MODES OF INTERPRETATION OF LAW

SOME REFLECTIONS IN INDUSTRIAL JURISPRUDENCE : INTERPRETATION OF LABOUR LEGISLATIONS : SOME SALIENT FEATURES AND AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION – A DOCUMENTARY

AJAYA KUMAR SAMANTARAY,Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad : 826003

INTERPRETATION,WHAT IT IS ?

      As far as my little knowledge is concerned , the term ‘interpretation’ refer to a judicial function, which aims at declaring “what the law is”. Our judicial system has given us large number of case-laws on the subject but still the search is on.This is due to the fact that “law is an evolutionary subject and at the same time a normative science”. It is an evolutionary subject because it is still in the process of evolution. It is a normative science because it stands on certain norms viz. social, psychological, political, economic and also sociological. Let us see what the popular law lexicons say about the word ‘interpretation’.

A. LAW DICTIONARY : P H COLLINS (PAGE 127)  interpretation (noun) what someone thinks is the meaning of a law or precedent. 

B. LAW LEXICON : P RAMANATH AIYAR (PAGE 613) : INTERPRETATION : The determination of the meaning of a writing; the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words , that is the sense in which their author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey; the art of finding out or collecting the intention of a writer, either from his words, or from other conjecture, or from both; the use of some other signs or marks, besides the words of the speaker or writer, in order to collect his meaning; the mere finding of then true sense of the special form of words used (Ame. Cyc.)  

    In the light of the above definitions,I intend to elaborate certain guiding principles of interpretation of labour legislations and at the same time outline certain case-laws for the information of the readers.The first question that comes here is  whoshould interpret the labour legislation? We are ware of the fact that quasi-judicial authorities have been appointed under Minimum Wages Act,1948; Workmen’ (Employees’) Compensation Act,1923; Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,1952; Payment of Gratuity Act,1972; Equal remuneration Act,1976 and Employees State Insurance Act,1948 etc. The quasi-judicial authorities have been appointed under specific provisions (sections) of the Acts to provide speedy and early relief to the working class since the judicial procedure takes long time to dispose off the cases. At the first instance, it is the quasi-judicial authorities,appointed under various labour legislations who are vested with the duties of   interpreting various provisions of different labour legislations. Thereafter, the High Courts, under Article 226 and the Apex Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution are entrusted with the work of interpretation of law.The counsels assist/aid the quasi-judicial and judicial authorities  in the task of interpreting the labour legislations. Under the heading, “who should interpret” I think it would be quite pertinent to cite a judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme court of India in the case of Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company vrs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd[AIR 1983 SC 239 at 254] wherein it has been held as follows:

“No one may speak for the Parliament and the Parliament is never before the court. After parliament has said what it intends to say, only the court may say what Parliament meant to say. None else. Once a statute leaves Parliament house, the Court’s is the only authentic voice which may echo (interpret) the Parliament. This, the court will do with reference to the language of the statute and other permissible aids”. 

MODES OF CONSTRUCTION 

       After discussing the clause ‘who should interpret’ let us proceed to mode of interpretation of statutes which also includes mode of construction as well. 

Promoter’s Speech 

           While piloting a legislation (which is called a bill) in the legislature, the promoter delivers a speech outlining the salient features of the proposed bill (statute) which is called ‘promoter’s speech’. The esteemed readers are aware of the fact that the term ”LAW” is the combination 3 alphabets viz. L, A and W. L indicates legislation (the process of law making), A indicates administration (implementation of law) and W indicates Wisdom (interpretation of law).The esteemed readers may please note that for interpreting the law a high degree of wisdom (analytical ability, intelligence and a very strong common sense) is required. Thus I have used the term ‘wisdom’ to indicate interpretation and I am sure, the esteemed readers would agree with my views.The esteemed readers may note that while piloting the bill, the promoter of the bill, in our country, the minister In-charge delivers a speech in the Parliament in which the necessity of the of bringing a particulars legislation,its historical perspective, aims, objects and the various proviso are enumerated so as to make the legislators conversant with the proposed legislation (bill).Then, the proposed draft (bill) is left to the legislators for debate. In this context I intend to say that promoter’s speech, as far as labour legislation is concerned, should be taken into consideration while interpreting the statute, if there exists any ambiguity in the statute.If any of the wordings,language used ij any labour legislation is found to be ‘equivocal’, the interpreter (Lord Justice) would be at liberty to refer to the Promoter’s speech while piloting the bill.This is due to the fact that labour legislations are beneficial legislations and need liberal interpretation.But while interpreting Penal/Criminal, Economic or Taxation statutes,Promoter’s speech,while piloting the bill should not be taken into consideration as penal, economic and taxation statutes need strict construction. As far as interpretation of Criminal /penal Law is concerned the esteemed readers may refer to case-law pertaining to P V Narasimha Rao vrs CBI/SPE [AIR 1998 SC 2120], popularly known as MPs Bribery case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this case, has held as follows: 

