With McCarthy too weak to resist Freedom caucus, a collision is imminent in 8 months between them, Greene, and Biden over Ukraine armaments
Putin lover Marjorie Greene who never saw a Kremlin policy she did not like is the canary in the coal mine, but see this, as to the coming blow out
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Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announces the Biden Administration's commitment of $3.075 billion in additional security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $2.85 billion to meet Ukraine's critical security and defense needs, as well as the Department of State's announcement of $225 million in Foreign Military Financing to contribute to the long-term capacity and modernization of Ukraine's military
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With Marjorie Greene demanding NO money for Ukraine, in 2023, this will lead to the mother of all confrontations, in Fall 2023: Putin lover Greene demanding total RUSSIAN victory versus everyone ELSE, not in thrall of Putin
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Yet U.S. political support for Ukraine remains bipartisan. Congress passed multiple aid packages for Ukraine by?bipartisan?majorities?multiple times this year,?including?another $45?billion?as part of a broader government funding bill last week. And although there have been calls by some on the right for more scrutiny of Ukraine aid, Zelenskyy?received?a warm welcome from both sides of the aisle when he addressed a joint meeting of Congress.
Political support for Ukraine will in all likelihood continue. True, the Republicans?won?control of the House of Representatives in November, and likely Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy promised that Ukraine would no longer receive a “blank check.” And yes, some of Ukraine's staunchest legislative?supporters?will not return for the next congressional session. But at the same time, some of the candidates from the Republican Party's isolationist wing?lost?their bids in November. And plenty of Republican leaders still?support?more Ukraine military aid, even if they want increased oversight about how that money is spent.
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Putin LOVER Marjorie Greene, whom fantasizes to be the US Vice President in 2025 will do her best maybe with Russian assistance to change the numbers on support around,.
This will become tricky in the five outcomes of the war 2023
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NATO supports Ukraine but won’t engage forces?
NATO maintains that Russia is the aggressor in this conflict, says Julie Garey, an assistant teaching professor of political science at Northeastern who specializes in international relations and U.S. foreign policy.
snip
'Russia's spring offensive will be key'
Michael Clarke, associate director of the Strategic Studies Institute, Exeter, UK
Those who seek to invade another country anywhere across the great Eurasian steppes are condemned eventually to winter in it.
snip
'Ukraine will win back its land'
Andrei Piontkovsky, scientist and analyst based in Washington DC
Ukraine will win by restoring completely its territorial integrity by spring 2023 at the latest. Two factors are shaping this conclusion.
One is the motivation, determination and courage of the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian nation as a whole, which is unprecedented in modern war history.
snip
'There is no end in sight'
Barbara Zanchetta, Department of War Studies, King's College London
Vladimir Putin expected Ukraine's passive acceptance of its more powerful neighbour's actions, with no meaningful involvement of other countries. This grave miscalculation has led to a protracted conflict, with seemingly no end in sight.
The winter will be difficult, as Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure will try to break the morale and endurance of an already shattered population. But Ukrainian resilience has proved to be remarkable. They will stand firm. The war will drag on. And on.
snip
'No other outcome except Russian defeat'
Ben Hodges, former commanding general, United States Army Europe
Things will move slower over the winter but there's no doubt that Ukraine's forces will be better able to cope than Russia's because of all the winter equipment coming from the UK, Canada and Germany.
By January, Ukraine could be in a position to begin the final phase of the campaign which is the liberation of Crimea
snip
'Expect more of the same'
David Gendelman, military expert based in Israel
Instead of "how it's going to end" here is what each side would like to achieve in the next phase..
The occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions will continue but a major Russian breakthrough like a drive from the south to Pavlograd to encircle the Ukrainian forces in the Donbas is less likely.
More probable is a continuation of current tactics - a slow grinding of Ukrainian forces on narrow directions and a slow advance, like in Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas, with possible same tactics in Svatove-Kreminna area.'
