METAPHYCIS

??????????????????????????????????EPISTEMOLOGY

CHAPTER 1

Topic: 1. Definition and Scope of Epistemology Philosophy generally deals with certain fundamental questions/knowledge/truth on beings of man and universe, and God; their nature, origin, and destiny of their life, as well as on knowledge itself.

We think, our sense knowledge of the world is a SUREknowledgeabout the same, and so much so that we do accept them without questioning or doubting.

But do our ordinary experiences sometimes DECEIVE us? There are examples of deception, such as for e.g., we mistake rope for snake; or we see things differently from a distance and from near: the silk we touch is viewed as rough with threads with a magnifying glass; or, different religions put forward different truths; or, scientific discoveries compel us to adopt an understanding of the world radically different from the world of common-sense knowledge: Sunrise, sunset, and the static nature of earth are more an illusion than a fact since sun is still while earth is moving.

The fact that our common-sense knowledge is shaken it compels us to work out a CRITIQUE of human knowledge. (That is, the fact that world is understood differently from our common sense knowledge, necessitates a critique of human knowledge.) Critique or criticism is (means) not a radical criticism as to mean ‘finding fault with’. Instead, criticism is understood in its original meaning as ‘to choose, judge, revise, reconsider our judgements’. It is a sense of ‘auto-criticism’ or ‘discernment’, and not a radical sense of criticism. Thus, the critique of knowledge is understood in the sense of ‘revising our capability of knowledge of reality’. It is a critical enquiry without it being a dogmatic one. Here we need to specify the PERSPECTIVE from which this critique of knowledge is pursued. It is to achieve truth. So the perspective is nothing but that of truth –to achieve true knowledge of reality.

So, such a critique of knowledge involves enquiring into unanswered questions still: How much can we be certain of knowledge about man and universe? What does it mean ‘to know’? What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? Is any knowledge justifiable/reliable? Which beliefs are justified and which are not? What is the relation between knowing and justification? In what lies this reliability? What are the limits and conditions of knowledge? And, the most basic question which it deals with is, ‘what distinguishes true or adequate knowledge from false or inadequate knowledge?’

Such questions, which form the subject-matter of gnoseology, have their analogous in logic. How can we assure that some given inference is valid; knowledge is valued from the standpoint of validity, while Gnoseology is dealt withfrom the standpoint of certitude, truth-value of knowledge. Hence, Epistemology helps us to enquire into, 1) the objectivity of our concepts i.e., that is, whether the concepts that we form are objectively true – relation between subjectivity and objectivity of knowledge, E.g., concept of god2) the existence of truthi.e. relation between knowledge and truth – why do we say something is true or some proposition is false, and 3) the ultimate foundations of human judgements i.e., the basis for the objectivity of our own judgements). E.g., judgement is relation between subject and object: I am a doctor. This judgement is true or false, depends on the relation between I and doctor.

Definition of Gnoseology: Gnoseology deals with the critical/fundamental problem about kng, in view of truth using some basic principles (i., Gnoseology tries to solve the problem of kng by making a metaphysical enquiry into truth/being of truth). Thus Epistemology as the study of knowledge has as its material object, human knowledge, and as its formal object, truth - truth value of knowledge (or justification of our knowledge).

Topic: 2. The Critical Problem of Knowledge and Method of Epistemology

The critical problem of knowledge

To better clarify, Popper argues that it is a ‘critical or fundamental enquiry’ not about the sources of kng since the question about the sources can be simply answered saying that there are different sources of kng. But, since the goal of kng is truth, this problem of kng is not in relation to the source of kng, rather to its finality (goal). That is, the question is, ‘can I know truth, and to what extent it be realized? Or, ‘whether what we claim to know is true or not?’

Epistemology is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge as there is the problem of knowledge. This problem of knowledge is the CRITICAL or fundamental problem, which is posed in the form of the pressing question, ‘how can we be certain of our knowledge (about sense-kng)’. That is, before confronting reality (of man, world, god), the problem is ‘whether we arecapable of Knowing the reality’ – this is the critical problem. It is critical because, all our knowledge studied in school, colleges is in question. It is critical because what we think we know, is being questioned. It is critical because our enquiry into fundamental questions of our life, movement, trust, belief, and after all knowledge, is in big question.

Method of Enquiry: due to the reasons said above, our method of enquiry is not the Cartesian rationalistapproach or Methodical doubt – i.e., starting with doubting everything, in order to construct it later; but if we doubt everything which includes even doubting the very value of truth and knowledge (before any enquiry is made), how can we go forward; it is impossible to go forward [this method instead is used for finding out the source of kng].We instead follow Aristotelian aporetic method of first examining the doubts (and not, however, by doubting everything,) regarding our enquiry, even doubts regarding truth and tries to solve them. It is akin to Socratic method of raising problems only, which indirectly serve as solutions, and toSt Thomaswho also followed the same pattern: questionis (objections or doubts raised) – his thesis – individual objections considered.

As philosophy is an enquiry into presuppositions, we will enquire into fundamental doubts – doubts concerning truth: what is truth? How to attain certainty of truth? That is, we are not making an enquiry with doubting existence of world, but with the questions regarding truth, kngetc., is submitted to examination (including about doubt – whether doubt is serious/irrelevant/justified or not).

Topic. 3. Proper titles

The title criteriology is a titleformerly given to it. Etymologically it derives from the two Greek words, kriterion, meaing, a standard of judgement, and logos, meaning study. It would mean, the study of the criteria to judge what is true and certain knowledge.

Another common title used until recently was the ‘critique of knowledge’; but here the term ‘critique’ is not to be understood in the modern philosophical sense of ‘radical criticism’ of everything but in its original or etymological sense of ‘criticism’ meaning to elect, and therefore to judge the value of a thing in function of a rule, e.g., literary criticism. Therefore ‘criticism’ has a meaning close to ‘discernment’, criterion, analysis or rethinking or reconsidering or revisiting, etc. Gnoseology is not uncritical, but is reflexive or critical.

Epistemology is the most commonly used title, which comes from the two Greek words: episteme meaning knowledge, and logos meaning science or study. Epistemology is the study of human knowledge, and not of an angelic or divine knowledge or knowledge of imaginary abstract intelligence; regarding these kinds of knowledge, we can have them only by analogy from the knowledge obtained from our direct experience or human knowledge. Epistemology is now widely used to mean theory of science or philosophy of science.

Another important title is Gnoseology, which etymologically comes from the two Greek words ‘Gnosis’ meaning knowledge, and ‘logos’ meaning study,

its equivalent title ‘theory of knowledge’ is now preferred to be the appropriate one, as this discipline refers to the relation between being (reality) and knowledge, i.e., referring to metaphysics of truth. As the ‘theory of knowledge’ is the ‘science of true and certain knowledge’ we discuss the subjects of knowledge, truth and certitude.

Other titles used previously are: Major logic (in contrast to Minor Logic or Logic Proper), Material logic (in contrast to formal Logic), Critical Logic, Applied Logic, Critics, Critical Philosophy (of Kant), Noetics (which comes from the Greek word ‘noesis’ meaning intuitive and not discursive kng; or intelligence/thought), ‘First principles of Knowledge’ (the study which investigates into the capacity of mind for truth)

Topic 4: Gnoseology and other sciences

Knowledge and Truth can be viewed from different perspectives, which are dealt with in epistemology, logic, psychology and metaphysics.

1. Logic and Epistemology

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Gnoseology became autonomous subject only in the Modern philosophy period. Till then, what resembled Gnoseology was Material Logic which dealt with the problem of universals. Logic is an art that provides laws of correct reasoning, which is less concerned with its truth. Formal Logic is a normative science (or practical science) setting norms or laws of correct reasoning towards the discovery of formal truth and not the material truth. Thus, Formal logic is concerned with human Knowledge in view of the validity of propositions rather than about their truth. That is, whether propositions are consistent with in the relation between subject and predicate of the proposition, or not, rather than that they correspond to their fact or not.

Epistemology, instead, is about truth or certainty of propositions or knowledge. While logic presupposes the possibility of truth in those propositions, and does not question their truth, Epistemology, deals with the certainty and truth of human knowledge or in reasoning. E.g., ‘Golden Mountain’ is formally true, and not materially.

An example for logical argument:

‘Universe is imperfect, and the imperfect is caused’. So, ‘the universe is caused. (Here in this argument it states that Universe has a cause, which we call God).

But, another example:

Universe is eternal; what is eternal is uncaused; therefore, universe is uncaused. (Here universe is eternal and lacks a cause).

Hence, the truth of universe being eternal or imperfect is presupposed by Logic, which is what to be enquired into by Epistemology. Epistemology is concerned with such presuppositions of reasoning. Hence while Logic is concerned with formaltruth (validity of reasoning or consistency of propositions), Epistemology is dealing with material logic (fact or truth)

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2. Psychology and Epistemology

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Both Psychology and Epistemology deal with mind or cognitive acts. Psychology studies mental happenings (cognitive activities) as facts, and not in view of truth/falsity, and give explanation to them according to the set of lawsof mental association/conjunction [e.g., cause and effect].

Epistemology views cognitive activities in view of truth or falsity. Although psychology does not exclude certain explanation of truth, Epistemology specifically studies cognitive activities as apprehending truth.

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3. Metaphysics and Epistemology

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Though Epistemology depends on logic/psychology as regards certain tenets, it depends more on Metaphysics. Metaphysics is a theory of being which studies about being, while Epistemology is about truth. Metaphysics is rational/systematic study about (knowledge of) reality/being; Epistemology studies about knowledge itself. Aristotle, the medieval Schoolmen, Spinoza and Leibniz are known for their theories of being while Plato, Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant were philosophers of theories of knowledge.

The truth is, being in so far as it is knowable (by reason). The relation between thought and reality (being) is called knowledge. The net-result or end of this relation is truth. Truth is the agreement/conformity (of this relation of) between thought and reality.

Topic, 5: Different Traditional Answers to the question of knowledge

Scepticism, Empiricism, rationalism, Realism, Idealism and Dogmatism were different answers to the question of human knowledge!

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1. Scepticism:

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David Hume is a great sceptic. According to the Sceptics, Man is incapable of knowing. Knowledge (as justified belief) about objective world is impossible, because ‘No one does know; No one can Know’, because, a sceptic asks the question, how can mind transcend itself to know reality distinct from itself?They claim that, one can’t. They ask, ‘can the objective world be real, independent of the cognitive processes which is supposed to reveal it?’

2. Empiricism

All our ideas/concepts have their origin in experience. They originate either directly from sense-experience, or indirectly either from the reflection upon sense-experience or from mind’s activity of compounding. Thus, it declares not only that source of knowledge is experience, but also that intellectual knowledge is reduced to (or limited to) sensible perception. That is, mind cannot go beyond (transcend) sensible experience; and so, beyond sensible kng, there is no knowledge. Thus, the sceptic tendency that there cannot be any knowledge is being questioned.

