Making Europe Great Again: Defence or Pretence?
President Trump has not caused a temporary crisis in transatlantic relations, but a permanent Atlantic Zeitenwende (Atlantic sea-change).? Can a deal be done to save that relationship and, of course, NATO. Europeans must move to Trump-proof their defence without encouraging him to double down on his threats, and even though he is “burning through a lot of goodwill”. ?That was both the challenge and consensus of this latest TAG Virtual Conference.
Given that challenge, Europe's future defence must have three purposes: to demonstrate greater European strategic responsibility; to maintain credible defence and deterrence in and around Europe should the US become embroiled in an Indo-Pacific War; and to act as insurance should President Trump withdraw US forces from Europe.
Europeans also need to move quickly. The risk Trump poses to NATO is not so much the US quitting the Alliance but blocking action therein. ?Europeans must collectively move to ensure they can still act if at some point the US prevents their use of NATO’s integrated command structure.? A strategic audit of European military forces and civilian assets must now be undertaken now to establish a new European defence concept, particularly strategic enablers (satellite communications, imagery, intelligence sharing etc). A bespoke reinforced European future force that is credible in its deterrence and defence role given the threats would take at least 8-10 years.? In the worst case, there could be a “window of danger” between 2030 and 2035, particularly for Allies on NATO’s eastern and northern flanks. ?Any such force would not only take a very significant increase in defence investment, but the effective mobilisation of industry, technology and parts of society akin to the British Shadow Factory Plan of 1935.
Europeans must also seek an accommodation with Trump. Such is the poor state of Europe’s armed forces that Europeans will continue to be dependent on the Americans through NATO for defence and deterrence at least until 2035. This reality makes the provision of a high-end European inter-position force between Russian and Ukrainian forces AND the maintenance of a credible Alliance defence and deterrence posture “a fantasy”. “It is not a feasible course of action and cannot be done”. There are only a maximum of 20-30 deployable warfighting brigades in European armies. The NATO Force Model envisages up to 50 such brigades whilst given force rotation at least 80 brigades would be needed, plus supporting air power which “cannot be done”.
Europeans could help Ukraine by supporting Kyiv’s “ability to deter Russia” going forward. The Ukrainians can also offer Europeans a host of lessons about innovative and affordable battlefield solutions, most notably drone technology. ?
A European extended nuclear deterrent faces profound political and operational challenges, not least the effective abandonment by Europeans of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the very rules-based order they seek to defend. Whilst the British like to proclaim the operational independence of their deterrent the system is wholly reliant on the Americans.? The French have greater independence but only the air component would be credible at the European theatre level and for all the rhetoric Paris remains “very ambivalent” about undertaking such a role.? One option would be to adapt existing dual capable European strike aircraft to carry nuclear-tipped Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles. To do that the run-down British Atomic Weapons Establishment must be rebuilt. I
Who is going to shape the new European security order? Germany is the critical change factor. The adversarial language of Vice-President Vance at the Munich Security Conference was heard by Chancellor-in-Waiting Friedrich Merz. However, Berlin must have the full support of London and Paris given the three countries together represent 70% of all European defence investment.
How is such an order to be built?? SACEUR’s Defence Plan remains a sound basis for reinforcing both the European pillar of NATO and building European strategic autonomy.?
Who is going to pay for it?? A rebalancing of social security with national security will be needed. Defence is no longer “discretionary expenditure”. A new “financial arsenal of democracy” is needed.? It is time for the financial and banking sector to repay the European taxpayer for the bail outs they received during the 2008-10 banking crisis. This could be done through the proposed Defence, Security and Resilience Bank – a kind of 21st?century Lend-Lease Deal.
What European Future Force? Before the transatlantic relationship is prematurely laid to rest Europeans must first seek a new burden sharing accommodation with the Americans. ?The January 2025 TAG?Atlantic Charter 2025: A New NATO Deal for America?https://thealphengroup.com/2025/01/12/atlantic-charter-2025-a-new-nato-deal-for-america/?lays out Europe’s force goals: 4 fully enabled, fully ready mobile warfighting corps (each 30,000 troops minimum), 2 ‘shield’ corps based in Poland and Romania, 3 fully enabled, fully ready Composite Air Strike Forces (CASF) (both aircraft and missiles), and 2 ?fully enabled, fully ready Non-US Standing Fleets.? In return, the US would maintain in Europe IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES a fully enabled, fully ready warfighting corps (V Corps), a Composite Air Strike Force and the US 6th?Fleet.
Julian Lindley-French
Chairman & Managing Director
2 天前As yet pretense
Company Owner / Director & Lecturer
2 天前The decision to withdraw British forces from Germany felt wrong at the time. Subsequent events have shown it to be a strategic misjudgement. Reconstituting a capable armoured presence, with appropriate CAS, for permanent redeployment to mainland Europe, would demonstrate a seriousness about Defence which has been lacking for decades.
Independent consultant
2 天前Thank you. Was the word Turkey mentioned in your conference? (I am not referring to the bird.) Or would the emerging European security architecture avoid it like pest?
Director, DMWC founded as a forum to discuss future security policy with NATO & EU experts
2 天前Julian, Excellent analysis as usual. What I have drawn from your conclusions is that France, with its independent “force de frappe” nuclear capability, offers the most credible of the European deterrent options available. Dependent on French political support to President Macron, which would be necessary to employ it. Assuming Macron obtained that approval, could a European ultimatum to the Kremlin, with French leadership, be the deterrent that everyone searches?
Systems Engineering, Military Procurement, Flight Test, ISR and Long Range Maritime Patrol Expert
2 天前Prof L-F. Glad to hear that behind the bluster, there is a plan. Namely that US protects Taiwan and Europe looks after itself. It leaves open the idea that Trumps courting of Putin is really to separate him from China. A laudable aim, even if we must assume Putin is able to play that like a fiddle. But what of us in Europe? What is the strategic aim? To contain Russia or to Defeat Russia? In Ukraine or after Ukraine? The proposed rebalancing of force levels looks a good deal for europeans. But I only see this working if one of both of the UK and France take a much bolder lead than they are currently doing. Thanks for the insights- it gives me some hope that real conversations are happening somewhere at least and it’s not all x posts (I know that I am writing this on a sm post myself!)