Master Plans and “drop-in” planning permissions: the Supreme Court gives judgement in Hillside Developments v Snowdonia [2022] UKSC 30

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In 1967, Merioneth County Council (the then relevant planning authority – this function later devolved upon Snowdonia National Park Authority, the Respondents to this appeal) had granted planning permission for the development of 401 dwellings ("the 1967 Permission") on a site in Snowdonia National Park ("the Site"). Between 1967 and 1973, it made seven further grants of planning permission in respect of the Site, each of which departed from the scheme of development authorised by the 1967 Permission.?In High Court proceedings in 1987, it had been held that the 1967 Permission had not lapsed, and could still lawfully be completed at any time. Eight further grants of planning permission in relation to the Site had been made between 1996 and 2011.

In 2019, the present owners of the Site, Hillside Parks Ltd ("Hillside"), brought proceedings against the Snowdonia National Park Authority (“the Authority”), in order to ascertain whether the scheme of development authorised by the 1967 Permission could still lawfully be completed. The Authority argued that it could not be, as development carried out pursuant to the additional permissions granted after 1967 was inconsistent with it. In particular, roads had been built in areas designated for houses, and houses had been built in areas designated for roads – an argument which the High Court (and the Court of Appeal) had permitted the Authority to make, even though it had not raised any such issue in the 1987 proceedings. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had found in the Authority’s favour on this point. Hillside were given permission to appeal the point further to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has, this morning, unanimously dismissed Hillside’s appeal, holding in summary as follows:

(1)?The courts below were right to hold that the 1967 Permission was a permission to carry out a single scheme of development on the Site, ?and cannot be construed (contrary to Hillside’s submission) as separately permitting particular parts of the scheme to be built alongside development on the Site authorised by independent permissions. ?F Lucas & Sons Ltd v Dorking and Horley Rural District Council (1964) 17 P & CR 116 (per Winn J) was therefore wrongly decided;

(2)?It is possible in principle for a local planning authority to grant a planning permission which approves a modification of such an entire scheme rather than constituting a separate permission referable just to part of the scheme;

(3)?Hillside has failed, however, to show that the additional planning permissions under which development has been carried out on the Site should be construed in this way. Therefore, that subsequent development is inconsistent with the 1967 Permission, and has had the effect that it is now physically impossible to develop the Site in accordance with the Master Plan approved by the 1967 Permission (as subsequently modified down to 1987);

(4)?Hillside has also carried out further development on the Site for which it has failed to show that any planning permission was obtained. This further development also makes it physically impossible to develop the site in accordance with the Master Plan approved by the 1967 Permission (as subsequently modified);

(5)?The long-standing Pilkington test (see Pilkington v Sec of State for the Environment [1973] 1 WLR 1527) is approved, but it does not rest on any principle of abandonment: there is no such principle in planning law (see the House of Lords decision in Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd v Sec of State for the Environment [1985] AC 132).