3. Rationalism:

Even the senses (sense-experience) need the approval of reason, for we observe that there are differences in sense-knowledge. Hence, the only source of knowledge is Reason, through which universal and necessary truths/clear and distinct ideas can be possessed.

Descartes’ attempt at a methodical doubt to suspend all sensible as well as intellectual knowledge in order to have ‘clear and distinct ideas’ through reason, is a rationalist approach. Reason alone can prove the foundations of kng; thus, the question of kng through senses, as put forward by empiricism, is being contested.

4. Idealism

- Knowledge of us is immaterial (and not material or physical). Hence, reality is fundamentally mental in nature, and not material/physical.

- Knowledge is not openness to reality, as claimed by realism. e.g., we can even think of ‘flying horse’ without any reference to reality. So, it is mind that thinks itself, and hence kng is not openness to reality.

- Until Descartes, kng as openness (or an opening) to reality was never questioned, i.e., knowledge simply means having kng about reality outside. That is, it was presumed that the human mind has the power to have insight into ‘reality as it is in itself’. But Descartes

with his methodical doubt, doubted all reality except the self. It led to certainty of self, without any relation to reality outside.

- There are different types of idealism: Absolute, Transcendental, Immaterialism, Theistic and Partial idealisms

- Absolute idealism of Hegel; every reality is reduced to idea; everything is Idea which unfolds in progress of history through dialectics

- Kant’s transcendental idealism/Critical idealism: different from absolute idealism. It recognizes the thing-in-itself (noumenon), but at the same time, its intelligibility is not possible; or it remains unknowable. So, reality is noumenon which is not known; what is known is only appearance or perception of reality to me, and not the reality as such.

-Berkeley’s idealism of immaterialism- esseestpercipi; being is what is perceived; beings are mental perceptions only.

- Theistic idealism: All things depend on a transcendent God who is Pure Thought or Intelligence; therefore, the finite things are thoughts of God. That is, things belong to His infinite Consciousness. It is a type of pantheism.

- Partial idealism: though it accepts idealism, it admits that some (and not all) things are independent of consciousness (or thought) [Berkeley, Kant]

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5. Realism

Kng is openness to reality. Therefore, a stone, a log of wood etc., have no kng, because they are shut in themselves, not open. But sentient beings (perhaps even plants) are open to reality. In contrast to Idealism, Realism would say, a subject is immediately in touch with reality

Thus, for realists, Man is capable of knowing (i.e., against scepticism) reality (against Idealism) through the use of both reason and experience (neither rationalism alone and no empiricism alone, but both).

6. Dogmatism

It is opposite of scepticism. It states, we can have absolute, definite, final, irreformable, infallible kng, without giving room for any further contestation.it assumes that men can have absolute truths; but we have to state t mistaken beliefs hat even the scientific kng is changing from time to time

Topic 6: Metaphysics or Gnoseology – what is primary

Kant’s metaphor: ‘Reason’ (capability to know ‘being’/reality) stands accused before the tribunal where the ‘reason’ is the judge (‘capability’ to know being). If so, reason’s capability to know ‘being’ has to be first judged by the reason itself which is nothing but the capability to ‘know’. Reason’s first kng is ‘being’ (which is the study of metaphysics as the science of being), butthis very reason itself is in question as regards ‘its capability to know’ (which is the study of epistemology as science of reason or knowledge). Hence, who will judge it? Reason itself becomes the judge. Therefore, Epistemology (reason/science of knowledge) is a sort of tribunal where the accused is reason or Metaphysics. That is, Metaphysics (reason/science of ‘being’) must be submitted to previous judgement of ‘knowledge’ of being (gnoseology). Kant and Descartes would examine value of kng as beginning of philosophy. That is, for them, before confronting any question of reality, one has to study limits of rational capacity. Hence the primacy of kng (gnoseology) over reality (metaphysics), according to Kant.

2. But, Kantian inspiration for primacy of gnoseology ends in baseless radical criticism, which ends up in begging the question[Fallacy of begging the question is presupposing the very fact you are going to examine or prove]. How is it? ‘The capacity of reason to know’ is to be tested, by presuming already that we will have ‘the same capacityof reason to know about it’. Here, we are presupposing/presuming our possession of the very capacity of reason to know, in enquiring/testing our capacity to know. Again, If we doubt our own faculty of knowing as truly effective, it is senseless to try to value its own measure [or to find anything definite!]. If our capacity to reason (itself to truth) is in doubt or in question, then how can we resolve the dilemma? So, Gnoseology does not have the pre-eminence.

3. St. Thomas Aq., who already resolved Kantian problem, defended man’s capacity to know truth or, say, the primacy of metaphysics; he says, ‘being measures knowledge’ (and not knowledge measures being) for the following reasons:

a)If the mind is not actualized by the knowledge of reality, it cannot know that it knows. Fundamentally, therefore, we know realities, and upon this basis we know that we know. That is, without the first kng of being, we can know nothing.The notion of being is the first thing that our intellect grasps. This expresses the truth in our first judgement: ‘this is’; without this first knowledge, we would know nothing. Aquinas says ‘being is the first thing that the intellect conceives, as that which is most known, that into which all other concepts can be resolved’.

b) Also, being rules intellect. For Aquinas, intellect conformstothecategories of object, and not vice versa; that is, it is notthat object confirms to the categoriesof intellect, as Kant says (So, it is against Kantian contention). E.g., it is white not because I think it is white, but because it is white, I think it is white. Something is being, not because I know; but, because something is being, I know that this is being. Or, Being is knowable because it is being, not that being is something because it is knowable.

Topic 7: Basic epistemic aspects

According to traditional epistemology, there are three self-evident truths/primary truths,which are indisputable and necessary for any enquiry to start. The first fact is the existence of self/ego/I exist; the firstprinciple is the principle of non-contradiction ‘something cannot be and not be at the same time’; the first condition is the aptitude of reason to know truth about objective reality.

?Topic8: Pre-Socratics (600-400 BC)

The pre-Socratics dealt with the arche/ beginning/ principle/ behind the multiplicity in Nature. Arche is a Greek term meaning source/primitive element/the principle of explanation. Arche is the original stuff from which the world came to be according to pre-Socratic philosophers – ‘from which all came to be and into which all perish’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983B -6-12) “The seeds of all sorts of things, some call water etc; that which permeates everything; the see of all animals is fluid” (Aristotle’s ‘soul’, I,2,5; 405b).

Thus their main concern was about the nature of physical reality and they attempted, therefore, at systematic cosmologies. The focus was on the object (things outside) rather than on the self of the subject; they were leastconcerned with knowledge as such or with the knowing subject.

However, with their inquiry into the truth hidden behind appearances, there emerged a clear distinction between sensible and intellectual knowledge.

Heraclitus and Parmenides

Heraclitus: reality is what appears, many, mutable, immediate, sensible things.

But, Parmenides (b. c. 515 BC)

For him, there is only Being and there are no beings. It is because they continuously change. He held the opinion against Heraclitus, claiming that Reality cannot be sensible things or beings because they continually change, or they are not one and immutable; things appear not only differently to different people, but to the same person differently at different times. In that case, we cannot for precision say, a thing IS this, because it already changed at next moment. In such case, we cannot say about a sensible thing as it is, or that reality cannot be ‘it is’. But for Parmenides, reality is Being in contrast with beings –the Parmenidean One in contrast with many, relative/ spacious appearances. That is, the object of intellect cannot be a sensible thing; But since intellect cannot operate with nothing, to comprehend would mean to know being –‘that which is’; outside of it is only non-being.

There is only Being and there is no non-being. It is because, for Parmenides, reality is ‘IS’; (i.e., ‘it is’, or ‘that which is’ or ‘Being’; or rather simply (it) is not (‘that which is not’ or ‘non-Being’). For Parmenides, besides the existent, nothing non-existent exists; [he holds two principles only, and calls them hot and cold i.e., fire and heat– hot with existent, and cold with non-existent (Meta, I,ch.5,987)]. For Parmenides, therefore, there is only being; non-being does not exist; ‘it will be never proved that things which are not, are – that is, someone cannot show that that which is not, is (Meta, XIV, ii).

The Platonists’ fundamental problem was that the principles must be ‘being’ and ‘not-being’; it means,‘not five meter long’ exists though this is understood as ‘falsity of five meter long’; it meant, Plato states falsity as the fact of ‘not-being’.

Evaluation: With Parmenides, the true reality is being (that which is’), of which it cannot be said that it is not one and immutable. Thus, Parmenides is very important because he established at the start of philosophy the relation between intellect and being. It is being as true reality, which is present to intellect.

Parmenides could be considered as an exaggerated realist, like Plato will be later or (So modern idealism which find its precursor in Parmenides is not true. Because, he identifies thought with real, but not as subjective idea [unlike Heraclitus, Parmenides gave importance to thought/reason to comprehend realiy; Heraclitus gave importance to senses for knowledge]

Topic 9: Greek sophists.

The ‘Sophists’, literally meaning, ‘wise men’, consist of teachers like Gorgias, Protagorus and others. Gorgias claimed that ‘Nothing exists; if it exists, it cannot be known; if it can be known, it is not comprehensible; if it is comprehensible, it cannot be communicated to others’.

So, sophists, though differed in their teaching in varied ways, generally held that there is no particular system of philosophy in common, and thus denied existence or possibility of any theoretical or conceptual or absolute knowledge or knowledge by intellect, such as for e.g., truth, justice etc. They were sceptics holding firmly that man is incapable of knowing any definite knowledge on anything whatsoever. They were vehemently opposed to belief that men can have absolute truths valid for all times, places and persons.

First of all, having repudiated the existence of any theoretical knowledge, what exists as knowledge, is only practical knowledge useful in view of momentary win. Practical ends/knowledge such as making money, authority, fame, etc., are what exists, and, to attain this, one needs technical (techne) knowledge such as, for example, communicative ability, rhetoric, governing ability of polis etc. In so denying theoretical knowledge, technical knowledge is merely based on practical knowledge which in its turn does not depend on theoretical knowledge. So teaching or learning was directed to impart technical knowledge only (such as for e.g., rhetoric skill), which lacked any theoretical basis and altruistic values, but based on utilitarian basis or practical knowledge, such as, for e.g., of acquiring making money, for garnishing money or fame.

Secondly, the outright denial of theoretical knowledge led the sophists to hold thatanyopinion (doxa) is true; and so, even contradictory opinions are true at the same time. There is no science (episteme). For them, ‘Omne apparens est verum’ - every appearance is true. Since there lacks any definite knowledge, truth is relative to each one, and not absolute. That is, ‘to each one his/her own truth’, according to time and place. Thus, truth is subjective and not objective (each one’s view is true to him or her). The famous sophist, Protagores succinctly put it this way, ‘man (individual) is the measure of all things’ (relativism). Each individual man decides on the truth value of a thing or being, and there lack common truths. As a result, pragmatic ends for the study of grammar or rhetoric were pursued with lack of science (scientific/theoretical truth).

