Make up your mind: A reflexive essay about the decision-making process

We could sum up the basic idea of the existentialist philosophical school through the famous statement of Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980): "Man is condemned to be free." The reason behind this statement lies in the fact that freedom implies choices and this fact brings with it some kind of decision making. Even not deciding consists in one kind of decision. In any case, a trail of responsibility is created in relation to the choice that was made. In his article "Elogio de la indecisión", Mario Bunge (2000) leads to a reflection exactly on this point. Following his intellectual provocation, freedom would be precisely in the power of non-decision. In his words: “(...) ser libre es poder se indeciso cuando a uno se le antoje, con razón o sin ella". The maintenance safeguard of the right not to decide would avoid the natural wear and tear of the decision-making process as a whole. But with that, the decision maker freedom would be guaranteed?

To answer this question, it is necessary to investigate further the decision-making process itself. Admittedly ubiquitous in the everyday life of all human beings since birth, this process is by no means trivial and should not be analyzed in a simplistic way. So much so, that approaches of the most diverse orders have been developed since the beginning of the history of humanity with the aim of trying to subjugate its obstacles. Its origins date back to Aristotle and ancient Greece, but it was from the second half of the twentieth century that the theory of decisions developed the most, based on influences from the different areas such as mathematics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and so on. It is a fact that the rational aspects of the decision are usually the most valued in fields such as business management. The decision itself, considered as part of human behavior, is also more easily defined and accepted if it is added to the concept of rationality, forming what has been called a rational decision. But to what extent can rationalism be regarded as the best model for decision-making?

The expression rationalism has its origin in the Latin "ratio" which means reason. His doctrine suggests placing total and exclusive trust in reason as an instrument for knowing the truth. According to Pavesi (2001), the rational model requires the decision maker a clear knowledge about: (1) their system of preferences and their alternatives, (2) about elements behavior of the universe in question, (3) a form for measuring these elements, (4) a sufficiently rigorous methodology to arrive at reasonably acceptable assessments and (5) an additional quantity of variables, elements and methods for this measurement. The concepts of this rationalism include: logic, minimizing ambiguity, questioning, valuing empirical support, seeking achievable goals, and practice. Frank P. Ramsey (1903-1930), despite his short life span, was also one of the main proponents on the use of induction and probability in decision making, arguing that rationality would be the ability to consistently order alternatives and decision preferences.

In general, there is an excessive concern for building a model where the means and ends are clearly related. However, despite the recognized value of the rational method, it may be too simplistic to attempt to translate mathematically the complexity of reality. The reduction of the universe to a series of limited and measurable alternatives can often end up being a kind of "Achilles heel" of the same model, given that compliance would only be possible if all individuals had a homogeneous vision of the world, sharing a same code of values. What we know is not what happens in practice. People differ in their way they think and phenomenologically analyze the world, precisely because of its human and therefore idiosyncratic characteristics. On the basis of this observation, it may be possible to conclude that rationalism makes use not only of reason, but mainly of some abuse of it.

Considering that the decision-maker is a loner and his decision obliges him to commit and take responsibility (Pavesi, 2001), the emotional aspect of a decision should not be disregarded. As proposed by Kahneman&Tversky (1981), our choices are not always only from the point of view of objectivity. Although they continue their paper by stating that experimental studies show that even lack of objectivity tends to follow regular patterns that would admit a mathematical description, other studies of decision making and their relation to the human mind reveal unconscious mechanisms that would help us in troubleshooting. It is the so-called "heuristic" process of decision making (Bonatti, 2010). This heuristic procedure would be a method of approaching problem solving, which would not follow a clear course, but rather on intuition and circumstances, generating new knowledge.

In other words, as Sutherland (1992) says: "Con todos mis respetos a Aristóteles, cabe afirmar que la conducta irracional no es la excepción sino la norma". To this consideration of Sutherland is also added the idea of Antonio Damasio, in affirming that the error of Descartes was precisely that of separating the body of the mind, the emotion of reason. It’s the equivalent of "I feel, therefore I am" instead of Descartes's "I think, therefore I am” (cogito, ergo sum). This is also true from the physiological point of view, since the areas related to emotional processes occupy a considerable space of the human brain, especially the prefrontal area, the hypothalamus, and the limbic system as a whole. Therefore, the entire decision-making process benefits from the emotions for generating alternatives, analysis and the choice itself.

Bringing this issue to the management field specifically, it is a fact that rational thinking cannot occur in the absence of emotion. In other words, people should not be criticized for using emotion in their decision-making process, but rather for how they use it for best results. It is the use of subjectivity as a differential in decision making, life and work. Bonatti (2010) adds that this subjective aspect cannot only not be discarded, but it is of fundamental importance in the evaluation of situations and alternative decision. Obviously, analysis based on technical and rational data is also very important within the organizational environment and can’t be ignored in any way. But if we combine intuition with these more linear factors, the result tends to be even better.

This point linked to subjectivity brings us to the beginning of the paper "Elogio de la Indecisión" by Bunge (2000), where the author comments on the stigma that hangs over the undecided ones and the feeling of losing time in waiting too much for decision making in relation to the speed of the world in which we live. This is one of the most difficult counterpoint issues if we remain focused on the corporate environment. Even more so if we consider the advances of information technology, artificial intelligence, globalization and the growing mutant demands of society. In fact, with the expansion of data science and big data, speed became a differential factor in the global competitive context. To the extent that organizations of the most diverse segments aim at their self-preservation, sustainability and growth, one cannot ignore the power of capillarity, information access acceleration, and the speed of the decision-making process.

