s senior leadership, was not on priority cases, lost her unmarked take-home vehicle, and had a less favorable work schedule. Her new position was more “administrative” and less “prestigious.”

The Eighth Circuit held that the changes in the “terms and conditions” of her transfer did not amount to a “material significant disadvantage,” and affirmed summary judgment for the City. 30 F. 4th 680, 688 (2022). Although the district court admitted the employee experienced “minor alterations in employment,” they did not amount to “material harms” to survive summary judgment and dismissal of her claim. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166560, 2020 WL 5505113, *8-9 (2020). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal finding the employee’s changes in her terms and conditions of employment “only minor changes in working conditions.”

In focusing on the language of Title VII, the U. S. Supreme Court noted that it does not require a “heightened threshold of harm—be it dubbed significant, serious, or something similar.” The Court held that, “[a]lthough an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test. Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar.” The showing must amount to “treat[ing] a person worse” because of sex or a protected trait. “To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”

The Court rejected the City’s argument that the significant-harm test from Burlington N. & S F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006) should apply to the transfer here. In White, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision was at issue. The Court explained that “White adopted the standard for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context. The test was meant to capture those (and only those) employer action serious enough to ‘dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”

When making decisions about transfers, position changes, or other decisions that “affect a term or condition of employment” for employees, employers must carefully consider the reasons and grounds for such decisions to avoid discrimination claims. ?