In short, the sophist movement proclaims the relativity of knowledge/truth by making a critique of reason or intellectual or theoretical knowledge. And, as the sophists denied theoretical knowledge, the first gnoseological problem arises: whether truth can be arrived at or not? The question of possibility of arriving at truth is challenged.

Topic 10: Socrates:

Socrates and then Plato (and later Aristotle with principle of non-contradiction) responded to sophists’ destruction of science and morals; theirs was more akin to Parmenides’ commitment to intellect.

Unlike the position of Sophists of impossibility of arriving at truth, the moral convictions and the certainty of mathematical science (pythagorism) demonstrate existence of certain intelligible reality above sensible world. Only physics lead to relativism because of the uncertainty caused by continual changes.

Thus, Socrates was convinced that ‘Truth is within’; it is for this reason, for example, when somebody does tell a lie, many who hear it would sense it. Unlike sophists’ contention that there is no absolute truth, Socrates would establish that truth is found within each person, and so, one is capable of knowing theoretical knowledge.

One could therefore base the practical knowledge on theoretical knowledge (truth). While Sophists would use rhetorical skill as a means of money making, fame etc (or as a mere practical knowledge), Socrates would instead promote rhetoric skill (the technical knowledge) to communicate truth (theoretical kng).

Socrates, the first systematic Greek philosopher, held that such wisdom is the virtue (arête). Knowledge or Wisdom is virtue. Virtuous knowledge is wisdom. Knowledge is primarily an ethical awareness (being aware of virtues).

Topic 11: Plato’s theory of knowledge as recollection

Plato held that the things of the sensible world lack perfection (e.g., a sensible man, justice seen in this world, fragile material beauty, objects that are imperfectly triangular or circular etc. lack perfection). They are thus shadows of something more perfect.

So, some fixed and necessary realities exist as the foundations of every certainty of knowledge of the physical world. Hence Ideas/Essences/Universals/separated/entia/Forms, form such a world of Ideas which are also called Platonic universals according to Aristotle. So the true world is the intelligible world of Ideas or subsistent Species or Forms such as singular Man, Justice, the Triangular etc. What truly exist are these Ideas outside mind in real world par excellence or the intelligible world (mundus intelligibilis). The sensible world consist of the shadows of these Ideas, in which we have only‘doxa (gk) or opinion and no true knowledge (episteme), because particular truths are ever changing. So since the Ideas are multiple, such contents of being are not to be reduced to the Being of Parmenides.

Knowledge therefore is a recollection (or remembrance) of the Ideas that mind had contemplated long ago, before coming to join with body; and, the sensible realities are only stimulus for the intelligence to recollect/remember the ideas; this is called theory of reminiscence or recollection. Accordingly, to know means to remember (the knowledge) that the mind possessed already, or to learn means to have an intellectual vision of Ideas.

Thus, for Plato, there is an ontological affinity between Ideas and mind. However, Ideas are not the products of mind, but independent realities of which intellect has a direct and immediate intuition.

Plato solved the problem of one and many (raised by first cosmologists), by juxtaposing two worlds; that is, Plato considered Heraclitus and Parmanedes misguiding reality as either flux or permanence. For Plato: there are two kinds of reality, temporal (Heraclitus) as well as spiritual realms (Parmanedes) with the allegory of Cave, and ordinary things gain their nature by ‘imitating’ or ‘participating’ in the Forms.

Topic 12: Aristotle’s Epistemology: knowledge is abstraction

As a realist, Aristotle corrected Plato regarding the certainty of the knowledge of the physical world. The sensible substances or ‘individual things’ are the result of form and matter; the matter is the element responsible for the individuality of the form- principleof individuation, individuality. And, ‘form’, removed from the matter, is not real but rather mental as a result of the operation of abstraction; abstraction is the mental operation of separating (abstracting) form (the intelligible) from the sensible. That is, for e.g., by mental operation from many trees, we form the idea/form of tree; e.g., the individual ‘tree’ as the immaterial, universal, immutable, is the ‘thought-of-tree’ or the form. These Forms/the essences, are the subsistent and universal mode of being or essence of natures, which exist only in the abstractive human intellect. ‘Form’ is the principle of mode of being.

Intellect knows mathematical realities without thinking of sensible things; likewise, we know of ‘universals’ (e.g., ‘flying horse’?) as the thought without any correspondence to any particular things. By this, it is not necessary that the universals exist outside particulars; instead, they are formed from the concepts of ‘flying’ and ‘horse’ using our imagination capacity while the mathematical realities are to be outside the sensible.

Knowledge is not reminiscence but abstraction. To know (Knowledge) means to abstract (or separate) form (or the intelligible) from the sensible; that is, mind derives its ideas from the sensible by abstraction; but for Plato, on the occasion of sense-perception, the mind remembers the idea which it contemplated in the world of Ideas. Thus, Aristotle’s doctrine of abstraction safeguards the bond between thought and the real.

However, apart from the sensible world, there exists an immaterial world, which is that of intelligences; they are for Plato ideas, but for Aristotle, they are rather minds (or nous is finite/passive mind/reason while Nous is Infinite/active reason). The supreme intelligence is the pure Act, which is happy in the act of contemplating itself.

Aristotle defends the first principles/first judgements which no one can negate, but are arrived at from experience through induction. First principles, for example, are the principle of non-contradiction that “something cannot ‘be and not be’ at the same time”. The first principles are surely the safeguard of science. For him, logical truth which is derived logically, is possible for all to attain.

Topic 13: Greek Sceptics The Greek scepticism founded by Pyrrho of Elias (BC, 365-275) cast doubt on any form of knowledge, questioning possibility of real knowledge. According to him, ‘not any longer yes to no; not rather this than that’. The Pyrrhoists held the absolute scepticism. Arguments for Scepticism are, first of all, the constant ‘flux’ of things with no stability; our senses often deceive us; the stability of the things is apparent only; and so world is transitory (passing) and of long duration. Secondly, discrepancies between philosophers; and then, universal relativity,infinite of reasoning, hypotheses (there are no theory), vicious circle etc.

Hence the best attitude is to suspend or withhold or abstain from passing judgement on anything since no knowledge is definite. That is, the Greek sceptics had recourse to suspending (epoche) and abstaining from enquiry and to relying upon appearances to get relief from anxiety and to obtain tranquillity of mind (ataraxia) from an attitude of indifference and silence (aphasia).

Counter arguments against scepticism are:

1. Aristotle’s non-contradiction – ‘something cannot be and not be at the same time’ - is a weapon against sceptics – no one can deny at least this truth. The ‘truth’ of non-contradiction even sceptics cannot deny; accordingly, one who denies this truth, naturally accepts at least that premise as true which cannot be false at the same time. Therefore, their scepticism, that ‘impossibility of arriving at any form of truth’ does not stand.

2. St Augustine, ‘si enim fallor, sum’ –‘even if I err, I am’; if you doubt, you affirm that you exist. It is different from Cartesian Cogito in that, it does not have the function of forming a new theory of knowledge, but simply it demonstrates the absurdity of scepticism, along the line of the principle of non-contradiction.

3.The position in current philosophy to counter scepticism is called dogmatism. Dogmatism, positively, believes in the existence of certain truths, such as, for e.g., the first principles of metaphysics. But, in the extreme sense, dogmatism today tends to consider almost all his opinions unquestionable.

Topic 14: Zeno’s stoicism (3rdB.C.): knowledge as representation

It originated as a response to sceptics. It held that human knowledgeis arepresentation orimpressionof external objects. As regards the origin of ideas, it brought about a difference between comprehensible representation and incomprehensible representation. The comprehensible representation is one which comes from the existent thing; such representations are credible when they attest to actual fact e.g., ‘I speak’; ‘it is day light’. Phantasiakataleptike- apprehensive perception is a perception which has to fulfil certain conditions in order to be veridical – clarity, common consent, probability, system. And incomprehensible representation which is not corresponding to reality, e.g., now it is night, said in full daylight.And such aknowledge is not true as there is error and doubt in this. Thus stoicism marked th rebirth of intellectualism i.e., the existence of intellectual truth.

Topic 15. St. Augustine‘s Divine Illumination

In the medieval era, theory of knowledge begins along the path of Platonism. According to Augustine, the intelligible world of Plato, which is the origin and source of truth and certainty, are the separated Ideas exist in the mind of God (Nous).

There are two worlds/cities: the intelligible world where truth itself dwells, and sensible world which we perceive by sight and touch. Accordingly there are two truths - things can be divided into those truths which the mind knows through senses i.e., about sensible things. Those intelligible truths which it perceives through itself by divine light. Knowledge is, therefore, contemplation, or elevation of mind towards the superior intelligible world (or the world of ideas).

St. Augustine’s divine illumination would therefore hold that finite minds alone are not sufficient explanation of the presence of infinite ideas and perfect values; but, human mind receives its light from an external source which is perfect and infinite, God (or human mind is illuminated by the God who just like the Sun which illuminates with its rays), to perceive such truths/Ideas/values. Thus, he holds the theory of divine illumination, according to which, the human[[ mind, illumined by divine light/mind, perceives eternal truths. That is, the intellectual light, by which it perceives eternal truths, is an emanation from the divine mind. Such an intellectual light, or the eternal, immutable truth which mind possesses internally, which is none other than the Truth of God, is the light coming from God, in which all external reasons for things exist (who is the raison d’etre - ‘reason of existence’ - of everything that exist).

By divine Illumination, Augustine recognizes that the light from above illumining the reality, with his insistence on sight, is the symbol of God. All things reflect God’s light or God’s goodness (Lumen Fidei, No. 33).

Q. Augustinian epistemology as Divine Illumination goes along with Plato. How do you view it?

Topic 16: Epistemology of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274): knowledge is abstraction

St. Thomas only partially accepts Augustinian theory of illumination. Though, for him, the existence of Forms as Ideas in God was not debatable, they are in God, not in real plurality, but it is His essence itself, in so far as God knows in Himself the multiple modes of being. It is for the reason that, essences, for him, exist materially in things, in another way or immaterially in the abstractive human mind, and in a sublime way (perfect way) in divine mind as the exemplary Ideas of all things.

Knowledge is abstraction (and it is not completely spiritual activity as in divine illumination) according to which, the essences that exist potentially in the matter, pass through senses, which in turn are transmitted to the mind immaterially (or by abstraction of essence) by the action of agent intellect, ultimately illuminated by light of God. Thus, there are three aspects important for abstraction: senses, agent intellect and God.

Thus, senses are the true starting point of kng, and not at all serve merely as stimulus of a purely spiritual activity as in divine illumination. In this regard, instead of divine illumination (by divine light), St Thomas makes use of the Aristotelian doctrine of agent intellect, which performs the abstraction of intelligible essences. Accordingly, knowledge is when, agent intellect (or one’s own intellect), ultimately illuminated by the light of God, causes to produce the abstraction (or immateriality) of essence of things, which, in turn, causes understanding (i.e., through this immateriality of essence).

