“The Making of a Jordanian Political Identity”

Transjordan was established in 1921 when the British government proclaimed Emir (later King) Abdullah as the ruler of Transjordan, that later became the Emirate of Transjordan through a signed treaty in 1923. Between 1923 and 1946, Emir Abdullah worked on promulgating a constitution, establishing a cohesive political unity among the local Bedouin tribes, and founding the governmental institutions of a nation state. In 1946, Abdullah negotiated a treaty that ended the British mandate, and during the same year the parliament proclaimed him king and changed the name of Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Jordan decided to unite the East (Jordan) and West (remaining unoccupied Palestinian territories) Banks and provide the evicted refugees from Israeli-occupied Palestine with the right to become Jordanian citizens, laying the ground for future tensions between Bedouin and Palestinian Jordanians that have come to reside in Jordan[1].

The history of Palestinian and Bedouin Jordanians has been an amalgamation of discrimination and struggle. King Abdullah the first was assassinated in Jerusalem by a Palestinian in 1951. Jordan used excessive military action to expel the Palestinian Libration Organization (PLO) in 1970 during a ten-day bloodbath known as Black September that resulted in the killing of thousands of Bedouin and Palestinian Jordanians[2].

When I was living in Jordan, the general consensus was that Palestinian Jordanians are not permitted to work at the General Intelligence Department (GID), the army, the police, or any security agency. While the Palestinian community is estimated to be more than half of the population, it is not properly represented in the government or parliament. There is no Palestinian governor at any of the 12 governorates, while the electoral system gives greater representation to areas that have a majority of inhabitants of non-Palestinian origin[3]. Jordanian Bedouins that serve in the military and government get an advantage in accessing high-quality education, healthcare, tax exemptions, and even in purchasing customs-free luxurious and expensive cars.

Jordan is an ethnically heterogeneous country that has been struck by a sudden and high influx of Syrian Refugees at the outset of the Syrian Crisis in 2011. As of February 2016, there are more than 630,000 Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in Jordan, constituting to approximately 10% of the total population[4]. The Syrian refugee crisis has had an extraordinary social and economic effect on Jordanian host communities, reversing development gains, stressing on basic social services and providing a competitive advantage for cheap Syrian labor over the existing limited employment opportunities[5]. Regional turmoil and the continuous influx of refugees threaten to disrupt the country’s political stability by changing its fragile national identity[6].

Prior to the revolution, Syria had a Pan-Arab identity. Baath was the ruling party that adopted a secular social ideology that called for uniting Arabs against imperialism and Zionism[7]. Various members of the Syrian community had a normal and healthy relationship with one another irrespective of their religion. Today, that relationship has completely changed, communication channels have eroded, trust has vanished, and everyone is suspicious of each other. Reese Erlich provides an example of an Alawite government employee, “If you’re invited to dinner by a Sunni, you would be afraid of an ambush, so you would refuse”[8].

Assad managed to change the Syrian identity, diverge the society, and redirect them all towards each another. The regime relies on a religious and socioeconomic coalition that includes Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Sunni bourgeoisie and their relatives that have benefited from the economic reforms in 2000. The religious minorities are privileged, safe, and fear revenge and marginalization if the regime fails. The majority of rebellions are Sunnis, but having some Sunni support on the side of the regime denied the opposition from victory[9]. As for the Kurds, they have their own ethnic affiliation that matters to them more than sectarianism or religion[10]. The Syrian Pan-Arab identity rapidly eroded and was replaced with a blend of a religious and ethnic identity.

Syrian Refugees that fled to Jordan carried with them their new identities that are mainly religious, and that were affected by the rise of extremism within the context of the ongoing civil war. The Jordanian government is afraid of the spillover effect that can easily disturb its fragile national identity. The systematic marginalization and exclusion of Palestinians from public participation has formulated feelings of resentment, anger, and bitterness among Palestinian Jordanians. Bedouin Jordanians generally adhere to primordialism, and identify themselves according to origin and ancestry, making it almost impossible for outsiders to join their group, and serving them in reasserting their superiority over Palestinians, and now Syrians[11].

The birth of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the outcome of a changing political arena in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and a growing sensation of a Pan-Islamic sectarian identity that obscured and replaced the diminishing Pan-Arab identity. From my professional and personal experience in Jordan, I was able to witness a growing sensation of a Sunni Pan-Islamic identity that can easily nurture across marginalized populations such as Palestinian Jordanians, Syrians, the Muslim Brotherhood Party, and even some Bedouins that are suffering from poor socioeconomic conditions.

The continuation of the Middle Eastern ethnic and sectarian polarization needs to be resolved rapidly through peaceful channels of dialogue. The growing influence of political Islam is not in the best interest of Jordan or the region. Social justice arises from secular political systems that respect constituents apart from their ethnic or religious affiliations and ensure political stability through equality.

References

[1] King Hussein I website, “The Making of Transjordan”

[2] Cleveland WL, Bunton M. (2009). A history of the modern Middle East. Westview Press

[3] US Department of State. (2002). Jordan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

[4] UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response

[5] 3RP: Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan.” United Nations Development Programme in the Arab States

[6] Haynes, W. C. (2016). Jordanian Society's Responses to Syrian Refugees

[7] Briefings, P. O. M. E. P. S. (2013). The Political Science of Syria’s War

[8] Reese Erlich. (2014). Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (New York: Prometheus Books,), 125

[9] Vasquez, Joshua. (2016). The Survival of Authoritarianism and the Syrian Identity Crisis: Explaining the Resilience of Assad's Ruling Bargain

[10] K?se et. al. (2016). A comparative analysis of soft power in the MENA region: the impact of ethnic, sectarian, and religious identity on soft power in Iraq and Egypt

[11] Haynes, W. C. (2016). Jordanian Society's Responses to Syrian Refugees