However, despite the agility of information displacement and pressure at all levels of an organization - operational, tactical, strategic - for faster decision making, we know that assertiveness and the hitting level of correct choices are also professional demands. Making firm decisions does not always mean making the right ones. Not to mention that the overload of information (and means of information) can also disrupt the decision maker. At times, more so than the lack of it.

Another view that corroborates with all this problematic regarding the speed of the decision comes from the cognitive psychologist Gary Klein, who argues that people under very high pressure, often even after years of studies on a certain subject, at the time of deciding, do not make use necessarily from manuals and research sources, but from their intuition. According to Klein (1999), the minds of trained people decide so quickly during moments of pressure that they can rarely reasonably explain why a decision has been made. In other words, over time we would be accumulating experience, and unconsciously we would create categories of events according to how we should behave.

Following Klein's reasoning, the so-called experts make quicker decisions precisely because, based on their experience, they compare fewer options than a newcomer, who tends to compare different options for solving a problem. Even to be more confident about the choice they are taking. If so, the validity of the study on the rationality of the theory of decisions could be questioned, since the best way to make quicker decisions would be to favor the accumulation of experiences. Comparing options would work well for beginners or for situations without pressure. It is with this purpose and also to justify and support the sequence of his paper, that Bunge (2000) suggests: "(...) desgraciadamente, se puede probar que esta teoría no sirve sino para ganarse la vida ense?ándola en alguna facultad”.  The phrase, although extremely strong and provocative, ends up making sense since subjectivity and intuition are two important components of the decision-making process as a whole. If the academy is more concerned with the mathematization of the process, what would be the actual usefulness of this type of teaching?

The very meaning of a decision-making process, at whatever level, presupposes some degree of emotion and associated free will. It is at this point that Bunge (2000) introduces the antithesis of this logic, suggesting the idea of freedom as the capacity not to make decisions. He does not thoroughly investigate the theme, but merely puts it as an initial point of reflection, introducing various problems derived from freedom. It uses examples of positive freedom (i.e.: love, talk) and negative (i.e.: being free of commitments, not working), but ends up indicating a measured and less risky position when affirming that full freedom may be both positive and negative. Moreover, he recalls that the truth is that we can only aspire to limited freedoms, because the fact that we belong to any kind of social system already carries obligations inherent to the system itself.

Despite the sophist and partial conception, the vision of freedom as an instrument of decision-making is not new from a historical-philosophical point of view. Both humanism and existentialism addressed these issues in their own way, or in a complementary view throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially regarding the idea of self-creation freedom as the generator of anguish or fear before freedom. The existentialist view was more negativist, as justified in thoughts such as those of Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Heidegger (1889-1976), based on notions such as boredom, despair and death. Sartre, as noted at the beginning of this essay, may be the most radical one, since he considers that man is forced to make his choices even without knowing his entire existence in full. According to him, the human being cannot escape from his freedom. And freedom itself would not only be a set of choices made at random, but rather options limited by the contingencies of the world in which one lives. Including cultural, environmental, physical conditions, society rules, etc. The humanist current was more optimistic, since it considered that the individual has a drive for self-realization that frees him from this drama, and offers him the freedom to create himself.

In opposition to what might be called a philosophical perspective on freedom of choice, the behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) arose, considering the concepts of freedom as myths to be denied through science. For Skinner, the focus of concern should be on administering rewards in a way that elicits desired behavior rather than the illusion of freedom itself. This is the most classic deterministic thinking of the human being. Free will would be the dream of the scientifically ignorant, since behavior would be controlled by the environment in conjunction with genetics.

The choice for a particular theoretical position was not the original idea of this essay, nor it is imagined that the subject will be exhausted with this humble reflection. The relevance of the controversy over the decision-making process is precisely to rekindle the discussion to whether the power of decision-making lies (or not) in the freedom to choose. Perhaps the answer to this philosophical question lies in the quality of life provided by our choice. 

We can only be truly free as far as our own awareness of the environment and the variables that determine us. This "decision-making emancipation" will only become an act of actual liberation when we can free ourselves from making choices, but this moment would only come unfortunately (or fortunately) with the very advent of death, eternal source of man's anguish. The fact is that there is too much information available and, at the same time, the feeling of less and less time for decision making. Exact sciences merge with human sciences to aid in this complex process of choice. If on the one hand this fusion is inevitable, on the other hand, the joining of intuition with reason further complicates the prospects of certain preferences. Perhaps our degree of freedom will vary depending on the alternatives we face in life. A greater or lesser range of possibilities can be seen in front of us both in professional and personal perspectives. Facing with courage the novelty of the consequences of our choices to come is the greatest challenge of the one who seeks his freedom in life.

References

• BONATTI, Patricia (2010) Teoria de la Decision (Org). Buenos Aires: Pearson.
• BUNGE, Mario (2000). Elogio de la Indecisión. Revista Notícias págs. 97-101. Buenos Aires.
• KAHNEMAN, Daniel & TVERSKY, Amos (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the psychology of Choice. Science, 211:453-458.
• KLEIN, Gary (1999). Sources of Power – How people make decisions. Miramax Books. Nova York.
• PAVESI, Pedro (2001). Consideraciones acerca de la Teoria del Decididor. Lecturas de teoría de la decisión. Nueva Técnica, Ed. Maio págs. 19-46. Buenos Aieres.
• SUTHERLAND, Stuart (1996). Irracionalidad, el enemigo interior. Editorial Alianza. Madrid, 1996.