And God is only the ultimate cause or exemplary causality, but not the immediate cause (as is envisaged by St Augustine as the light of God), for the abstraction of the essence is from the sensible. It is because, transcendentalism (transcendent god as cause of understanding) is not sufficient to explain the knowledge of truth. Instead, one must make use of one’s own means given by God in knowing truth. Neo-Platonism runs through during through the medieval period.

Q. Aquinas’ theory of knowledge as abstraction of essences, though partially accepts Augustinian epistemology, differs from the latter’s view. Explain

Topic 17: Ockham’s Nominalism: knowledge is intuition

William of Ockham rejects ontological value of universals: Nominalism rejects the existence of essences or universals. Instead, only individual is real, and not the universal. He reasons that, if there exists a common nature (or essence or universal) for example ‘man’, it would also die oncea man dies. But, according to Ockham, ‘a man can be annihilated by God without any other man being annihilated or destroyed’. Therefore, there is nothing in common between them.

Hence, the so called ‘universals or essences’ are not real entities but are onlynames (nominalism) ormere concepts of reason/general ideas in the mind (conceptualism), used to classify into groups of individual things in so far as they are (reciprocally) ‘similar’. E.g., Socrates and Plato are more similar to each other than one of them is similar to a donkey; it is not that Socrates and Plato have something in common; but they are similar to one another according to something, but not on common essence. Thus he rejects the ontological value of universal (that is, he rejects ‘universal’ as existing or as real). As a result, since essences do not exist, Ockhamdenied man’s capacity to know the essences of things. Then what does it mean ‘to know’?

Rejects abstract knowledge: First of all, he considers John Duns Scotus’ distinction between intuitive kng (kng by means of experience) and abstract kng. On account of abstract kng, we cannot with evidence know whether a contingent thing (that exists at one time and non-existent at other time) exists or not (for contingent thing is not an absolute thing). So, abstraction works away from the concrete existence.

Knowledge is intuition or intuitive knowledge or im-mediate knowledge: he makes a distinction of Truths of fact (evidentia naturalis) and Truths of reason/analytical (evidentia potissima). Truths of fact are what we perceive in the natural world; e.g., ‘here there is a snake’. Thus, the Knowledge of facts by means of experience is intuitive kng. ‘In general, every simple kng of a term, or of more terms, of a thing or of more things, in virtue of which one can know with evidence a contingent truth, especially regarding a present fact, is an intuitive kng’, said Ockham. That is, only direct and immediate kng of individual beings is valid.

There are two kinds of intuition: sense-intuition by which one can know only directly knowable objects as proposed by empiricism, and intellectual intuition which is direct knowledge of essences through reflection from sensation as proposed by rationalism, e.g., kng of mind, causation etc. Truths of fact are first certitude and not demonstrative, which are the bases for science. Hence intuitive knowledge is most certain knowledge and only knowledge. ‘There is nothing known unless known intuitively’ (or ‘nihil cognoscitur nisi cognoscatur intuitive’). That is, noetic knowledge which is intuitive/immediate act of vision/direct knowledge, is only ‘known’ for certain, and not reasoning or discursive/logical knowledge from premises to conclusion.

Ockham’s razor: No abstraction or existence of hidden entities. In the case of entities or essences or substantial forms or potencies, it is to be applied Ockham’s razor: ‘non sunt multiplicanda entia’ – ‘entities are not to be multiplied’ beyond necessity.

Reason is opposed to faith: To the question of the knowledge about supernatural beings such as God, Soul etc., which are not directly known, we cannot apply reason to faith. Reason is opposed to faith for man is incapable to know the essence of things by reason. According to him, reason won’t help us to understand supernatural things. It is because, the finite beings lose their stability and consistency but have to depend on the mercy of divine omnipotence only, to know things that do not apparently exist and to help us know falsity of what seems to be true. So reason and faith are not complementary. Thus, here reason/philosophy/totality of human kng is in question, and loses its harmony with faith. Hence the critical problem whether we can be certain of our knowledge, remains unanswered.

Q. Ockham’s razor,non sunt multiplicanda entia sums up his epistemology, especially with regard to his distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge. Explain

Topic 16:Epistemology of Descartes and Rationalist philosophy

1. Most certain knowledge of thought and Existence: Rene Descartes suggests ‘dubitare de omnibus’ or the universal doubt according to which all our knowledge - sensible, rational, mathematical, geometrical and eternal truths - is subjected to doubt. By this, he makes a critical examination of human knowledge with the radical universal doubt of sense-realities. But unlike sceptics, his ‘universal doubt’ is not a sceptical one but only a methodical doubt according to which, universal doubt is put forward as a method to arrive at certainty of the suspected truths one by one. The universal doubt paves the way for the certainty or intuitive kng of one’s own ‘thought’ – cogito (the fact that ‘I think’, or the doubting capability). From this cogito, emerges the intuitive or the most certain knowledge of ‘sum’ or the‘first reality’of ‘my existence’ as ‘something that thinks’ or as the ‘thinking thing/subject’. Thus, indubitably, the existence of thinking subject/thinking thing is proved.

2. Thought as the object of thought:

(abstract: Thought is the starting point of reality; I see the reality of thought, from where thought comes; thought is not from reality/existence; reality from thought; so, consciousness of thought precedes perception of existence; thought is object of thought, and not existence object of thought).

Starting with this intuition or the first certitude of existence of ‘thinking/thought’, the ‘thinker’ (any thinker, thinking self/subject) is derived, which is then followed by proving other truths, including God by deduction/reasoning from the first truth. The originality of Descartes is that thought is the point of departure of philosophy. That is, I see the reality of pure thought, or I see thought as the object of thought or thought as self-consciousness or simply consciousness; thus the object of thought is thought, and not an object/thing outside. If so, the consciousness of thoughtprecedes the perception of existence, while the traditional philosophy held that consciousness is known from the perception/experience of the external world (i.e., object of thought is external world).

3. Fracture between thought and Reality:

(Abstract: reality-caused by idea; reality in itself not understood, but only as ‘cause’ of idea; object is not object, but representation or thought of reality; if reality was coming from idea, no problems; but it is not; so, don’t know thought reflects reality as it is known by deduction from thought; and thus, a fraction between idea and reality).

Thus, what is known first is ‘the idea’ (i.e., that which is accepted is the clear idea, removed from every imaginative or sensitive element). And then we have to see whether, ‘behind this idea’ there is a reality or not. For Descartes, the reality is caused by idea, or idea causes reality, and not reality causes idea as held by Aristotle. That is, it does not make an effort to apprehend reality in itself but only as ‘caused’. In this way, a fracture is produced between idea and reality. That is, the ‘thinker’ (or me) never goes beyond the realm of mental productions – that is, human mind can attain no other object other than its own ideas or productions (principle of immanence). What is certain is one thinks (broadly speaking ‘to think means to conceptualize, feel, wish etc.’), but it is difficult to determine, what it is that one knows, or if, in general, one really knows anything or not. The object, (that which is outside of thought), is not reality, but object is reality’s representation only.

Since the point of departure is thought, or the thought which is not in so far as it is immediately referred to reality, it is difficult to conclude thought reflects reality (that is, difficult to say, thought is being). So, one needs to know reality with deduction (not by intuition); yet, one does not know how we could truly conceive it, because we do not conceive anything other than ideas. [It is because we cannot leave ideas to explore ‘how things stand’ in order to recognize that ideas are true].

Moderated realism

(Abstract: unlike Plato’s exaggerated realism of every idea is true, Descartes admits errors; thought is not being, but corresponds being)

At the same time, it also does not mean that, ‘every idea is true’ - not ‘exaggerated realism’ of Plato - because, thought, reflecting on itself (thought), can recognize its eventual errors, with the help of experience and of logic. Descartes held moderate realism, according to which, it is not that thought is being, but rather our thought corresponds to being. Descartes is still a realist, rather a moderate realist and not an exaggerated realist.

[Exaggeratedrealism: universals have existence of their own; every idea is true; e.g., Plato; Realism: world outside exist independent of mind; idealism: things of the world do not exist independent of the mind, but exist in relation to cognizing mind and its operations].

5. Descartes’ over-emphasis of reason or intelligibility, abandoned Aristotelian Realism, but favouring Scholastic’s philosophy of moderate realism.

(Abstract: rationalists abandoned Aristotelian realism, scholastic treatises on abstraction though maintaining realism; but held moderate realism as thought is not being, but represents reality; but relied on intelligibility and not sensibility as providing adequate knowledge)

And so, rationalists abandoned (the scholastic attempts which belonged to) Aristotelian realism that favours reality as individual ( Aristotelian philosophy of nature – physical intelligibility exhausts itself in maths losing concept of essence of material thing) and abandoned examining epistemological problems on abstraction, universals, the principle of individuation etc.

The Scholastics (with the philosophy of possible essences), instead, tried to explain both kng and essences of individual things, always favouring the individual (that is, reality is individual/thing). But, the scholastics held moderate realism, according to which, it is not that thought is being, but rather our thought corresponds to being; therefore moderate realism – represents reality.

Thus, with Descartes began rationalist philosophy which emphasised the use of reason or a priori of experience; or that, the clear and distinct idea is simpliciter or lies in full intelligibility (of a thing), (that is, it is in its intelligibility, the things are enquired), and not in sensibility since sensibility cannot provide adequate knowledge. The method (the extension of the mathematical method to all fields of kng) is only conceptual, which is logical demonstration working from axioms and definitions, with the aim of constructing an objective philosophical system.

Topic 17: Epistemology of Locke and Empiricism

1. Empiricism emerged as radical critique of innate ideas. It is against the rationalist dogmatic certainties that there are clear and distinct a prioriknowledge before experience. There is no proof of innatism because all our ideas are derived from experience and so no knowledge of a priori of experience is possible.

2. Representative Realism: Locke instead speaks of kng as the relation between ideas, e.g., three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; here we see a connection between ideas, and therefore we ‘know’ it.[E.g., relations between ideas establish themselves through intuition – e.g., 2 + 2 makes 4, and also through deduction].

Knowledge is also a relationship between the idea and the real thing; (that is,by intuition, I come to know the reality of ‘I’; the existence of God by demonstration, and the existence of world by sensation).

Locke as a ‘representative/indirect realist’, would hold that ideas are produced in us by the objects outside (and so things exist outside mind), but these ideas are not the exact images of objects, except that they are only resemblances of something inherent in the object. It is representative realism because ideas only represent things/objects. As a positive claim of representative realism, ideas, impressions or sensations are the sort of objects that we directly perceive, and as its negative claim, there is no direct access to the objects in themselves.

