Low fertility rates and the enormous consequences for worldwide Countries

In the early 1960s, I was a child who had just learned to read and write. I assiduously read a weekly children's magazine: the Corriere dei Piccoli (Courier of the Little Ones), nicknamed Corrierino ("Little Courier"). The Corrierino published material in many genres: stories in comic strip format, illustrated tales and novels, educational material, feature columns, humour, news, reviews, readers' letters, puzzles, board games, and more. In a 1964 issue, the centre fold presented, in comic strip format, the so-called "Project 2000", an interdisciplinary study promoted by the Italian Government, which was supposed to foresight what society, science, economy, industry and the population would be like in the early 2000s. Part of the centre fold also spoke, in popular terms, of demographic changes. In 2000, Italy would have a smaller population because fewer children would be born, a sign of cultural progress, even if older people would live longer. Demographic decline would be a panacea for all the problems that afflicted 1964 society: unemployment, lack of housing, crowding in schools and health services, etc. In fact, all these problems were due to the adverse effects of overcrowding. This was a recent phenomenon for Italy, whose population had not grown significantly since 1861, the year of the Proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy, to 1945. In the post-war period, an explosive demographic growth began, known to history as the baby boom, starting in the 1940s and ending in the 1960s, in the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan.

I have used this personal memory to show how demographic decline has been a well-forecasted event by demography scientists and decision-makers worldwide since the baby boom years.

A phenomenon long neglected in the name of fighting overpopulation was identified as the most substantial constraint on social and economic development in Western countries, Japan, China, and India.

And here we are, crying over spilt milk.

Italy has one of the lowest fertility rates in the European Union: 1.2 per woman, against the European average of 1.5, below the replacement rate of 2.1.

The total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she lived to the end of her childbearing years and bore children according to the age-specific fertility rates of the specified year.

Replacement level is the fertility rate at which a population replaces itself from one generation to the next. In developed countries, this requires an average of 2.1 children per woman. This means that a couple needs to have two children to replace themselves in the population. Any fertility rate below this level indicates a declining population, which can have significant social and economic implications.

This low fertility rate does not compensate for excess mortality. Added to this is the population's ageing process: Italy has about 14 million people over 65 and 800 thousand ninety-year-olds out of 58.9 million. The UN estimates the Italian population will be 56,5 million in 2050 and 49,6 million in 2100.

But we are not alone. Nearly every high-income country in the world has below-replacement fertility, led by South Korea, which has the lowest total fertility rate,0.81 births per woman. Also, China and India are experiencing a fall in the fertility rate due to specific family planning measures. Some lower-income countries with below-replacement fertility or are moving in that direction, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are always under the replacement rate.

It's worth noting that Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as the only region with a consistent demographic growth.

There is no demographic timebomb; it is part of the demographic transition. We knew this would happen, and it has been happening across the 21st Century, so it is not unexpected. However, we last prepared for this some time ago. It's high time we update our policies to address this issue.

Economists and political leaders point to various implications of low fertility, including a shrinking labour force and a reduction in innovation due to declining human capital. Declining fertility also means fewer people are served in support of government programs that rely on taxpayer funding, such as health services and retirement benefits. While the workforce and tax player base are shrinking, a growing ageing population requires more care and health services.

In the luckiest case, one child will care for two old parents. At worst, no one will care about an old couple of spouses.

In contrast to the 1980s demographic forecast, the immigration flow from low-income countries to high-income ones doesn't compensate enough for the demographic fall.

The traditional paradigm of determinist demography science (people tend to make more children during increasing income periods and stop generating children when incomes are decreasing) has been pulverised by the recent trend in wealthy countries.

Nevertheless, this paradigm seemed to run well in explaining the fall of demographic trends in Western Countries and Japan between 1914 and 1929 (because of the combined effects of the I World War, the Spanish flu epidemy, the economic depression of 1920 - 1921 and 1929 Great Depression, that affected virtually every country of the world). In Western Countries and Japan, the favourable demographic trend started again after the beginning of the recovery from the Great Recession in 1933.

Why are fertility rates falling?

The more common explanation focuses on female behaviour. According to theory, it is being driven by more women in education and work, as well as greater access to contraception, leading to women choosing to have fewer children.

