A LOOK AT THE WASTED PAST THAT OVERTOOK US WITH WAR

A look at the wasted past that overtook us with war

This is the "Energy Doctrine 2020-2026" and mutual vision of things of my colleagues and me, which we came to back in 2019 due to new circumstances arosen and superficial vision of the country’s leaders on the present and future of the nuclear industry in Ukraine.

Yes, the doctrine has already lost its relevance, because the enemy won at the beginning of 2020 and Derkach's Russian mafia seized the nuclear industry. This is our sincere internal resistance to the core of things, which forced us to offer the alternative against the destructive plans of russian federation for the unconditional destruction of the state nuclear energy company of Ukraine - NNEGC Energoatom and the nuclear industry as a whole, destroying the foundations of Ukraine's energy independence.

Here you will be able to comprehend what is the view on the industry’s development among professional specialists. We were falsely hoping to be heard by those who are against us. The reality turned out to be terrible and extremely absurd and not unexpectedly grotesque, because they handed over the destruction of the nuclear industry to the atomic “Dunning Krugers”, kind of nuclear lawyers and economists on how to rob Kyiv condominiums.

Thus, the fate of devastation reached upon almost everything that we had as the industrial pride of Ukraine, and all the years of independence was purposefully destroyed, thanks to the political and economic influence of russian federation and the destructive effect of the oligarchic system, making resistance impossible. This was avoided for a very long time by the relentlessly developing nuclear industry of Ukraine.

We gave it all the best, existing in the human dimension among engineers, scientists and other specialists of Ukraine, that was gained through cooperation with the best specialists from the surrounding world, companies and governments of the USA, Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovaks, Slovenia, Poland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Switzerland, Japan, China, South Korea, South Africa, Armenia, Kazakhstan, India and other world famous scientists and players in this atom fission technology market.

Why am I writing all this? Someone will say - for laughter or entertainment, someone will think - it’s out of resentment that not everything was successful, and someone who knows me better as a specialist in the field of operation and nuclear safety of nuclear power plants will understands everything without explanations. My area is operation, nuclear and operational safety and nuclear power plant engineering.

This material is just a professional record of what we have and what could be the near and far horizon of development of the nuclear industry in Ukraine - this extremely important for the survival area. This is also our way of seeing the Ukrainian contribution to the survival of mankind, in the face of new circumstances of solar activity and climate change on the planet. In my opinion, nuclear technologies are a solution to fundamental problems of improving the environment and protecting humanity from the consequences of negative changes in the energy spectrum of solar activity.

We have formally presented it to the people in this country who were given the opportunity and they failed to take decisions back in the second half of 2019 and up to this day. We talked perhaps with the enemy or his vassals, which is of course a great mistake and waste of time and life, sharing our vision of the present and future of the nuclear industry ....

Now it is already clear that we approached and humiliated ourselves before the instrument of the enemy, whose time has come. This is a very funny and tragic story, but to my mind a very informative and expensive experience. That's why sometimes I can't help it, because it's impossible not to laugh and curse the ridiculous and pitiful people at this passable and unregulated crossroads of civilizations.

By the end of 2019, we have understood a lot and drew the appropriate conclusions that a disguised evil and an endless curse lies behind these expectations. Someone left his company at his own wish, while others continued to hold their positions at NNEGC Energoatom until they were officially dismissed against their will. Despite this, we recklessly plunged into what we know how to do well - it is to become even more efficient and wiser, not stopping at what life requires of each of us and not remain indifferent to the fate of the industry and to real specialists who work with dignity despite all these hardships.

The enemy premeditated it all by putting those in leadership positions who would hand over the keys to the energy safety of Ukraine in the first two weeks of the war. And now they are fighting for survival, beating the chest that they are more Ukrainians than those who admonished, who wrote both the Energy Doctrine and warned about the devilry that became the enemy’s tool in preparation for this terrible war.

All this holds our pain, our thoughts and the search for solutions today and now for the prosperity and development of life.

P/S/. In the “Energy Doctrine 2020-2026” and two slides to it, what will propose next is our way of seeing the state of affairs in the area and its sustainable development and progress. The diagrams represent our brief proposals in terms of time and cost among other electricity producers and its main consumers, as an attempt to show as informatively as possible the dynamics of changes in production and increase in the gross electricity production by the Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

We consider this with a practically unchanged and low indicator of the unit cost of a sold kilowatt-hour of electricity, which has a fixed price on the domestic and foreign markets for enterprises with large needs and the share of electricity in export products. All dynamics are shown in quantitative flows of energy and money, with its gradual redistribution, growing and sustainable production of electricity by NNEGC Energoatom from 2019 and until 2027.

Energy Doctrine of NNEGC “Energoatom” for 2020-2026

Directive 1

Do not exceed established regulations for interim maintenance and overhauls.

Result

A return to the required limits of standard outage time will regain the planned output of 12 bln. kWxh/y and provide additional output of 84 bln. kWxh/y by 2027 in the amount from 2520 to 6720 mln.$.

