The Modern Thucydides Traps - Can We Avoid Them Before It's Too Late?

As we watch the war between Ukraine and Russia unfold before our incredulous eyes, we have reasons to be very concerned about where this might be heading. In the latter part of the 5th century BCE, Athens and Sparta famously clashed in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE). But that war did not start between those two powers, rather, it started as a feud between Athens-backed Corcyra and Spartan ally, Corinth. Each of the smaller city-states entreated their more powerful friends to intervene. If Ukraine and Russia try to pull their own allies into this fight, it will set the stage for what are essentially three Thucydides "traps" that could ultimately ensnare the US and its allies in another messy, global conflict.

These "traps" are laid out in Chapter 2 of my book, The New Art of War (Cambridge, 2021) on pages 61 and 62. The first is Graham Allison's construct, i.e., that US fear of China's growing power could precipitate a war, since "fear" is one of Thucydides' prime causes of war, the others being honor and interest. But China is not in this war! Ah but don't forget, Athens and Sparta were not in the war to begin with either. Russia and China have recently forged an anti-Western alliance and established closer policy and economic ties. This casts Russia in the role of Corinth and Ukraine as Corcyra. The US's fear of the China-Russia alliance could indirectly pull us and NATO into a war in Europe.

The other two "traps" are also important. From The New Art of War: "For Athens and Sparta, there were actually two traps, which are just as apropos today as they were then. The first is the belief that war is an acceptable, and even noble, instrument for realizing political ends. This 'traps' ambitious nations into a cycle of competition, conflict, and war for supremacy in power, security, and glory. The second 'trap' is more complex and relates to great powers and alliances. This trap is primed when strong states pledge support to lesser powers."

Clearly, Vladimir Putin fell into the first trap, and in so doing, he's primed the second. In fact, the US, NATO, and the EU are supporting Ukraine, if not directly participating in the fighting (yet). What happens when Russia extends its reach beyond the borders of Ukraine, physically or in cyberspace, to disrupt or even destroy this flow of materiel and aid? Will the situation not escalate? Perhaps. Perhaps not.

Mitigating this trend toward a wider conflict is one that did NOT exist in the 5th century BCE, i.e., the most significant geo-strategic artifact of the 20th century--the nuclear age. For more on this, I'd direct you to Chapter 4 of The New Art of War (pp. 291-3). With nuclear weapons, the strategic question will my aggression give me what I want at an acceptable risk/cost? "is always 'no,' because these weapons are so irresistibly destructive, particularly when employed on long range ballistic, cruise, or hypersonic missiles, the cost always exceeds the benefit. In other words, assessment of relative capacities and context between nuclear-armed adversaries eliminates the will to fight."

We have seen this reality play out before our eyes. Russia has been posturing to invade for nearly a year, but all the world's powers have stood by, never once committing flesh to deter Russia's gambit. Oh how different this scenario is compared with the global response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

So now the free world sits on a precipice between the ancient and the modern, wanting so badly to act against evil aggression, but compelled to respect Russia's nuclear capacity. This is precisely why Putin issued his somewhat murky order to raise the alert level for his nuclear forces--a reminder to the world's "do-gooder" nations--back off!

This situation is fraught with danger, and though we cannot be certain of ultimate success, the likelihood of a tragic misstep is magnified if we fail to understand the dynamics at work. As Clausewitz advises, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

Ultimately, the key to averting a modern Peloponnesian War in Europe will be to identify the "nature" of Thucydides' traps and craft and implement policies to avoid them. There are ways to do this I'll not specify here, but let's pray leaders on both sides find them. Before it's too late.