Middle East intelligence as an instrument of war and peace
The ability of Hamas to outwit Israel’s intelligence apparatus and launch the October 7 attacks exposed flaws that may prove difficult to fix
In a nutshell
Every outbreak of conflict is a sign of failure for an intelligence service. The job of these agencies is to know of threats before the irreparable happens. The task of the officers on the ground, whether Israeli or Palestinian, is to identify the enemy’s weak spots and warning signals, analyze them and convey the findings to the political decision-makers ultimately responsible.
The war in Gaza, triggered by the Hamas terrorist group’s attack on Israelis on October 7, will go down in the history books of intelligence failures because it confirms three trends to reckon with: a) information overload generated by technology that impairs analytical acuity; b) the shift from human intelligence to electromagnetic sources; and c) “understanding” is harder than “knowing” – intelligence agencies obtain less than 5 percent of the data they process from closed or confidential sources.”
Missing the warning signs
Hamas had likely been eavesdropping on Israeli communications for several months before striking. A common practice among pro-Iranian armed groups is to make “noise” on social networks, multiplying false alarms, inventing the names of fighters or entire units or factions to feed the Israelis false information and confuse their forces. In this flood of misleading rumors, it is challenging to ascertain what is true.
Nonetheless, several signals should have alerted Israel to the imminence of an attack by Hamas’s Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, particularly its Nukhba force of naval commandos. This summer, a 15-page document marked “Top Secret“ and dated June 15, 2023, was discovered by Israeli forces. It described how to infiltrate a kibbutz and take its residents hostage. It included a cryptic timeline: “Hour S, Day Y.” Egyptian intelligence warned their Israeli counterparts that an operation was being prepared. Shin Bet, the Israeli security agency, collected similar material, but it contained no evidence of an impending big strike.
Hamas and the strategy of patience
For a long time, Hamas’s intelligence and special operations structure took the form of autonomous cells that did not know each other. One of the best known, Cell 101 of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, was responsible for kidnapping Israelis to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners. After a 2006 fratricidal war between the two main Palestinian rivals, Hamas and Fatah, a process of vertical integration was established to accompany the transformation of the movement. It became a parastatal entity with ample rockets and missiles, developed supply lines and intensified military training.
The last military exercise between the Palestinian factions took place on September 12, 2023. The Hard Corner 4 brought together the forces of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The exercise did not attract much attention. Unlike a conventional army, which works on a variety of strategic scenarios, Hamas never changes. Its enemy is Israel. For years, it has been preparing to breach the security barriers, take control of Israeli posts and infiltrate the kibbutzim. It examines the same battle scenarios repeatedly.
Hamas’s secret weapon was patience. While the underground tunnels in Gaza were being dug with pickaxes over the years, a reconnaissance of the Israeli positions was secretly carried out. A plan mapping the Israeli positions was drawn up to simultaneously neutralize the electromagnetic surveillance systems of the Israeli positions of the Northern and the Southern Brigades and Unit 8200 of the Military Intelligence Service (Aman) at the Urim signal intelligence (SIGINT) base. Hamas observed the Israeli positions long enough to identify the blind spots through which fighters could infiltrate and overwhelm the Israeli lines.
In this instance, the Israelis largely fell victim to their negligence.
Hamas has succeeded in solving an old problem of Palestinian factions: operational secrecy. It was not until 3 a.m. on the morning of October 7 that Ronen Bar, the head of the Israel Security Agency, known as Shin Bet, realized that Hamas’s unusual activity was not an exercise but the prelude to a significant attack.
Maintaining secrecy over the attack was made easier by Gaza’s geography, a small enclave with an extensive tunnel network. Hamas strategists can walk to meeting places and conduct their conversations in person, without telephones or the internet. The technique, a classic in the world of intelligence, consists of physically dismantling computer modems and connecting hard drives “point-to-point” with ordinary cables bought in shops without ever using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. The centralization of information is entrusted to teams that disconnect from social networks. Orders are no longer written down but memorized by a handful of leaders. Only when the attack is launched are orders given in plain language. By the time the enemy understands them, it is too late.
A cascade of failures
After the October 7 attack, the head of Israeli military intelligence, Aharon Haliva, admitted the failure of his services. The soldiers stationed at the Gaza border had no warning of the impending Hamas operation. Historian Georges-Henri Soutou wrote that surprise “comes not so much from the genius of the one who surprises as from the lack of judgment of the one who is surprised.”
In this instance, the Israelis largely fell victim to their negligence. Convinced it had the situation in Gaza under control, Unit 8200 had stopped listening to Hamas militant hand-held radios a year earlier. Their American partners also believed that it was no longer necessary to focus on the Palestinian factions. The other mistake was the depletion of Palestinian human resources.