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We can expect that the radical right in the USA will do its best to demand total Russian occupation of the EU and the destruction of NATO. In particular Greene will be orchestrating attacks on all those resisting Putin. But in the end it will be a slow grinding conclusion to one of the mentioned scenarios for 2023
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IMMEDIATE RELEASE
More Than $3 Billion in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine
Jan. 6, 2023?|???
Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announces the Biden Administration's commitment of $3.075 billion in additional security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $2.85 billion to meet Ukraine's critical security and defense needs, as well as the Department of State's announcement of $225 million in Foreign Military Financing to contribute to the long-term capacity and modernization of Ukraine's military.?
The Presidential Drawdown is the twenty-ninth such drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine that the Biden Administration has authorized since August 2021. Capabilities in this package include:
The Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and other armored vehicles and artillery systems will complement the recent commitment of combat vehicles to Ukraine by Germany and France. DoD also welcomes Germany's commitment to join the United States in supporting Ukraine's urgent requirement for air defense capabilities by also supplying one Patriot air defense battery to Ukraine.?
The Biden Administration will continue to encourage Allies and partners to make additional donations of air defense systems, artillery, combat vehicles, and other critical capabilities to support Ukraine in defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity for as long as it takes. Toward that end, the Department of State also announced today $682 million in additional Foreign Military Financing to incentivize and backfill donations of military equipment to Ukraine by Allies and partners.
In total, the United States has committed more than $24.9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration. Since 2014, the United States has committed more than $27 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and more than $24.2 billion since the beginning of Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion on February 24.
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Whereas this is what Greene will be doing her best to torpedo
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Much of the concern about the United States suffering from war fatigue stems from a?series?of (PDF)?polls (PDF)?of the American electorate that found popular support for Ukraine slipping. Separate surveys from the?Wall Street Journal, the?Chicago Council on Global Affairs (PDF), and the?Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute (PDF)?found that, while an overwhelming majority of Americans still backed Ukraine and believed Russia was the aggressor, a growing minority—particularly among Republicans—believed the United States was providing too much aid and that the war was costing the United States too much.
These numbers need to be taken in context. First, in absolute terms, support for Ukraine among Americans remains relatively robust—hovering at?57?percent (PDF)?or?more (PDF), depending on the poll.
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Whereas
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The Myth of America's Ukraine Fatigue
COMMENTARY
(Foreign Policy)
A worker installs Ukrainian and U.S. flags along Pennsylvania Avenue ahead of a visit by Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2022
Photo by Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
by?Raphael S. Cohen?and?Gian Gentile
January 3, 2023
As the Ukraine war grinds into its second year, one of the big strategic questions is whether or not Americans and their allies are growing tired of the war. Indeed, there are media accounts of unnamed senior U.S. officials?warning?Kyiv about this concern—and Ukrainians, understandably, also?worry?that their Western backers might grow tired of the war. The question of whether Western support for Ukraine is waning has kept the?pollsters busy?and?dominated?the?opinion?pages. In all likelihood, this was a major reason why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled to Washington earlier this month, leaving his country for the first time since the war began.
But just how real is Americans' war fatigue? Less than it seems, most likely.
Much of the concern about the United States suffering from war fatigue stems from a?series?of (PDF)?polls (PDF)?of the American electorate that found popular support for Ukraine slipping. Separate surveys from the?Wall Street Journal, the?Chicago Council on Global Affairs (PDF), and the?Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute (PDF)?found that, while an overwhelming majority of Americans still backed Ukraine and believed Russia was the aggressor, a growing minority—particularly among Republicans—believed the United States was providing too much aid and that the war was costing the United States too much.
These numbers need to be taken in context. First, in absolute terms, support for Ukraine among Americans remains relatively robust—hovering at?57?percent (PDF)?or?more (PDF), depending on the poll. This is a remarkable fact, particularly now that the war is nearly a year old. Nor is it?unusual?for there to be a partisan skew in opinion on a war. Conflicts—including in Vietnam,?Iraq, and?Afghanistan—often begin with support from both sides of the aisle. But as wars draw on, and as the original motive for the intervention begins to fade from collective memory, partisan?divides?creep in.
Just how real is Americans' war fatigue? Less than it seems, most likely.
