Marauding Terrorist Attacks (MTAs)
Endro SUNARSO, CPP?, PMP?, FSyl, F.ISRM
Highly experienced security professional with extensive experience in corporate & physical security operations & management across APAC & ME.
The UK's National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) defines Marauding Terrorist Attacks (MTAs) as fast-moving, violent attacks where assailants move through a few locations to find & kill or injure as many people as possible. Most deaths occur within the first few minutes, before law enforcement units are able to respond.
A marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA) is currently considered to be the most significant terrorist threat affecting the UK & other western countries. Marauding terrorist firearms attacks (MTFAs) or active-shooter terrorist attacks are a growing concern among security services around the world. Since the Mumbai-attacks in 2008, incidents like Anders Behring Breivik's attack at Ut?ya in 2011, the 2013 Westgate mall shooting in Nairobi, the coordinated attacks in Paris in Nov 2015, & more recently the Christchurch shooting in New Zealand & the US, El Paso attack in 2019, followed by the Hanau hookah bar attack in 2020 have fed this concern. An MTFA may involve:
? shootings
? the use of explosives & grenades
? fires
? hostage taking
? sieges
Such attacks are complex & their nature often changes rapidly during the course of an attack. As such, they present difficult challenges for law enforcement & other emergency services. Specific plans & procedures have been, & continue to be, developed in order to deal with such incidents. Because attacks of this nature can be carried out by a small number of attackers – sometimes an individual – there is the possibility for multiple attacks to be carried out simultaneously. Such tactics would stretch emergency service resources & contribute to the confusion & panic created. If such an attack did occur, multiple casualties would be inevitable.
Terrorists enter a busy area aiming to kill or injure as many people as possible. The attackers then begin marauding, travelling on foot or in a vehicle, to find & kill or injure more people. Attackers are drawn by movement & deterred by seemingly unoccupied locations as well as by anything that may take time & effort to overcome, such as a locked door.
The terrorists may take hostages, resulting in a longer siege. Attacks may conclude with the arrest, death or escape of the terrorists. Terrorists typically use a quiet location where they expect not to be disturbed to make final preparations, ready weapons & wait for the appropriate moment to make their final approach to the targeted location & launch the attack. Marauding terrorist attacks can take many forms:
? Arrival at a location on foot, in a vehicle or an attack perpetrated by insiders.
? Entering without using force or forcing entry using an?explosive device, a vehicle, coercion of someone with access or a combination thereof.
2. Attackers armed with edged or bladed weapons, guns, pipe bombs, petrol bombs or multiple weapons. Edged & bladed weapons attacks progress less rapidly than those involving firearms since attackers must be within striking distance of their victims & expend more energy on each kill. Such an attack is highly likely to have been planned. Terrorists typically research multiple targets, searching for one where their attack is most likely to succeed. Attacks are typically perpetrated in order to generate publicity for the terrorists’ cause & are fortunately rare occurrences.
The benchmark Mumbai Marauding Terrorist Attack, India, Nov 2008
After first traveling aboard a Pakistani-flagged cargo ship, the terrorists hijacked an Indian fishing boat & killed its crew. When they were near the Mumbai coast, they used inflatable dinghies to reach Badhwar Park & the Sassoon Docks, near the city’s Gateway to India monument. At that point the 10 terrorists split into small teams & proceeded to carry out sophisticated, simultaneous, deadly attacks on multiple targets, including the city's main railway station, two of its most prominent hotels, a popular outdoor cafe, a movie theater, & a Jewish community center.
Armed with automatic weapons & hand grenades, the terrorists targeted civilians at numerous sites in the southern part of Mumbai, including the Chhatrapati Shivaji railway station, the popular Leopold Café, 2 hospitals & a theatre. While most of the attacks ended within a few hours after they began at around 9:30 PM on 26 Nov, the terror continued to unfold at 3 locations where hostages were taken - the Nariman House, where a Jewish outreach centre was located & the luxury hotels Oberoi Trident & Taj Mahal Palace & Tower.
By the time the standoff ended at the Nariman House on the evening of 28 Nov 2008, 6 hostages as well as 2 gunmen had been killed. At the 2 hotels, dozens of guests & staff were either trapped by gunfire or held hostage. Indian security forces ended the siege at the Oberoi Trident around midday on 28 Nov & at the Taj Mahal Palace on the morning of the following day. In all, at least 174 people, including 20 security force personnel & 26 foreign nationals were killed. More than 300 people were injured. Nine of the 10 terrorists were killed & 1 (Mohammed Kasab) was arrested. He was found guilty in an Indian Court of Law & was subsequently hanged in prison in 2012.
