MARAWI CRISIS AND DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS

MARAWI CRISIS AND DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS

The Marawi Crisis developed after the Philippine military launched a raid on the supposed hideout of a most wanted Abu Sayyaf leader, in Marawi City of Lanao del Sur province in the southern Philippine island chain of Mindanao on May 23, 2017. The raid is reported to have instigated militants from the Maute group who were sheltering the Abu Sayyaf leader, named Isnilon Hapilon, to call for reinforcements leading to a full-scale armed confrontation between the security forces and the resident militants. In the aftermath of the initial firefight between the military and Maute group, the militants are believed to have gone on a rampage setting several government buildings on fire and holding citizens hostage in a local church. The escalation of the situation led to the declaration of martial law by incumbent President Duterte for a period of 60 days across Mindanao, further leading to a mass exodus of local residents of Marawi City and the launching of airstrikes by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to neutralize the militants. 

This report provides an understanding of the major militant groups, their inter-linkages and their relationship with the current government in the Philippines. It also highlights the militant profile of Isnilon Hapilon, the militant seemingly responsible for the Marawi Crisis. The significance of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and prospects for the passage of this crucial law, which will provide autonomy to Muslim secessionists of the southern Philippines is also discussed in this report. 

Martial law is not a novelty for the Philippine people, given that on two occasions in the past, the respective governments of Ferdinand Marcos and Gloria Arroyo have imposed martial law for varied reasons. The report explains the implications of martial law on the general public and emphasizes on the counterbalances provided by the Philippine Constitution to the President's powers with regards to the declaration of martial law. Lastly, the report examines the effects of the Marawi Crisis and martial law on business in the Philippines, particularly on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and tourism. 

President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law across Mindanao, the southern island chain of the archipelago nation, for 60 days following skirmishes between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and members of the Islamic State (IS)-affiliated Maute group in Marawi City. The armed confrontation began when AFP troops raided the supposed hideout of a wanted IS-ring leader, Isnilon Hapilon who has a 5 million USD bounty (US Department of Justice) on his head. Following the raid and initial firefight between the militants and troops, the Maute reportedly called for re-enforcements leading to a full-scale battle in the evening hours of March 23, 2017, with around 100 members of the militant group infiltrating Marawi. According to sources, the militants went on a rampage, setting a Catholic church and a hospital ablaze while holding hostages in government buildings. Sources have indicated that the militants hoisted IS flags at several locations while setting 107 prisoners (including several Maute group militants) free from the Marawi City and Malabang District jails. At the time of writing, the AFP has launched a comprehensive operation to neutralize the militants who are holed up in the city and are demanding a withdrawal of government troops in exchange of the hostages held by them. A massive exodus of residents of Marawi City has also begun due to the fighting as army tanks and attack helicopters are conducting targeted strikes against the Maute and other militants in the city. 31 militants and 6 security personnel have been killed as of May 26, 2017. 

As a nation, the Philippines for the large part has been under the shadow of militancy due to the presence of Islamic insurgencies in Mindanao. While some of these insurgencies have been directed at either achieving a form of autonomy or sovereignty, the association of certain militant groups with transnational terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (IS) has raised concerns in the southern Philippines. A clear distinction can be drawn between insurgent groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)/Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and terrorist outfits such as Abu Sayyaf and the Maute group, taking into account the fact that the latter in the recent past are believed to have not indulged in criminal activities while adhering to assurances given by the Duterte administration with respect to the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and related issues. The Philippine government had earlier denied reports confirming the presence of IS in the country. However, recent incidents revolving around the activities of Abu Sayyaf and other groups have given credence to the possibility of a continued existence of IS-inspired militant groups in the Southeast Asian country. The terror attacks allegedly perpetrated by the Maute in Davao, leading to the death of 15 civilians, following which a state of emergency was declared throughout the Philippines by the incumbent President and the current situation in Marawi City have acted to confirm suspicions of the government with regards to the capabilities of IS-linked terrorist organisations in the country.  