E.g., we may have mistaken perception if we do have direct access; that is, I may be mistaken to perceive an object in front of me, as mango for e.g., from its certain shape, yellow, sweet smell etc. Thus I conclude that having such qualities it is a mango]. The first type of effects produced in us by the objects, (shape, figure, quantity, etc.) are in the objects themselves, which are called primary qualities. The second type of effects produced in us by contact with the objects, (sensations of smell, yellow etc.), do not really belong to the objects - this is called secondary qualities. Simple ideas that emerge from impressions – primary and secondary qualities, are combined and formed into complex ideas, e.g., man, go, triangle etc.]. Now, ideas such as primary qualities are true representations or the properties of objects. Thus, only the properties are known of things, and not things in themselves; and of course, they presuppose ‘substance’ as the support of such qualities, but nothing more known of it; thus for Locke real essence of things is unknown to us. And, ideas such as secondary qualities do not correspond to reality, as they are modifications of animal body, produced by contact with things.

3. Objection to Locke: thought as the object of thought

a) First of all, thus, according to Locke, the immediate object of perception or thought or intellect is idea, not the thing in itself.Thus we know only ideas, but we are not capable of knowing whether these ideas are similar or not, to the things themselves.Thus, there lacks a true foundation to place the question of the correspondence of idea with reality; it is because, for him, idea is the immediate object. Therefore we have fallen into the same difficulties of Descartes–thought (idea) as the object of thought. And Locke will have recourse to causality to reach to the external world. (world as ‘cause’ of idea, or idea causes world)

b) secondly, with regard to the relations between primary and secondary qualities of (external bodies), we never perceive their necessary connection, but only factual connection; but only the necessary knowledgecan be considered as idea. And, as a consequence, physics, metaphysics, and sciences that intend to know substance, cannot be known fully and surely; they are partial and only probable. With the exception of the existence of God which is proved through demonstration or reason. [That is, for Locke, God’s existence is ‘deduced’ or ‘demonstrated’ from the intuitive knowledge of our existence as the ‘cause of our existence’ which alone is known as intuitive. In other words, a man’s knowledge of one’s own existence is intuitive, while God’s existence is ‘demonstrative’ as it cannot be known by intuition. So he bases his argument of God’s existence on the intuitive knowledge of our existence].

Topic 18: Critical Idealism of Kant:

1) Primacy of Knowing subject: Kant’s fundamental idealism or critical idealism stressed the need for primacy of the knowing subject in obtaining knowledge. Kant changed the usual notion of kng with His Copernican Revolution. Accordingly, human thought does not revolve around the objects any more, but objects revolve around the intellect - i.e., conditions/categories of the mind. Thus, objects are understood according to the subjective structure. That is, it is the knowing subject’s activity that makes the real the knowable, but the noumeno - real in itself - is not knowable. Because, new prerogatives are attributed to the knowing subject: a priori forms of sensibility in man such as space and time are a priori to know through senses; a priori categories of mind (12 in number), and synthetic a priori judgements (not on experience) etc.

[synthetic a priori are judgements that are not tautological/analytical, and neither a posteriori nor based on experience; that is, the universal and necessary truths are not based on experience, but based only on a priori categories of mind. E.g., when we say ‘sun heats stone’, we synthesize two phenomena/sensation matter ‘sun and stone’ with the use of category/mental form of ‘causality. For Kant, geometry known on the intuition of space a priori; mathematics on the intuition of time a priori; and finally physics, on a superior level, on the use of concepts or categories in the sphere of spatio-temporal objects. Categories for Aristotle are only modes of being, while for Kant they are modes of judgements].

Besides, Form and matter makes an object. But for Kant, thought furnishes the form, and it is the sensation that gives matter, and the union/synthesis of this form and matter becomes the object of thought (or Knowledge). It is different from Aristotelian concept of form found imminent in the things, and the intellect possesses them in an immaterial way – abstraction.

Hence, no longer the real (things) informed the existence of our consciousness (as realists say), but consciousness informed the real.

2) Kant is a critical idealist.

Firstly, His is a critical idealism, and not an absolute idealist like Hegel. According to Hegel’s absolutism, reason/thought/idea is considered absolute; that is, for him, reason does not need experience to substantiate/conform it. But, unlike Hegel, thought/reason for Kant isalways bound to phenomenon or sensation, and reason can think only in vain without phenomenon/sensation. That is, reason should not be taken absolute, without the need for experience to substantiate it (i.e., he is against absolute idealism). (reason is not to be dogmatised (or considered absolute outside of experience).

Kant, therefore, criticises those metaphysical conceptswhich surpass experience (e.g., God, etc.), because, the metaphysical concepts of substance, cause etc. are valid only if applied to phenomena (experience). Therefore, Philosophy of Kant is a critique of kng to show the limits of reason/thought. Thus, he rejects a metaphysics of non-phenomenal reality (God, soul, world etc.).

[Kant’s ‘positivistic idealism’ eliminates the value of metaphysics as the science of non-phenomenal reality/God/absolute idealism. To judge is to apply a concept to experience – judgement prevails over concept, which is empty if not referred to experience. Therefore rationalism is abuse of concepts; empiricism blindness of pure experience. So judgement introduces concept into experience or phenomenical world].

Secondly, His critical idealism is turned into subjectivism– accordingly, the knowing subject is important, and not object. It differs from Hegel’s absolute idealism, because, though Kant’s critical idealism still recognizes the thing-in-itself or noumenon (which is similar to ‘substance’ in Locke), it remains unknowable. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel radicalized this view, transforming Kant’s idealism into absolute idealism, and the latter holds that ‘things-in-themselves’ are a contradiction in terms, because a thing must be an object of our consciousness if it is to be an object at all. Thus, His critical idealism will later pave way to Transcendental idealism(drawn up by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel) according to which the subject becomes theabsolute.

[To avoid total idealism, Kant must admit in some way the existence of things-in-themselves as the unknowable origin of the matter of phenomena, though it cannot be proved!].

3. Evaluation of Critical Idealism

a) With regard to his view of a priori forms of sensibility of space and time and a priori forms of understanding, we can in a way evaluate it with the following remarks of Amartya sen, said in different context. Amartya Sen says, “what we can see is not independent of where we stand in relation to what we are trying to see. And this in turn can influence our beliefs, understanding and decisions. Positionally dependent observations, beliefs and choices can be important for the enterprise of knowledge as well as for practical reason. Indeed, epistemology, decision theory and ethics all have to take note of the dependence of observations and inferences on the positions of the observer” [Idea of Justice, Penguine, New Delhi, 2nd edition, 2010:156]. Here from the earth, Sun and moon look similar in size. From the moon, the sun and moon would not look similar in size. That is no reason for taking the cited claim as non-objective, or purely as a mental phenomenon special to a particular person. Another person observing the sun and moon from the earth, conforms this claim of their size. [IJ, 156]. At the same time, Amartya sen will say that human mind and our ability to go beyond our local world; there is no particular reason to presume that interactive communication and public engagement can be sought only within such boundaries (or within the confines of those who can be seen as ‘one people’) [IJ, 151]. Positional objectivity can indeed be the appropriate understanding of objectivity, depending on the exercise in which we are involved. E.g., sun and moon viewed from earth, by any two, would have in similar size for the two, is objective and not subjective, looking from the position of earth [IJ, 159] b) At first instance, Kantianism will seem to be an effort to reconcile empiricism and rationalism, or restore unity to the edifice of kng. But in reality, the value given to datum(or the given or phenomenon) is so reduced that, [the whole weight of] reconstruction of kng must be carried out exclusively by the activity of the knowing subject. [datum= being given – e.g., about tomato, I don’t know whether real or painted wax; but one thing know that, it has bulgy shape, certain visual depth; the manner of being present to consciousness is called ‘being given’, and that which is present thus is called ‘datum’]

c) Ideas of ‘soul, world and God’ remain three ‘Ideas’ of Reason since they do not correspond to any phenomenon or experience and so they are not legitimate or real ones. [‘Phenomenical world’, however, is not to be confused with reality since real world is still hidden. But it may instead be ‘experience’ to be applied a concept, or sensation, even if in Kant it assumes the function of existential reality; the so-called world is vast and stars which are still hidden; we will never know world in its entirety].

Moreover, they are rather ‘regulating ideas of enquiry’ (ideas that regulate enquiry), and not objects or categories that synthesize or conceptualize some object; instead, in Kant, it is the intellect/thought with their capabilities, that forms an object, and not the other way round (i.e., not that object be able to inform as real to intellect).

c) While he rejects arriving at metaphysical truths (intellectually or) theoretically, he accedes to such great truths through the work of Practical Reason. It is here noumenon finally appears, in the theses concerning freedom, immortality of soul and existence of God. [To avoid total idealism, Kant must admit in some way the existence of things-in-themselves as the unknowable origin of the matter of phenomena, though cannot be proved. According to him we cannot prove (or not demonstrate by reason) God’s existence, but we should act as if God existed, because a practical conviction in God is a necessary presupposition of morality. Existence of God, man cannot prove with reason. But ‘we are convinced that God exists; it is therefore not necessary to prove God’s existence’]

CHAPTER 3: NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Topic 19: Definition and its elements of knowledge

As it is difficult to define ‘time’, ‘pain’ etc., it is much more difficult to define what is ‘to know’. [St Augustine said, if you ask me whether I know time, I will say I know it very well. But if you ask to define it for you, I find I cannot’]. As it is a primary term, we will be able to describe what is knowledge, rather than define it. [primary in the sense that it is difficult for a blind man to define what is to see rather than describe it].

If one poses the question, what is knowledge, one can say that kng is that which sentient beings such as men, brutes, (and perhaps even plants) have, but lifeless things lack. A log of wood, a stone, a cloud in the sky lack knowledge because they are ‘shut up’ in themselves or unconscious of the surrounding reality. Thus, we can say knowledge is ‘openness to reality’ or openness of the knower to the world or reality; the knower ‘opens’ himself to the world. Knowledge, however, primarily is an activity of man and not of brutes.

As there exist different modes of being (as being is analogical), so there are different modes of knowing such as thought, sensation, consciousness, knowledge of science, philosophical and religious kng, knowledge of adults and children, kng proper to animals, human kng etc.

We cannot undermine one knowledge from the other or exclusively ratify one knowledge as the best; for example, Parmenides extolled reason and eliminated the other ways of kng as opinions; Hume accepted only sense-experience (and no causality); Positivism extols only scientific kng etc.

The common elements in all these forms of knowledge: knowledge is cognitive (mental not exactly physical) relation between knower (subject) and the known (or object).

First, how is the RELATION explained? That is, does the knower go to the known thing/object or vice versa? In truth, the act of knowledge (cognition) is inverse; that is, the known thing ‘penetrates’ or ‘makes itself present’ into the subject [opposite to Kant’s Copernican revolution]. E.g., when the colour blue is known, the blue penetrates into the subject, and reproduces itself as something objective in the knower. Where does the knowledge take place, inside or outside the subject? Knowledge takes place inside the subject. [but then knowledge is openness to reality, would mean it enters into a particular communication with other things; in a certain sense, he leaves himself to the surrounding reality].