The world watched on television as these 10 terrorists paralyzed a great metropolis of 12 million people & murdered nearly 200 of them. The victims were Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs & Jews. Senior American intelligence officials have placed responsibility for the attacks on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist group based in Pakistan.
Marauding terrorist attacks (MTAs) or active-shooter terrorist attacks are a growing concern among security services around the world. The Mumbai MTA culminated in a televised siege finale in the Taj Oberoi Hotel. This was a deliberate ploy on the part of the terrorists & their leaders, as the media impact of the protracted mayhem & uncertainty was always a significant part of their strategic intent. The mass shooting of individuals, often within view of journalists, fulfilled the basic terrorist need of killing a few to terrorize the many. The MTA is a therefore a high pay-off tactic in a highly connected media-dependent world.
Ever since the Mumbai MTA, police & emergency services have been forced to rethink their training & response to the possibility of such an attack but, by definition, a response is usually reactive & initiated once an attack commences. In the Mumbai attacks, the focus was not on one specific target but, instead, heavily-armed multiple offenders (possibly with some training) attacking multiple targets in a coordinated manner with little or no expectation of survival.
Marauding terrorist attacks (MTAs) or active-shooter terrorist attacks are a growing concern among security services around the world. Historically, marauding terrorist attacks were associated with the use of firearms. More recently attacks have involved the use of other weapons, most notably knives. There have been several high-profile terrorist attacks on UK soil in recent years such as those at Westminster Bridge & London Bridge, which have seen significant numbers of deaths & serious injuries associated with them.
Recent Marauding Terrorist Attacks ?
London Bridge & Borough Market Attack, London, UK, June 2017
Three terrorists drove a van, containing petrol bombs, into pedestrians on London Bridge, killing 2 people, before beginning to maraud. Armed with kitchen knives & wearing fake suicide vests, the attackers entered several bars & restaurants, killing 6 people with kitchen knives. Dozens of people were injured. The attackers targeted at least one building that had been locked but where the occupants were still visible having failed to hide. The attack lasted roughly 8 minutes.
On the evening of 3 June 2017, the 3 attackers drove a hired van from East London into the City of London. At 10.06pm, they drove south over London Bridge, mounting the east footway repeatedly. The van struck & injured many pedestrians. Xavier Thomas was thrown into the Thames & died quickly due to immersion. Christine Archibald was run over near the south end of the Bridge & suffered fatal injuries. At 10.07pm, the men crashed the van into railings outside the Barrowboy & Banker pub. In the van, they left a mobile phone which was running a directions application set with the destination of Oxford Street. Later investigations also showed that the attackers had made web searches about the Westminster area. After the collision, the 3 men quickly left the van. They were armed with the ceramic knives strapped to their wrists & were wearing what appeared to be suicide vests. They began stabbing people at street level, before descending to the courtyard of a restaurant, Boro Bistro. In this phase of the attack, they fatally wounded Sara Zelenak, James McMullan, Sébastien Bélanger, Alexandre Pigeard & Kirsty Boden. At 10.09pm, the attackers returned to street level, moving south on Borough High Street & attacking further members of the public. Ignacio Echeverría Miralles de Imperial, who intervened to protect others, was fatally stabbed at this stage. Unarmed officers who confronted the attackers were themselves assaulted and injured. At 10.10pm, the attackers turned into Stoney Street, which borders Borough Market. They attacked people in the road there & entered various bars as they moved up the street. Between 10.13pm & 10.14pm they were in Black & Blue restaurant, where they stabbed 3 customers. After leaving, they moved back down Stoney Street. Noticing some unarmed officers & members of the public in the covered market area, they charged down Middle Road a short distance before returning. At 10.16pm, they were back in Stoney Street, where they set upon an unsuspecting bystander. While the terrorists were engaged in that attack, an armed response vehicle of the City of London Police (CoLP) arrived in Stoney Street. On seeing the officers arrive, the attackers immediately charged them, knives raised. They did not respond to verbal commands. The officers responded by firing on the attackers, each of whom fell to the ground. In the period that followed, armed officers of the CoLP & Metropolitan Police Service kept the 3 men covered with firearms, because they believed them to be wearing suicide vests. The officers fired on Redouane & Butt on further occasions when they made movements which appeared consistent with attempts to detonate explosive devices. This London Bridge vehicle ramming & knife attack lasted only 10 minutes & in that time 8 people were killed with 48 seriously injured.