Yet U.S. political support for Ukraine remains bipartisan. Congress passed multiple aid packages for Ukraine by?bipartisan?majorities?multiple times this year,?including?another $45?billion?as part of a broader government funding bill last week. And although there have been calls by some on the right for more scrutiny of Ukraine aid, Zelenskyy?received?a warm welcome from both sides of the aisle when he addressed a joint meeting of Congress.
Political support for Ukraine will in all likelihood continue. True, the Republicans?won?control of the House of Representatives in November, and likely Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy promised that Ukraine would no longer receive a “blank check.” And yes, some of Ukraine's staunchest legislative?supporters?will not return for the next congressional session. But at the same time, some of the candidates from the Republican Party's isolationist wing?lost?their bids in November. And plenty of Republican leaders still?support?more Ukraine military aid, even if they want increased oversight about how that money is spent.
What's more, U.S. foreign policy has rarely perfectly followed the polls. Although successive presidential administrations have complained about the “blob” or “deep state” that blocks their foreign-policy agendas, the fact remains that Americans, for the most part, have allowed their leaders more latitude on foreign than domestic matters. That's partly because Americans tend to?care?less about foreign-policy issues than they do about domestic ones—particularly those that directly impact their pocketbooks.
That's not to say that Americans don't have views about foreign policy. They do. Ask Americans about any particular issue—especially one that has attracted as much media attention as Ukraine—and most will offer an opinion. But polls are a snapshot in time and often change with events. Should Russia do something shocking—such as employing a nuclear weapon or trying to?capture?Kyiv again—support for Ukraine among the naysayers may well rebound.
Another thing worth remembering is that Americans hate to lose. Case in point: Americans overwhelmingly?approved?then-President Barack Obama's withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq in 2011—only to?slam?his handling of Iraq when the Islamic State nearly overran the country in 2014. President Joe Biden's own tenure follows a similar course: Americans?supported?withdrawing from Afghanistan, but they blamed him for the debacle that followed. In war, from a purely political perspective, it's usually safer for politicians to stay the course.
Perhaps this is why democracies' track records of playing the long game in armed conflicts is actually pretty good. From the ancient Athenians during the?Peloponnesian War?on through to the present day, democracies have not usually been the fickle, shrinking violets their detractors make them out to be. In the United States, the wars in?Korea, Vietnam,?Iraq, and?Afghanistan?were all eventually deeply unpopular. Yet the United States fought for three years in Korea, almost nine years in Iraq (before going back in after the initial withdrawal), and almost 20 years in both Vietnam and Afghanistan. All these campaigns involved significantly more investment of American blood and treasure than the U.S. commitment to Ukraine has demanded thus far.
Finally, the most important reason to be skeptical of Americans' supposed Ukraine fatigue is, quite simply, that there is no such thing. Americans are not, in literal fact, exhausted by this war. With the possible exception of the handful of U.S. policymakers directly engaged in U.S. policy toward Ukraine, as well as those U.S. forces elsewhere in Europe providing security assistance and humanitarian relief, few Americans are actively engaged in the conflict. The United States is not suffering losses on the battlefield, nor is it enduring energy shortages. For most Americans, gas prices today average a few cents?less?than a year ago. And Americans aren't paying higher taxes due to the war, either. Since Congress does not need to balance the federal budget, aid for Ukraine is not coming at the expense of domestic spending, at least for the moment.
A variety of American opinionmakers have their own reasons for amplifying the Ukraine fatigue narrative. Some “America first” Republicans may?find?the war a distraction and would prefer to talk about domestic issues, such as immigration and crime. Certain liberal anti-war activists may?have?a knee-jerk reaction to any U.S. military involvement, however indirect. For some media commentators, the war fatigue narrative is an easy way to frame a complex foreign topic as a domestic political debate. And a handful of voices may genuinely?sympathize?with Russian talking points, which regularly include the idea that the West will tire of helping Ukraine. Some Americans may really believe that they are paying more of a price for the conflict than they in fact are, but this is primarily based on perceptions—not facts.
