MILCOM - December analysis
Strategic Effect
The regime of Syria’s dictator Bashir al-Assad is no more. On 7th December 2024 Mr. Assad fled Damascus following a dramatic advance across much of Syria by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Islamist political grouping. One day later Mr. Assad and his family were reportedly granted asylum in Russia.
Syria has been mired in civil war since 2011. A dramatic offensive led by forces opposed to the regime commenced on 27th November. Several Syrian cities fell in rapid succession to the opposition including Homs in the central, western part of the country and Aleppo in the north. Mr. Assad’s fate was sealed following fall of Damascus.
Unconfirmed local reports say that HTS’ advance was assisted by a concerted jamming effort directed against tactical radio networks and military communications used by forces loyal to the regime. Speculation focused on Turkish forces deployed in Syria directing electronic attacks against these communications. Turkish forces have been deployed in northern Syria since 2016. The Turkish military has supported elements of the anti-Assad opposition and fought Kurdish militias active there. As Armada has chronicled in the past, Turkish military Electronic Warfare (EW) assets have proven effective during Ankara’s involvement in the Syrian civil war.
Several conclusions can be drawn assuming these reports of Turkish EW prowess are correct: Firstly, Syrian forces loyal to the regime lacked Communications/Transmission Security (COMSEC/TRANSEC) protocols to resist electronic attack. Secondly, these forces may have been largely relying on civilian communications unable to withstand electronic attack. Thirdly, Mr. Assad’s Russian backers may not have provided the secure communications needed to guarantee electromagnetic resilience. Fourthly, any COMSEC/TRANSEC protocols and/or military communications used by regime forces may have been unable to withstand the severity of attacks.
Perhaps the most important lesson is that HTS cadres may have enjoyed electromagnetic superiority over the regime thanks to the jamming. Regime forces could not use the spectrum as they wished for communications, unlike HTS units. The inability of the regime to thus exploit the spectrum for communications cost them dearly by depriving them of a vital tactical and operational command and control conduit. This depravation may have had a strategic effect by discombobulating the regime’s forces, thus contributing to Mr. Assad’s downfall.
MILCOM Analysis - November
Belarussian Tactical Communications Enhancements
The modernisation of the Belarussian Army’s tactical communications is continuing with recent deliveries of new R-185 Epocha command and control platforms.
Keeping Secrets
Why capturing an airborne radio compatible with NATO’s Link-16 tactical datalink protocol may not hand Russian radio frequency engineers an intelligence coup.
Found in Translation
A recent military exercise in Germany trialled the interoperability of several tactical datalink and communications protocols used throughout NATO.
December Radio Roundup
Armada’s monthly roundup of all the latest news in the military communications product, programme and operational domains.
MILCOM Analysis - November
Ready Mercury?
The US Navy has shared details with Armada regarding its ongoing plans to replace the force’s existing Boeing E-6B Mercury TACAMO aircraft.
Eastern Promise
NATO’s Multi-Domain Operations posture comes under scrutiny during this year’s Riga Conference held in the Latvian Capital.
LETACCIS Leaps
The UK’s ongoing overhaul of its military communications, and command and control capabilities, has taken an important step forward.
November Radio Roundup
Armada's monthly roundup of all the latest news in the military communications product, programme and operational domains.