Midnight Coup: How Nawaz Sharif Fell and Pervez Musharraf Rose to Power

The night of October 12, 1999, began like any other in Islamabad. Yet, by midnight, Pakistan’s political landscape had been irrevocably altered. The country had been engulfed by yet another military coup, with the prime minister under arrest and the newly appointed army chief in solitary confinement.

The roots of this dramatic shift lay in the previous year, as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif consolidated his power after winning the 1997 elections with a thumping majority. Initially, Sharif adopted a more conciliatory approach to governance. His path was made smoother by the presence of a neutral, professional army chief, General Jahangir Karamat, who ensured that the military stayed out of political affairs. But Sharif’s ambitions soon began to extend beyond the legislative pillar. In his pursuit of unchecked power, he moved against the judiciary and executive, forcing Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah into resignation in December 1997.

Sharif’s next target was General Karamat, whose insistence on the formation of a National Security Council was perceived by the prime minister as a conspiracy to reassert military control. Despite having the backing of his generals and the option to impose martial law, General Karamat, a firm believer in constitutionalism, chose to resign in October 1998. In his place, Sharif appointed a relatively obscure general, Pervez Musharraf, bypassing three senior officers.

Musharraf, a Muhajir with a modest service record marred by instances of insubordination, was seen by Sharif as an ideal figurehead—someone who lacked a constituency within the army and could easily be controlled. His reputation as a general more interested in cigars, dogs, and high-end liquor than in military matters only reinforced this perception. But Sharif’s confidence in Musharraf’s docility would soon prove misguided.

The first year of Musharraf’s tenure was marked by the Kargil conflict with India, a disastrous venture that tarnished both Musharraf and Sharif. While Musharraf’s plans to retake Siachen fell flat, Sharif found himself under increasing pressure, facing the kind of political isolation that had undone leaders like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto two decades earlier.

By October 1999, tensions between the civilian government and the military had reached a boiling point. On October 12, as Musharraf was returning from a trip to Sri Lanka, Nawaz Sharif made his fateful move. He dismissed Musharraf and replaced him with General Ziauddin Khawaja, the Director-General of the ISI and a trusted confidant. But this decision set in motion a chain of events that Sharif could not control.

General Khawaja was officially appointed Chief of Army Staff in a brief ceremony at the prime minister’s residence. Immediately after, he tried to assert his authority, ordering key military appointments. However, by then, the military machine loyal to Musharraf had already begun moving. In Rawalpindi, a company of the infamous 111 Brigade, historically responsible for initiating coups, had seized control of Pakistan Television (PTV) and Radio Pakistan. At the same time, another contingent advanced towards the prime minister’s residence.

Inside the residence, General Khawaja found himself in a desperate situation. He frantically tried to contact top military commanders, ordering the arrest of Musharraf, whose plane was expected to land in Karachi. But his attempts to enforce control met resistance at every turn. Lt. Gen. Usmani, the Karachi corps commander, refused to arrest Musharraf, while the 111 Brigade, led by Lt. Col. Shahid Ali, closed in on the prime minister’s complex.

A tense standoff ensued when Lt. Col. Shahid Ali arrived at the residence. General Khawaja, still trying to wield the authority of his new title, ordered Ali to retreat. But the colonel, acting on orders from his superior, refused. Khawaja’s desperate calls to Brigadier Salahuddin Satti, the commander of the 111 Brigade, and Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, the corps commander of X Corps, went unanswered.

At that moment, the writing was on the wall. Shahid Ali, seizing the moment, snatched the phone from Khawaja’s hand in a symbolic show of power. The security forces guarding the prime minister’s residence, themselves members of the 111 Brigade, laid down their arms, effectively joining the coup. General Khawaja’s last hope of resistance crumbled before his eyes.

Meanwhile, in Karachi, Musharraf’s aircraft had landed safely, thanks to the defiance of Lt. Gen. Usmani. By midnight, Pakistan had once again fallen under military rule. Nawaz Sharif was placed under arrest, and General Ziauddin Khawaja, who had held the position of army chief for barely three hours, was thrown into solitary confinement.

The events of that night marked the beginning of Pervez Musharraf’s nearly decade-long rule over Pakistan. It was a stark reminder of the fragility of civilian governments in a country where the military has often played the role of kingmaker. For Nawaz Sharif, the night of October 12, 1999, was a dramatic fall from power—a reversal of fortune that echoed the tragic end of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto two decades earlier.