However, the choice of generating babies is not just a matter of women's will. The explanation for the decreasing fertility rate is more complex. The social structure, religious beliefs, economic prosperity and urbanisation within each country will likely affect fertility rates. Developed countries tend to have a lower fertility rate due to lifestyle choices associated with economic affluence where mortality rates are low, birth control is easily accessible, and children often can become an economic drain for couples caused by housing, education costs and other costs involved in bringing up children. Higher education and professional careers usually mean couples have children late in life. As late as a couple decides to have a child, as less probability of having other children. A large number of couples lean towards this choice because there are not enough economic guarantees and support for the family. Many couples choose not to have children because they want to preserve their style of life and enjoy a life free of the responsibilities connected to parenthood.

As long as society experiences a low fertility rate and has few children, having a small family or no children at all is acceptable in society's culture.

This can result in a demographic and economic paradox.

A drop below replacement fertility does not mean the global population will immediately fall. It will likely take about 30 additional years, or roughly how long it takes for a new generation to start reproducing, for the global death rate to exceed the fertility rate.

Many predictions estimate that more time will be needed before the human population reaches a critical juncture when the worldwide population will stop growing. The United Nations Population Division projects that the world population, 8 billion as of 2023, would peak around the year 2086 at about 10.4 billion and then start a slow decline, assuming a continuing decrease in the global average fertility rate from 2.5 births per woman during the 2015–2020 period to 1.8 by the year 2100.

Regardless of when the turning point comes, growing disparity in fertility levels could contribute to the widening of other disparities. For middle- to high-income, low-fertility countries, falling below replacement level could mean labour shortages and pressure on health care systems, nationalised health insurance, and social security programs. Meanwhile, low-income countries that still have high fertility are at heightened risk of falling further behind on the world's economic stage. They cannot make the necessary investments to improve health, well-being, and education with too few resources to support a booming population. In addition, migrations from the less developed South of the World to the Northern Countries more affluent will depauperate countries of origin of human resources that can support further development. Most people who move to the north are the most clever and skilled, and they have more chances to adapt to new countries with their culture, language, and way of living.

Anyway, the decreasing population trend can unfold even faster because there are many variables we cannot foresee now.

For example, how will climate change affect the fertility and mortality rate?

In high-income countries, life expectancy is expected to grow linearly. The current phenomenon of the increasing ageing population is relatively new, even in high-income countries, and could be explained as the outcome of the synergy of factors: the existence of individuals who are the result of a process of long genetic selection, that affected previous generations, and now live in a period that offers better life conditions, better medical treatment, more healthy food and water, a more healthful and safe style of life, and more education and knowledge. Life expectancy could quickly stop increasing or reducing if one or more factors change or disappear.

Forecasting a rebound effect of the fertility rate after a long fall is difficult.

Experts believe we are observing a demographic substitution that will continue long after the turning point. The world will become used to a low-medium fertility rate, usually below the replacement level. Accordingly, the worldwide population will decrease until it plateaus. This will likely happen over 2100 or later. But to foresee further it is unrealistic.

How should countries deal with falling fertility rates?

If we cannot reverse the trend, we can mitigate the effects with proper measures.

To increase fertility rates, countries can make it easier for women and couples to have children by providing more generous childcare provisions, such as tax breaks and extended, fully paid maternity leave. In addition, companies could be compelled to offer new mums and dads more flexible working hours, extend working-from-home opportunities, and provide workplace crèches. Incentive or obligate employers not to take the hit to their earnings and career prospects that becoming a mother causes often. On the contrary, authorities and companies must remove restrictions and barriers concerning women, their organisational roles, and how they coincide with their maternal responsibilities. Most importantly, to eliminate disparities between men's and women's wages in similar roles.

In this regard, with a fertility rate of 1.83 in 2020, France is the most fertile country in the European Union. France has slowed the fall in its fertility rate over the past decades.

In France, having children is viewed as a private matter and a social duty. For this reason, the Government spends about four per cent of GDP on family-specific social insurance measures — one of the highest rates in the world.

It is the "French exception": the first modern society that does not discourage women from having children but encourages them to do so with a constantly evolving family policy. In France, families have the most children even though mothers maintain their careers. With its high rate of employment among women, especially young mothers, the country is exemplary in Europe.