For a long time, Israeli intelligence built up intelligence sources through payments, work permits and administrative facilities. Local antagonisms, combined with rivalries among Palestinian families, made it possible to recruit quality people. However, the relentless impoverishment of Gaza and the absence of any political perspective on the conflict eventually dried up the sources. Mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians continues to grow. Recruitment will be even more difficult after the war in Gaza.
In addition, intelligence channels have likely been clogged by the preponderance of fake news refined by Hamas. That is a systemic challenge for all intelligence services: to establish a fluid and relevant chain for the exploitation of collected information, ensuring a vertical flow from the source on the ground to the top without altering or degrading the original data. Failure to do so exposes the intelligence community to what is known as “cascading errors” – errors of judgment passed from desk to desk with no mechanism for challenging, if not stopping and qualifying or modifying the information.
After a long period of internal introspection, Israeli intelligence will reevaluate its information processing chain.
In Israel, as elsewhere, electronic intelligence has its shortcomings. It is powerful, perfectly curious and endowed with an almost infinite memory capacity. But it is not infallible. It does not read of the existence of dormant stockpiles of weapons buried in tunnels. It does not anticipate critical questions. Why were Palestinian fighters carrying North Korean T-58 rifles, copies of the Kalashnikov, on October 7? Where did the missiles mounted on Chinese drones that hit Israeli relay antennas come from?
Although Israeli military intelligence suffered a clear and undeniable defeat, it was able to recover quickly. Its electromagnetic eavesdropping capabilities, combined with local sources, enabled the elimination of several Hamas leaders, including Bilal al-Kedra, commander of the southern Khan Yunis Hamas battalion believed to be responsible for the Nirim kibbutz massacre and other significant attacks. Electronic intelligence made it possible to unearth the audio of harrowing telephone conversations, such as that of a Hamas fighter excitedly calling his parents after executing a dozen Israeli citizens. These few minutes of conversation speak volumes about the barbarity of the attack and the de facto inability of Israeli intelligence to anticipate this mass murder.
Scenarios
Most likely: Israel learns from its mistakes
After a long period of introspection, Israeli intelligence will reevaluate its information processing chain. Human intelligence capabilities will be completely reorganized, and funds will be allocated to rebuild an intelligence network in Gaza and the West Bank, with extensions along the Egyptian border. Despite these initiatives, Israeli recruitment suffers from the legacy of the war and the deterioration of Israel’s image in Arab public opinion. Money cannot buy everything.
Least likely: Inertia prevents major changes
The Israelis will prove unable to carry out an in-depth overhaul of Shin Bet, their internal security agency. Inertia and bureaucratic red tape prevent a thorough reform of Israel’s intelligence services. Some cosmetic measures may be announced following the publication of a Knesset inquiry report, but little truly changes. The war ends without Hamas being eradicated from Gaza. The guns are silent again. Gaza is rebuilt and the Palestinian factions regroup. One day, a spark ignites the powder keg, and everything starts again.
About: Pierre Boussel is a columnist and researcher specializing in the Arab world.
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Syria and the Israel-Hamas War: Symbolic Support, Short of Escalation
What does Syria think about the war in Gaza, and why has Bashar al-Assad not rushed to join the campaign against Israel and convert his country’s southern border into a significant front?
INSS Insight No. 1803, December 24, 2023
Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Israel has become engaged in a multi-front conflict with forces that have attacked from Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. In contrast, apart from a few incidents executed mainly by Palestinian groups, it does not appear that an active front against Israel is forming in Syria. Although the mood in Syria is generally supportive of the Palestinians (alongside criticism of President Bashar al-Assad, the axis of resistance, and the international community), Assad is not interested in supporting Hamas, as the price is a possible threat to his survival. Iran may also prefer to keep Syria out of the conflict, in order to safeguard its “Syrian asset” and activate it when Tehran decides – and not the Palestinians. Israel, however, would be well advised to continue exacting a price from members of the “axis” located in Syria for their activity on other fronts, while continuing to take advantage of the opportunity to weaken their military capabilities, given that the risk of escalation on the Syrian front is likely lower than elsewhere.
Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Israel has confronted challenges on several fronts created by Iranian proxies across the Middle East – primarily Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shiite militias in Iraq that have attacked US military bases. Given their commitment to Hamas in the framework of the “axis of resistance,” it seems that the goal of these organizations is to engage in a limited conflict in order to apply direct and indirect pressure on Israel (via the United States) to end the war against Hamas – and primarily, to divert the attention of the IDF away from the Gaza Strip to other fronts. In Syria, in contrast, apart from a number of incidents of rocket fire that have been ascribed to Palestinian factions, and attacks by Shiite militias against US bases on Syrian soil, it currently does not appear that an active front is forming on the Israel-Syria border. Clearly President Bashar al-Assad is in no rush to contribute to the campaign and turn Syria into a significant arena of conflict, for three main considerations:
Yet while an additional front has not developed with Syria, not all is quiet. Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, there have been several incidents of rocket fire into Israel from the Syrian side of the border. These attacks were carried out by Palestinian factions, apparently without the approval of the Syrian regime. Other attacks, such as the drone that was launched from Syrian territory and hit a school in Eilat, have been blamed on Shiite militias operating in Syria. In the case of the Eilat drone, the attack was apparently carried out by the Imam Hussein Division, an elite unit headed by a former Hezbollah commander Dhu al-Faqar, under the command of the Iranian Quds Force. In response, the IDF attacked targets in Syria on several occasions, exacting a price from the sovereign state hosting the group and claiming the lives of several Hezbollah fighters (and, according to foreign news reports, also members of the Quds Force). This is something that Israel usually avoids, given the “rules of the game” with Hezbollah.
In addition, since the onset of the war, pro-Iranian militias, led by the “Iraqi resistance,” have attacked US military bases in Syria and Iraq on dozens of occasions. The United States only responded to a few of these incidents by attacking militia positions in eastern Syria and Iraq, in order to avoid escalation.
As usual, the Syrian regime continues to struggle with a number of challenges that are not related to the war in the Gaza Strip. First and foremost is an additional round of fighting in the northwest of the country between the regime and rebel forces. In this framework, Russian and Syrian forces have renewed their airstrikes in the Homs and Idlib regions, and since early October, dozens of fatalities and hundreds of injuries have been reported. Clashes with local forces continue in eastern Syria, and there has been a marked increase in attacks by ISIS on Syrian military forces. In Suwayda, in the south of the country, the Druze population continues to protest against the regime over the severe economic crisis.
How Does Syria View the War in Gaza?
The prevalent view in Syria regarding the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip is one of general support for the Palestinians, while highlighting the similarity between “war crimes” and the extent of the destruction in Gaza to that seen in Syria during the civil war. The differences emerge vis-à-vis the regime, the “axis of resistance,” and Hamas.
The official discourse in Syria – like that of supporters of the regime – focuses on support for Hamas’s surprise attack and the Palestinian people, while highlighting Israeli aggression toward the Palestinians. At the same time, opponents of the regime have criticized the limited regional and international attention to the Syrian people during the civil war, compared to the attention showered on the Palestinians, including global mass demonstrations for the Palestinian cause. There has also been criticism of the international calls for a ceasefire and for an end to the war in the Gaza Strip, while such calls were noticeably weaker in the case of the Syrian civil war. Some opponents of the regime view Hamas as part of the “axis of resistance” that includes Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria, express support for Israel, and call for the elimination of Hamas, with the hope that this would weaken the axis. When at a joint summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on November 11 Assad accused Israel of war crimes and condemned the West for its response to the war in Gaza, many people on social media noted the irony of his comments, given the atrocities that Assad himself committed against the Palestinians in his country – as well as the rest of his citizens – during the Syrian civil war. In Idlib, an opposition stronghold, people took to the streets to express their solidarity with the people of Gaza, but mocked Damascus’ statements condemning the Zionist occupation: “the same country that, along with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, committed war crimes against the Syrian people, including the use of chemical weapons at Ghuta near Damascus and in Khan Shaykhun – crimes that are many times more egregious and severe.” Similar criticism has been sounded among the Druze: “Clean your teeth of the flesh of Palestinian children from Tel al-Zaatar [Lebanon, 1976] and the al-Yarmouk camp [south Damascus, 2012-2018] before complaining about Gaza.” Some opposition forces in Syria and in exile have also called on Israel to use the opportunity to eliminate Assad.
The commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazlum Kobane, said that Hamas’ attack in Israel was unacceptable, but so, too, was the “disproportionate” force that Israel uses against the Palestinians. Israel’s tactics, he warned, would likely unleash a fresh spiral of extremist terrorism that could well engulf the entire region in flames and also spread to the West. Moreover, he argued, the war allows actors like Turkey to take advantage of the situation and intensify its operations against the Kurds, while the world’s attention is focused on the Gaza Strip.