Second, there are chiefly THREE elements of kng: a subject, object and cognition. The subject is the one who knows. It can be called the knowing-subject or subject of kng or simply subject. The object is understood in two ways: first, before something is known (to be known); It may be called knowable object. Second, during or after the act by which something is known; it is called an ‘object known’. By object, we do not mean that it is always outside subject’s body. It may also be within the body of the knower (e.g., pain, hunger, muscular contractions, movement of joints). They are outside the subject’s kng but not outside the subject’s body. [Again, all the objects of external senses (that are outside the body) are intra-organic and therefore intra-bodily]. Cognition: The act by which the subject knows the object is called cognition. The fruit of cognition is the ‘cognitional species’ in the knowing subject.

Knowledge is a possession of the known (object) on the part of the knower (subject) through the act of cognition. That is, there is a union of the object with the subject, without cancelling the difference between knower and the known.

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T. 20: Knowledge/cognition as Intentional assimilation

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Cognition (or knowledge or the act of knowledge) by which a thing or an object is known by a knowing subject, is termed as assimilation or identification; this identification of subject and object is not something physical, but takes place in the realm of intentional immateriality. In other words, the Intentional immateriality is known as cognition.

Immateriality: Knowledge/cognition is not a material action, in as much as the object does not physically act as a body on the subject, like burning, smashing. E.g., one who sees the colour will not become physically the colour blue. So, the object exists in the subject in a new way, and not in a material mode of being, rather in an immaterial way. Hence, an object in the world around us, is the natural or material or proper or real mode of being (glenn, 20), and the knowing subject conceives it immaterially.

Intentional species: ‘the object present immaterially in the subject’ is called intentional species/being; that is, the species exists intentionally in the subject. And this intentional species is so called because it is capable of referring back to the material thing. This intentional species in the subject is a form different from ‘natural species’ (real object). While the real object outside is only one, the intentional species is multiplied according to the number of knowing subjects.

A simile of mirror will be of help us better understand this. In a mirror image, we have an immaterial form of an object (that is, it ‘abandons’ the materiality of an object). But when the mirror is removed from the object, the mirror does not reproduce it (or it does not have any image so as to refer back to any material thing); that is, the mirror image does not have an intentional species or ‘objective’ being. [‘object’=that which is present before the knower; to be an object of a knowing faculty is not a real property of things, nor does it refer directly to the reality of the known, rather it points to the knowability of that which is grasped]. Thus, by the act of knowledge, subject acquires a form immaterially (and it does not necessarily mean spiritual), and it is intentional (objective) in so far as it refers to a material thing.

Knowledge is thus intentional (and immaterial) appropriation of a form. In other words, when one says ‘I know this thing’, he intentionally possesses a certain being. That is, the material mode of being that is outside, becomes immaterial mode of being in so far as it exists intentionally in the subject – this is called knowledge. As Knowledge happens through intentional immateriality, kng is intentional assimilation. [idealism cancels the distinction between object and subject in such a way so as to arrive at cognitive monism which cancels the distinction between beings. Now, intentional species is NOT that which is known, since in that case, it is self-knowledge; instead, it is that by which the real thing is known. Immaterial species makes an ontological foundation of being, while it allows intentional growth of a subject that is almost infinite. God is known not with an appropriate species, but in analogical way].

T.21. Knowledge and being

Kng is (intentional) appropriation (acquiring) of a form of a thing. Aristotle says, without the universal, we cannot acquire kng – metaphysics, XIII, ix, 22. What does this form refer to? A form is reduced to a mode of being. A mode of being is a form of being. Form can refer to both natural being and intentional being. There are different modes (forms) of being (or modalities), for e.g., the modes of being man are being white, being just, being corporeal etc. Form is a principle of the mode of being of things, both natural and intentional. Thus, when we say, kng is appropriation of the form (being) of a thing, [or ‘it is known by that which is’,], it means knowing according to all modalities (modes or forms or essences) of a being (esse) [for e.g, to know is to be informed that sth takes place, acts, develops etc., or by that which is, acting, developing, taking place etc. That is, accidents.

2. The first thing known about a thing is that ‘it is’ – ‘that which is’ – being (existence). And “‘that which is not’ is not knowable” E.g., I cannot know a rock that does not exist. [I cannot know sth that does not exist – ‘that which is not’].I cannot know sth which does not exist. [to say that I know something that does not exist, is sheer absurd].I can know such a rock does not exist [in reference to other beings – rock etc.]. E.g., I cannot say, I know a flying horse exist – (because that does not exist); but I can say, I know a flying horse does not exist. Thus, a thing is knowable in so far as it is [and, in the measure (form-s) in which it is]. I can know sth exists or some other thing (sth else) as not existing.

T. 22. Intelligence and being

Being is understood in two senses: a) act of being (or being as existence, or esse in Latin), e.g., as what is sonorous, corporeal, luminous etc.; and b) being as essence or ens, e.g., ‘man’, ‘chair’. But, Intelligence first knows ‘not that which is luminous, sonorous, corporeal etc.’ Instead, for example, it is the sight that perceives the white object [or knows something in so far as it is white or coloured.

Intelligence, instead, knows man or tree – the essence of beings or things [all being have their own essence, such as the essence man, dog, flower]. Thomas Hobbes would say, the object of vision/hearing is visible species or audible species while understanding has got its object as intelligible species or intelligible being seen. Intelligence knows not simply that man is a being or simply that man exists, but man or tree in so far as it is essence (ens) (or as an expression of a certain mode of being - or man as essence of man. Thus, a thing is knowable in so far as it is, (‘that which is’; existence) and in the measure (form-s) in which it is (essence/form). Therefore the first thing that our intellect attains is that of being (in its essence).

It is responding to the question ‘what is this? Thus to comprehend (moulding a concept) is to know the essence of a thing, that which a thing is or its mode of being. The object of intellect is the essence (ens), made actual by the act of being (esse). Essence happens when it is abstracted. [Heidegger – things unveil their being only to man, and not to irrational creatures, or man is the only being in the world to know the being of things].

The fact that the formal object of intelligence is being, does not mean that man has the perfect notion of everything. Cognition is a progress through growing reflection as well as specifying the general or obscure ideas that we initially have. That is, all kng is acquired through experience and (rational) reflection [A systematic reflection of being is metaphysics, as scientific kng of light is ‘optics’].

CHAPTER 4: CRITIQUE OF SENSE-KNOWLEDGE

T. 23. Sensation and Perception

a) Object of senses or a sense-object?

Object of sense is called ‘sense-data’ or simply the datum (meaning the given in Latin) presented by the senses. E.g., the colour for the sense of sight; odour, size, shape etc. are the so called sense-objects. And, ‘datum’ (datum means ‘the given’; ‘data’ is plural of ‘datum’ in Latin) of an apple means, what is given to us as red, its shape, size, taste, etc. of an apple Sense-object may otherwise be called ‘sensible’. There are two types of sensible or Sense-object. Sense-object of each sense is called proper sensible e.g., colour (light) for seeing, sound for hearing, odour etc., while sense-objects perceived by more than one sense is called common sensibles e.g., movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude, size, shape, distance etc. That is, for example, size is not an object proper to sight alone, nor to touch alone.

What is sense? Sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. The organ of sense is meant as that in which ultimately such a power is seated. List of senses, sense organs and sense-objects: sight–eyes–colour; of smell – nose – odour; of taste-tongue-taste; of hearing-ear-sound; and of touch-skin- pressure.

b) Sensation and Perception

Sensation and perception are different but two aspects of one operation called sense-cognition. Cognition is the impression of an object upon the subject (immaterially + intentionally), like a signet on the wax, by (capabilities of receiving impression such as) sense-faculties and intellectual faculty (or mind).

Sensation (is in as much as this operation) is in the experience of the awareness by the subject (of retinal image!) with sense-faculties. Or, sensation is the experience of being immediately aware of sense-objects such as colour etc. Whenever we see colour, we have sensation of colour, but the colour itself is sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation (Bertrand Russell) Sensations (e.g., visual, tactile, retinal image) are the first information about external reality or world and about the internal world (our body), with our sense-faculties. E.g., we feel ‘cold’ as external reality, and at the same time, cold penetrates into skin, and so we ourselves also feel it –internally.

Sensations enable us to differentiate between objects, of which we are aware (e.g., by odour, we can distinguish bet object!).Knowledge is acquired and not ‘given’ or the datum.

Senses are of two types: five external senses, and four internal senses such as estimative sense or instinct, common sense, imagination, and memory. c) Perception is a collection of sensations in a whole as a unit. Except in the case of ‘a new born’ child we cannot speak of isolated, pure sensation. Instead, many sensations are collected to form a perception of a tree, table, a cloud; Perception in other words, is an integral knowledge of external objects.

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T.24: Objectivity of sensation/ or, Different Attempts at a solution to the problem of sense-kng and reality

Do sense-knowledge provide safe and certain knowledge? Or, are our sense kng and reality different or same? Or do our perceptions give us access to things as they are? E.g., we see Sun moving but in reality it is still, and so are many of our sensations. There are difference solutions, which we shall now analyse.

1. An extreme solution: it concludes that sense kng is not a true or proper kng, but it only orients us to the world [by these forms]. That is, sense-kng does not provide us with objective real (or real world), nor does it go beyond the subjective world. The word ‘phenomenon’ only refers to the phenomenal world, meaning that the sensible world is that appears, but is not true.

But, as against this view, the materialist and empiricist thinkers, including the sceptics do not approve the distinction between intellectual and sense kng; they do not recognize the intellectual kng at all, but for them, knowledgeis reduced to (the corporeal) modifications of senses only; in other words, sensation is kng which is, in fact, contingent, relative and uncertain.

2. Interpretationistic theory points out that the so-called ‘qualities’ perceived such as odours, tastes, sounds etc., do not exist as such in reality as ‘qualities’; instead, they correspond to some objective structures or ‘quantities’ only; that is, sensations are only a result of certain complex physical functions like movement of corpuscles (or cells) or undulatory (or waving) vibrations that act on the senses. This position is held by modern physics. E.g., sound is the result of vibration of the air that strikes hearing.

But qualitative realism which means that sensations are qualities and not quantities, is somewhat factual but not ingenuous, since the perception of sensibles as ‘qualities’ is relatively subjective too (or relative to the state of subject). E.g., water seems colder for the heated hand than for the already-cold hand. Again, if the sensible communes are reduced to pure quantity, it is difficult to explain some of the qualitative elements such as, force, resistance, causal influence, which are found in the mechanical scientific explanations too. That is, reduction of sensible qualities to pure quantity has not been able to cancel some of qualitative elements, such as those said above. But, at the same time, a qualitative description of a physical landscape, or of the life and conditions of animals, do not seem to be subjectivist, but objective. This helps us to know qualities objectively, and not subjectively only.

