What's New: Graphics posted on X (Twitter) by John Wiseman, the gent behind GPSJam.org.
- The graphics show areas in the Middle East where spoofing has been occurring, and the false locations being transmitted.
- John is clearly a brilliant guy, but he has a day job and does this kind of thing as a hobby.?Certainly govt authorities must be doing this kind of thing also.
- Open source information can provide insights, though one has to be careful about drawing inferences.?One example of this are areas in southwest Texas that often show up on GPSJam.org. The folks at Stanford have determined that these do not indicate interference. Rather they result from? military training aircraft performing aerobatics and other maneuvers that prevent them from receiving good GPS signals all the time. Their ADS-B equipment transmits a lower navigation integrity code and this is reflected on GPSJam.org's GIS display.
- The data is from open broadcast ADS-B transmissions from aircraft. This only works if enough aircraft fly in an area of interest.
- The "spoof to" locations are likely not the locations of the transmitters. As John says "why would someone do that?"
Combined map showing areas affected by GPS spoofing in the past week, and the spoof locations. Again, I can't detect spoofing if aircraft didn't fly in an area, and this map doesn't (yet) indicate where there isn't data. But I'm pretty confident that the spoofing that is shown is real, based on my analysis of ADS-B data.
Aviation/ GPS/ Space/ PNT Consultant. B-777 Captain (Ret), QC Line Check Pilot. B777, 787, 757/767, 737, A320 type rated. Actively and safely flying since 1977 with over 26,500 hours of flight time. Opinions my own.
11 个月Thanks for sharing this Dana. I like John’s statement below: “I can't detect spoofing if aircraft didn't fly in an area, and this map doesn't (yet) indicate where there isn't data.” As you and I discussed, there is still a lot of “unknown” about the recent aviation gps spoofing events, locations and the intent. But, it seems there is now (finally) interest for obvious safety reasons. Hopefully, the interested parties will come up with a solution to identify and isolate these “false signals” from the onboard GPS receivers before the MMR’s feed this false data and possibly cause total navigation capability for transport category aircraft, especially over the oceanic airspace. The military version of the GPS has the above mentioned filtering capabilities but now is the time to ensure the same for civilian aircraft. https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/
Bye-Fellow and Director of Studies at Queens' College, University of Cambridge. Chairman of the Technical Committee of the Royal Institute of Navigation NED and Tech-Founder Mentor to various startups in the UK and USA.
11 个月Great stuff as usual from John - I love things like this, individuals casually doing really useful and important stuff in their spare time. It's what the internet is for, rather than people eating Tide pods on tiktok etc.