Syria, the “Campaign within the War” and the Significance for Israel
It appears that Assad and his supporters do not want to turn Syria into another high-intensity conflict zone with Israel, as part of the multi-front war waged by Iran and the “axis of resistance.” At the same time, the regime’s ability to rein in activity by Palestinian factions or members of the axis on Syrian soil is limited, and Damascus is susceptible to pressure from Iran and Hezbollah. Moreover, although the latter two are not necessarily interested in pressuring Assad at the current time, this might change the longer the fighting in Gaza goes on – depending on an escalation of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah and the extent to which Iran believes the organization is threatened.
Consequently, Israel should now formulate a clear strategy for each of the relevant actors on the Syrian front, so that it can also create opportunities. With regard to the Assad regime, Israel should find the balance between exacting a direct price for the activity of the “axis of resistance” on Syrian soil, in order to encourage Damascus to rein in the hostile activity and underscore the risk it incurs, while avoiding too much pressure, which could prompt Assad to give the axis members a free hand or even to respond by himself to Israeli attacks.
As for the “axis” elements on Syrian soil, Israel should use the momentum provided by the war by responding more forcefully against axis assets. Compared to Lebanon, Israel enjoys much greater freedom of operation in Syria; this should be used to expand operations against Hezbollah and the militias, in order to reduce their military capabilities and to distance them from the border with Israel. The frequency and scope of these attacks should be greater than in non-wartime periods or in the Campaign between Wars, underway in Syria for more than a decade. This would allow for new rules of the game, which would benefit Israel and could also help formulate a new security reality for the “day after” on the Syrian arena.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
About: Carmit Valensi
Dr. Carmit Valensi is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and the Head of the Northern Arena Program. She specializes in contemporary Middle East affairs, strategic studies, military concepts, and terrorism, and her work on these subjects has appeared in academic and professional publications. She is the co-author of the book Syrian Requiem: The Civil War and its Aftermath (Princeton University Press, 2021). Dr. Valensi earned her Ph.D. in political science at Tel Aviv University, focusing on "hybrid actors" such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and FARC. She holds a B.A. in Middle East history and political science, and an M.A. in diplomacy studies from Tel Aviv University. In 2010-2011 she was a research fellow in the Fox Fellowship program in regional and international studies at Yale University. Dr. Valensi served as a senior advisor in the Intelligence corps and worked as an analyst at the IDF's Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies.
About: Tal Avraham
Tal Avraham is a research assistant at INSS. Tal was born and lives in Hod Hasharon and was an active member and guide in the Scouts movement. He was released out of the IDF after serving as an officer in several positions in an elite unit of the Intelligence Directorate, and as a department commander in unit's training course. Tal started his career at the INSS as an intern in the Northern Arena program, and later became a research assistant in the program, as well as joined the Data Analytics Desk that conducts quantitative research projects using various data analysis tools. During the pandemic he volunteered as an analyst at the COVID-19 National Information and Knowledge Center, and he currently volunteers in “Greenpeace”, a non-profit organization which advocates for the protection of the environment as well as raising awareness for climate change.
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U.S. Strikes Drone Facilities Used by Iran-Sponsored Militias in Iraq
The airstrikes come amid growing threat to U.S. military in the region
By Gordon Lubold - Dec. 25, 2023
WASHINGTON—The U.S. said it struck three drone facilities used by a Shiite militant group and other groups in Iraq in response to a series of attacks by the groups on American positions in Iraq and Syria, including an attack Monday in northern Iraq in which three U.S. troops were wounded, including one critically.
“These precision strikes are a response to a series of attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-sponsored militias, including an attack by Iran-affiliated Kataib Hezbollah and affiliated groups on Erbil Air Base earlier today, and intended to disrupt and degrade capabilities of the Iran-aligned militia groups directly responsible,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a statement.?
Early assessments showed that the U.S. airstrikes against the groups destroyed the facilities used by Kataib Hezbollah and other groups and “likely killed a number of Kataib Hezbollah militants,” U.S. Central Command said in a separate statement.
This is the fifth time the U.S. has taken a military response against such groups in Iraq and Syria since those groups, which are considered to be backed and aligned with Iran, started targeting American positions there with drone and missile attacks?after the Israeli insertion of troops into Gaza following Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7.
Attacks against American troops there have come close, but haven’t yet killed any American troops. One American contractor died of cardiac arrest following an earlier attack in Iraq, and a dud drone landed on a barracks in a separate attack, but didn’t kill any American troops. The attack Monday in Erbil, by a one-way drone that hit a building housing American troops, appeared to be the most serious thus far.
American troops are in the region to conduct a continuing advise-and-assist mission to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. But their presence there has exposed those troops to attacks from Iranian-backed groups in the region.?