In other words, the United States' Ukraine fatigue is more myth than reality. This has important implications for the war itself. Right now, Russia's strategy seems to be largely based on?protraction: Let the war grind on, and eventually the United States and its allies will lose interest, and the Ukrainians will cave. In all likelihood, this strategy will not work. If past is precedent, and present trends continue, it could be years before any of the declines in the American public's support actually result in a change of policy.
At the same time, these polls should be a clarion call for U.S. leaders and the United States' allies and partners all over the world. Russia's invasion of Ukraine was more than just a dispute of borders and political allegiances: It was an attack on the liberal international order itself. To their great credit, democracies all over the world responded appropriately. As the war drags on, the leaders of the free world need to remind their publics what is at stake in Ukraine—not just for European and global security, but for democracy at large.
Zelenskyy's visit to Washington was one important step in reminding Americans what is at stake, but it was only a beginning. The war in Ukraine, unfortunately, does not seem likely to end soon. As long as the fight continues on the battlefield, the battle for Western opinion must go on as well.
Raphael S. Cohen is the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at RAND Project Air Force. Gian Gentile is the deputy director of the RAND's Army Research Division.
This commentary originally appeared on?Foreign Policy?on January 2, 2023. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.
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https://news.northeastern.edu/2023/01/05/russia-putin-ukraine-war-2023/
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REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE UKRAINE/RUSSIA WAR AND WHAT WE CAN EXPECT IN 2023
Local residents carry their belongings as they leave their home ruined in the Saturday Russian rocket attack in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. AP Photo/Andriy Andriyenko
by?Alena Kuzub
January 5, 2023
Review of the state of the Ukraine/Russia war and what we can expect in 2023
After 10 months of war, Ukraine did not see a ceasefire on New Year’s Eve, which is usually widely celebrated in the former Soviet Union republics.?
Instead, Ukrainian air defenses reportedly?intercepted drones?that Russia again sent to strike Ukrainian infrastructure during consecutive nights from Dec. 31 to Jan. 2.??
More surprising was the announcement on Thursday that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin ordered a 36-hour ceasefire starting at 12 a.m. Jan. 6 to allow citizens living in the areas of hostilities and professing Orthodoxy to attend church services on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.
Ukraine did not immediately react to Putin’s ceasefire announcement. However, a senior adviser to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Mykhailo Podolyak, called the “Christmas truce” a?“cynical trap and an element of propaganda.”
Russia maintains that it would entertain the idea of peace talks only when Ukraine takes into account “new territorial realities,” meaning its one-sided annexation in September of Ukrainian Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.
“Both countries seem to be very far away in terms of a compromise that can be reached,” says?Pablo Calderon Martinez, assistant professor of politics and international relations at Northeastern University-London.?
Although Ukraine has been doing very well defensively, he says, neither side can claim outright victory. He cannot see Ukraine taking back or giving away its territory in the East, currently occupied by Russia, nor Russia pulling back to pre-war borders.
“It’s the ultimate definition of a stalemate. We are entering a war of attrition, really,” Calderon Martinez says.
Russia is weakened in many ways, which is starting to show in 2023, says Mai’a Cross, dean’s professor of political science, international affairs and diplomacy, and director of Northeastern’s Center for International and World Cultures. The country’s economy experienced a contraction in 2022 after being cut off from the global economy as a result of Western sanctions.
“There is the ongoing question of how Russia is going to make money from selling oil and energy resources,” Cross says.
It currently relies on China and India, which are willing to find ways around sanctions, she says. But the country was selling most of its energy resources to Europe, and being cut off from that source of income will be an increased challenge in 2023.?
Intelligence and analysts suggest that Russia is running low on ammunition and equipment, Cross says. It is going to be quite difficult for Russia to import basic goods and military weaponry, like the missiles it has been using to indiscriminately attack regular Ukrainian citizens and infrastructure.?
Cross also believes that with more than 80,000 troops killed the Russian professional army that had started the war is experiencing a collapse.
But Ukraine still remains a relatively small country with a relatively small military force, Calderon Martinez says, relying on support from the outside. It is highly unlikely that NATO will decide to get involved with boots on the ground, he says.
