The Man Who Made A Difference

The Bulge is depicted as a disaster for American staff processes and leadership, which it was with the exception of one man-Col Oscar Koch, G2 of Patton’s Third Army.?Of all the Intelligence staffs from SHAEF to Montgomery to Bradley to their respective armies, they all got it wrong-except Koch.?He correctly predicted the German units that would attack and where they would attack and was quite close as to when.

Patton, despite his image as a swashbuckling thruster, was actually extremely mindful and sensitive to both logistics and intelligence-the lifeblood of a thrusting power applicator.?From Africa and the II Corps, he had encouraged smart, contrarian thinkers with independent streaks. His staff personnel were a free wheeling but cohesive grouping that always searched for the right answer rather than the predictable, doctrinal answer-combat was not predictable and his staff reflected that.

Their diligence had been well rewarded throughout the war and he took pleasure in both supporting their independence from higher headquarters but also actively challenged their conclusions and analysis, which further fueled their fires of curiosity and creativity. (I know this from a first-hand source, my ROTC PMS?was a Major on Patton’s G3 staff.)

The lead pot stirrer was the G2, Oscar Koch.?He was an artilleryman by trade but an intelligence officer by choice-or at least Patton’s choice.?He had been with Patton since the 2d Armored days at Indio, California. Patton, in his genius of judgment, made him the Division G2, then Corps G2 then Army G2.?He was always fiercely independent from attempts by higher to “manage” his analysis and had to be consistently backstopped by Patton to preserve his independence.?Most disconcertingly, he was usually correct which only engendered more irritations from above.

He was a voracious crossword puzzle consumer as well as an inveterate workaholic.?He usually woke around 4am to read out of unit intelligence assessments and summaries and went to bed reading the same around midnight.?Hence, his nickname, Monk.?

He was viewed by many as an eccentric curiosity to be “worked around” when SHAEF or Bradley’s staff had to address his analysis.

?In some cases he was wrong but in most cases he was right-especially during the Breakout Phase from Normandy. Patton listened carefully when he spoke and acted accordingly. If Monk said; “No Germans on the flanks,” Patton acted accordingly-being labeled audacious when he knew otherwise.

He spent considerable time delving into the minutiae of other units’ assessments. More importantly, he maintained a special map that outlined the Order of Battle for the entire German army regardless of its geographical location and association with 3d Army.?

After the battle pause in November due to logistical exhaustion, Koch had extra time to work on his eccentricities.?He began to count German Panzer divisions on both Western and Eastern fronts.?In October, he was able to account for virtually all between the two fronts.?Scratching an intellectual itch, he made it a point to pace these divisions in terms of possible future intentions and capabilities.?

By the first week in December, he had lost five of them. By the end of the second week, fifteen. At this point, he privately briefed Patton as to the possibility of the “Lost divisions” attacking the West. He pinpointed the Ardennes as the most likely avenue with a combination of intuition and a reading of history. This combined with a precipitous drop off of German radio transmissions led him to three conclusions which he sent to SHAEF with Patton’s imprimatur.

?The Germans were massing Armored elements for a major counterattack

?The attack would most likely be in the Ardennes

?The attack would probably occur in December?

SHAEF G2 and Bradley’s 2d Army as well as Hodges 1st Army all had contrary assessments judging the Germans spent and the Ardennes the least likely location for significant action.?One who did not discount this was Patton.

Patton, approximately 12 December, used Koch’s briefing to begin to formulate a “What If” plan. It involved applying immediate pressure on the northern flank to ensure access, a withdrawal of units in the far south to a more forward north facing assembly areas and a map study.

The study showed three possible routes for Third Army to relieve a potential German attack-One, Two, Three.?An attack corridor, unit assignment and route march plan was developed for each.?It was this plan that Patton carried in his pocket to Verdun on 19 December to meet with Ike and other commanders to address how to respond.?He said he could attack in three days, the others thought a week or more. Ike directed a week. Patton radioed the choice and it was underway before he returned to his headquarters.

This was accomplished because Patton, through experience, believed in Koch and Koch believed in thinking beyond his boundaries and was not afraid to defend his contrarian opinions-opinions which stood the test of battle.

The Bulge may have unfolded considerably different had Eisenhower and Bradley listened as much as Patton.