Westminster Bridge, London, UK, March 2017
A single terrorist drove a car into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, killing 5 people & injuring more than 50. Running towards Parliament, he then stabbed & killed a police officer before being shot. The attack lasted 82 seconds.
Paris, France, November 2015
Three groups of terrorists killed 130 people & injured over 400 during a 3-hour long attack on central Paris using explosives & assault rifles. One of a group of 3 suicide bombers blew himself & a?by-stander up at an entrance to the Stade de France during an international football match, after being refused entry. The other 2 bombers, who may have been intending to target people as the stadium was evacuated, subsequently blew themselves up outside the stadium. The 2nd group, travelling by car, used assault rifles to kill patrons of bars & restaurants in a different area of Paris.
The 3rd group attacked the Bataclan Concert Hall resulting in a siege. On the evening of 13 Nov 2015, 3 terrorists equipped with military-grade firearms & explosive jackets penetrated Bataclan, a Paris music hall containing 1,500 people. The terrorists started a massive execution of the people located in the orchestra pit. Terrorists then moved to the upper circle to take 400 people hostage.
Immediately, RAID (Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence), the French national police counter-terrorism team & the BRI (Research & Intervention Brigade) were engaged. These units encompass police operators & tactical emergency medical physicians. At the first look, 3 tactical physicians identified more than a hundred casualties, including dozens of fatalities. A terrorist then detonated his bomb, killing himself.
Paris, France, January 2015
Two terrorists, arriving by car & first incorrectly entering a neighboring building, coerced an employee to gain entry to the office of the targeted magazine Charlie Hebdo & killed 12 people with assault rifles. After shooting at responding police, the terrorists escaped by car & killed a police officer nearby. The original vehicle was abandoned & the terrorists hijacked a car in order to escape.
These attacks generally take place in some constrained environment: a street or other confined area within a city centre, or some public building & more recently, along long stretches reasonably devoid of heavy street furniture (bridges). These are also generally crowded locations. The combination of crowds & confined space can limit freedom of movement & routes for escape.
It is essential to prepare incident commanders to respond effectively under the complex conditions of marauding terrorist attacks, when they will face a blizzard of information & will need to command a myriad of actors to end the event with minimal casualties.
Marauding terrorist attacks can take many forms: from the complex assaults in Brussels (22 Mar 2016) & Paris (13 Nov 2015) to the single shooter attack on tourists in Sousse, Tunisia (26 Jun 2015), to the use of vehicles & knives. Due to the dynamic nature of such attacks, it has proven difficult to prepare security forces, including 1st responders, to deal with these situations. One very important lesson learnt over the last number of years is that improving people’s situational awareness helps mitigate the effects of the terrorist attacks.
In the event of an attack, there are a number of critical tasks that must be completed before the arrival of law enforcement units & personnel:
1.??? assessing the situation
2.??? calling police
3.??? alerting personnel & members of the public to take action
4.??? deciding whether to lock doors to delay attackers (lockdown).
The responsibility for completing these tasks are the responsibility of the Security Control Room operators. However, these operators themselves are often unclear on what tasks needs to be completed & who is responsible for each task, resulting in duplication of effort & essential tasks being forgotten.
Typically, front-line personnel such as security guards, stewards, receptionists & concierges would be the most likely to?recognize an attack unfolding & subsequently guide the actions of other personnel & members of the public.
Planning, training & rehearsal improve the response capability of security control room operators. Training can be a bind, it can be boring, difficult to schedule & someone has to pay for the additional hours but, in the event of an emergency, there can be no excuses for continuity & emergency plans not being enacted seamlessly. Training is essential for those front-line staff such as stewards & security officers to be able to react as they need to if an evacuation proves necessary or a crime scene develops & needs to be preserved. Cost will inevitably be a consideration but this is one area where cheapest may not always be best & time researching training providers to ensure their credentials are sound & that their knowledge & experience is relevant will be a few moments well spent.
Detecting the attack & making a?rapid initial assessment
Rapid assessment of an attack determines which procedures should be followed, informs decision-making & enables security personnel to communicate information about the attack to law enforcement & other 1st responders.