        “ We often say that we are looking for the intention of parliament, but that is not quite accurate.We are seeking the meaning of the words ,which parliament used.We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said. 

                     The question which gives rise to debate are rarely those which later have to be decided by the courts. One might take the view of the promoters of a Bill as an indication of the intention of parliament but any view the promoters may have had about questions which later come before the court will not often appear in Hansard and often those questions have never occurred to the promoters. At best we might get material from which a more or less dubious inference might be drawn as to what the promoters intended or would have intended if they had thought about the matter, and it would, I think generally be dangerous to attach weight to what some other members of either House may have said ”.  

                     The above statement were quoted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court from the judgment of Lord Reid in the case of Black-Claswon International Ltd vrs. Papirwerke Waidh of Aschaffenburg   [(1975) AC 591]. 

Preamble of the Legislation 

      While discussing this part of labour legislation it would quite pertinent to refer to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D S Nakaravrs Union of India [[(1983) 1 SCC 305=AIR 1983 SC 130=www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1416283] wherein it was held that preamble is the part of Constitution. The expression/word ‘socialist’ was inserted into the preamble of the constitution by the constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act,1976.A socialist state is a state, which aims at eliminating inequality in income, status and standards of life. The economic theory of socialism aims at providing a decent standard of life to the working people and specially provide security from cradle to grave. Elimination of economic inequality and equitable distribution of income are the basic characteristics of socialism. In view of the same, it can be said that the preamble of the labour legislations are the parts of the labour laws and should be taken into account while interpreting the statutes. In this context it would be quite pertinent to refer to the following judicial pronouncements:

A. AIR 1954 SC 139 : The policy and purpose of a given measure may be decided from the long title and the preamble thereof

B. ILR 1958 (Bom) 242 : In order to determine whether rules could be made under rule making power and to ascertain what  the purpose or purposes of the acts are ,it is the preamble to refer to.

C. AIR 1953 SC 276 : The title and preamble,whatever their value might be as as aids to the construction of a statute,undoubtedly throw light on the intent and design of the legislature and indicate to the scope and purpose of legislation itself.

D. AIR 1958 Cal 373 : Policies of the statutes are relevant for their proper construction. But within the broad framework of the main purpose and policy of the statute construction is largely, fundamentally and primarily a matter of interpretation of the words used in the statutes. Idea of policy gathered from extraneous to the text of the statue and its preamble are neither conclusive not convincing, if the actual language subject to interpretation leaves no room for doubt.

The esteemed readers may note that preamble, in any labour legislation is not just an empty formality, certain values are attached to the preamble of a statute and such values may be social, legal, and circumstantial. This is the reason for which adequate importance has been attached to the preamble of a statute.

Intention of the Legislature

     Lord Denning, fondly called peoples judge, a British judge and jurist has given a beautiful account on this aspect, in his book, The Discipline of Law as follows:

“When a defect appears in a statute, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of the parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written words so as to give ‘force of life’to the intention of the legislature”.

The above principle was enunciated by Lord Denning in Heydon’s case [(1950) 1 All E R 1029].

     The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Kanilal Sur vrs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907], held that ‘the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself.

Interpretation of ambiguous statute or provisions having equivocal terms

This also comes under ‘intention of legislature’ but since, in my view, ‘defective statute’ and ‘ambiguous statutes’ are two different propositions, I have preferred to take the headnote as above for the benefit of the esteemed readers.In connection with an ambiguous statute or provisions having equivocal terms,it would in fairness of the subject to refer to a citation in the case of Magor and St. Mellonsvrs New Port Borough Council [1951 (2) All E R 839] wherein it has been held as follows:

“We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and Ministers  and carry it out and making sense of the enactment than by opening  it upto destructive analysis”. 

Intention of the Legislature : When not to be looked into ?