“I don’t really see a way out of it for either of the countries,” Calderon Martinez says. “Of course, the war will have to end at some point or will have to subside at some point. How it will happen, we’ll have to see.”?
NATO supports Ukraine but won’t engage forces?
NATO maintains that Russia is the aggressor in this conflict, says Julie Garey, an assistant teaching professor of political science at Northeastern who specializes in international relations and U.S. foreign policy.
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“They want Ukraine to be able to decide its own destiny, free of Russian interference,” she says.
Garey believes the alliance’s support is largely reflected in the support the U.S. has been providing Ukraine. The U.S. Congress approved?$45 billion?worth of assistance to Ukraine as part of the $1.66 trillion?government funding bill?for 2023.?
The U.S. public is predominantly unified around the notion that the U.S. is fighting Russia by supporting Ukraine and that Russia is an entity that should be opposed.?
NATO is also active in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania because of what’s happening close to its borders, she says.?
“They are dealing with not only perhaps the threat of the conflict spilling over, but also with refugees, people leaving Ukraine,” she says.
However, a missile killing two people when it hit a Polish village about 4 miles from the Ukrainian border shows that the allies recognize the importance of taking a moment to decide how to engage as an organization, Garey says.
Ultimately, Poland decided to treat what had happened as an isolated incident. The alliance undertook reviews of its defense mechanisms.?
“NATO is not interested in engaging in a large-scale war,” she says. “Prolonged military engagements are expensive.”
NATO refrained from announcing a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine because that would have required willingness to use force, Garey says. It also would create a potential for an accidental use of force or a deliberate use of force.?
“I think there was a real reluctance to open that door,” Garey says, given that Russia is a nuclear power. “The other thing that probably does come into play is that Ukraine is not a member of NATO.”
But the allies have the ability to act as individual units, she says. NATO doesn’t prohibit them from reacting in ways they see fit.
Russia nuclear threat still remains
Despite Russia being weakened, Cross says, it still has thousands of nuclear weapons that have been maintained over the decades. If Putin is desperate to claim some kind of victory, she says, he might use them.
“The threat remains that if he feels backed into a corner and the losses of the Russian military continue to be so humiliating, there’s the possibility of using those [weapons],” she says.?
Russia also could ramp up propaganda domestically and hybrid attacks abroad to try to destabilize Western elections, for example, or advance anti-Western narratives through social media, Cross says.?
She has come across U.S. think tanks and European governments using the argument that Putin was forced to engage Ukraine in war because of the expansion of NATO.?
“It’s disturbing, and it actually works. People actually do start to make these arguments that totally line up with what Putin wants out there,” Cross says. “That sort of narrative is completely counterproductive when it comes to helping the Ukrainians.”?
Europe can tap into more non-military resources
“By and large in Europe, support for Ukraine seems to be the de facto position,” Calderon Martinez says.
“It absolutely doesn’t have a choice in this matter, because this is about the future of Europe,” Cross says.
Russia doesn’t have many tools at its disposal to discourage the West from supporting Ukraine, Calderon Martinez says. Its main leverage—energy shortage intimidation tactics—didn’t work as the European Union was able to efficiently shift away from Russian energy dependency, procuring more than 90% of its energy supplies from elsewhere. The weather in December and early January has been milder, as well.
In the U.K., Calderon Martinez says, support for Ukraine is unconditional and unwavering.
“That’s the one policy point that has made both mainstream political parties agree on,” he says.
As for the EU, he cannot see big players like Germany and France—and countries in the middle like Poland, Italy and Spain—deviating from supporting Ukraine despite some past pro-Putin sentiment within right-wing parties in Italy, France and Hungary.
Although the EU is much more limited than the U.S. when it comes to providing military equipment, Cross says, it can deepen sanctions, solicit diplomatic support and use its civilian resources to bolster governmental systems in Ukraine and help rebuild infrastructure to stabilize cities.
Will it take China to pressure Russia into peace talks?