Risks

Above-the-norm downtimes tend to increase the risks by an order for the accidents at the shutdown reactor, and they are economically unjustified and unprofitable.

Reference

The planned output of Ukrainian NPPs in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012 was 90.3, 92.7, 90.1, 90.5 и 90.3 bln. kWxh, which was produced at nominal powers and within the plant technical specification requirements.

Above-the-norm downtime should be justified both from the point of view of the economic soundness, and impact on the design safety. The world’s tendency is to minimize the power unit downtime by the level, where the achieved safety or design safety can be maintained.

Directive 2

Implement the programs related to NPPs modernization (Integrated Safety Improvement Program), and increase of the plant capacity factor and power with the regulated outage time.

Result:

For the period until 2027, the additional downtimes greater than 1000 days are excluded with the reduced electricity production minimum of 24 bln. kWxh, which is equivalent to the decommissioned VVER-440 power unit.

Risks:

Exceeding the regulated outage time may increase the risk of accidents at the shutdown reactor, and this is economically unjustified and unprofitable, since it will result in losses from 720 to 1920 mln. $.

Reference:

The planned downtime of VVER-1000 power units for PLEX were initially 120 days per power unit. For the period 2014-2019, the actual downtime of 9 power units achieved in average 270 days per power unit, which exceeded the planned downtime for 1350 days totally with the reduced electricity production of 32.4 bln. kWxh amounting 648 mln.$.

Directive?3

Keep unchanged the special commitments on the tariff and total energy supplied to the population at the level of 35 bln kWxh per year and to the household electricity consumers at the level of 15 bln kWxh per year.

Result

Till 2027, the lowest tariff will be maintained as 20$ / MWxh for the consumption of 350 bln. kWxh/year.

Risks

Low tariff does not stimulate energy saving.

Directive 4

А.??Retain special commitments of NNEGC “Energoatom” on electricity supply for Ukrenergo to cover the losses of energy distribution and conversion until 2023 – 12.9 bln. kWxh/year and transportation until 2022 - 3.9 bln. kWxh/year.

B.??For the period from 2023 to 2027, establish commitments on compensation of the distribution losses - 9 bln. kWxh/year.

С.??For the period of 2022 and 2023, establish commitments on compensation of the transportation losses - 3.4 bln. kWxh/year, and withdraw them later from NNEGC Energoatom.

Result

The lowest tariff of 20 $/MWxh is maintained for the supply of 85.4 bln. kWxh for the period from 2020 to 2026.?

Risks

No incentive for Ukrenergo to reduce the losses. At that, one out of seven years of all NPPs operation cover the losses in Ukrenergo or two constantly operating VVER-1000 power units.

Directive 5

Ensure maximum electricity generation by NPPs, which go beyond the special commitments of Directives 3 and 4, and provide warranties of long-term and direct contracts for sale of total output for the Ukrainian energy-consuming enterprises, producers of competitive products to the international market.?

Result

Till the end of 2026, the guaranteed sale of 188.8 bln. kWxh amounted to 5 664 mln.$ for export production.

Risks

Artificial limitation of the plant output in favor of other market participants, high probability of provoking plant equipment failures while seeking for the benefit.

Having limited financing and artificial limitations in energy output, a research is ongoing to find the compensation of financial losses, which occur as a result of plant operation at the reduced power level, leading directly or indirectly to NPPs constant operation in the maneuvering modes, under the pretense of benefits of higher energy cost for peak load operation modes.

Reference

It is necessary to take into account that the design safety of operating NPPs is justified for the base mode of electricity generation. The forced long-term operation at the reduced power level requires reconsideration of the plant design basis or confirmation of the current safety level. The world’s practice has examples of the plant operation in the maneuvering mode, but this will require changes in the design within the plant design limits.

Directive 6

From the beginning of 2021 take Khmelnytskyy NPP Unit 2 out of energy grid of Ukraine and connect it to the energy grid ESTSO-E.

Result

Electricity supply from NPPs to the Ukrainian market will stay at the level of 85 bln. kWxh/y for the energy grid of Ukraine as a result of Directives 1 and 2, even without compensating measures of increasing the reactor power and capacity factor, planned in the framework of energy bridge Ukraine-Poland.

Taking of Khmelnytskyy NPP (KhNPP) Unit 2 out of the energy grid, as well as export of Ukrainian electricity of up to 7.5 bln. kWxh/y into the energy grid of Europe is an important strategic decision and it is a correct tactical decision:

???Firstly, efforts of the Russian Federation (RF) are devalued regarding the attempt to compensate 12% by Belarus NPP and Leningrad NPP due to termination of operation of NPPs in Germany in 2022. Ukraine becomes a full-rate party at the European energy market.

???Secondly, this is a significant step to further full-scale connection of the energy grid of Ukraine to the European energy grid, which is a beginning of the end of RF’s dominance era at the Ukrainian market of energy services, efforts and equipment supplies.

??Thirdly, the management of NNEGC Energoatom will have to make sure that the power units, connected to the energy grid, keep operating in a sustained manner within Directives 1 and 2.