Kataib Hezbollah and others have targeted American troops in Iraq and Syria for weeks since the Israeli campaign began against Hamas inside the Gaza Strip. Those attacks halted briefly during the pause of the conflict inside Gaza last month, only to resume again when the Israelis continued executing their campaign. Such groups have attacked American troops more than 100 times, the Pentagon said. ?
President Biden directed the strikes, Austin said in the statement. “While we do not seek to escalate conflict in the region, we are committed and fully prepared to take further necessary measures to protect our people and our facilities,” Austin said.
Biden was briefed on the attack against American troops in Erbil early Monday, the White House said late Monday in a separate statement. The Pentagon presented options and Biden chose one during a call with Austin Monday afternoon. “During that call, the President directed strikes against three locations utilized by Kataib Hezbollah and affiliated groups focused specifically on unmanned aerial drone activities,” the statement said. After a series of calls, the strikes were conducted about 8:45 p.m. Monday.
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Bagdhad condemns US strike on Iraqi military positions
BAGHDAD: Iraq on Tuesday denounced US air strikes in the country as a "hostile act" after the Pentagon said it had targeted three sites used by pro-Iran forces after coming under fire. The government said the strikes that killed one member of the security forces and wounded 24?other people, including civilians, were an "unacceptable attack on Iraqi sovereignty" that damaged bilateral relations.
An Iraqi interior ministry official said the strikes targeted a Hashed Al-Shaabi site in the central city of Hilla, one of two locations targeted in Babylon province. One person was killed and 20 wounded, while four others were wounded in another strike in the southern province of Wassit, the official said. Two security sources in Babylon and Wassit provinces gave the same information. Hours earlier the United States said its forces had carried out strikes on three sites used by pro-Iran groups in Iraq in response to a series of attacks on US personnel. US forces have repeatedly targeted sites used by Iran and its proxy forces in Iraq and Syria in response to dozens of attacks on American and allied forces in the region since the October 7 outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. “US military forces conducted necessary and proportionate strikes on three facilities used by Kataeb Hezbollah and affiliated groups in Iraq,” US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a statement. The Iran-backed Kataeb Hezbollah, or Hezbollah Brigades, forms part of the Hashed Al-Shaabi, a coalition of former paramilitary forces that are now integrated into Iraq’s regular armed forces. “These precision strikes are a response to a series of attacks against US personnel in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-sponsored militias, including an attack by Iran-affiliated Kataeb Hezbollah and affiliated groups on Irbil Air Base” on Monday, Austin said. That attack wounded three US military personnel, one critically, US National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said. US President Joe Biden was briefed on the attack — which was carried out with a one-way attack drone — and directed the US strikes in a call with Austin and other national security officials after ordering the defense department to prepare a response, the statement said. Biden “places no higher priority than the protection of American personnel serving in harm’s way. The United States will act at a time and in a manner of our choosing should these attacks continue,” the statement added. The drone attack was claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a loose formation of armed groups affiliated with the Hashed Al-Shaabi. A tally by US military officials has counted 103 attacks against its troops in Iraq and Syria since October 17, most of which have been claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which opposes US support for Israel in its war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
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Iraq is at a crossroads — with Al-Sudani fighting a lone battle
Amid the ever-shifting sands and raging fires of a convulsing Arab region, Iraq stands at a challenging crossroads. Internal and external factors vie for dominance, obfuscating the complex nature of the nation’s path forward. This complexity is particularly palpable in the tangled web created by the intersection of the political economy and security considerations, with regard to state-aligned militia groups. More than two decades after the US invasion, hopes of a stable, prosperous Iraqi state have been diminished by this intersection. The heavy reliance of the country on oil revenues leaves it vulnerable to global market fluctuations and limits the options for economic diversification. This economic fragility, coupled with a bloated public sector and lack of job opportunities, creates fertile ground for recruitment by militia groups. Moreover, the nebulous line between the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is just one notable example of the overlap between the political and security spheres, and the continuing challenges created by state monopolization of violence. In particular, the PMF’s shift from a largely anti-Daesh military entity to a political actor reflects the sophisticated adaptation of such groups to the unique political architecture in Iraq. These militias, some of which are aligned with Iran, operate within the framework of the PMF but also maintain a degree of independence. The blurred lines between national loyalty, sectarian allegiances, and foreign influence within these groups further complicate Iraq’s internal security and its international relations. Some elements are allegedly involved in planning attacks on international advisers, resulting in incidents such as the airstrikes in Kirkuk which led to the deaths of five members of the Iran-backed Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba militia. This incident reveals the reality of how these state-aligned groups maneuver, sometimes exploiting the ambiguity of their status both as extensions of the state and as independent actors in order to escape any consequences, while the Iraqi state leadership remains at the mercy of their unpredictable actions. Additionally, Iran’s pervasive influence in Iraq cannot be overlooked. The intertwining economic challenges and complex security landscape in the country embolden an increasingly assertive Tehran, which has markedly expanded its foothold by fostering alliances with Shiite militias, with profound implications for Iraq’s sovereignty and foreign policy orientation. Despite losses in the 2021 elections, groups backed by Iran assert more influence in Baghdad now than ever. Militia politicians, along with judges groomed by Tehran and controlled by militias, represent an emerging vector through which Iran can further subvert Iraq’s military, judicial, and political systems. The effects of this intrusion can also be seen in Iraq’s oil economy. It is effectively under the control of groups backed by Tehran, thereby impinging on the country’s economic sovereignty and diverting a critical resource to further the activities of such groups, while indirectly supporting foreign interests at the expense of Baghdad’s own priorities. For example, the insistent “resistance” of these hybrid, state-aligned factions to the US hampers Iraq’s efforts to maintain a balanced foreign policy and complicates its relationship with Washington. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani faces the Herculean task of managing all these turbulent dynamics. He must attempt to reconcile the economic needs of the state, the military power of state-aligned organizations, and a fragile sovereignty — all while attempting to steer Iraq away from becoming a proxy theater for friction between Washington and Tehran.
