Lula Didn't Even Wait for the Second Round of Municipal Elections to Reposition His Government: A Rightward Shift on the Horizon?

For the Alvorada Palace, there’s no time left to waste. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has already received the message from the ballot boxes in the 2024 municipal elections—and it’s bitter as bile. The left has lost. Yet the harshest reality isn’t just the loss of mayoral seats, as that has been an unwelcome constant for the PT since 2016. The true crisis lies in the widening gap between leftist rhetoric and the voices of lower-income Brazilians.

Consider the municipal election in S?o Paulo, now headed to a runoff between Ricardo Nunes of the MDB, backed by former President Jair Bolsonaro, and federal congressman Guilherme Boulos of PSOL, supported by Lula. Nunes’s stronger appeal to working-class voters marked the campaign, despite Lula’s strategic move of positioning Marta Suplicy, a former PT mayor, as Boulos’s running mate. Even though Lula was the city’s top choice for president, Boulos struggled to gain traction in S?o Paulo’s outskirts.

Lula is a political animal—a rare breed these days. The disconnect between the left and the broader country had been looming for over a year. Consider this: the government has collected a string of good economic news, from wage growth and a rising GDP to historically low unemployment. Yet, government approval remains tepid—roughly one in three Brazilians is pleased, another is discontent, and the remaining third is indifferent. Given this, Lula is beginning to recognize the legs may not hold until 2026, and it might be wise to recalibrate his message to reach a voter who doesn’t feel that his government or the left represents their aspirations.

Lula’s moves to reposition his pieces are already underway. A few sharp-eyed observers noticed the odd spectacle of him receiving ex-Bolsonaro supporter Congressman Otoni de Paula and Evangelical leaders at the Planalto Palace. The PT’s path to viability in 2026 could hinge on the 2024 mayoral race in Cuiabá, where PT candidate Ludio Cabral has been confronting far-right opponent Abilio Brunini while steering clear of divisive moral debates. Yet, this is a risky approach that Lula may need time to evaluate.

Another piece of the puzzle for 2026 is the choice of the next PT party president. Lula favors Araraquara’s mayor, Edinho Silva, but internal party movements support candidates closer to the current president, Gleisi Hoffmann—a scenario that irritates Planalto insiders. Edinho would give Lula the autonomy to reposition the PT that Gleisi likely wouldn’t, making him a critical piece in Lula’s strategy for 2026.

In S?o Paulo’s election, another indicator hints at Lula’s potential shift in direction. In the final days, Boulos, the PSOL candidate, tried to rebrand, reading an impassioned letter pledging to support small entrepreneurs, particularly gig workers like app drivers and couriers. This indicates that the large bloc of Brazilians who eschew formal employment may finally be on the left’s radar. Terms like “right-wing poor,” “precarious,” and “cupcake entrepreneur” are likely to be swept from the political lexicon from now until the next election cycle—a realization that’s admittedly overdue. Since 2017, when the Perseu Abramo Foundation, a PT-linked think tank, released its study “Perceptions and Political Values in S?o Paulo’s Outskirts,” it’s been clear that today’s working-class voter is not the same as in the days of Lula the metalworker.

Where this repositioning will lead Lula and the PT is hard to predict. The embrace of entrepreneurship, defense of meritocracy, and even public funding for projects previously seen as “liberal” are all considered likely steps. The cheap steak and beer haven’t had the desired effect for Lula. Today’s erratic voter expects prosperity to arrive with the speed of online betting or day trading – or the frenetic scrolling that shapes social media interactions. Life doesn’t move at the pace of TikTok dances—that’s a given—but blaming voters won’t help.

Ministerial Reforms in Lula’s First-Term Style Are on the Horizon

A more direct consequence is also in view for analysts: a cabinet reshuffle with a tilt to the right. Lula expanded the ministries to encompass his Brazilian Broad Front coalition, yet kept key positions under his and PT’s control. Many ministries have proven ineffective, failing to either secure congressional support or deliver tangible results to boost Lula’s popularity.?

A clear example is Nísia Trindade’s appointment to the Ministry of Health, the Ministries Esplanade’s largest budget, a technically adept leader tied to the left. The “Centr?o faction”, a collective parliamentary group non-identified with right-wingers or left-wingers, especially the Speaker of the House, Arthur Lira, has long coveted this role but was denied. The outcome is that Nísia’s administration has been lackluster, to put it kindly, with serious challenges like a recent shortage of COVID vaccines in the public healthcare system. This lends weight to the possibility of Lula offering juicier roles to centrists in the latter half of his term, enhancing his sway among these parties. Even within the left, repositioning could push the PT into near-isolation, as the PSB and PDT test the waters of a federation with other smaller centrist parties, reshuffling the deck for 2026 and beyond.

Lula has weathered crises before. The Mensal?o scandal of 2005 forced the PT into concessions, which Lula accepted and coasted to an easy re-election in 2006. The difference now is that Lula isn’t the same, the PT isn’t the same, and—most definitely—the voter isn’t the same.