Risks

Artificial manipulation of information regarding unpreparedness of KhNPP Unit 2 and incompletion of compensating measures on additional electricity generation through increasing the reactor power and capacity factor.

Deliberate delay in putting the transmission line to Rzeszow into operation, manipulation of information by Ukrenegro regarding the inexpediency of such a step due to required connection of the DC link. This is actually a game for the benefit of other market players and against the step-by-step connection of power grid of Ukraine to the European energy market.

Reference

Connection of KhNPP Unit 2 to the European energy market makes it possible to earn from 300 mln$ to 600 mln $ a year, which over 4 years, before commissioning of Khmelnytskyy NPP Unit 3, makes it possible to earn at the European market from 1200 to 2400 mln $ and over 2025 and 2026, before commissioning of Khmelnytskyy NPP Unit 4, additionally from 600 to 1200 mln.$. This completely compensates all expenses for completion of the construction works and commissioning of the above mentioned power units.

Directive 7

Ensure safety, lifetime and aging management of each power unit for the maximum possible perspective of operation, as well as introduce new capacities with the increased flexibility of energy supply to the Ukrainian and European markets

Result

In 2019 the analysis was performed for the activities completed and planned within the Comprehensive Safety Improvement Program, i.e. safety impact, lifetime, aging management, functional effectiveness and specific costs. Funding suspended for the projects with unachieved objectives, which turned to be ineffective and duplicating the low-level works.

By the end of 2020, the benchmark study is conducted, as well as harmonization of data on risks for power units and between the sites of Ukrainian NPPs. The priority of the modernization activities is established on the basis of dominant risks for safety functions, equipment and operating personnel. Based on the obtained data, the current comprehensive program for modernization of Ukrainian NPPs (Comprehensive Program) is updated and approved.?

Refusal from the program on the reactor core nominal power increase, keeping the design basis for the heat engineering parameters of the primary system of NPP. Increase of plant output is achieved through increase of capacity factor and increase of total annual electricity production by increase of effectiveness and capacity of turbine generators.

By the end of 2021, the analysis is performed and the program of plant lifetime extension is developed for the entire fleet of VVER-1000 vessels with “low neutron leakage” of 151 fuel assemblies (12 fuel assemblies in the baffle “teeth” are replaced with dummies) with the rated reactor power not more than 102%, taking into account the requirements of Directive 11 in terms of nuclear fuel for VVER-1000 cores. The foreseen costs for implementation do not exceed those ones planned earlier for the increase of plant capacity.

From 2020, the practice of auctions is suspended for such a sensitive topic as lifetime extension of plant equipment.

Until 2021, the Ukrainian scientific and technical support authority is established, which acts not as a consumer and interpreter of other people's programs and methods, but as a powerful player in the market with regard to the analysis and justification of safety of lifetime extension.

Refusal from the practice of analytical justification of the main equipment lifetime with calculations, not supported by the real data of observations, measurements, monitoring. The input data for the analytical justification will be independent and proper tests of material characteristics, which essentially determine the lifetime of reactor and baffle (critical place), as well as new and restored monitoring systems for real-time observation of the plant equipment, the results of which are directly used in the assessment of equipment current state and its lifetime.

An integrated approach to solving the problem makes it possible to increase the service time of the VVER-1000 fleet to 60-80 years, which will almost double the lifetime of the earliest VVER-1000 reactor facility in Ukraine, put into operation in 1982.

Risks

A company may enter the service market, the purpose of which will be an incorrect assessment of the actual lifetime and suggestions of incorrect actions relevant to equipment.

There are risks of selecting one company/contractor for implementation of the lifetime-related methodology, principles. Therefore, for such stages it is important to fund several competing groups, from which the best team can then be assigned, for example, by partial merging or activity-specific involvement.

Reference

Up to the present, all actions were taken with an eye to the Russian Federation. All methodologies are rewriting of the Russian or European documents, which kills the country’s own scientific and technical support. As of now, there is no national regulatory framework in Ukraine, which is based on the data of its own studies and cooperation with the international institutions.

Proper independent tests of the material characteristics, which largely determine the lifetime of reactor and baffle (critical place) have not been carried out. The analyses are conducted using the Russian analytical methods but without access to the actual data that would allow refining of the obtained results for each specific case.

There is a vicious practice, when the fatal character of "unreliability" of the reactor is given to the individual statistical emissions. In the Western world, this practice has long been abandoned and the lifetime is calculated on the basis of data for the entire fleet of reactors. All this allows, for example as in the United States, make recommendations for the entire fleet to extend the service life up to 80 years. In some cases, when a particular reactor has clearly formulated and obvious deviations in the material or operating conditions from the criterial parameters, there is a procedure and computer program for the additional assessment of this power unit.

In the US (for example), the sensitive works related to the lifetime are conducted without a tender. The main focus is on the recognized authoritative organizations and independent supervision.