While interpreting a statute, the plain meaning of the word has to be followed,particularly when there is no ambiguity in interpreting the same,reference to some of the precedents on the subject would be in fitness of things.This view was taken by a Division bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd vrs. Shinder Kaur[AIR 1998 P&H 184, para 6 (DB)].The learned Division Bench stated that while defining/interpreting the meaning of motor car, it was held that ‘tractor’ is not a motor car.Inthen year 1939,the Privy Council had taken the following view in the case of Pakala Narayana Swamy vrs Emperor,  ‘ but in truth when the meaning of word is plain it is not the duty of the courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions’.

Intention of the Legislature : From where to be gathered ?

In the foregoing paragraphs the esteemed readers have read intention of the legislature and when the same should not be looked into. Now, it is intended to discuss ‘gathering the intention of the legislature and the source of such gathering’. While discussing the same I would like to cite what the Hon’ble Supreme Court said in AIR 1990 SC 1752 :

“Where, therefore, the ‘language’ is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used, what is to be borne in mind as to what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition, of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception,including that of necessity”. 

In the case of State of Keralavrs Mathai Verghese[AIR 1987 SC 33=1987 SCR (1) 317 = www.indiankanoon.org/doc/58373] the Hon’ble Supreme court has stated as follows: 

    “In deed the Court cannot reframe the legislation as it has no power to legislate”. 

     The High Court of Allahabad, in the case of Ramashraya and etc, etcvrs District Panchayati Raj Officer [AIR 1998 All 87], has stated as follows: 

“It is a well settled proposition of law that although a preamble of a statute is a key interpretation of the provisions of the Act, but the intention of the legislature is not necessarily to be gathered from the preamble taken by itself, but to be gathered from the provisions of the Act. Where the language of the Act is clear, the preamble cannot be a guide, but where the object on meaning of the provisions of the act is not clear then an aid from the preamble can be taken into consideration for the purpose of explaining the provisions of the Act”.

Statement of Objects and Reasons of a Legislation: How far useful ?

     The Author strongly feels that the statement of objects and reasons in a statute are of equal importance as the substantive provisions are.The statement of objects and reasons act as a guide to the Quasi-judicial Authorities or the Judges while interpreting the proviso of a statute.In this context, it would be quite appropriate to refer to a judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Narain Khamman vrs Pargun Kumar Jain [ AIR 1985 SC 4]wherein it has been held as follows:

“Though the statement of objects and reasons accompanying a legislative Bill could not be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it was permissible to refer to the same for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy”. 

     The intention of the legislature and preamble of the Acts, as described above; have been discussed just to guide the interpreter while interpreting the statutes. In the next part, I intend to discuss the principles of interpretation of labour statutes. In all, I intend to discuss fourteen principles of interpretation of labour statutes, as follows: 

1.     THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLE : According to Lord Coke, “the Primary Principle of Interpretation is that a Constitutional or statutory provision should be construed according to the intent of they that made it”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has endorsed this view in the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh vrs L V A Dikshitulu [AIR 1979 SC 193] in the following pedagogy: 

“Normally,the intent of the legislature is gathered from the language of the provisions of a statute.If the language or the phraseology thus by itself, claims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to regardless of consequences that may follow.But if words used in the provision are imprecise,protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one,the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to   reach at the real legislative intent.In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed,it is legitimate for the court  to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid  other well recognised rules of construction,such as its legislative history,the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved and the consequence that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to other possible interpretation”. 

     The above view was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the year 1988 in the case of Dr. Ajaya Pradhan vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1988 SC 1875]. Differentiating between liberal and strict construction, the Hon’ble supreme Court, in the case of Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd vrs Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [ AIR 1992 SC 152], stated as follows:

“The choice between strict and liberal construction arises only in case of doubt in regard to the intention of the legislature manifest on the statutory language. Indeed, the need to resort to any interpretative process arises only where the meaning is not manifest on the plain words of the statute. If the words are plain and clear and directly convey the meaning, there is no need for any interpretation”. 

2.     THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE : This principle has come into vogue in the year 1975 while the Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted certain provisions of Payment of Bonus Act,1965 in the case of Anandji Haridas & Co. vrs. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh [ AIR 1975 SC 946] : 

“As a general principle of interpretation,when the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous,then intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence such as Parliamentary debates,reports of the committees of the legislature or even the statement made by the minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act is admissible to construe those words. It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or when its language is ambiguous, uncertain or clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning,that external evidence as to evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of circumstances which led to the passing of the statute may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which the legislature had in view in using the words in question”. 

