Montaigne: Natural Malady

Instead of trying to find unity in the views of Hermes, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Proclus through Pico's syncretic method, Michel de Montaigne argues that the various opinions of the philosophers, which contradict each other, should make one skeptical over whether or not reason is the source of belief. Montaigne regards Pico and other Premoderns’ belief in the great microcosm of man and its vertical incline towards the heavens and to God as a “presumption” and “is our natural malady” (Montaigne, 598). Pico and other Premoderns, who believe that reason and the soul, enable man to transcend his terrestrial state and ascend to the heavens and God, suffer from a “natural malady of man,” which is to presume man is separate from nature. This natural malady is comical, because “the most unfortunate and frail of all creatures, and at the same time the most vain glorious” (Montaigne, 598). These delusional philosophers believe that man, on the one hand, can transcend the “most lifeless and debased part of the universe;” and, on the other hand, they “establish [themselves] in the imagination above the circle of the moon, and brings heaven under its feet” (Montaigne, 599). Astrology, Alchemy, and any other philosophy or art which works from such a presumption is a “natural malady of man” due to not the credibility of reason, but rather man’s delusional imagination. On Montaigne's view, Premodernity is a bundle of disconnected customs, superstitions, and beliefs. None of its beliefs are grounded in reason or faith, but the force of belief comes from Nature (anima mundi).

In the Apology for Raimond, Montaigne presents us with his Pyrrhonism (or skepticism) by arguing that neither faith nor reason is the sources of beliefs. The source of belief in God is mere belief. “If we believed in Him, I do not say with faith, but with simple belief” (Montaigne, 587). Beliefs are not derived from reason and faith, which separates man from the other animals, because animals have beliefs as well. Belief is part of survival in nature, which becomes custom. In certain places of the world, this belief is better than that belief, because the former is more helpful for human survival. These beliefs are past down from generation to generation as customs, but one set of customs are no better than any other set of customs. Montaigne’s solution of diversity of philosophical opinions and social customs is to reduce them not to reason or faith, but survival techniques, which become beliefs that become customs. The order of Montaigne’s Pyrrhonist epistemology is a) nature requires animals (including man) to have survival techniques, b) those survival techniques become beliefs, and then c) those beliefs become customs.

To demonstrate the lack of faith in human affairs, “observe the horrible impudence with which we toss to and fro the divine justification, how irreligiously we have cast them aside and taken up again, according as chance has changed our position in these public storms” (Montaigne, 586). Montaigne’s point is that faith does not dictate divine justification, but mitigating circumstances. For example, Henry VIII wrote a defense of the Catholic faith against the Lutherans, and then gets rid of the Catholic Church to provide himself with a new wife and more money than Charles V is getting from the New World. Faith and reason had nothing to do with the King of England’s decision, but the mitigating circumstances of him needing a male heir and the bonus of the wealth of Church of England, because he has gone through much of his father’s inheritance. Religion is custom, which we receive from those who rule over us (either family or our Prince): “we chance to be dwellers in the country are practiced; where we are influenced by its antiquity of the men who have upheld it” (Montaigne, 588). Our geography has more to do with our religion than faith, or reason. The Antiquity of the custom has more to do with our religion than faith or reason. We believe whatever we are told to believe in the country we reside, because customs of our nation are the source of our religion. “We are Christians by the same title that we are Perigordians or Germans” (Montaigne, 589). 

Religion is neither grounded on reason nor faith, so the distinction between natural religion and revealed religion is non-sense. Natural religion is the philosophical opinion that belief in God comes from the force of reason, while revealed religion is the opinion that belief in God comes from the force of faith. Montaigne’s work is called the Apology for Raimond Sebond, because Raimond Sebond’s work, which attempts to defend Christian piety on reason, is no worse than any other work, which makes an attempt to either defend religion on reason or faith. His skepticism is very clear: “it is for mortal and human religion to be received through human guidance” (Montaigne, 589). Our own human weakness is the true source of belief in God, not faith or reason. Plato believes that atheism is unnatural and unfamiliar, because belief in God comes “either by reason or by force” (Montaigne, 589). Plato, however, is wrong, because belief in God is strongest in those who are the least rational: children and old people, who are afraid of death. “That children and the old people are more capable of religion; as if it were born and won belief from our weakness” (Montaigne, 590).