It is necessary to refuse from keeping in mind the power level established by the design and switch to the strategy of setting the maximum power level not higher than the design one based on the goals of plant lifetime optimization. There can be time limitations of the power level due to the increase of the terms of production of these capacities. In this case, the decrease in the power level relative to the design value will be less than 20%, which can be used to maneuver the power of the power unit.

Directive 8

Provide an effective policy of human resource management to ensure adequate amount of the competent personnel for nuclear power plants

Result

Qualified and motivated personnel with the high level of responsibility and commitment to safety culture, which will ensure efficient and safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

The systematic processes that help to establish, maintain, distribute and apply the essential elements of intellectual capital needed for the success of an organization. A modern strategy that transforms all types of intellectual assets into the greater productivity, efficiency and new added value.

Risks

“Aging” of personnel, labor migration to other industries and countries, loss of prestige of work at the nuclear power plants for young people.

Reference

The three previous industrial revolutions in each case led to disappearance of this or that technology and to disarray of the workforce, which required new skills to survive in the new economic conditions. Often time, the tempo of personnel requalification lagged behind the tempo of the revolutionary transformations, which created significant social problems and left entire generations without means of subsistence.

The effective policy of personnel management and training is immensely powerful: the country reduces unemployment by creating new, more valuable jobs, while companies acquire talents in the critical areas and train promising and loyal employees.

Directive 9

Provide management transformation

Within 5 years, through corporatization - move to a commonly accepted management model, introduce modern planning and monitoring tools, reduce the need for management through business logic optimization of automation, raise a new generation of managers through careful selection and intensive training in real-life conditions.

Result?

The NPP staff should be 500 people per power unit (instead of 2500), performing only operational activities. Management functions are radically revised, unnecessary ones withdrawn, number of performers reduced. Development functions are centralized, a development model with a finite number of measurable tasks is designed. Service divisions are transformed into well-equipped, efficiency-oriented entities.

Risks

The existing management system replicates the model of the 90s: pumping out the income through procurements by constantly increasing unreasonable costs. Bureaucracy, as the basis of this system, does not allow solving other problems: due to the lack of motivation for the efficiency of the enterprise, the corresponding competences are lost and the new ones are not created.

Directive 10

Provide transformation of procurements

By the end of 2022, “from product to product”, create professional procurement schemes and destroy the existing ones.

Result

Specific goods and services that constitute the regular need for the nuclear power plant (spare parts, special materials) are purchased by robots through automatic algorithms from the manufacturers or authorized dealers.

The unique equipment and services (0.5% of nomenclature, 80% of money) are purchased at the international tenders through the procedure of competitive dialogue with the world technology leaders.

The procurement of bulk goods (60% of nomenclature, 2% of money) is outsourced by the central procurement organizations (CPO).

Risks

The existing procurement system operates through the intermediate parties oriented on the highly marginal schemes. As a result, the NPP receives a product of dubious quality, not in a timely manner, at a bloated price. If this system is broken, the NPP will stay without the supply for some time (which is unacceptable), since the suppliers without intermediaries are incapacitated.

?Directive 11

Provide the conditions for provision and treatment of the nuclear fuel for Ukrainian NPPs through its maximum diversification and import substitution

Result

1.???From 2024, the control rods, neutron flux measuring channels (NFMS) and other means of in-core power monitoring are of Ukrainian production.

2.???From 2023, transition to the Westinghouse (WEC) fuel assemblies with the extended fuel column by 15 mm. The beginning of the transition of NPP power units with VVER-1000 reactors with the fully loaded core by the WEC fuel for 18-month refueling cycle using the nuclear fuel with integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA).

3.???From 2026, the nuclear fuel for VVER-1000 and VVER-440 reactors is purchased only with the WEC technology.

4.???From 2023, beginning of the trial operation with loading of 151 fuel assemblies into the core, without 12 fuel assemblies in the thinnest part of the baffle - on the teeth, and their replacement by dummies - neutron reflectors. Preservation of the design basis for the nominal thermotechnical parameters of the coolant and the thermal power of the reactor core not greater than 102% Nnom.

5.???From 2026, use of the fuel with high density of the fissile material in U3Si2 matrix, resistant to transients and accidents.

6.???From 2020, termination of the spent nuclear fuel export to the Russian Federation - saving of 70 million USD / year.

7.???From 2022, production of the container for ZNPP’s dry spent nuclear fuel storage for WEC’s fuel assemblies.

8.???From 2021, beginning of production of the CSFSF containers (by HOLTEC) at the production facilities of Ukrainian enterprises and utilities.

9.???Through 2023, development of the new uranium-bearing deposits in Ukraine and decrease in the unit cost of uranium mining and primary enrichment to 80 $/kg. By 2025, increase of the uranium production and primary enrichment from Ukrainian deposits up to 2,400-2,600 tons/year. Reduction of the cost input for the primary enrichment of annual need in the uranium from 200 million $/year to 150 million $/year.

10.?By the end of 2024, commissioning of the Ukrainian nuclear fuel fabrication plant using the WEC technology. Reduced costs for nuclear fuel fabrication for up to $ 20 million / year.

