Most curious of times – Part 2.

Disagreements, rivalries, differing political perspectives, and even the occasional fracas, are all part of any community. To be human is to see and interpret the world in different ways, and in healthy communities with a strong connection to history, community and place, different views are?accommodated without descent into violence.

But for many, there is a sense that across the first decades of the 21st-century, those bonds have become frayed or broken. That in far too many cases, a difference of opinion has become a choosing of sides, and resulted in communities, societies and nations feeling more chaotic, more divisive, and sadly, more violent. ?

The Global Peace Index[1], which factors in internal disruptions and conflict, confirms that there has been a decline in the peace index ratings of many democratic nations over the past decade. On that index of 163 nations, the U.S. has slipped from 101 to 132 in just 10-years, Norway fell from 10 to 28, Japan from 8 to 17, Australia from 14 to 19, Poland from 23 to 32, and France from 48 to 86.

?In Part 1 of these essays, I provided evidence of the link between rising socioeconomic inequity, and increased social tensions and unrest across free market western democracies. But there are clearly other factors impacting the vulnerability[i] of individual communities, societies and nations to such disruptions. Research reveals how bad faith actors,[2] both foreign and domestic, have been, and continue to be active in the dissemination of disinformation[ii] and the cultivation of social and cultural unrest and conflict; what I term Fragmentation Attacks.

Tsar Bear, Cozy Bear, Sednit and APT28 (Fancy Bear), are Russian State hacking and disinformation groups that many will know of, but there are many more groups and individuals engaged in such attacks, and not just in Russia. The activities of bad faith actors have been identified in investigations into the majority of the social disruptions that have plagued the western world since 2010.

Whether from within Russia or elsewhere, some of those actors target the disruption of crucial business and government infrastructure through hacking, while others focus primarily on the development and dissemination of disinformation, and the exploitation of inherent tensions, anxieties and mistrust within a given society. Their specific purpose is the cultivation of social unrest and promotion of societal conflict. It is that second group of fragmentation attacks that my research has uncovered and exposed.

The preferred tool of the architects of fragmentation attacks is (as one would imagine), social media. Platform providers are largely unbothered by ethical considerations of truth, fairness and the corroboration of the content they host, nor do they accept accountability for the consequences of the dissemination of falsehoods on their platforms. Social media therefore provides the ideal vehicle for the distribution of disinformation, as it can be done anonymously, and lacks authentication, accountability and consequence.

There remains a reluctance amongst some authorities to accept that fragmentation attacks can be strategic in nature. This is partly because the sheer volume of disinformation and misinformation posted on social media, makes the identification of clear strategic patterns and links exceedingly challenging.

Research thus far, has however revealed a great deal about the techniques of the architects of fragmentation attacks.

We now know that the perpetrators of fragmentation attacks, seek out and target pre-existing points of discontent and disaffection (cultural fragility) within a target community or culture, but do not necessarily support or oppose any cause or individual. Their objective is social disharmony and conflict, not winners and losers.[iii] The architects of fragmentation attacks instead seek to amplify the tensions between opposing arguments to foster disharmony and conflict; a clear ‘winner’ or ‘loser’ is simply not a consideration[iv].

We also know that fragmentation architects cannot exploit any sentiment that is not already alive within a target constituency. ?They do not for example, ‘create’ a racist society, they exploit any pre-existing racist sentiment that exists within a community, society or nation.

In the same vein, fragmentation architects target latent cultural, social and religious vulnerabilities and fears. Many of the anti-immigration and anti-refugee uprisings, that have plagued Europe since 2010, exploit the fears and concerns within communities, that their ‘identity’ and ‘culture’ are being overrun and lost. Once again I reiterate, the fragmentation architect in most incidences, is not interested in the issue of loss of cultural, social, or religious identity, they are only interested in the disruptions that can be generated through the exploitation of the pre-existing fears and concerns within any given community.

What is clear then, is that fragmentation architects harness culturally imbedded behaviours. I quote the following report from 2017:

“…the model for fragmentation attacks was based upon the accepted ethical and behavioural conventions within western political, corporate and bureaucratic cultures. Effectively the architects of these attacks, whether foreign or domestic, were and are, using a societies own cultural indifference to ethical standards, and culturally tolerated behavioural mores, against itself.? So while a number of countries were becoming increasingly incensed over the perceived attempts by other states to influence their electoral and political processes, internally, the use of such tactics was viewed within their own ethical construct, as a legitimate, even desirable part of the necessary skills of strong and successful leaders.”[3] ??

Culture reflects leadership.

With the growing global awareness of fragmentation attacks, authorities are re-examining the causes and influencers of the geopolitical and cultural ructions that have occurred across recent history. As a consequence, there is general acceptance amongst intelligence authorities, that in a number of high profile examples, evidence points to groups or individuals at the behest of other states or special interests, seeking to disrupt and corrupt political outcomes, and drive geopolitical, economic, security, trade, and social agendas.? The ability to produce definitive evidence, and prosecute individual perpetrators, has proven exceedingly difficult, because despite common reference to such things as digital fingerprints, and digital DNA, the level of digital forensics required to produce definitive evidence, proves politically fraught (extradition of identified criminals proving impossible), time consuming, exceedingly complex, and as a consequence, very costly.

Globally $80-b (U.S) was invested in cybersecurity in 2023, after the losses through cybercrime exceeded $6-trillion in 2022. While on the combatting of disinformation side of the ledger, according to the International Fact Checking Network[4], there are approximately 211 organisations across 69 countries providing fact checking services globally. Of the 137 who responded to a survey in 2023, 52 (38%) reported operating budgets of less than $100k, and just 16 (12%) received budgets of $1m or more. It is also worth noting that 68% of organisations report having 10 or less staff.

Yet while arguments can be made for increasing investment in exposing disinformation and misinformation across societies and nations, the most effective protection against fragmentation attacks, is found in enhancing the resilience of communities, societies and nations against such attacks; the question is of course, how? ?

That will be discussed in Part 3 of these essays.

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

[1] Institute for Economics and Peace., June 2024., “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World”., Sydney Australia., Available from: https://visionofhumanity.org/resources.

[2] ?Burgess, Guy., 2022., “Bad Faith Actors I -- Types of Actors”., www.beyondintractability.org

[3] Brennan, Dr Peter j., 2017., Weaponising Culture., Intelligence Report – European Economic Union - Published Papers 2018., p.4

[4] IFCN-Poynter., 2023., State of the Fact-Checkers Report., https://www.poynter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/State-of-Fact-Checkers-2023.pdf., p.11

[i] I will discuss ‘Measures of Vulnerability’ in greater detail in Essay 3.

[ii] ‘Disinformation’ is defined as the deliberate creation and distribution of knowingly false information, as opposed to ‘misinformation’ which is defined as the promotion and circulation of falsehoods that the individual or media concerned does not ‘know’ to be inaccurate.

[iii] There are always exceptions of course, Brexit is an example where foreign interference in the process was in support of Britain’s exit from the European Union, as those external forces sought to dismantle and undermine the economic and cooperative power of the EU.

[iv] There are clearly exceptions to this general rule, especially when seeking political change in other nations.