Match-Fixing in Sport

Match-fixing in sport and how it is tackled

Sports organisations and governments are facing match-fixing which is currently threatening the integrity of sports. As the attraction and commerciality of sport depends upon its unpredictability, it will not be supported if the outcome is always guaranteed.[1] The Council of Europe convention[2] defined manipulation of sports competitions as “an intentional arrangement, act or omission, aimed at an improper alteration of the result or course of competition, removing its unpredictability to obtain an undue advantage”.[3] Although sport is mostly governed by private associations claiming autonomy, important issues such as match-fixing impacts the public sphere. This has prompted global attention as to whether ‘Sports Governing Bodies’(SGBs) are best to tackle this cancerous and epidemic threat without the assistance of law enforcement agencies.[4]??

Can the Sports Governing Bodies unaccompanied by law enforcement agencies fight to eradicate match-fixing and ensure protection of sports' pureness and unpredictability?

Anti-corruption regulations(i.e. BWF Code of Conduct)[5] established by ‘Sports Governing Bodies’(SGBs), enforced athletes to succumb to internal disciplinary measures imposed by private sporting tribunals whose jurisprudence formed “Lex - Sportiva” (similar to common law). Therefore as traditionally agreed, SGBs have the ultimate responsibility given their autonomy to keep sports clean from match-fixing. The majority of SGBs now have an anti-corruption unit in place such as the Tennis Integrity Unit(TIU)[6] and the Anti-Corruption and Security Unit for Cricket(ACSU). They have also enforced educational programmes warning athletes of the dangers of match-fixing proving a significant evolvement in this area. This developing infrastructure, tackles effectively the “evils of corruption” occurring in sports events.

Additionally, many SGBs are working closely through memorandum of understanding with crime agencies and international bookmakers(e.g. FIFA and IOC with Interpol) to help in investigating, detecting and penalizing match-fixers.[7] These actions illustrate that SGBs campaign hard to establish a zero tolerance culture against corruption and are up-to-date in dealing with match-fixing. Furthermore, a High Court’s decision on a match-fixing case(Kaneria)[8], “reinforced the principle of unfettered judgement for private sporting tribunals”. The discretion to impose a life ban was left to the cricketing panel(as a private tribunal), rather than with the national courts, as it was more suitable to implement sporting justice due to their extended knowledge and experience of the sport.[9] Further bans enforced by private tribunals as the leading experts in challenging match-fixing, are successful in imposing severe punishments acting as a deterrent. Such examples are Mr. Oriekhov by UEFA,[10] Koellerer[11] by ATP and many others. Considering also that these are complex and costly prosecutions that require high level of expertise, it is doubtful that state law enforcement will prioritise and pursue them more effectively than SGBs as shown in Stephen Lee case.[12] As a result, it can be firmly argued that match-fixing is better served through discrete sporting channels, using a flexible burden of proof(comfortable satisfaction), ensuring consistency and allowing ‘Lex - Sportiva’ to develop autonomously. There is no inherent reason that law enforcement agencies should be the “preeminent regulatory body” as once they interfere, the autonomous SGBs will fade.[13]

Reasons why the SGBs must collaborate with law enforcement agencies to tackle and keep the pureness and unpredictability of sports intact from the intentional and prearranged manipulation of the outcome by the "killers" of sports.

Justifying sports autonomy using the traditional argument of keeping sports free from political intervention, does not protect modern sport from match-fixing. Often, SGBs ?are questioned about their legitimacy and are constantly criticised for their democratic credentials and accountability. Their aim is to protect the private commercial benefits of sport without being concerned of the public interest. Although some SGBs have enforced powerful “normative frameworks and institutional mechanisms,” many of them are reactive rather than pro-active.[14] Betting companies were frustrated with the Tennis Integrity Unit(TIU) as they provided them with a lengthy list of suspicious match-fixing games and received no response. Some reports suggest that the TIU were aware of sportsmen involved in match-fixing and intentionally remained silent for undisclosed reasons, thus demonstrating minimal action against match-fixing. Furthermore, players who received bans by the TIU(e.g. Arkadiusz Kocyla), stated that the process of investigation and sanctioning was unfair, unjust and unclear.[15] These common scandals frequently experienced by many SGBs, infer a “lack of professional management, transparency and good governance” within the sporting world. [16] Therefore, this area of unregulated monopoly allows match-fixing to invade all aspects of sport.

