Military Sales and Foreign Policy

At First Glance………. evaluating published articles of note

This article is in response to a Cato Institute article on U.S. foreign military sales by A. Treavor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey. You can find the original article at the link below:

The authors make no bones about how they feel regarding the utility of “arms” sales. They lay out a reasoned, cogent case against selling arms abroad. They also make an effort to be balanced and include a section arguing the case for #arms #sales. So that leaves one asking the question, have they gotten this right? It is a fair question, especially given the draconian recommendations that they make in closing the paper. But it also raises the question, are they objective and is there merit to their case against arms sales?

As far as objectivity, I would argue that while they give the appearance of presenting a balanced assessment and analysis of the relevant data, they are far from objective. Their recommendations (discussed below) are anything but balanced and seek to constraint the executive branch, will hinder U.S. foreign policy flexibility and are impractical. The authors devote a lot of ink to making the case against arms sales. True, they do make a case for sales. But their “for case” is incomplete and they go to great length to discredit the pros which they offer in the “for case.”

Let’s begin with the arguments they offer in favor of arms sales:

? “First, arms sales are less risky than sending American troops, providing explicit security guarantees to other nations, or initiating direct military intervention, even long distance”

o These are valid points. But this incorrectly implies that the whole reason for selling arms is to avoid deploying troops and avoiding foreign entanglements when, in reality, we often sell arms to reinforce foreign commitments, not avoid them.

? “Second, arms sales are an extremely flexible tool of #statecraft”

o Indeed arms sales are a flexible tool of statecraft. But then why do they later make recommendations that will hamper sales and make the tool far less effective? Clearly, they are not in agreement with the “for case,” but rather only offering what they believe the other side would argue.

? “Finally, arms sales represent a very low-cost and low-friction policy tool for the White House”

o Here again I would have to agree with their assessment.

So that was the case in favor of arms sales. I will not detail their arguments against arms sales, as that constitutes the majority of the paper. I will concede that they have several valid arguments, in particular, the moral hazard of arms sales to sketchy regimes and countries with poor human rights records. This alone should merit far greater scrutiny by #Congress, the Executive Branch and the American public.

The authors make several other cases against arms sales and claim that arms sales provide little direct benefit to U.S. national security. To make their case they offer that “arms sales are completely useless to combat the largest terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland: lone wolf attackers already living in the United States.” Intentionally or otherwise, they imply that domestic terrorism is germane, that it is the single greatest national security threat to the United States. That is incorrect. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (especially by rogue states like Iran and North Korea), cyber warfare, and Russia all constitute far more serious threats to national security than domestic terrorism. So their argument is not germane to the discussion of foreign arms sales. Additionally, arms sales can result in indirect benefits that aid our partners, friends and allies around the world, thereby achieving our foreign policy goals.

The case they present in favor of foreign arms sales neglects several valid reasons they occur and why the U.S. uses arms sales as part of its foreign policy, namely:

? We sell arms to allies to ensure standardization, inter-operability, and to reassure them as well. This is especially true of treaty alliances like NATO.

? Arms sales abroad play a vital role in reducing our own defense costs by ensuring adequate volume, harmonizing production lines (keeping production going when U.S. forces are not in need of new or additional equipment). Restarting production lines on expensive military hardware is usually cost prohibitive and rapidly drives up research and production costs for modern weaponry and equipment.

? Their depiction of arms sales obscures a lot of what is going on. This lumps all military sales into a basket of "arms." Yes, the lion’s share of dollar cost in arms sales is applicable to “arms” or weapons systems like planes, ships and tanks. But foreign “arms” sales also include radios, intelligence collection, medical equipment, training, institution building, training site construction, uniforms, professional education, mobile training teams and so on. To object to “arms” sales without differentiating the types is inaccurate at best, disingenuous at worst.

They present four policy recommendations for consideration:

? Issue an updated presidential policy directive on arms sales

o On its own, this is not an unreasonable recommendation. Arms sale policy should be reviewed annually for applicability and merit. But they want a default policy of “no sale” and strict restraints on all sales. This is unreasonable and unduly restricts the foreign policy of the United States for a “feel good” declaration that will achieve little. Others easily step into the role of arms merchants (Europeans, Russia and more recently even China) when the U.S. backs away. That is not a valid reason to sell weapons, just a statement that their recommendation will not end arms sales to sketchy regimes, only eliminate U.S. influence completely and cede the ground to others, many of whom are less interested in the behavior of their customers than the U.S. tends to be.

? Immediately Stop Selling Weapons to Risky Nations

o You will get little argument from me on this one. But, who exactly determines what nations are risky? Today's friends become tomorrow's enemies. There are plenty of historical examples of states who make a wrong turn or become hostile to the United States or their own citizens (Iran, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe). The authors categorize 71 countries as bad bets today. While they have a reasonable methodology, still, this is a subjective issue. They claim cutting off 71 states will prevent the U.S. from enabling conflicts abroad. No doubt their logic holds up, in some cases. But the 71 countries they list are not all embroiled in conflict. This is reflection of reality in a few cases and estimates and projections in most cases. The list of transgressors should be small, not an effort to exclude as many states as possible.

? Improve and respond to end-use-monitoring (EUM)

o Hear, hear! Yes, please. This is very much needed. Existing Department of State (Blue Lantern) and Department of Defense (Golden Sentry) programs are wholly unsatisfactory, as is notification to foreign customers who almost always feel impinged upon when we ask to inventory things. In order to acquire defense material from the U.S. they signed contracts accepting EUM and enhanced EUM. This recommendation makes a lot of sense and is a very useful tool to ensure proper use of defense material, if done correctly.

? Amend the AECA to require congressional approval for all arms sales

o This recommendation is problematic for several reasons. First, it presumes that Congress is effective at its existing oversight responsibilities. It is not. Congressional reporting thresholds (which Congress established) are either $14 million and above or any sensitive munitions (from a prescribed list of arms and munitions). Congress set these thresholds for a reason. They themselves recognize that requiring their approval for all sales is an insane, ineffective and inefficient practice. For example, this would include transfer of $500,000 in tactical radios to Uganda for the Somalia mission. What exactly will we gain from this requirement? For certain it will slow down the process and result in delays.

o It unduly constrains the chief executive from executing his or her duties in directing U.S. foreign policy. The existing congressional threshold ensure the executive branch does not run off on its own and arm states, ensures that all major weapon systems get congressional approval and leaves flexibility to handle the large number of small scale foreign military sales to the executive branch without tying up Congress. This has worked very well. Congress already has the authority and discretion to review any foreign military sales case whenever they choose. Why change it? To feel better or because we do not trust the executive branch? Neither is sufficient to warrant a change.

o Second, changing this requirement is akin to the silliness of counting congressional success in passing legislation by adding up the naming of U.S. post offices as "legislative success.”

How and why the United States sells arms, training and defense material should be something we scrutinize regularly. #Congress already has a role and should play its part. EUM is important and needs serious review and better proselytizing. The authors raise important questions and offer some good advice for policy. However, their recommendations are too constrictive and place too much emphasis on eliminating foreign military sales for the sake of feeling better or morality. Foreign military arms sales are an unpleasant tool. But they serve a purpose. A reduction in sales, tighter control of whom we sell too and improved #EUM would be productive. However, a default “no sale” policy will harm U.S. foreign Policy.

Chris Wyatt, Carlisle, PA

March 29th, 2018

Ugandan Military Police in pre-deployment training at Camp Singo, August 2013 (? Chris Wyatt)