It is often difficult for security control room operators to detect an attack & ascertain what is happening, resulting in a delay to a response. This?can be improved through training as well as improved configuration of technical security systems.
Often the 1st indication of an attack is people moving in the same direction forming a large crowd. However, the cause of this may not be possible to discern & there may not be a threat. For example, at Oxford Circus tube station, London in 2017, an altercation between 2 people on the platform resulted in a large crowd running from the area, falsely believe a marauding terrorist attack was in progress. In such situations, more information must be gathered to make an assessment. Security personnel could ask members of the crowd for information or CCTVs could be used to identify the cause.
Panic buttons & duress alarms at entry points
Covert duress alarms at access control points are similarly useful in the situation where someone is coerced into granting access to an attacker.
CCTV Video monitoring systems
Detecting an attack directly using CCTV is difficult. Secondary indicators such as a running crowd or casualties lying on the floor are more easily spotted. Pro-active, continuous monitoring of the most vulnerable areas offers the best opportunity for rapid detection of an attack.
The coverage & display that is optimal for detecting & tracking a marauding terrorist attack is often different from the design that is best for meeting the requirements of business-as-usual.
Comprehensive CCTV coverage of entry points & thoroughfares, including stairwells, is needed to track the general location of attackers, personnel & members of the public.
Routes likely to be used by attackers should be prioritized. A recording & playback function helps when attempting to?identify the attackers & type of their weapons to pass to responding law enforcement personnel.
Supplementary discreet cameras that the attackers may not readily identify during attack planning can also be useful.
Attack detection systems
Technical options such as gunshot detection systems for firearms attacks & emerging technologies such as anomalous sound & video analytics can assist in detecting & subsequently tracking an attack, for example by detecting screams during a edged or bladed-weapon attack or detecting individuals lying on the floor.
Alerting personnel & members of the public to take action
Personnel & members of the public must be alerted to the attack so they know to take action. They must be given clear, concise & current information in order to make the right decisions to survive. An announcement using a PA system is the best way to achieve this.
Unfortunately, it has also been shown that most security control room operators often make poor announcements that are inaudible, rambling, vague, misleading, incorrect & lack credibility. Training & practice have been shown to significantly improve the quality of announcements made by operators.
External speakers can help prevent people from entering a site that is under attack. Other ways to reach people include digital signs, text message alerts & similar systems, such as smartphone applications.
Alerts should be aimed primarily at people who are at high immediate risk but may not be aware of the attack & secondarily at people who are at lower immediate risk but may stray into a high risk area.
People who are already in the midst of the attack will gain more value from relying on their own senses & until they escape the?immediate threat, are likely to ignore alert & updates.
Applying 'Run, Hide, Tell' or 'Run, Hide, Fight' to mitigate impacts of an attack
Public responses play a central role in determining both direct & indirect effects of terrorism. While there may be little a person unfortunate enough to be caught up in an active shooter attack can do to protect themselves, the aim of pre-event guidance & campaigns are to increase the likelihood of members of the public engaging in protective behaviors & avoiding actions that may put increase their risk.
领英推荐
While research shows that public pre-event risk communication can lead to more protective behaviors being taken during both natural & man-made disasters, research specifically on the ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ guidance suggests that it is effective in encouraging protective behaviors during MTAs, as well as in discouraging behaviors that would be potentially life-threatening. Critiques of the ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ guidance characterize it as ‘limp’ & argue that it leads to passivity in situations where a more active response would have been advantageous.
In the US, the behavioral advice for active-shooter incidents is ‘Run, Hide, Fight’ where pro-active resistance as a last resort is necessary & will lead to higher rates of survival. Some research evidence, mainly focused on active-shooter incidents in schools & on campuses, support this.
However, in the context of marauding terrorist attacks in public places, concrete incidents where pro-active resistance from potential victims led to the attacker being overthrown demonstrate the importance of encouraging active resistance as a last resort. During the 10 Aug 2019 Baerum mosque attack in Norway, attacker Philip Manshaus was subdued by mosque attendees before he could hurt anybody. On 29 Nov 2019, attacker Usman Khan was restrained by members of the public during his attack on London Bridge.
Both sets of guidance have shown to increase the likelihood of protective behaviors compared to a no guidance condition. There is no evidence of the ‘Run, Hide, Fight’ guidance leads to unwarranted ‘heroism’. However, there is some evidence that the ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ message may lead to increased likelihood of passivity in situations where more pro-active reactions would be beneficial.