The current situation developed following the AFP’s attempts to capture Isnilon Hapilon, an Abu Sayyaf leader who had pledged the group’s allegiance to the IS under a coalition of 10 local militant groups named Dawlatul Islam Wilayatul Mashriq. He was supposedly also named the leader of IS in Southeast Asia. While the AFP has continued to pursue Hapilon in the past, he has remained elusive. In 2008, the AFP had bombarded an Abu Sayyaf camp in the vicinity of Jolo, Sulu wounding Hapilon in the arm. In 2013, in a similar operation, Hapilon evaded the AFP. Recently, in January 2017, with an uptick in maritime abductions conducted by Abu Sayyaf throughout 2016, the AFP decided to bombard Hapilon’s hideout near Butig town in Lanao del Sur province, critically wounding the Abu Sayyaf leader, who was then carried on a stretcher before disappearing into a nearby mountainous region. What remains notable is the mobility of Hapilon and his associates from the hinterlands of Basilan to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), specifically Lanao del Sur, where Hapilon was last seen in January. Moreover, Marawi is the capital of Lanao del Sur. The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) of the Philippines, had earlier confirmed that Hapilon had moved to Lanao del Sur from his mountainous base in Basilan to form a control center for militancy operations in collaboration with the Maute group. Furthermore, on January 23rd, Malaysian police arrested four militants who were involved in recruiting fighters for operations of the IS in the Philippines. They had reportedly intended on utilizing the eastern Malaysian state of Sabah as a transit point for militants interested in fighting for the IS in the Philippines. The presence of foreign fighters in Marawi City during clashes between the Maute and security forces acts to bolster the argument that foreign fighters might have been recruited by groups such as the Abu Sayyaf with the intentions of giving the Southeast Asia branch a more global militant outlook.

The Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) has been a matter of contention for successive governments in the Philippines. The BBL pertains to the establishment of the proposed new autonomous area known as Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BAR), replacing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), covering the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi. The final agreement signed between the Philippine government and insurgent groups in the region was signed in 2014, known as the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB). According to the clauses of the agreement, the MNLF and MILF would surrender their arms and ammunition to a third party in exchange for autonomy for Muslim-dominated regions in the southern Philippines. While the negotiations between secessionist outfits and the previous government led by President Aquino seemed to be on track, the 'Mamasapano Clash' of January 2015, which led to the killing of 44 personnel of the elite Special Action Force (SAF) which was on a mission to locate and terminate an Indonesian Islamist militant in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, led to a public backlash and consecutive opinion polls showed the growing resentment in the general public against the secessionists. Due to this, the bill was stalled in the Philippine Congress in relation to growing public discontent against Islamic outfits in ARMM. 

However, President Duterte’s ascendancy to the helm of affairs has been viewed optimistically by the active militant groups in the southern Philippines. Duterte has continually supported the demands of groups such as the MNLF and MILF for autonomy, citing his credentials as the only President to be elected from Mindanao, thus sympathizing with and understanding issues related to the Moro struggle for self-governance. Duterte had earlier hosted Nur Misuari, leader of the MNLF, at Malacanang Palace, the President’s residence in November 2016. Misuari was previously charged with the Zamboanga City siege in 2013 that led to both civilian and security personnel casualties. A temporary suspension of the arrest warrant in the case was ordered by a local court a few hours before Misuari’s visit. That said, the reconciliation process initiated by President Duterte has seemingly not provided any respite from successive threats and attacks from groups such as the Abu Sayyaf and the Maute as seen during the current Marawi City siege. 

While pivotal success has been achieved by the Duterte government in bolstering the peace process with Muslim secessionists in Mindanao, certain terrorist groups who have been largely disavowed by the MNLF and MILF continue to exist. Groups such as Abu Sayyaf, Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines (AKP), the Maute group and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) continue to target military installations and commit criminal activities such as ransom kidnappings. Abu Sayyaf has surfaced as one of the most notorious terror groups, due to the brutal murders of Westerners after a series of kidnappings. Furthermore, the group has also executed multiple maritime abductions within the proximity of the Sulu Island, which has been identified as a stronghold. This internal fracturing of the Moro movement has increased the complexity of the issue as groups such as the MILF, MNLF and other traditional groups remain committed to the peace process while newly formed outfits such as Abu Sayyaf and BIFF have rejected the government’s proposals while indulging in anti-state activities. Having said that, the BBL remains crucial in reaching a resolution with secessionists and prospects for the socio-economic development of Mindanao, specifically the ARMM. In the case that the Duterte administration manages to pass the BBL, the Philippine government will have managed to integrate two major groups, the MNLF and MILF and formed the political and military space required to counter extremist factions such as Abu Sayyaf. 