Despite losses in the 2021 elections, groups backed by Iran assert more influence in Baghdad now than ever.
Al-Sudani’s tenure has been akin to attempting to perform a delicate balancing act in a whirlwind. His efforts to bolster the capacities of state security forces and curb the power of the militias are commendable, but hampered by the deeply entrenched state-aligned structures and regional interference. The intensification of attacks against the military forces of the US-led international coalition and civilian personnel underscores the grand dilemma his administration faces: How to manage domestic peace while grappling with the self-interests of foreign powers. Meanwhile, situations continue to change beyond Iraq’s borders. The war on Gaza and parallel escalations in the Red Sea have added a new layer to dramatic regional dynamics. Though outside Iraq’s immediate neighborhood, the ripples of instability caused by these events complicate Iraq’s situation and its regional diplomatic navigation. The situation Iraq faces is emblematic of the political and geopolitical struggles within the wider Middle East, where domestic politics, regional power plays, and international geopolitics converge. Iraq is therefore trapped in the geopolitical crossfire, forcing Baghdad to navigate a geopolitical sphere in which alliances shift unpredictably and power balances sway precariously. The intersection of politics, security, and economics in Iraq reflects this convoluted landscape, which is likely to take root over the coming years as a symptom of our increasingly disordered world. Al-Sudani must now navigate this complex and volatile landscape, which is riddled with internal discord, foreign intrusion, and lofty ambitions to transform Iraq into a regional nexus. To effectively govern under these circumstances, he needs to execute a three-pronged strategy. Firstly, he must alleviate internal strife by promoting a consensus-driven approach that prioritizes common national interests over sectarian gains. By utilizing Iraq’s potential as a melting pot of ethnic and religious groups, he should foster an environment of inclusivity and mutual respect. Secondly, Al-Sudani ought to attempt to mitigate foreign encroachment by asserting Iraq’s sovereignty. This involves maintaining a delicate balance between adherence to global norms and the prioritization of national interests — a deft diplomatic skill which, if executed correctly, could keep foreign influence at bay while preserving beneficial international relations. Thirdly, he must work toward realizing Iraq’s aspirations to become a regional “bridge” by actively mediating and facilitating dialogue between opposing forces. The country’s unique geopolitical positioning could help to resolve regional disputes and promote stability. The international community, in particular the US and the EU, can bolster Al-Sudani’s efforts by providing him with comprehensive support. A combination of strategic advice, targeted aid, and diplomatic backing could play a critical role. An emphasis on infrastructural and institutional development will help Iraq achieve long-term stability, which would contribute to fostering regional harmony in ever-more turbulent times. Furthermore, diplomatic acknowledgment of Iraq’s role as a mediator could shine a global spotlight on the country’s peacemaking efforts, thereby complementing Al-Sudani’s efforts to position Iraq as an intermediary in a perennially fragmented part of the world. Al-Sudani’s effective leadership in the face of these myriad challenges demonstrates his political acumen. It offers the international community an opportunity to complement his leadership by facilitating Baghdad’s overarching ambitions, while remaining cautious and careful not to inadvertently stifle his efforts through excessive intervention.-
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Israeli War Cabinet Meets to Consider Egyptian Proposal to End War in Gaza
Three-step plan would likely face resistance from both sides
By Summer Said - Carrie Keller-Lynn - Updated Dec. 25, 2023
Israel’s war cabinet met on Monday night to discuss a three-step plan put forward by Egypt for ending the war in Gaza, Israeli officials said.