The presumption that man is superior over other animals and his behavior is so much more perfect than other animals comes from nature itself, because he is the weakest animal of nature, so nature has given him this bad faith about his status in nature. “It seems, in truth, that nature by way of consolation for our miserable and beggarly condition, has given us for our portion only presumption” (Montaigne, 650). An essential part of Montaigne’s epistemology is to explain the origin of our consistent belief in reason and faith, because he can show contradictions, but needs to provide some explanation for the cause of this belief. His explanation turns upon the weakness of our natural state relative to other animals. “We are the only animal left naked on the naked earth, bound, fettered, having only the spoil of others with which to arm and cloth itself, whereas nature has covered all other created things with shells, with husk, with bark, and with wool” (Montaigne, 604). Unlike other animals, man comes into this world without the benefit of clothing and self-defense. Man requires more care, so nature has provided man with a counterweight to his nakedness in nature: nature has provided us with “a presumption,” which assists in our survival.

Man’s presumption is that, we are masters over nature, because of reason and our religious significance in creation. This “presumption,” however, is no more meaningful than an elephant has tusks to defend itself. A philosophical problem with Montaigne’s presumption is that reason appears to be the cause of our presumption over nature, because we understand numbers, writing, metallurgy, and various other arts and technologies, which provides us with the upper hand over other animals. Montaigne’s deconstruction of presumption of man is to show animals and man do not differ very much in that they have morality, religion, capacity to heal themselves, and sexuality. By showing that animals reason very similar to humans, Montaigne hopes to blur the division between man and animals in order to deconstruct the“presumption.” Accordingly, he must show that human reasoning is not different than animal reasoning. “We ought to conclude from the lie manifestations like faculties, and consequently to confess that the same reasoning, the same way that we follow in working, is also that of animals” (Montaigne, 609). Montaigne is removing man from his special place in the cosmos due to his rational soul, and placing him inside of nature, as no different as any other animal. His naturalism is the anti-thesis to Calvinism or Florentine Neo-Platonism.

Obviously, mortalism is a consequence of man’s privileged position being removed, unless animals have immortal souls as well. To show the equality of man and animals, Montaigne argues that our ability to conceive instead of simply perceive is also shared by the animals. Montaigne knows that Neo-Platonists, such as Ficino, believe that man ability to conceive mathematical and metaphysical truths which are independent from sense perception are demonstrations of man’s ability to understand the incorporeal and remove the corporeal. On Neo-Platonists’ view, animals do not have the ability to conceive, but only perceive. “The privledge our soul glorifies herself on, reducing to her own conditions whatever she conceives, of divesting of mortal and corporeal qualities whatever comes to her, and make them lay aside, as superfluous and mean garments, thickness, length, depth, weight, colour, and odour, in order to adapt them to her immortal and spiritual nature” (Montaigne, 640). Humans believe that their soul is immortal, because of its ability to abstract, reduce, particular things into abstract categories (universals) and separate which qualities are accidental and essential, because this is the activity of a transcendental entity outside of nature.

This is what Montaigne calls the “ presumption” of man. Man alone has the ability to not only perceive, but also to conceive amongst the animals on the earth. “So Rome and Paris, which I have in my thoughts --- the Paris which I conceive, I conceive and apprehend without dimesion and without place, without stone, without plaster, and without wood” (Montaigne, 640). Montaigne argues that the ability to conceive is self-evident in the behaviors of animals while they sleep and dream, because these animals are conceiving in their sleep of things which they have perceived in the day. “A horse accustomed to sound of trumpets, of musketry, and of battle, whom we see quivering and trembling in his sleep…it is certain that he conceives in his thought the beat of the drum without noise, an army without arms and without body (Montaigne, 641).

A wise critic (such as my elder maternal uncle) would say that the horse is only remembering his perceptions of battle in his sleep, and that this is no proof of the ability of animals to conceive. If Montaigne provided other examples which did not conform to dream/ sleep and conceiving structure, then he could overcome this objection, but he does not, because his other examples of the hare, the dog, and greyhound involve them sleeping and showing signs of remembering their perceptions. So Montaigne does not really show how animals have the ability to conceive as humans, so my uncle has a point. But Montaigne's intentions are clear that man and animal are no different in their ability to conceive. Ergo, Montaigne’s naturalism is a doctrine of mortalism, because the human ability to conceive (as distinct from animals) is the central Premodern proof of the immortality of the soul.