Additionally, in Guillermo case[17] it was exemplified that SGBs lack the necessary jurisdiction and tools for launching investigations or punishing individuals who are not directly related to the world of sports, and as the Chairman of the Anti-Corruption and Security Unit for Cricket(ACSU) said “we are not a police force and we cannot engage in undercover operations”.[18] Since match-fixing is associated with criminal activities, it requires cross-border and multi-agent cooperation to eliminate it. Therefore, it can also be firmly argued that the law enforcement agencies are better candidates than SGBs for providing law enforcement and crime control against match-fixing. More appropriate would be to implement an international convention such as the Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions, since match-fixing is transboundary.[19] Such convention aims at developing cooperation between public authorities, SGBs and betting operators to prevent match-fixing, preserving the integrity of sports. Most importantly, the convention tries to ensure that domestic laws enable to criminally sanction match-fixing when it involves “coercion, corruption or fraudulent practises”. Criminal convictions provide a vigorous deterrent effect and are extremely important and successful prosecutions in English courts, suggest that sport-specific offences are unnecessary. For instance, in Anderson case,[20] a match-fixing conspiracy was challenged under Criminal Law Act 1977 s.1,[21] and a successful application of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 s.1(1)[22] in Butt[23] sentenced the offenders to prison.[24] Other recent statutory instruments are the Fraud Act 2006,[25] Criminal Finance Act 2017[26] on unexplained wealth, and Gambling Act 2005 s.42[27] where on the latter, an attempt to influence the game, was challenged successfully in Mosdall case.[28] These imposed sanctions and/or criminal convictions act as an effective deterrent, discouraging sportsmen from engaging in match-fixing, affecting their personal and professional reputation. Consequently, when it comes to match-fixing, the cooperation between SGBs and law enforcement agencies is crucial. Thus, SGBs can maintain the integrity of sports and unpredictability while governments and law enforcement agencies ensure match-fixing and organised crime is eradicated.

It is fair to argue that in the 21st century both SGBs and law enforcement agencies must collaborate to eliminate Match-Fixing and sustain sport at its purest level.

It is undeniable that match-fixing prevention measures have been developed by SGBs and law enforcement agencies, however the truth is that all sport is still vulnerable. Based on the above analysis, many SGBs have developed powerful control mechanisms and regulations to prevent manipulation of sports, nevertheless law enforcement agencies are still primordial in supporting initiatives established by the SGBs to tackle match-fixing and preserve the integrity of sports. In the 21st century sports autonomy is like a ‘spaghetti bowl’, meaning that both SGBs and law enforcement agencies are required to work together against match-fixing.[29]

Bibliography:

[1] Michael J. Beloff QC ‘Sport, ethics and the law’ I.S.L.R. 2017, 1, 3-10 p1,5 See also Kevin Carpenter ‘Match- fixing - the biggest threat to sport in the 21st century?’ I.S.L.R. 2012, 2, 13-24 p19 See also Professor Richard H. McLaren and Tori Crawford ‘The role of CAS in sports fraud’ I.S.L.R. 2014, 2, 35-49 p35

[2] Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 215, Magglingen/Macolin, 18.IX.2014 art.3(4); Crojne v United Cricket Board of South Africa 2001 (4) SA 1361

[3] Tom Serby ‘The Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions: the best bet for the global fight against match-fixing?’ Int Sports Law J (2015) 15:83–100 p84 See also Kevin Carpenter ‘Combating match-fixing in sport - a guide to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions’ LawInSport 2014, October 6, Internet See also Michael J Beloff QC ‘Good at games - does law help or hinder sport?’ I.S.L.R. 2019, 1, 3-10 p5; Ivey v Genting CasinosUK Ltd (t/a Crockfords Club),[2018]A.C. 391 p405-406

[4] Ioannis Galariotis, Miguel Poiares Maduro and Benedita Menezes Queiroz ‘The transnational governance of sports: key issues and proposals’ I.S.L.R. 2019, 3, 77-80 p77 See also Tom Serby ‘Follow the money: confiscation of unexplained wealth laws and sport's fixing crisis’ I.S.L.R. 2013, 1, 2-8 p2,8 See also Tom Serby ‘The Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions: the best bet for the global fight against match-fixing?’ Int Sports Law J (2015) 15:83–100 p94, 96

[5] Badminton World Federation (BWF) Code of Conduct in relation to Betting, Wagering and Irregular Match Results; International Olympic Committee (IOC) Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions; World Rugby Handbook, Regulation 6: Anti-corruption and Betting

[6] Diarmaid Harkin ‘The questionable legitimacy of non-state anti-corruption bodies: a case study of the Tennis Integrity Unit’ Crime Law Soc Change (2017) 68:167–185 p167

[7] Tom Serby ‘The Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions: the best bet for the global fight against match-fixing?’ Int Sports Law J (2015) 15:83–100 p94 See also K. Carpenter, ‘Match-fixing: Framing the fight-back’ (2015) International Center for Sport Security (ICSS) Journal 2(4)See also INTERPOL and International Olympic Committee, ‘Handbook on Protecting Sport from Competition Manipulation’ (2016) See also Urvasi Naidoo ‘On the front foot against corruption’ I.S.L.R. 2004, 1(Feb), 3-8 p8

[8] Kaneria v The England and Wales Cricket Board Ltd [2014] EWHC 1348 (Comm). See also Tom Serby ‘Sports Corruption: Sporting Autonomy, Lex Sportiva and the Rule of Law’ Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 15: 2, pp. 1–9, DOI ?p3

[9] Kaneria v The England and Wales Cricket Board Ltd [2014] EWHC 1348 (Comm). para 41. See also Tom Serby ‘Sports Corruption: Sporting Autonomy, Lex Sportiva and the Rule of Law’ Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 15: 2, pp. 1–9, DOI p3 See also A Code for Good Governance in Sport https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/library/policy_documents/xg-gg-201307-dlvrbl2-sept2013.pdf