The Egyptian proposal, a copy of which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, is the most comprehensive peace plan to be proposed to the two parties in the 11-week-old Gaza war.
Some terms of the plan are expected to be strenuously resisted by both sides.?
The deal calls for an initial pause in fighting to allow for the release of Israeli hostages including children, women and elderly in need of urgent medical attention, in exchange for the release of around 140 Palestinian prisoners. It would be followed by the formation of a transitional government for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank made up of various Palestinian factions, including Hamas.
Israel’s war cabinet is meeting as pressure mounts to bring home the remaining 129 hostages, including 22 dead bodies, held by Hamas. It also comes as?the death toll among Israeli soldiers rises.?
Israeli minister Benny Gantz, a member of the three-member war cabinet, told a group of hostage families on Sunday night that there are several proposals in the works to release those held but signaled it wasn’t clear they were all being seriously considered, according to one of the attendees at the meeting.?
“I can’t say there is progress yet,” Gantz said, according to the person at the meeting. “There are Egyptian proposals and there are other proposals flying around from all kinds of directions. I don’t even know which of them are even relevant.”
The White House National Security Council declined to comment on the Egyptian proposal. As efforts to reach a hostage deal continue, a Biden administration official said many competing ideas are circulating so it would be a mistake to put too much stock in any one idea.
On a visit to troops in north Gaza on Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave no signal that the war could end soon. “We’re not stopping, the war continues until the end,” he said.
In a?WSJ op-ed?that published later Monday, Netanyahu outlined three prerequisites for peace between Israel and Palestinians in Gaza: “Hamas must be destroyed, Gaza must be demilitarized, and Palestinian society must be deradicalized.”
Egypt shared the multiphased proposal late last week with Israel, Hamas, Qatar and the U.S. and has discussed parts of it with the Palestinian Authority, the semiautonomous body that controls parts of the West Bank. Those discussions, according to Egyptian officials, included the creation of a transitional, technocratic government after a cease-fire deal is reached between Israel and Hamas.
The proposal by Egypt, which has emerged as a key negotiator between Israel and Hamas, will face significant hurdles on both sides.
Including Hamas in any transitional government would run up against Israel’s overarching war aim of eradicating Hamas, while the release of senior Palestinian prisoners would meet resistance from Israel’s right-wing government.?
“This deal is really a victory for Hamas and it’s really difficult for me to see the Israelis agreeing to that,” said Gershon Baskin, who previously negotiated a hostage-release deal on Israel’s behalf.
Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, is unlikely to accept a deal that would see him relinquish power in Gaza and release Israeli hostages.
The war is also taking a heavy toll on Hamas and on the civilian population in Gaza, which is facing a monumental humanitarian crisis. More than 20,000 Palestinians, mostly women and children, have been killed, according to the Palestinian health officials. The figures don’t distinguish between combatants and civilians.?
On Monday, the Israeli military said fighting continued in the Hamas stronghold of Khan Younis, where it is in the process of establishing operational control over the city’s main routes. Israeli airstrikes overnight killed dozens of Palestinians in central Gaza, health authorities in Gaza said.?
The strikes caused damage to roads, hampering rescue efforts, and bodies still lay buried beneath the rubble, according to Palestinian health authorities and the Palestine Red Crescent Society, the main provider of emergency services.
Late Monday, the military said that soldiers found a Toyota Corolla vehicle with an Israeli license plate that belonged to the family of the late Israeli hostage Samer Talalka. Remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade as well as bloodstains, which were identified as belonging to another hostage, were found in the vehicle, the military said. Talalka and two other Israeli hostages were mistakenly shot by Israeli soldiers earlier this month after they emerged from a building in northern Gaza. Their deaths intensified pressure on Netanyahu’s government to take new steps to free the remaining hostages.
Late Sunday, the Israeli military said it had dismantled a large, underground tunnel complex that served as Hamas’s northern command center. It said the complex had sheltered commanders directing the Oct. 7 attack on southern Israel, in which Israel says around 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed. The military said the tunnel network was also used to hold Israeli hostages. The bodies of five hostages were recovered from a tunnel tied to the northern command center, the military said. Analysts say that this is an indicator that the tunnels were very important to Hamas.?
The Egyptian proposal’s first phase calls for Israel and Hamas to agree to a roughly 10-day pause in fighting, during which all civilian hostages being held in Gaza would be released in exchange for Israel releasing around 140 Palestinian prisoners.