3.  THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE : The fundamental rule of interpretationhas been adhered to

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shri Ram vrs. The State of Maharashtra [AIR 1961 SC 674 at Para 8].It would be quite pertinent to extract the relevant portion of the decision which is as follows: 

“One of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are precise in themselves and also unambiguous ‘no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense’, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature”. 

4.THE CARDINAL OR GOLDEN RULE : The cardinal rule of construction of statute is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the court muct adopt ordinary rule of   literal interpretation. According to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Jugal Kishore Saraf vrs. Raw Cotton Company Ltd [AIR 1955 SC 376], “if the literal construction does not lead to apparent absurdity, there is no reason why literal construction should be avoided. On cardinal  principle of construction, the High Court of Calcutta has delivered a judgment in the year 1998 in the case of Manoranjan Das vrs State of West Bengal [AIR 1998 Cal 22 at para 15] as follows: 

“ In the matter of construction of statute, the cardinal principle to be borne in mind is that if the legislature has provided so be presumed that anything which is necessary for the purpose of the Act has to be done”. 

5.   BALANCED VIEW OF INTERPRETATION : A statute may be interpreted to include circumstances, which are unknown or did not exist at the time of enactment of the statute.In this situation, Courts must construe enactment from the point of view of furthering social interest, which is purpose of legislation to promote. This view has been taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh (a special bench) in the case of Sarada Mani vrs G Alexander [AIR 1998 AP 157 (Special Bench)]. 

6.  PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION :This rule of construction/interpretation of statute is popularly known as ‘mischief rule’. Its application, at times becomes necessary to enablereading of words by implication when there is indoubt about the purpose which the Parliament intended to achieve.But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act,it should be possible to state with certainty that these words should have been inserted by the Draftsman and approved by Parliament and their attention been drawn to the omission before the Act passed into law. This view was taken by the House of Lords in the case of Pickstone vrs. Freeman PLC [(1982) 2 All E R 803].A Full Bench of the Allahabad  High Court has taken the following view on purposive construction/interpretation in the case of Sri Durga Gita Vidyalaya Association vrs. State of U P [AIR 1962 Alld. 187 (FB)] 

“Purposive interpretation of a statute should be made while  considering the relevant provisions of the Act.The court should  not adopt an inflexible or rigid stand to make provisions of the  statute nugatory. By such resolution the petitioners are in no way affected in a case.Therefore, the case at the instance of the petitioners has to be spurned”. 

7.  HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION : The principle of harmonious construction has basically been derived from the word ’harmony’ which has got certain absolute positive implications. Harmony, in ordinary literal sense is ‘together with’ or in ‘close coordination/cooperation’. As far as my little knowledge is concerned, before interpreting or constructing a statute, the interpreter should read the statute in detail and the reading should be harmonious i.e.no provision of the statute should be read in isolation. The proviso of the statute should be read together with the statement of objects and reasons and also the preamble. This should be done due to the fact that ‘the interpreter, while interpreting the statutes should not forget about the aims and objects of the statute. Harmonious reading of the statute only can help harmonious construction of the statute. 

          It is a general acceptance of the fact that the words of a proviso are not to be taken

absolutely in their strict literal sense. In construing a proviso one has to harmoniously construe the proviso with main section and to see that the proviso do not cut down the obligations cast by the section itself. 

Whether the provisions contained in the proviso are mandatory or directory, one has to look at the intention of the law maker as expressed in the law.If the intention is clear by using imperative words such as ‘must’ instead of ‘shall’ that will itself be sufficient to hold that the provision is mandatory and it shall not be necessary to pursue the enquiry further. Similarly, if the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, It can rarely be directory. 

 Lord Diplock, in the case of Duport Steels Ltd vrs Sirs [(1980) All E R 529] stated that  “it endangers public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if Judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the Court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to public interest. This view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vrs. M/s Price Water House [AIR 1998 SC 74 at para 50].In this case, a chartered Accountant was found to be guilty of professional misconduct for which a second enquiry was ordered. The  Chartered Accountant approached the High Court of Delhi which quashed the second enquiry. The Institute went on appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. A learned three  Judges Bench heard  the appeal. While two Judges upheld the action of the institute for 2nd enquiry, one learned Judge of the same bench did not agree on the4 same citing harmonious construction of the s tatute viz. The Chartered Accountants Act. Here it may be opined that harmonious interpretation of statute should not be resorted to while somebody has done certain criminal or professional misconduct. Under the guise of harmonious construction the wrong doers shall escape. Harmonious interpretation is to be resorted to in case of labour and social welfare legislations to further the interest of the weaker sections of the society.  