11.?‘Zero’ option is adopted regarding the return of the reprocessed SNF from the Russian Federation to Ukraine for all the spent nuclear fuel, which until 2020 was sent from the Ukrainian NPPs for storage and reprocessing to the Russian Federation.

12.?From 2026, beginning of construction of two CANDU-6 reactors at SUNPP site with their commissioning in 2030, 2031, 2032 for spent nuclear fuel after-burn.

13.?From 2025, beginning of construction of the fluoride plant at the GOKOR site (the oxidized ore mining and reprocessing complex, in Kirovograd region) for the production of rare earth materials from kaolin, with the prospective of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, starting from 2030.

By the end of 2026, the total savings from stopping of the spent nuclear fuel export to the Russian Federation amounts to 490 million dollars, the savings from the primary enrichment and fabrication of the Ukrainian nuclear fuel totally amounts to 140 million dollars. Taking into account development of the new deposits and technologies for the extraction/enrichment of the Ukrainian uranium, the amount from 100 to 200 million dollars will be required for the construction and up to 300 million dollars for commissioning of the fuel fabrication plant. Thus, the required costs of 500 million dollars practically are covered by 490 million dollars from termination of the spent nuclear fuel export to the Russian Federation or 4 years of operation of the Ukrainian nuclear fuel fabrication plant using Ukrainian uranium of primary enrichment.

Directive 12

Ensure scientific and technical cooperation and use of the production potentials of the nuclear and industrial complex of enterprises of Ukraine, the USA, Canada, the EU, Great Britain, South Korea and Japan, for safe operation and effective development of the nuclear industry in Ukraine

Result

Sustainment of development of the power engineering complex of Ukraine with the positive dynamics for implementation of the projects on modernization, lifetime extension and construction of new power units;

Saving of the financial resources from project implementation up to 60% of the cost of the power unit.

Risks

None, including social and economic aspects, since it provides for the increase in the number of jobs from 50 to 70 thousand.

Reference

It becomes clear today that interests of the industry connected with the nuclear energy industry can be considered and supported only by the nuclear energy industry itself.

With joint efforts, the resources and ways of cooperation will be found to ensure the vitality of the NPPs by providing the equipment, spare parts and maintenance of the power units.

Building of the new capacities in Ukraine should foresee participation of the Ukrainian enterprises within 75-80% in the scope of supplies, works and services in order to reduce the cost of facilities and develop the Ukrainian economy.

To arrange the power engineering complex for implementation, to localize construction of the new facilities (preserve them), the import substitution project is in progress.

An example of the effective project implementation are the flagships in the power engineering industry (i.e. PJSC “Turboatom”, PJSC “Khartron”, PJSC “Monolit”, PJSC “Novokramatorsk Machine Building Plant”, PJSC “Sumy Plant Nasosenergomash” and others).

The annual scope of orders for the nuclear industry in 2018 amounted to 2.5 - 3 billion hryvnia and had an upward trend in 2019.

For development and exploitation of the high-tech and science-intensive equipment production, the specialized institutes of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine are involved, providing the scientific support and testing base to verify the quality of products.

The transition from the import substitution project to the project of localizing the construction of new capacities is accomplished by performing the following three tasks.

Task 1:?Maximum enlargement and perspective planning of orders for NPP equipment for 3 - 5 years;

Task 2:?Definition of specialized enterprises in Ukraine by types of equipment and arrangement of cooperative industries on their basis with a leading role of the customer in this work.

Task 3:?Through the specialized enterprises, creation of the regional "parks" that unite production sites, machine-tool capabilities, design, technological and scientific resources of the industrial centers of Ukraine and such as Kharkiv, Dnipro, Sumy, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhye, Kramatorsk, Rivno and others.

On implementation of the key advantages of Ukraine in the energy sector and transformation of the State Enterprise NNEGC “Energoatom” into a highly profitable non-state enterprise

Overview of the situation

After a break-up of the USSR, Ukraine was lucky: it got 12 operating power units of NPPs and 3 more units with a high level of readiness. Today, these power units generate up to 60% of the energy, in the price of which there is no cost of return on investment. Therefore, the cost of a kilowatt in Ukraine is 15-20 cents lower than the world’s one, which is the country's key advantage in the system of global competition. Full use of this advantage would make it possible to lead in the energy-intensive areas: electric steel, aluminum, greenhouses, electric transportation, and to ensure the minimum price of energy and its derivatives for the population.

Due to Germany's refusal from nuclear power plants and complete shutdown of NPPs by 2022, and due to the decision of Belgium to decommission and completely shut down the Belgian nuclear power plants by 2025, the EU comes up with a deficit of 29 billion KWxh / year in the energy balance, where Ukraine can earn 4-8 billion euros annually, which is calculated from minimum assumptions of the cost of one from $40 / MWxh to $80 / MWxh. There is an opportunity to build up these super-cheap capabilities to generate 20-30 billion kWxh by means of small investments into the efficiency, capacity factor, increase in TG capacity and maintain this state by 2040 or have more through measures on lifetime extension of nuclear power plants. Moreover, there are opportunities for further reduction of the nuclear energy cost through the fabrication of own nuclear fuel, waste processing, and putting things in order in procurements.