In 2016, Maynooth University researchers announced a first-of-its-kind study to examine people’s behavior during the first 10 minutes of marauding terrorist attacks. This study, led by Dr Mark Maguire, Head of Maynooth University’s Department of Anthropology, was to build societal resilience & furnish first responders with vital insights that will enable them react to these events in a measured & effective manner.
Those first 10 minutes of a terrorist attack are extremely long for those experiencing it. An armed security response has not arrived & nearby 1st response services cannot enter the scene.
The findings to date point to the very real possibility that the role played by natural instinct in these circumstances has been greatly overstated in the past. The evidence points to learned behavior & cultural factors playing a far more significant role in decision-making processes when people are placed in extreme stress. Where the public is accustomed to being protected by the government, they are more likely to have a passive response to an attack. Conversely, people from states where there has been much conflict & unrest are more likely to take action against the attackers.
Instigating lockdown & using active delay systems
Most deaths occur within the first few minutes of a marauding terrorist attack. Analysis of attacks have shown that instigating lockdown in the event of a marauding terrorist attack can be a highly effective way of reducing casualties. It is typically most useful when an attack begins outside a site or building, where lockdown can delay attackers from entering an area or deter them altogether.
Lockdown means locking doors &/or other barriers such as turnstiles, to?prevent access to part of a site or building. It is most likely?to be of use to deter & delay attackers attempting to?enter a building from the outside. Lockdown aims to reduce the immediate threat of harm by:
? Delaying attackers’ progress in finding & killing?victims
? Preventing people inadvertently putting themselves into?the path of attackers. (However, a poorly implemented lockdown can actually increase the risk to personnel & members of the public.)
However, lockdown may not be suitable in situations including:
? Sites where access is generally not restricted & there are no barriers to lock.
? Sites with limited escape routes where the risk of a crush may be too high if people’s exit were slowed or stopped.
? Buildings with many doors that are locked & unlocked manually, where the speed of instigating or cancelling a?lockdown would be too slow.
? Attacks beginning within a building where locking doors would impede people’s escape.
? Where there are insufficient security personnel to monitor & maintain lockdown integrity.
Implementing a lockdown requires careful planning of procedures &?security equipment as well as training of personnel. Warning systems use a variety of methods including security fog, strobe lights, LED & glare lights. The effectiveness of active delay systems depends on where & how they are used. These systems may also inhibit the ability of people to escape & emergency services to respond.
Centralised lockdown management
Centrally managed lockdown requires a security control room with systems that can remotely lock & unlock doors. Such systems typically also monitor whether the door is open or locked shut. Managing lockdown from a central location ensures that individual doors are locked & unlocked in a coordinated fashion. Where lockdown management can be centralised, consider also allowing local control where front-line personnel are empowered to initiate lockdown at an entrance without the need to wait for security control room operators to act.
The integrity of lockdown may be compromised if personnel, members of the public or attackers force a door open or otherwise gain entry to a locked area. The can be catastrophic if attackers gain access to an area that people cannot leave. Whilst there are people within a locked area, it is essential that the integrity of the lockdown is continually monitored. Where it is not possible to use technical monitoring, it is strongly recommended that locked doors can still be opened from the inside to allow people to escape.
One-way lockdown means that doors cannot be opened from one side but can be opened from the other. This allows people to leave an area but not reenter it. This type of lockdown is often a good choice since it leaves escape routes available, making compliance with fire safety legislation & codes more straightforward. However, there is a risk that people opening the doors will allow attackers to gain entry to locked zones. One-way lockdown may be achieved with electronic locks & pushbars. Most often, doors with electronic locks have release buttons on the inside to allow people to open the door. Automated access control systems often include functionality to disable the reader on the outside of the door, preventing attackers using stolen access tokens.
Every door & security barrier on the site will delay the progress of an attack. For offices or other sites with areas of restricted access, dividing an area into zones using physical barriers such as turnstiles & security doors in combination with security walling & an automated access control system provides the best protection. Lockable doors for staff areas & meeting rooms & even collapsible gates or roller shutters on shop fronts will delay attackers & may discourage them from entering an area altogether if they perceive the barrier to be too difficult to overcome.