A?virtual meeting?held between Putin and Xi Jinping, the president of the People’s Republic of China, on Dec. 30 demonstrated that Putin is looking for an ally to supply weaponry and basic economic goods, Cross says.
“But that relationship is not a natural one, in many ways,” she says.?
Although both Putin and Xi are serious authoritarian leaders, they have nothing in common beyond that, Cross says.?
“If his biggest possible supporter is Xi Jinping, then that is a very weak relationship,” Cross says, as China has demonstrated reluctance in supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from day one.
Although China would not want to be seen as pro-American or pro-NATO, Calderon Martinez says, it is going through a particularly tricky moment with the end of the COVID-19 restrictions. The government needs to provide high levels of economic growth that its citizens were accustomed to before the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war.
“So it’s possible that they might start putting pressure on Russia to change their approach [to the war],” Calderon Martinez says.?
?For media inquiries, please contact?[email protected].
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Written by?Alena Kuzub.
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Whereas
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Ukraine war: Five ways conflict could go in 2023
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The conflict in Ukraine is about to enter its second calendar year. We asked several military analysts how they think events on the ground will unfold in 2023.
Could it conclude in the coming year and how - on the battlefield or at the negotiating table? Or might it grind on to 2024?
'Russia's spring offensive will be key'
Michael Clarke, associate director of the Strategic Studies Institute, Exeter, UK
Those who seek to invade another country anywhere across the great Eurasian steppes are condemned eventually to winter in it.
Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin all had to keep their armies moving in the face of a steppes winter, and now - his invasion going backwards on the ground - Vladimir Putin is digging his forces in for the winter to await a new Russian offensive in the spring.
Both sides need a pause but the Ukrainians are better equipped and motivated to keep going, and we can expect them to maintain the pressure, at least in the Donbas.
Around Kreminna and Svatove they are very close to a big breakthrough that would throw Russian forces 40 miles back to the next natural defensive line, close to where their invasion effectively began in February.
Kyiv will be reluctant to halt when the immediate prize is so great. Ukrainian offensives might, nevertheless, pause down in the south-west, following the recovery of Kherson.
Crossing over to the east side of the Dnipro river to pressure Russia's vulnerable road and rail links into Crimea might be too demanding. But the possibility of Kyiv launching a surprise new offensive can never be ruled out.
For 2023, the key determinant will be the fate of Russia's spring offensive. Putin had admitted that about 50,000 of the newly mobilised troops are already at the front; the other 250,000 of those just mobilised are training for next year.
There is no scope for anything but more war until the fortunes of those new Russian forces are settled on the battlefield.
A short and unstable ceasefire is the only other prospect. Putin has made it clear he will not stop. And Ukraine has made it clear it is still fighting for its life.
'Ukraine will win back its land'
Andrei Piontkovsky, scientist and analyst based in Washington DC
Ukraine will win by restoring completely its territorial integrity by spring 2023 at the latest. Two factors are shaping this conclusion.
One is the motivation, determination and courage of the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian nation as a whole, which is unprecedented in modern war history.
The other is the fact that, after years of appeasement of a Russian dictator, the West has finally grown up to realise the magnitude of historical challenge it faces. This is best illustrated by a recent statement by Nato General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg.
"The price we pay is in money. While the price the Ukrainians pay is in blood. If authoritarian regimes see that force is rewarded we will all pay a much higher price. And the world will become a more dangerous world for all of us."
The exact timing of the inevitable Ukrainian victory will be determined by the speed at which Nato can deliver a new game-changing package of military assault weapons (tanks, planes, long-ranged missiles).
I expect Melitopol will become the key battle point in the coming months (maybe weeks). Having taken over Melitopol, Ukrainians will easily move to the Azov Sea, effectively cutting off supply and communication lines to Crimea.
Russian capitulation will be formally agreed upon at technical talks after devastating Ukrainian advances on the battleground.
The victorious powers - Ukraine, UK, USA - will shape a new international security architecture.
'There is no end in sight'
Barbara Zanchetta, Department of War Studies, King's College London
Vladimir Putin expected Ukraine's passive acceptance of its more powerful neighbour's actions, with no meaningful involvement of other countries. This grave miscalculation has led to a protracted conflict, with seemingly no end in sight.