That phase also calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from residential communities in Gaza and allow the free movement of Palestinians across the strip. Israel would also pause drone surveillance and allow a significant increase in aid going into Gaza, especially to the northern part of the enclave, access to which has been restricted.?
In the second and third phases, Israel and Hamas would negotiate the release of female Israeli soldiers, followed by male Israeli soldiers, in return for large numbers of Palestinian prisoners.
Those hostage-prisoner exchanges, along with the formation of the transitional, technocratic government, pose a thicket of negotiating challenges for both sides.
The transitional government plans would require rivals Hamas and Fatah to reconcile and work together. Once the transitional government took over, elections would be held in which Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who is 88, would be succeeded by a younger leader accepted by a majority of Palestinians.?
While U.S. officials have previously urged a role for the Palestinian Authority, Netanyahu has balked at the group’s involvement in postwar Gaza.?
Read more:
Benjamin Netanyahu: Our Three Prerequisites for Peace
We must destroy Hamas, demilitarize Gaza and deradicalize the whole of Palestinian society.
By Benjamin Netanyahu - Dec. 25, 2023
Hamas must be destroyed, Gaza must be demilitarized, and Palestinian society must be deradicalized. These are the three prerequisites for peace between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors in Gaza.
First, Hamas, a key Iranian proxy, must be destroyed. The U.S., U.K., France, Germany and many other countries support Israel’s intention to demolish the terror group. To achieve that goal, its military capabilities must be dismantled and its political rule over Gaza must end. Hamas’s leaders have vowed to repeat the Oct. 7 massacre “again and again.” That is why their destruction is the only proportional response to prevent the repeat of such horrific atrocities. Anything less guarantees more war and more bloodshed.
In destroying Hamas, Israel will continue to act in full compliance with international law. This is especially challenging because an integral part of Hamas’s strategy is to use Palestinian civilians as human shields. Hamas places its terrorist infrastructure inside and underneath homes, hospitals, mosques, schools and other civilian sites, deliberately putting the Palestinian population at risk.
Israel does its best to minimize civilian casualties by dropping leaflets, sending text messages and using other means to warn Gazans to get out of harm’s way. Hamas by contrast does its utmost to keep Palestinians in harm’s way—often at gunpoint.
Unjustly blaming Israel for these casualties will only encourage Hamas and other terror organizations around the world to use human shields. To render this cruel and cynical strategy ineffective, the international community must place the blame for these casualties squarely on Hamas. It must recognize that Israel is fighting the bigger battle of the civilized world against barbarism.
Second, Gaza must be demilitarized. Israel must ensure that the territory is never again used as a base to attack it. Among other things, this will require establishing a temporary security zone on the perimeter of Gaza and an inspection mechanism on the border between Gaza and Egypt that meets Israel’s security needs and prevents smuggling of weapons into the territory.
The expectation that the Palestinian Authority will demilitarize Gaza is a pipe dream. It currently funds and glorifies terrorism in Judea and Samaria and educates Palestinian children to seek the destruction of Israel. Not surprisingly it has shown neither the capability nor the will to demilitarize Gaza. It failed to do so before Hamas booted it out of the territory in 2007, and it has failed to do so in the territories under its control today. For the foreseeable future Israel will have to retain overriding security responsibility over Gaza.
Third, Gaza will have to be deradicalized. Schools must teach children to cherish life rather than death, and imams must cease to preach for the murder of Jews. Palestinian civil society needs to be transformed so that its people support fighting terrorism rather than funding it.
That will likely require courageous and moral leadership. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas can’t even bring himself to condemn the Oct. 7 atrocities. Several of his ministers deny that the murders and rapes happened or accuse Israel of perpetrating these horrific crimes against its own people. Another threatened that a similar attack would be carried out in Judea and Samaria.
Successful deradicalization took place in Germany and Japan after the Allied victory in World War II. Today, both nations are great allies of the U.S. and promote peace, stability and prosperity in Europe and Asia.
More recently, since the 9/11 attacks, visionary Arab leaders in the Gulf have led efforts to deradicalize their societies and transform their countries. Israel has since forged the historic Abraham Accords and today enjoys peace agreements with six Arab states. Such a cultural transformation will be possible in Gaza only among Palestinians who don’t seek the destruction of Israel.
Once Hamas is destroyed, Gaza is demilitarized and Palestinian society begins a deradicalization process, Gaza can be rebuilt and the prospects of a broader peace in the Middle East will become a reality.-
Mr. Netanyahu is Israel’s prime minister.
Appeared in the December 26, 2023, print edition as 'Israel’s Three Prerequisites For Peace'.
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