[10] CAS 2010/A/2172 Mr Oleg Oriekhov v/ UEFA

[11] Danielle Koellerer(2011) https://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/media-releases/daniel-koellerer-anti-corruption-disciplinary-hearing (Accessed 02/01/2020) See also Joseph Odartei Lamptey v FIFA CAS 2017/A/5173; The FA v Bradley Wood (April 2018); Professional Tennis Integrity Officers (PTIOs) v. Nick Lindahl CAS 2017/A/4956; Butt v International Cricket Council CAS 2011/A/2364; Asif v International Cricket Council CAS 2011/A/2362; Andrey Kumantsov(2014); Lucas Renard(2011); Claudia Coppola(2013); Yannick Ebbinghaus(2013); CAS 2008/A/1630 Mathieu Montcourt v/ ATP

[12] World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association (WPBSA) v Stephen Lee SR/0000540006 (2013)

[13] CAS 2011/A/2621 David Savic v. Professional Tennis Integrity Officers; CAS 2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Aleksander Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA See also Mark James ‘Sports Law’ 3rd edition, Published by Palgrave Sports Master 2017 p63-64

[14] Diarmaid Harkin ‘The questionable legitimacy of non-state anti-corruption bodies: a case study of the Tennis Integrity Unit’ Crime Law Soc Change (2017) 68:167–185 p172 See also Tom Serby ‘Sports Corruption: Sporting Autonomy, Lex Sportiva and the Rule of Law’ Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 15: 2, pp. 1–9, DOI p1 See also Kevin Carpenter ‘Match- fixing - the biggest threat to sport in the 21st century?’ I.S.L.R. 2012, 2, 13-24 p21

[15] Diarmaid Harkin ‘The questionable legitimacy of non-state anti-corruption bodies: a case study of the Tennis Integrity Unit’ Crime Law Soc Change (2017) 68:167–185 p178,179

[16] Michael J. Beloff QC ‘Sport, ethics and the law’ I.S.L.R. 2017, 1, 3-10 p8 See also Ioannis Galariotis, Miguel Poiares Maduro and Benedita Menezes Queiroz ‘The transnational governance of sports: key issues and proposals’ I.S.L.R. 2019, 3, 77-80 p79 See also Urvasi Naidoo ‘On the front foot against corruption’ I.S.L.R. 2004, 1(Feb), 3-8 p3

[17] Guillermo Olaso de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit CAS 2014/A/3467 See also Alexandra Veuthey ‘Match-fixing and governance in cricket and football: what is the fix?’ Int Sports Law J (2014) 14:82–114 p104

[18] Michael J. Beloff QC ‘Sport, ethics and the law’ I.S.L.R. 2017, 1, 3-10 p4

[19] Diarmaid Harkin ‘The questionable legitimacy of non-state anti-corruption bodies: a case study of the Tennis Integrity Unit’ Crime Law Soc Change (2017) 68:167–185 p172 See also Alexandra Veuthey ‘Match-fixing and governance in cricket and football: what is the fix?’ Int Sports Law J (2014) 14:82–114 p104 See also K. Carpenter, ‘Match-fixing: Framing the fight-back’ (2015) International Center for Sport Security (ICSS) Journal 2(4) See also Tom Serby ‘The Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions: the best bet for the global fight against match-fixing?’ Int Sports Law J (2015) 15:83–100 p83-84 See also Lauri Tarasti ‘First international convention against sport manipulation’ I.S.L.R. 2015, 2, 20-28 p21

[20] R v Anderson [1986] AC 27

[21] Criminal Law Act 1977 s 1

[22] Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 s 1(1)

[23] R v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir (unreported) Southwark Crown Court, 3 November 2011

[24] Mark James ‘Sports Law’ 3rd edition, Published by Palgrave Sports Master 2017 p141-142

[25] Fraud Act 2006 s 1

[26] Criminal Finances Act 2017 See also Tom Serby ‘Sports Corruption: Sporting Autonomy, Lex Sportiva and the Rule of Law’ Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 15: 2, pp. 1–9, DOI?p4

[27] Gambling Act 2005 s 42

[28] R v Mosdall (unreported) Kingston Crown Court, 3 December 2015 See also Mark James ‘Sports Law’ 3rd edition, Published by Palgrave Sports Master 2017 p142-143

[29] Urvasi Naido and Simon Gardiner ‘On the front foot against corruption’ The International Sports Law Journal Jan. 1, 2007 Issue 1-2 p21 See also Alexandra Veuthey ‘Match-fixing and governance in cricket and football: what is the fix?’ Int Sports Law J (2014) 14:82–114 p104,111 See also Tom Serby ‘Sports Corruption: Sporting Autonomy, Lex Sportiva and the Rule of Law’ Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 15: 2, pp. 1–9, DOI p6

Author: Georgios Mouzouris | Advocate at MOUZOURIS & VASSILIOU Law Office