Note that whilst many doors with electronic locks can be opened by activating a break-glass switch on the inside, this typically leaves the door unlocked for the duration of the attack, potentially giving access to marauding attackers. It is important that ramifications of using these mechanisms to leave a locked area are understood.
Important response tasks for onsite security personnel
Alerting neighbors, updating personnel & members of the public, making a detailed assessment in order to update law enforcement units & directing front-line personnel are all important tasks. However, it is highly unlikely that any of these will be completed unless you have a security control room with highly trained & well rehearsed operators.
Alerting neighbors
Marauding attackers will enter surrounding locations looking for further victims. By alerting the neighbors to the attack, you allow them to take action to evacuate or lockdown premises. This requires that a channel of communication such as a shared radio channel or a shared channel/chatroom/group on an instant messenger application has been established.
Updating personnel & members of the public
Equipping people with current information about the progress of the attack & the whereabouts of attackers means that they can make the best decisions about what action to take.
Research has shown that people in hiding may emerge & put themselves in danger if they are not told that the attack is still in progress. People are reassured by regular announcements. Continue to reassure people by announcing that “police have been called”.
Law enforcement may request that particular announcements are?made depending on the circumstances of the incident. Unless law enforcement makes a specific request to do so, it?should not be announced that the police have arrived since doing so would inform the attackers & remove the police’s advantage.
Making a detailed assessment
Gathering more information about the attack will hep you immensely with your decisions & enable you to pass pertinent information to personnel & members of the public as well as law enforcement.
Assessing the attack in greater detail requires highly competent operators using a CCTV monitoring system with coverage of thoroughfares & a playback facility. It will take several minutes & their assessment should identify:
? The number of attackers, likely requiring live monitoring of their movements
? What they are wearing & carrying
? Weapons (knives, pistols, assault rifles, explosive vests)
? Whether they have split up or remain as a single group. If possible, obtain still images of the attackers to assist law enforcement & 1st responders.
Directing front-line personnel
Front-line personnel can be directed over a shared radio channel with more detail than can be communicated using public announcements. However, those already in the midst of the attack are unlikely to be able to listen or answer.
Radio protocol
Research has highlighted that security & front-line personnel seldom practice radio communications in the context of an emergency. People talk over one another, broadcast unnecessarily long, rambling messages blocking others on the channel & ask for updates rather than trusting that updates will be provided when available.
It is therefore crucial that people are concise when conveying information & are fluent in radio protocol (saying ‘over’ when ending a transmission that expects a?reply & ‘out’ when ending an exchange).
Effective communication undoubtedly becomes more difficult under pressure & it is crucial for this skill to be regularly practiced.
The sheer importance of rehearsals
With well-developed procedures, security systems, training & rehearsals, lives can be saved.
One can go so far with briefing documents, videos & lectures but when you put these people into safe & managed stress test situations that is where you start to see the real benefit of full rehearsals.
References
An evaluation of college campus preparedness intervention. J. Saf. Res. (201
“Communicating public guidance for firearms and weapons attacks: factors influencing intention to ‘run, hide, tell’ in the UK and Denmark” Risk Anal. (2019)
Communications in public health emergency preparedness: a systematic review of the literature. Biosecur. Bioterrorism Biodefense Strategy, Pract. Sci.(20`3)
Official Advice to ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ Not Remotely Helpful, Say Experts (2015)
Active shooter: an agent-based model of unarmed resistance.
?J.P.?Blair?et al.
A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 (2014)
Preventing school shootings: the effectiveness of safety measures. Vict. Offenders (2017)
One size does not fit all: traditional lockdown versus multioption responses to school shootings. J. Sch. Violence (2020)
Endro Sunarso is an expert in Security Management, Physical Security & Counter Terrorism. He is regularly consulted on matters pertaining to transportation security, off-shore security, critical infrastructure protection, security & threat assessments, & blast mitigation.
Besides being a Certified Protection Professional (CPP?), a Certified Identity & Access Manager (CIAM?), a Project Management Professional (PMP?) & a Certified Scrum Master (CSM?), Endro is also a Fellow of the Security Institute (FSyl) & the Institute of Strategic Risk Management (F.ISRM).
Endro has spent about 2 decades in Corporate Security (executive protection, crisis management, critical infrastructure protection, governance, business continuity, loss mitigation, due diligence, counter corporate espionage, etc). He also has more than a decade of experience in Security & Blast Consultancy work, initially in the Gulf Region & later in South East Asia.
?