3. The perceptionistic thesis holds that our sensations indicate true and proper qualities of material things – that is, colours, sounds, temperatures etc. are real in themselves. But If so, there is no phenomenological difference between cases of ‘illusions’ and that of ‘veridical perception’, e.g., rope-snake.

4. A moderated perceptionistic theory is more a realistic view of sensible qualities, though, sometimes, things are not exactly as they appear such as for e.g., sun seems moving; but really earth moves. Accordingly, not only that the sensible qualities are objectively present, but also that, they have an operativity independent of their activity, on a sentient (i.e., qualities do not act equally on all sentients). e.g., a) colour put on the head, are objectively same colour, but it sickens some. Thus, it is qualitative or subjective but also has objectivity; E.g. b) that’s why sound is qualitatively present to the hearer, but at the same time, sometimes it can break one’s earldom. E.g, c) Light has concrete effects on the material beings but also that, they act differently on different bodies– e.g., on the plants in a way different from man; - oxygen, carbon dioxide etc. d) heat dilates (makes larger or bigger) body.

So in reality it is possible to have a science of qualities, though modern physics considers it in a quantitative manner. World of objects are quantitatively (what is measureable) objective and also qualitatively subjective.

Positional objectivity of Amartya Sen has to be understood in this context (in the notes of Kant)

T. 25. Errors of senses

Ordinarily, proper sensibles cannot go wrong. The perception that there is white before us cannot be false, but perception that what it is white, could be false; e.g., the seeing a special object of sight (for e.g., white) can never be in error, but the belief that the white object seen as a man, may be mistaken. So, a mistaken judgement (judging of an error) on a proper sense-object lies not in the ambit of error of sense, but in the ambit of an intellectual judgement. E.g., to judge a white piece of card as red is an intellectual error.

Errors of sensationscan happen due to

1. poor functioning of sense organs, or due to imagination (i.e., a branch of tree could be wrongly imagined to be a person). If corrected, it can provide with correct sense knowledge

2. Errors on certain common sensibles are more frequent. E.g., errors on distance, number of objects, movements etc. But, a complete experience will correct them. Common sensibles sometimes fall into the errors of sensibles per accidens, such as for e.g., a certain coloured object is a man; a rope seems to be a snake in a dimmed light, which, however, claims ‘positional objectivity’ of everyone feeling the same, and not to someone alone due to mental nervousness or morbid fear of snakes.

3. Lack of precision of measurements due to physical apparatusis not an error but an imperfection. It is because such limitations are inherent in the instruments of observations

4. Scientific description of things is not a counterpart to an ordinary description of things, but they are only different planes of kng. E.g., a city seen from an aeroplane and from a ground seems different. But it is rather a limited kng than an error. It may lead to an error if they present a thing in a different way. E.g., a white card is presented as red through red window.

Often, distinction (distinguishing) between an image and a reality vanisheswhen common sense (sense consciousness or feeling the feeling) does not function well and when there lacks use of reason.

Chapter 6.TRUTH

TOPIC: 29: TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TRUTH

Philosophies opposing theories of truth

There are different views regarding the quest of truth. Scepticism would say that man is incapable of knowing truth. That is, having denied access to truth or theoretical knowledge, the sceptics and relativists say that any opinion whatsoever is true; so even two contradictory propositions could be simultaneously true.Absolute idealism would reduce every reality to idea. For them, so every idea is true to fact; human intelligence is identical with reality (Hegel etc.).Wittgenstein, the philosopher of language, held that philosophy cannot serve as a science of true propositions about reality or truth; it is therefore not the task of philosophy to enquire into the totality of such truths, but natural sciences do. Why can’t there be philosophy truth? It is because we always operate within a ‘language game’; that is, one cannot get out of language. The function of language is inter-subjective communication only, andnot a reference to reality; that is, that language is not a neutral tool (or not an objective tool) meant to describe outside reality.So philosophy, instead, deals with meaning of propositions, clarification of thoughts, and not reference to reality or not to set of a number of propositions.

What is truth, then?

Since, therefore, there are thus different views regarding the quest of truth, we are inclined to ask certain questions:Is philosophy a discipline to enquire into truth? If not, why? If yes, what is the truth? (Pontius’ Pilot’s question). Can we know truth? Are there one or many truths? What is the basis to say sth is true? What are the criteria of truth? Are we looking for definition or criterion of truth? There are three traditional theories of truth. We will examine one by one.

1. Coherence theory

This theory is an elaboration of Kantian and Cartesian solutions to truth; that is, truth does not need reference to the world of empirical reality. Truth, for Descartes, is the ‘knowledge of clear and distinct ideas’ as in a mathematical truth, which have nothing to do with experience. For Kant and Descartes, truth is the conformity of ideas of mind (idealism).Basically thus, logicalcoherence of statements and conclusion makes a syllogism true;that is, its conclusion is true if it coheres with the premises]. Truth is not that the idea coheres with reality, but idea coheres with ideas. Coherence of ideas is the criterion of truth.The truth of a proposition is not so much measured with facts, but by comparing with other statements. If the ideas agree themselves, the statement is true; if not, it is false. E.g., If I say, ‘Pierce is a fool but he is intelligent’, it is incoherent and do not agree with each other, and so they are not true.

Criticism: all the logically coherent system of beliefs need not make it true.E.g., ‘universe is perfect, and the perfect is uncaused’, therefore ‘the universe is uncaused. This syllogism is coherent, but it is not true to the facts.

2. Pragmatist theory of truth

William James, will claim that Utility is the criteria of truth. Accordingly, what is useful, practical, helpful make some statement true. William James “philosophy is not sufficient unto itself but plunges eagerly into reality, into science, into life, there to be refreshed and rejuvenated” – he was speaking about pragmatism in philosophy. He took this idea from C.S. Peirce but he altered the process. For Peirce, usefulness is the criterion for meaningfulness, on account of which,scientific terms can be considered meaningful only if its use has practical consequences. But James Bentham applied this to truth. For him, what bears fruit for any length of time is true. Accordingly, that which man thinks, wishes or does is true.Thus, a statement is true not because it corresponds to facts or to any logical coherenceof propositions, but because, it serves any useful purpose. If it does, the proposition is true, and if not, the proposition is not true. E.g., according to pragmatism, the proposition ‘it is true that other people exist’, means, ‘it is useful to believe that other people exist’.

Criticism: giving false witness to save the accused from punishment is useful to the client, but it cannot be true.

3. A Brief Exposition of Correspondence theory

St. Thomas asks ‘quid sit veritas?’ orwhat is truth?In his ‘On Truth’ (‘De Veritate’) he defines Truth as ‘adaequatiorei et intellectus’. That is, the conformity of the intellect with real(thing) (that is, idea is not a copy/likeness of reality as claimed by Hume and Kant, but identity/conformity to real);conformity oridentitymeans the truth of a thing is if it is, and not if it is not. It is not a physical conformity, but it maintainsa difference between intentional being and natural being. The ‘correspondence between thought and reality’ is called truth. Or, Truth is ‘whatcorrespond to facts’. Russell distinguishes between facts and truth: ‘facts’ are represented by actual‘books’ in the shelf of library, while ‘truths’ are entries in the catalogue. Ifentries are there in the catalogue, it is presumed ortruethat there should be a book; but may be thebook is found missing.

According to Thomistic definition, one,in finding truth, distinguishes between two distinct elements such as thought and reality, subject and object, intelligence and intelligibility; and then, their uniting or conforming one another in the act of knowledge in the best possible way is called truth.This Thomistic theory refers back toAristotle’s definition of truth: to say of ‘what is, that it is, and what is not, that it is not’; that is the truth’. As against Plato who linked truth with Being, Aristotle claims that truth is primarily a quality of our judgements (in the mind). Judgements mean then that the truth is not a likeness to a thing, but true a thing is if it is, not true a thing is if it is not.

Criticism to this theory

B. Russel would say that our judgements have a subjective and objective side. They are subjectiveif our judgement (of a thing) depends on the mind of the asserter or his beliefs and convictions. It would otherwise mean that the absolute truth or the objective truth is impossible to achieve because our judgements are biased by our viewpoints, and others cannot look through our eyes. Our judgements depend on our mind for the existence of facts but not their truth. But, to this criticism, Mercier would say, our judgements are objectively true if they accurately point to facts or correspond to facts outside (e.g., table corresponds to our thought). Mercier, however, would note that the correspondence theory gives the definition of truth and not the criteria.

TOPIC: Correspondence theory: Three types of progression to Truth

How the conformity between the intellect and the thing known takes place? There are three types of progression of Truth, such as Material truth, Logical truth, Ontological truth.

A) Material truth

Now, the simple apprehension (in knowing what a thing is – ‘quod quid est’) is the first mental operation by which we form a concept. Material truth is simple apprehension of a concept, through comprehending the essence or quiddity of a particular thing (and not some other), by means of a comparison with the thing itself (and not with mind/judgement) (so like a child?). Thus, with the sensation (e.g., odour, colour, smell of some food) and simple apprehension (e.g., (concepts of!) true food, true gold, true man, true god), we possess a material truth;

[e.g., we know what is true gold, that is concept/essence of true gold, true food- this is simple apprehension; but we don’t know a particular thing is true food or not, that happens in judgement- this food is true food; e.g. we have conceptof true gold, but then we find a particular chain as kollam supreme gold]

In other words, material truth is the conformity between knowing faculty (sense!) and the thing (thus sensation), in the simple comprehension. In material truth, we are not in complete knowledge of a thing, but ispossible only in judgement. In material truth, the intellect is still not in act with the complete knowledge of a real being of a thing. Instead, act with the real being of a thing is possible only in judgement (llano, 35).

B. Logical Truth

Logical or epistemological truth is second mental operation of judgement expressed in propositions (relation between knower and object!).

E.g., true gold exists; gold is expensive; My true friend exists, my friend is sitting; god exists; [sitting=material truth; true frined=material]

In simple apprehension, one knows only essence, and not whether the thingreallyis the same as the form or essence of the thing.But, truth or falsity is when essence is in conformity with real or not.Or negatively, one knows a thing as true, not when it knowsessence of a thing, rather only when it judges with proposition that, the thingreally is the same as the form or essence of thething it apprehends (llano, 35).

We do not mean that senses do not correspond to the thing, but instead the senses know, but the conformity which happens in the senses is not conformity of truth, because conformity as such happens when it is cognitively possessed as such. To possess truth means, to know the conformity, but the senses do not know their conformity in any way whatsoever. There are different examples

E.g., when we have material truth of ‘true gold’, we don’t conform it completely whether it is really ‘gold’ until the concept and thing are confirmed; may be, it is a supreme gold covering. E.g., Eventhough the sense of sight possesses the image of what it sees, it does not know that conformity exists between the thing seen and the image it perceives. E.g., when I think of ‘red’, I have a real conformity with the object (of concept) in my mind, which is derived from the specific rose which I know see. But to have the concept of redness is not the same thing as formally to know its conformity to a real thing: this rose. That is, to have the concept of redness is not the same thing as formally to know its conformity to a real thing: this rose (llano, 34). [another example: you see someone is in ‘pain’ in the leg; u have sensation of pain and by which u form concept/simple apprehension of ‘pain’, an there is conformity of sense. But your idea of pain, need not correspond to the real pain in the man; may be, it is a fake action from his part to have pain; so, only if your idea of pain and sensation of pain, really does correspond to the leg in wound, it is to be stated as true – corresponding to the fact; otherwise, one can even pretend being in pain without any reality.]