But who, to what extent and why uses the advantages of the country today? These are the companies that reduce the costs for their own production by manipulations at the energy market and these are numerous crooks in the field of energy distribution and municipal services. The goals of such businesses are short-term, and the "delta" earned by them is being devoured, as if the free energy would be eternal. This makes it impossible to purposefully use the country’s advantages to its benefit. In fact, NNEGC “Energoatom” became a part of the private structure, which was not controlled by anyone except individuals and private structures, and the government acted as the guarantor of these relations, ensuring timely adjustments to the planned targets so that it suited both NNEGC “Energoatom” and the competitive side.

The source of advantages is NNEGC “Energoatom”, which has been used for 30 years for pumping out money through procurements, the demand for which was expanded via the safety improvement measures. In fact, these costs have almost no effect on the safety, cost, efficiency and actual lifetime of the NPP. Because of this, it will not be possible to retain the key advantage for a long time.

Since the safety important systems of NPPs are marginally extremely attractive, the share of equipment and materials of dubious origin is growing there, which leads to the firm degradation of safety. This is already a risk for the global nuclear power industry, which will unlikely withstand another Chernobyl.

The management of NNEGC “Energoatom” is extremely bureaucratic, which protects from bearing responsibility for inefficiency. As a result, the competencies and skills required for the implementation of complex projects are lost; it is extremely risky and doubtful to get them “on the fly” through the change of leadership. With sharp changes, a crisis is inevitable with the risk of irreparable loss of power units and qualified personnel.

Main idea

It is proposed to link the projects of Ukraine’s benefits realization with the preparation of NNEGC “Energoatom” for corporatization, the idea of which was promoted in 2002 by British Energy, a company with the experience in privatization of the British nuclear power plants under Margaret Thatcher. For the following 18 years, some legal studies were conducted without working out what to do after transformation of “Energoatom” into the state joint stock company. It is completely unclear what ideas and actions will help to avoid bankruptcy of the alienated infrastructure, to achieve efficiency and profitability of the company's core. Given the current loss of control of NNEGC “Energoatom”, corporatization is extremely risky.

It is proposed to sequentially separate the operational functions of NNEGC “Energoatom” from the investment ones and delegate the management of the most important investment projects to the venture Fund controlled by investors and not associated with the operating activities. The Fund must create, replenish and update the Investment Needs Map, visualization model and system in order to clearly represent the dependency between the investment in a particular project, return parameters and implementation status. This will attract investors other than the state, create appropriate concessions and partnerships, as well as arrange the stock market and other financial instruments. This will help to concentrate on the long-term, most profitable tasks, stop the theft of funds, and achieve the country’s development goals.

Such an approach will allow NNEGC “Energoatom” not to make drastic changes, since the company’s operational activity today is organized in a quite reliable manner. With the help of the Fund, it will get new technical, technological and organizational properties that make management much easier and more efficient. It is much easier, safer and more reliable to adapt to the ready-made properties than to create one’s own. Thanks to such successive changes, an indivisible part of “Energoatom” will appear, which will be engaged only in operation of nuclear power plants, as well as the private infrastructure (repair and maintenance, etc.) and facilities for consumption of super-cheap energy, operating for the benefit of the country.

To create, launch and adjust the work of the Fund, there is a team consisting of the experienced specialists: investment providers, nuclear scientists, bankers, lawyers, logisticians - up to 60 people. They have accomplished the following activities:

1.????The Doctrine on balanced development of energy and energy consumption was prepared, the main projects for the implementation and development of key advantages were worked out;

2.????A draft Unified NPP Development Program is being developed; the program links the measures on the plant reliability and lifetime and the tasks for increasing production, efficiency and profitability

3.????There are expert capabilities and readiness to revise the current projects of NNEGC “Energoatom” in terms of their feasibility, technical excellence, benefits and prospective. The next step is freezing the unprofitable projects, firing their internal lobbyists, preventing recurrence.

4.????With the scientists of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine (NASU), the possibilities for creating the development model have been worked out, which will provide an investment opportunity based on the analysis of "what-if" options;

5.????Establishment of the alternative robotic procurement system of NNEGC “Energoatom” has begun, with the focus on the modern logistics methods and IAEA experience;

6.????Approaches have been worked out to create a unified system for planning and monitoring the investment projects, repairs, adjustments and procurement, which guarantees full control over the use of funds, project development, achievement of financial results

We emphasize once again that such an approach does not create risks for NPP operations. The Fund does not interfere with the current management system and cannot disrupt it. The transfer of control to the structures created for corporatization is carried out step by step, as far as the conditions established by the Fund appear. The existing structures of NNEGC “Energoatom” gradually become obsolete due to their uselessness.