The winter will be difficult, as Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure will try to break the morale and endurance of an already shattered population. But Ukrainian resilience has proved to be remarkable. They will stand firm. The war will drag on. And on.
The prospects for negotiation are bleak. For a potential peace deal the core demands of at least one side need to change. There is no evidence that this has happened, or that it will happen soon.
How will the end come, then?
The costs of the war, both material and human, might break the level of commitment of the Russian political elite. The key will be inside Russia.
Past wars in which miscalculation was a crucial element, such as Vietnam for United States, or Afghanistan for the Soviet Union, only ended in this way. Domestic political conditions shifted in the country that had miscalculated, making exit - either "honourable" or not - the only viable option.
This may only happen, however, if the West stands firm in its support for Ukraine, in the face of increased domestic pressures linked to the costs of the war.
Sadly, this will continue to be a long-protracted political, economic and military battle of resolve. And by the end of 2023 it will most probably still be ongoing.
'No other outcome except Russian defeat'
Ben Hodges, former commanding general, United States Army Europe
It's too early to plan a victory parade in Kyiv but all the momentum is with Ukraine now and there is no doubt in my mind that they will win this war, probably in 2023.
Things will move slower over the winter but there's no doubt that Ukraine's forces will be better able to cope than Russia's because of all the winter equipment coming from the UK, Canada and Germany.
By January, Ukraine could be in a position to begin the final phase of the campaign which is the liberation of Crimea.
We know from history that war is a test of will and a test of logistics. When I see the determination of the Ukrainian people and soldiers, and the rapidly improving logistical situation for Ukraine, I see no other outcome but a Russian defeat.
The Russian pull-out from Kherson has partly led me to this conclusion. Firstly as a psychological boost for the Ukrainian people, secondly as a profound embarrassment for the Kremlin and thirdly by handing Ukraine's forces a key operational advantage - all approaches into Crimea are now within range of Ukrainian weapon systems.
I believe that the end of 2023 will see Crimea fully restored to Ukrainian control and sovereignty though there may be some sort or agreement that allows Russia to phase out some of its naval presence in Sevastopol… perhaps even to the end of the treaty (approximately 2025) that had existed before Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea.
Reconstruction efforts will be under way on the Ukrainian infrastructure along the Azov Sea coast, including the important ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, and the reopening of the North Crimean Canal that diverts water from the Dnipro to Crimea will be another important project receiving attention.
'Expect more of the same'
David Gendelman, military expert based in Israel
Instead of "how it's going to end" here is what each side would like to achieve in the next phase.
Only about half of Russia's 300,000 mobilised troops are already in the fighting zone. The rest, together with the forces freed for action after Kherson withdrawal, gives the Russians an opportunity to launch an offensive.
The occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions will continue but a major Russian breakthrough like a drive from the south to Pavlograd to encircle the Ukrainian forces in the Donbas is less likely.
More probable is a continuation of current tactics - a slow grinding of Ukrainian forces on narrow directions and a slow advance, like in Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas, with possible same tactics in Svatove-Kreminna area.
Continuing targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure and other attacks on Ukrainian rear will complete this war of attrition strategy.
Significant Ukrainian forces were also freed after a Russian retreat from Kherson. For them the most strategically valuable direction is south, to Melitopol or Berdyansk, aiming to cut the Russian mainland corridor to Crimea. That would be a major Ukrainian victory, and that is exactly why Russians are fortifying Melitopol.
Another option for Ukraine is Svatove - success there would endanger the whole northern flank of the entire Russian frontline.
The big question is how many Ukrainian forces are free and available for the offensive at this point, and what timetable General Zaluzhnyi has on his desk stating how many new reserve brigades and corps that are being built will be ready in one, two or three months from now, including manpower, armoured vehicles and heavy weapons.
After the mud freezes, we will get the answer to this question. And this answer will get us a little closer to "how it's going to end".
The analysts were chosen for their military expertise and their mix of perspectives
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Andrew Beckwith, PhD