E.g., the conformity of the mirror image of my face is not a conformity of truth, because it is not known by the mirror, but simply had by it.

So during simpleapprehension, mind does not yet knowthat the content of its representation (or concept) is in conformity (or not) with reality, with the res (thing); instead, only in judgement, mind reflects on its contents (of apprehension in order) to affirm its correspondence with reality (llano, 35; sangh, 247).

Truth is not just any sort of conformity, but is essentially a known conformity (llano 32). That is, I can have in my mind an image or a concept of a thing, but there will only be truth properly speaking if I know the conformity explicitly.

So truth is found primarily - that is, formally and explicitly – in the intellect through ‘composing or dividing’ in judgement, and only secondarily – materially or implicitly – in the intellect by forming a concept through simple apprehension. [In judgement – through composition or division – analyses different aspects of the thing with different concepts, which are then composed. E.g., different concepts come together and then we identify the same thing to the thought].

C. Ontological truth [Truth in relation to the different types of intellect.

Is it the conformity of intellect or Mind to reality, or conformity of reality to intellect? It is in both ways.The conformity of Intellect to Things(Mind to Reality) as they are, is called logical truthor truth of mind); this is why we say that mind is true (i.e., after possessing the thing in the mind).

But, ontologically, the being of a thing precedes the aspect of its truth (De veritate, q.1.a.1),while logically truth is found in a more principal way in the intellect than in things. This is when the mind possesses the ‘intentional’ form of a thing(ontologically, this kind of truth is based on the intentional possession of the form of the thing).(as intentional form of the thing; or things known in an immaterial way and as intentional being). Being is true in as much as it is known by the intellect. We say that knowledge is ‘true’ because it manifests and declares the being of things(It is one meaning of truth - as ‘truth of things’)

The intelligence conforming itself to things (or to that which they are) is called logical truth (or truth of mind); in an inverted sense, conformity of Things (Beings) to some Intelligence is called ontological truth (or truth of things).

That is, the order of conformation is that of Reality to Mind (or of things to intellect).

Sth is not white because we think that it really is white, but because it is white we, who affirm this, conform ourselves to truth (llano, 18; sangh,).

This is ontological truth. Being constitutes the foundation of truth. Or being causes truth.

For e.g., to say, being is true, is similarity to medicine cause health,But ‘medicine is not healthy’, though Medicine can be called ‘healthy’ by attribution (in so far it causes health).for e.g., ‘healthy’ is predicated of animals, and so we can say, ‘man is healthy’.

Likewise, while being causes truth, truth is principally in the intellect (and not in being); being is true in so far as it causes truth or in so far is it is in the intellect. that is, the formal constituent of truth is found principally in the intellect (llano, 20). That is, Being rules the intellect and not vice-versa (llano, 18).

This intelligibility of things, or relation between thing and intelligence]. This order of ‘being to intellect’ (Ontological truth) which is based on being or reality, is two fold. That is, this relation is understood in two ways:

1) a non-constitutive relation (not an intrinsic relation), in the sense that things do not depend on the fact that they be known. So, ‘to be is to be known (or perceived)’, is incorrect. Here, Berkeley is incorrect.

2. it is a constitutive relation, if there is an ontological dependence between thought and things to be known, or if a productive thought conceived or caused the thing.

This is a relation that exists bet artificial things and human mind, and between things and the Creator (Intelligence of the Creator)

St Thomas conceives this notion by having recourse to the notion of ‘measure’. Measure is not a quantitative notion (thookkam – mal) here, but it is understood as a criterion to determine the proportions of another element which is measured (measure of truth of things).(sangh, 247).

Intelligence in its speculative function, is measuredby the being of known things (natural things), [or, it can’t measure natural things fully!], but in its practical function, measures the being of produced or artificial things. [intellect causes artificial things!; natural things not caused by intellect, but by god!].

Thus, a) human practical intellect is the cause of becoming of artificial things (art); that is, the artisan produces his work in accordance with the exemplary idea he has in his mind, and therefore it depends on him its conformity to his paradigm. Therefore human intelligence is the measure of the truth of artificial things (which is produced by it).

b) Speculative intellect of man gets knowledge from natural things or from being moved by them. On their part, natural things measure the speculative mind. [He is not the creator of natural things. The intellect contemplates things as they are. So these things are the measure or rule of the truth of the speculative intellect]].

c) Instead, divine intellect measures things radically because it is the origin of their entire reality. In the divine intellect are found all things as the artificial things are in the mind of artisan.

-Thus,

a) Divine intellect (and its truth) measures and is not measured

b) The thing (and its truth) is measured by divine intellect, but measures human intelligence

c) Human intelligence measures only artificial things but is measured by natural things (llano, 21)

How far things are conformed, and in which way? Conformity of things (meaning adapt; not ‘confirm’=validitate):

Truth is when man judges things according to their being (form), (or conformity) and so, Error results from discordance between that which it thinks and that which is (e.g., if man conceives God, he would then fall into error; so also with natural things). [then conformity to object and not a thing, for man; for God conformity to thing!]

Things are constitutively true (or true in a constitute sense), only insofar as one confirms to the form God has thought for them [as they conform to Platonic IDEAS). And therefore, things cannot be constitutively true for the intelligibility of man [e.g., knowing god by man].

Only in God there is perfect conformity between thought and reality; He is identical to His intelligence; and in him, there is no distinction between the mind and the truth of a thing, between intelligence and intelligibility.

- Humanintelligence at an initial stage falls into ‘unconformity’ (bet thought and reality). It isbecause the proper object of intelligence is the abstract universal essence, while things are concrete and individual. [seeing a thing from a distance, we fall into unconformity, because we start to conceive them from genus into species etc; living (bc, moving)-animal-man-)

So, to reach conformity, human intellect mustadapt itself to the type of intelligibility of things (e.g., artificial/natural), and must also adapt to certain methodological rules derived from our rational nature [inductive and deductive etc.; analysis, synthesis, genus-species; division] [therefore, a lunatic saying this is the thing; but not true or not conformity; we say so, using certain methodological rules of reasoning – inductive and deductive; genus-species etc]. [The conformation happens between mind and reality and vice-versa. Or this conformation happens in two-ways (llano, 17-18, 32ff ;sangh, 247). The difference between ontological truth and logical truth or statements (refer, mercier, 42-43)]]

In the final analysis, [metaphysical realism would not pretend that] the intelligence is identical with reality as is suggested by absolute idealism; nor does it accept as scepticism thinks, that man is incapable of knowing truth; nor is truth identical with freedom [or, truth is not what one wishes]as is suggested by pragmatism. But metaphysical realism would hold that truth is a task and a threshold to cross; that is, truth is a conformity between intellect and thing, but this conformity must be conquered as the fruit of a process, and at times, it istiring and its performance cannot be taken for granted to find truth.

Aristotle says, “we can never find truth fully, but we may not be disappointed either, in our attempt to find truth. It is because, each one has to say something about truth. We, separately, do not say about truth considerably. But when we come together, we can get a considerable knowledge” [Metaphysics, Bk, 2, Part 1].

TOPIC. Propertiesor characteristics of Truth

1. Knowable by man: It is against scepticism. Just as the first ethical truth of the necessity is to ‘do good and avoid evil’, its counterpart proposition ‘man can know truth’ is the first metaphysical-noetical/epistemological truth. It means, man has the capacity to know truth. The base or the fact of this principle of capability of knowing truth, is two reasons:

a) the principle of non-contradiction of being – it implies that if you affirm something, you cannot affirm the contrary. If you affirm that man has no capability to know, you are at least affirming this truth. [Whoever affirms something, intends not to affirm the contrary.In other words, if you negate this universal principle to know truth, you are affirming at least something - at least the truth of its negation; Or, if one doubts this universal principle, then one would know the truth of his doubt. So man can know truth. Thus, in every judgement (which affirms or negates something), human mind implicitly knows truth.

b) As St Thomas says, ‘cognitive faculties cannot err in the knowledge of its object unless through some defect or corruption’. As the sight does not err in the knowledge of colours, except because of corruption, the cognitivefaculty cannot err naturally in the judgement of its object. It is because, the cognitive faculty is directed to being/truth and the perfection of things. Since the object of intellect is truth (or knowledge of being), there exists a natural tendency of intelligence toward truth.Error exists always as an accidental phenomenon (defect), which ordinarily can be known, corrected or eliminated in some way. E.g., when I say, it is raining, it is true; instead, if someone else says that stones are being pelted instead of raining, it can be corrected; when one says, animals talk, then he is affirming something false. Errors thus can be corrected to affirm truth. Thus tendency towards truth is natural to intelligence because ‘conformity to things belongs to the nature of intelligence’.

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2. Truth is ‘One’ – there exists as many truths as there are judgements, but this does not mean that there exist contradictory truths. One can also understand by ‘unique’ truth that of God, the eternal Truth, counterpoising multiple temporal truths.

3. Not more or less (Indivisible): we cannot have knowledge which is more or less one. A judgement such as 2+2=4,is not more or less true. There can be gradation of erroror falsity, in relation to true judgement, but not gradation of truth. E.g., it is more false to say of a man of 30 is 8, than to place him as 29 years.

4. Immutable: ‘Immutable’ means that there are those truths which do not change with time. Necessary truths are always true, since they refer to realities which are immutableE.g., for immutable truths, 2+2=4. In this sense, historical truths are not immutable truths, but may change with passing of time.

5. Absolute (or universal): accordingly, truth is not relative to man. There is no truth of mine, which is opposed to others. It is because of the principle of non-contradiction. Truths are not arbitrarily subjective, but endowed with an amount of ‘objectivity’ for e.g., the cat is on the mat; Indira Gandhi was assassinated.

6 .Relativeto where you stand (positional objectivity). That is, sometimes object is an entity of reason with respect of a positional character – e.g., table for me is on the right, but for you on the left. E.g., an object isseen differently from different sides’ another e.g., a thing is seen small or big; or,there is truly relative entity- e.g., earth moves with respect to sun, and not with respect to its inhabitants; This is why errors on the sensible communesmay occur.There could also be different systems of measurement (say, personal truth).E.g., ‘I believe that p is true’; when someone else says this, he is not acting in an arbitrary fashion; on the contrary he is animated by universal intent, and he hopes that his findings will coincide with the findings of others – it is regarding personal truth.

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