Establishment proposals

Since the proposal affects the functions of several ministries and departments (Ministry of Fuel and Energy, SNRIU, etc.), it is proposed to create the Fund, as interdepartmental and subordinate to the Prime Minister. The complexity and ambiguity of tasks requires strong communication with the legislator, which implies accountability and communication with the President’s Administration. Funding of the Fund is possible at the expense of money saved from the budget of NNEGC “Energoatom” due to frozen projects, cheaper procurements, etc.

On Uranium Mining in Ukraine

?There are not so many countries in the world that mine uranium. Ukraine is one of the top ten countries in terms of uranium production and it holds the first place in Europe in uranium resources. But, it should be noted that out of 7 deposits indicated in the Balance of Mineral Reserves of Ukraine "Uran" as the balance ones, in the last 10 years only two have undergone a modern geological and economic assessment and the materials have been reviewed by the State Reserves Committee of Ukraine.

Uranium is a strategic raw material (although this concept is excluded now from the regulatory framework of Ukraine), especially in the country, where more than 50% of electricity is produced by the nuclear power plants, and will be produced at least through 2050. As specified in the “National Program for Development of the Mineral Resource Base of Ukraine for the period up to 2030”, approved by the Law of Ukraine dated April 21, 2011 No. 3268-VI, uranium is an item of export, or can be considered as such to ensure the currency receipts and revenues into the state budget in a short time.

To maintain electricity generation by the operating power units, about 2.5 thousand tons of uranium are required annually. Today, Ukraine extracts up to 30% of uranium ore of total need. Ukraine is the only country in the world that has its own powerful resource base and developed uranium industry and does not meet its own needs. All governments of Ukraine without exception, spoke about the need for expansion of uranium mining. In the future, it is expected to have increased demand for ore, which may lead to the cost increase for this raw material, which itself makes up 46% of the nuclear fuel cost. Ukraine has a significant need for nuclear fuel, and by 2025 the country will consume ~ 690 fuel assemblies per year.

Ten years ago, a rather ambitious program "Nuclear Fuel of Ukraine" was adopted with the plans to increase the production of uranium concentrate up to 1880 tons per year, which did not receive adequate funding and failed. Meanwhile, the old deposits are depleted, funding for the development of new ones is practically absent.

Unfortunately, it is not planned to include the “Kirovgeologia” enterprise founded in 1947 into the structure of “Energoatom”. The primary target of the enterprise was to carry out geological prospecting and exploration works, first only for uranium and then for the strategic raw materials (other radioactive and rare elements, diamonds and precious metals), conduct radiation research and study of the natural sources of ionizing radiation on the territory of Ukraine (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 709-3 dated 12.21.1992) and hold the special geological fund, where all the information on uranium sites in Ukraine is collected before they are commissioned.

At present, the public enterprise (PE) “Kirovgeologiya” is under the control of the State Service of Geology and Mineral Resources of Ukraine. PE “Kirovgeologiya” cooperates with the Eastern Mining and Processing Plant (SkhidGZK) since the beginning of its foundation. There are three mines in SkhidGZK: Ingulska, Smolinska and Novokonstyantynivska, which develop four deposits. The hydrometallurgical plant SkhidGZK in Zheltye Vody is processing ore into yellow cake. The concentrate is sent to the Russian Federation for isotopic enrichment and fuel assembly manufacturing. The goal of SkhidGZK is to maintain the existing production volume at old deposits at the level of 650-670 tons of uranium per year and bring production to 500-550 tons of uranium per year at the Novokonstyantynivska mine.

Considerable part of the ore is mined right under the streets of Kropyvnytskyi city. On the outskirts of the city, the Ingulskaya mine is located, which mines the Michurinske and eastern zone of the Central deposit at depths from 160 to 650 m. There are five vertical shafts and about 6 km of underground shaping of deposits. The uranium reserves will be enough minimum until 2030, and there is a large Western zone of the Central deposit nearby, but its ore deposits are concentrated almost under the central part of the city. The cost of uranium (in concentrate) in 2017 was $ 105 / kg at the cost of uranium mining (in ore mass) $ 40 / kg.

The Smolinsk extracts the Vatutinskoye deposit; its ores had, on average, a higher uranium content than at the Ingul mine, but they are practically depleted. In 2017, the official statement was made to close it within 3-5 years. This is a serious blow to the Smolino settlement, for which the mine is a city-forming business. At present, the main hopes are associated with the development of the Novokonstyantynivska mine, which operates the corresponding mine, it is the largest in Europe in terms of uranium reserves of almost 100 thousand tons. Now mining is carried out at the horizons of 240-300 m.

The rock mass is distributed along the surface through the mine shaft, which was built during exploration works at the deposit many years ago. In 2018, the production of uranium oxide concentrate from the mined ore was 336 tons. Raising production to the design capacity requires development of the mine infrastructure, including the excavation of additional mine shafts that would cost about a quarter of a billion dollars and at least 3-5 years of intensive work. In the recent years, the completion works were financed poorly and only at the expense of the plant.