The "presumption” of man is self-evident in his belief that he alone has the ability to reason. Nature has given man and animals the ability to reason in order to survive in this world. The vanity of our presumption blinds us from seeing that same power of reasoning found in man is also found in animals: “The vanity of our presumption causes us to like better to owe to our capacity to our powers rather than to her liberality” (Montaigne, 609). Man believes that his powers of reasoning come from himself and not nature. His reasoning comes from a unique source which is categorically and metaphysically distinct from nature. Greek philosophers invent “the rational soul” to capture this unique source of man’s reason. 

Animals, on the other hand, are ruled by their instincts, which come from nature, and having nothing do with the activity and the exercise of the rational soul and free will. All of this Greek philosophical language is meant to distinguish man from the animals, which is non-sense. Montaigne is arguing that everything the Greek philosophers attribute to man “reason, “free will,” “choice” and “skill” do not come from an imaginary rational soul and free will, but from instincts which are no different than any other animal. If reasoning, imagination, choice, and execution of skill are no different than the instincts of an animal, then not only can we rid ourselves of all the unnecessary philosophical debates over the rational soul and free will, but also explain human beliefs in terms of customs derived from natural instincts, which are formed depending upon circumstance and geography. “We ought to conclude from like manifestations, like faculties, and consequently to confess that the same reasoning, the same way that we follow in working, is also that of animals” (Montaigne, 609). 

Montaigne provides some entertaining examples how human beliefs and customs are no different than animals and their instincts. Our belief that we alone have religious practice is absurd. “Elephants have some participation in religion, because, after their absolutions and cleansing, we see them lifting their trunks like arms, and keeping, their eyes fixed on the rising sun, stand a long time in meditation and contemplation at certain hours of the day, from their own inclination, without instruction and without precept” (Montaigne, 621). Like the Elephant, Catholics and Muslims clean themselves after absolution with holy water, they mediate in prayer for some period of time. Indians and other primitive people raise their arms to the sun, because they believe the sun to be holy. Montaigne is keen on pointing out that Elephant preforms these religious activities not by instruction by man, but out of his own inspiration and inclination.

Accordingly, just as nature provides man with the instinct of religion, so nature provides animals with the instinct of religion. Ants bury their dead by the same inclination which drives Christians to bury their dead. “[Cleanthes] says that he saw some ants go from their hill, bearing the body of a dead ant, toward another hill from which several ants came out to meet them, as if to parley with them” (Montaigne, 621). Not all religions bury their dead, so nature provides different instincts to different cultures and different species of animals. Zoroastrians leave their dead to be eaten by vultures; Ancient Romans burned their dead; and Scythians ate their dead. Elephants and ants have different religious inclinations. Elephants are like Catholics and Muslims; while ants are like Ancient Egyptians burying their great dead in ant mounds.

Montaigne, on the one hand, wants unity through nature for all animals (including man) as the source of their behaviors, customs and beliefs, and, the other hand, the diversity among man in his opinions is the same diversity as in nature. Although Montaigne is trying separate himself from the other Premoderns with his Pyrrhonic naturalism, he succumbs to their problem of unity of opposites. Montaigne successfully navigates the problem of the unity of opposites and his naturalism by maintaining the Hermetic belief in the world soul. “Nature has embraced universally all her creatures, and there is not one that she has not fully supplied with all the means necessary for preservation of his being” (Montaigne, 603). Man and animals are no different from one another, because the inspiration of their beliefs and customs comes from nature.

Averroes maintained that the concept of man is eternal, but an individual man is mortal. Analogously, Montaigne believes that placing the soul in the world is more reasonable than placing it in man, because the world is the source of generation and degeneration of all genus and species of plant, animal, and man. While most Premodern philosophers put the epistemic burden upon man’s rationality as the origin of beliefs, Montaigne has put the burden upon nature to determine beliefs and customs. The diversity of opinions cannot be reconciled by faith or reason, but only explained by nature and its various manifestations of beliefs and customs. This also true with diversity and behavior of animals as well, because they all derive their reasoning power, imagination, ability to conceive from nature. Montaigne’s skepticism still retains the Premodern anima mundi in order to make sense of his naturalism.