President Duterte declared martial law across Mindanao following the escalation of the crisis in Marawi City on March 23, 2017. The Philippine people have faced martial law on two more occasions, first during the rule of Ferdinand Marcos between 1972-1981 when he imposed martial law across the Philippines and second during President Gloria Arroyo’s tenure for eight days in 2009, encompassing only Maguindanao province. Duterte during his election campaign as well as after his inauguration had threatened to impose martial law in relation to illegal drugs and their endemic usage in the Philippines as well as with respect to the threat to the nation from militancy in the southern Philippines. Basic facts about martial law in the Philippines are highlighted in the infographic below. 

Duterte’s administration has faced severe criticism from the United States, EU and several other countries for alleged human rights violations committed during the ‘Drug War’ launched by the President following his rise to the seat of power. More than 7000 supposed drug users and traffickers have been killed during the extensive campaign against illegal drugs since June 2016. Most of these killings have been reportedly extrajudicial, carried out by vigilantes. Further, President Duterte has been recalcitrant and dismissed all allegations of lawlessness during his campaign against drugs in the country. Due to this precedent, human rights groups and several opposition parties in the country have been skeptical of Duterte’s declaration of martial law, given the abovementioned powers it provides the President and correspondingly, the AFP. The risk of military abuses in Mindanao remains high as the military has the authority to supersede the local civilian administration, even though the Department of National Defense has issued a statement on May 24, 2017, citing that the rule of law would not be comprised in areas where martial law has been imposed. Moreover, Duterte’s statement indicating that the martial law in Mindanao would be similar to the one witnessed during the Marcos regime has raised concerns amongst political observers that the writ of habeas corpus might be dissolved, leading to detentions without charge, torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. His statement on expanding the martial law in the Visayas and Luzon island chains has acted to further the apprehensions of his opponents and the international community.

That said, as mentioned above, a series of checks and balances to negate the ill-effects of martial law are underscored in the Philippine constitution. The President is responsible for outlining the basis of a rebellion or invasion due to which martial law is in effect. A normal citizen can challenge the declaration by filing a suit which is required to be heard in a span of 30 days by the Supreme Court (SC). Further, the Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) can revoke the martial law if it deems the President’s arguments in favor of martial law unsubstantial. In the case of the Marawi crisis, the Duterte administration is liable to cite the carnage caused by the Maute and associated groups in Marawi with the destruction of public property, burning of areas of worship, freeing of militants from the city’s jails and the threat of the rebellion spreading to surrounding sensitive regions such as Sulu, Zamboanga Peninsula, Maguindanao and Davao. 

The Philippines has continued to maintain a secure economic growth per year over the last five years, enlarging at an average of 6 percent. Low inflation rates and the stability of the Philippine Peso against foreign currency has helped the previous and current administration sustain economic growth in the country, despite a worldwide slowdown. The Philippines has remained a top destination for global investors, given its predominant middle-class population and the internal flow of remittances from the Middle-East and other regions. The Philippines’ 101 million people, with a principal youth demographic and skilled English-speaking population has attracted investors to one of the largest markets in Southeast Asia. While the Philippines is a signatory of several UN human rights conventions and treaties, the country has faced several issues with respect human rights violations. This trend has seen a significant uptick following the initiation of the drug war and the attitude of the Duterte administration with regards to criticism of its policies. Human rights violations have been witnessed in agricultural businesses, real estate, tourism, power generation, specifically in areas where government militia have been deployed to deal with the communist and Muslim insurgencies across the country. 