Families are eligible for more than 20 family benefits depending on their situation and income. For example, all families with at least two children receive child benefits. Other maintenance payments, allowances to help pay for the care of children, and shared childcare allowances enable one or both parents to take time off from work or reduce their employment level are also available.

The country's comprehensive offerings include nationwide full-day care facilities for all children. This means that children and young people receive full-day care until they graduate from secondary school. Kindergarten (called "école maternelle" in French) offers free full-day care to children as young as two to three years, allowing parents to focus on training, work or the search for a job. In addition, hundreds of thousands of government-recognised and fairly paid childminders also provide full-day care for children. Parents receive a childcare allowance to help pay the costs, and most care costs can be claimed as a tax deduction.

Under the French family policy model, women can also return to work, primarily on a part-time basis but typically full-time. Combined with the statutory minimum wage, more women than in many other EU countries earn an income that allows them to survive independently, thus ensuring independent old-age provision.

The high birth rate is mainly because women are less often forced to choose between family and career. In France, 7.7% of births are from women having four or more children.

From the cultural point of view, there is no debate about whether children are harmed if they are not cared for by their own mothers.

France benefits from constant immigration. Since the middle of the 19th Century, France has attracted immigrants, first from European countries (like Poland, Spain, and Italy) and then from the former French colonies. Most of them lived in the Ile-de-France region, which contains Paris, and in Provence-Alpes-C?te d'Azur in the Southeastern part of the country. Most immigrants arriving in France were from Africa and Europe.

On the one hand, immigrants maintain the needed labour force and increase the taxpayers' base. On the other hand, immigrants are young and have a probability of having more than one child, supporting the French demographic. About 22% of newborns in France had at least one foreign-born grandparent (9% born in another European country, 8% born in the Maghreb and 2% born in another region). Immigrant families tend to be large as well as the second or third.

However, France is divided on the migration issue. The subject divided citizens, with more than 80 per cent of the French saying it could not be discussed peacefully. Although the majority of the French consider their country to have a responsibility to welcome migrants, they are a minority in thinking that France has the capacity to receive them. On the other hand, more people than ever believe that foreigners living in France should have the right to vote in all local elections.

Moreover, the contrasts about immigration are strongly influenced by cultural perceptions of where these people come from. Thousands of Ukrainians are fleeing their country, following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army, seem to be easier to accept by French public opinion.

Other means for countries to deal with falling birth rates.

A country can quickly deal with the effects of a falling birth rate in two main ways: it can have large-scale immigration or keep its population healthier and employed for longer.

Regarding the second strategy, Singapore has a successful case history.

Singapore is one of the fastest-ageing countries in the world. Much effort is being put into raising the retirement age, training in middle life, and encouraging companies—which have to offer re-employment up to 69—to hire older workers. Re-employment means that older workers can stay at work after reaching retirement age if they wish.

Currently, the retirement age in Singapore is 63, but this is due to rise to 65 by 2030. By that year, the age at which people in re-employment can stay in work is expected to have increased to 70.

The Singaporean Government is also increasing efforts to ensure every citizen has a doctor who must take care of them, monitor their condition, and ensure we have healthier cohorts who can continue to work.

Singapore is spending a lot of money to have the healthiest population and allow people to work into old age.

According to the Singaporean Government, it is fundamental to get over the idea that older people are entitled to an indefinitely long leisure period at the end of their lives. People are healthier, vigorous, cognitively sharper, and ready to go on at much older ages than before.

This measure seems inevitable economically. As life expectancy increases, it becomes increasingly challenging to afford ever-longer retirements for the sustainability of the pension system and the increasing cost of the public health system. Something has to give, and working longer is the obvious solution.

The demography experts know that countries must make people work longer or increase immigration, probably both. But to do that, political consensus is required, and politicians know that asking people to approve additional immigration and the need to work for more years in later life is not a vote-winner.

However, demography is expected to make a leap ahead that will enormously improve its methodologies and tools. Demography includes more and more contributions from other disciplines, such as genetics, ecology, geography, medicine and climatology. Artificial intelligence will bring more powerful statistical methodologies to increase data processing and computing power. The quantity of data that will be processed will augment as many as the sources of the statistical survey will be more distributed worldwide.