8. LITERAL CONSTRUCTION : WHEN TO AVOID ? : Though I have cited a case-law favouring literal construction of statutes, sometimes it becomes essential to avoid literal construction. If literal construction of a statute leads to frustrate the objects of the Act and intention of the legislature who made the enactment, such literal construction should be avoided at all cost. In R vrs R[(1991) 4 All ER 481], it has been held that “the literal reading of the words would have frustrated substantially the purpose of enactment and would have led to absurdity of supposing that the legislation was to subject to licensing control, only those establishments conducted in the least offensive way and to leave those which ponder over outrageously from any control of legal restraint” 

9. PROCEDURAL LAW : HOW TO INTERPRET ?  :  In interpreting procedural law, when more than one interpretation is possible, the one, which curtails the procedure without eluding the justice, is to be adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to and is an aid to  justice. Any interpretation, which elude or frustrate the recipient of justice is not followed. This view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shreenath and Another vrs Rajesh and others [AIR 1998 SC 1827] . 

10. IRONING OUT THE CREASES - LORD DENNING  :  In Seaford Court Estate vrs. Asher[(1949) 2 All ER 155] Lord Justice Denning has stated that “a judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can only iron out the creases”. This view was agreed to by the Hon’ble supreme Court of India in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vrs. Rajappa [AIR 1978 SC 1107] while declaring BWSSB is an industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947. 

      While describing the ironing out the creases maxim, propounded by Lord Denning, it comes to my mind that nothing should be added to or nothing should be subtracted from an Act.This is due to the fact that the judiciary in our country is not entrusted with the power to legislate nor it has been entrusted with the power to correct or amend any law. It has to declare “what the law is” and not “what the law ought to be”. If they add or subtract

something to and from the law respectively, it will amount to usurpation of legislative power which our constitution does not permit. According to Madhya Pradesh High Court, in the case of Prem Narain Sharma vrs State Transport Appellate Tribunal [AIR 1998 MP 229] “it is well settled law that while interpreting the statute or a document, nothing can be added or subtracted. The language has to be read as it stands”. 

11. USE OF EXTERNAL AIDS :   The Hon’ble Supreme court of India, in the case of Municipal Corporation of Thane vrs Asmo Plastic industries [AIR 1998 SC 2442] stated that “external aids like technical materials though of course may be useful on certain aspect, the same will not be decisive of the matter”. The citation shows that external aids have very little importance and at the same time it could not be considered as a decisive force. While interpreting labour legislations ,the interpreters should avoid the external aids as far as possible and practicable. 

12. USE OF PEREMPTORY LANGUAGE  : The use of peremptory language in a negative form isper se indicative of the intent that the provisions have to be mandatory. However, the rule that negative words are usually mandatory, is like any other rule subordinate to the context and the object intended to be achieved by the particular requirement. There cannot be an universal rule for interpretation.” There can also be no general rule that a particular provision should be construed as directly only or should be construed as obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the court to try to get at the real intention of the lawmaker carefully looking at the whole scope of the enactment  [AIR 1998 CAL 326 at para 26] 

13. INTERPRETATION OF PLAIN LANGUAGE : Maxwell is a celebrated writer on       Interpretation of Statutes and his famous work, ‘MAXWELL ON INTERPRETATION’ has been accepted worldwide and gained acclamation. At page 229 of the book he has stated as follows :

“If the meaning of the statute is plain, the effect must be given to it Irrespective of the consequences. It is only when that the language of the statute is capable of bearing more than one construction then in selecting the true meaning, regard must be given to the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative construction. If the words of the statute are susceptible to only to one meaning and no alternative construction is reasonably open then only such a construction is possible which gives the general meaning of the words. Any consideration that it will result into hardship, inconvenience injustice, has to be rejected and preference is to be given to that construction”. 

14. INTERPRETATION OF UNEQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE - MAXWELL : When, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced, however, harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of statute is not to be collected any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient, words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to “leave the remedy (if one be resolved) to others”.