Militants in today’s world are bent on causing business disruptions in a particular country or region by targeting its economic centers or areas of strategic importance. A militant attack inadvertently leads to significant human and economic losses. Militancy-related incidents act to expose a government’s inability to safeguard its citizens, foreigners, and property. Further, it leads to a sizable relocation of a government’s funding from public works projects to defense related expenditure. An armed rebellion as seen during the Marawi Crisis also has the potential of increasing investor vulnerability while severely affecting human, private and public capital. An internal escalation of the rebellion can lead to catastrophic effects on the financial aid received by the Philippines from the US and EU, given the concerns these entities might have with a diversion of funds to defense rather than their utilization for economic development and poverty alleviation. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and tourism are likely to bear the brunt of the IS-inspired attack on Marawi City and previous attacks such as the one witnessed in Davao.

FDI

While Islamist militant activity in the Philippines is concentrated in Mindanao and the economically developed regions in Luzon and Visayas remain more or less insulated from the militant threat, the recurring attacks across the southern Philippines might affect the prospects for FDI and raise the concerns of foreign investors with regards to the security of their employees, property, and business in the Philippines. FDI remains an important source of investment for emerging economies such as the Philippines. Militant activity in certain regions of the Philippines and its escalation which might be possible in the long term, in the case that the government proves unsuccessful in mitigating risks emanating from militant groups in the south, might lead to an increase in the cost of doing business in the Southeast Asian country. This might be a direct result of investor uncertainty and a rise in wages, larger insurance premiums and greater emphasis on security expenditure, to protect establishments in sensitive areas. This is liable to lead to a lower Return on Investment (RoI). Effects on FDI might be long-term as compared to other industries and economic entities that have a corresponding on a nation’s economy and prospects for development. 

TOURISM

While the current scenario in Marawi pertains to local militants elements inspired by the IS, the attack is and the martial law imposition is liable to set a bad precedent for tourism and might deter foreign tourists from visiting the Philippines, as seen worldwide in the aftermath of a militant attack or a localized armed confrontation. More stringent immigration norms (due to concerns related to influx of foreign militants to fight for local groups), a bolstered security presence in wake of the martial law imposed and the supposed affiliation of the Maute group and Abu Sayyaf can be cited as the primary reasons for a prospective reduction in the tourist footfall, specifically from foreign countries. On May 24, 2017, the US State Department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) responded to the situation by sending out travel advisories warning citizens to avoid non-essential travel to western Mindanao. This is incidentally the third time a travel warning has been issued by the US State Department and FCO regarding travel to the Philippines. That being said, given that the security situation is isolated to Marawi City, the government has assured foreign governments that the developing militant incident and martial law are unlikely to cause any hindrances to foreigners traveling to the Philippines, specifically to Luzon and Visayas. As witnessed during similar situations in the past, the Marawi Crisis might have a short-term impact on the tourism industry, but an extension of the martial law might indeed lead to more long-term effects.

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Edgar Allan Abalon, MNSA

Executive Leader - Security Industry Corporate Strategic Management Executive, providing relevant socio-economic programs management, training and consulting services

7 年

Worth sharing ??

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Edgar Allan Abalon, MNSA

Executive Leader - Security Industry Corporate Strategic Management Executive, providing relevant socio-economic programs management, training and consulting services

7 年

While there is an undeniable tactical alliance between Maute Group and Abu Sayyaff Group, their ability to hold this alliance is quite questionable for the following reasons: 1. Historically, these two groups belong to different tribes which are traditionally opposed to each other's cultural idiosyncrasies, i.e. Intermarriages and giving women power over fiefdom affairs. These alone can bring forth discord in future decision making efforts now and in the near future for this tactical alliance; 2. The emergence of Both groups came not from militancy nor belligerency but rather from a perspective of an organized crime mindset, i.e. Kidnap for ransom, hijacking, extortion, illegal drugs, etc. Money therefore is the premium of their existence; 3. The decision for a tactical alliance apparently came from the ASG's desire to get the support of ISIS, with financial support as the premium to which the Maute are also aware; and 4. Both groups are besieged with intensive and sustained military operations for several months now. On the run and therefore without money to buy influence in their traditional grounds, this tactical alliance is therefore more of a convenience and an opportunity to earn for both groups, than being a seed of establishing a real extremist group.

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