At the end of 2017, SkhidGZK production of the uranium concentrate amounted to 836.1 tons. The rest (up to 1.5 thousand tons) is purchased annually from Russian, European and Kazakhstan suppliers. At the same time, Russia despite significant efforts to extract uranium, both within the country and abroad, has an uncovered deficit of about 2 thousand tons. Under such conditions it is impossible to expect from Russia a loyal price offer for the uranium, both now and in the future.

The general condition of the uranium mineral resource base in Ukraine is assessed as satisfactory. Its main part is associated with the large reserves of albitite ore formation; its uranium ores, in terms of quality, belong to the ordinary and poor ones with a high cost of underground mining. The existing facilities are suitable for open pit mining. There are also small deposits in the sandy-carbonaceous parts of the section that are likely to be available for mining by in-situ leaching (ISL).

In 2018, based on the court decision, an unprecedented step was taken - special permits for geological exploration with pilot production of five uranium ore deposits in the Mykolayiv and Dnipro regions were issued to the “Atomic Energy Systems of Ukraine” LLC (AESU). It goes about the Safonivska area, Mykhaylivska and Sadova squares in the Mykolayiv region, as well as the Novoguryevska area and Surska area in the Dnipro region. Here, the uranium is will be mined using the ISL method. It should be noted that partly, due to these facilities, SkhidGZK can quickly increase the volume of production. Of course, they need geological study to be conducted by the specialized institution with subsequent transfer to production.

In Ukraine, from the point of view of independence and security, and from the standpoint of economic efficiency, it is advisable to develop the links in the nuclear fuel chain and, first of all, develop the extraction of the ore and production of yellow cake, which is a widespread market product with a tendency of increasing world prices.

To ensure prompt provision of the Ukrainian NPPs with their own uranium, the following series of actions aimed at development of the Novokonstyantynivsko-Dokuchaevskiy uranium ore unit should be taken:

-??????change the legislation in terms of simplification of the procedure for obtaining special permits for the use of subsoil, obtaining land for use, attracting financial resources, and various kinds of approvals for projects and construction plans and resource provision. As of now, these procedures require at least five years, the work can be stopped at any stage for an indefinite term or canceled at all;

-??????focus on the accelerated commissioning of the deposits suitable for open pit mining method and ISL. In case of successful solution of the previous point for the facilities of this type, the first fraction of uranium can be mined already in the second year, at that in the case of the open pit mining, it is possible to use serial mining equipment and to involve more local personnel;

-??start construction of the new enriching factory with the hydrometallurgical plant, located close to the Novokonstyantynivskyy field. This will reduce transportation costs compared to the existing ones, reduce the environmental impact, create competitive conditions, and allow SkhidGZK to carry out renovation and re-equipment in the future;

-???ensure increase in the production capacity of the Novokonstyantynivska mine. Start the works on the construction of new mine shafts and preparatory mine workings;

-??improve the structure of industrial reserves of the Kirovohrad uranium ore region, with the allocation of areas with the most economically attractive metals, by summarizing all existing geological information on the deposits and infrastructure of the Ingul mine. Without conducting the required scope of geological exploration work and appropriate scientific and technological support, the development of uranium mining is impossible;

-??in the future, it is necessary to focus on identifying deposits with rich and complex ores, for example, in the zones of Riphean structural anomalies and in the volcano-tectonic structures of the Ukrainian crystalline shield.

For the comprehensive and economically justified solution of the issues regarding own the strategic needs for uranium raw materials, it is proposed to include PE “Kirovgeologiya” into the structure of NNEGC “Energoatom”, which will be later used as a basis for arranging the production of other minerals required for the nuclear power industry, but firstly:

-??in order to accelerate commissioning of the Aprelskyy field, it is necessary to ensure financing of works at “Kirovgeologia” enterprise to expand the current approved geological task on drilling exploration, specifically to add the activities for pilot production (APP) and start them as soon as possible. Upon completion of the APP, to get approval on the reserves in the State Reserves Committee of Ukraine and transfer the deposit to the mining organization;

-???to carry out the works on reassessment of the Lisne deposit reserves with the simultaneous experimental-industrial development. The reserves of this deposit in the Soviet era were studied by the State Reserves Committee of the USSR and are suitable for quarrying.

Despite the moderate market recovery, the main players are confident in the long-term prospective of the nuclear industry. At present, there are signs that the price of uranium is bound to rise above the current levels. The Mineral Resources Council of Australia (MCA) has resumed the debates on changing attitudes towards nuclear energy, saying it is time to end discriminatory treatment of it.

The MCA Chief Executive, Tanya Constable, emphasizes that nuclear power, which provides 11 percent of the world's electricity, is inexpensive, with zero emissions and available 24/7. There are already several examples in the world when renewable sources reach saturation point and lose their efficiency in the power system. Nuclear power is not intended to compete with the renewable energy sources, but in fact should complement them. Alexander Boytsov (Director of the Uranium One Group's Mineral Resources Development Program) is confident that the uranium price on the world market should be 1.5-2 times higher than the current one so that the producers could invest in the opening of new mines. In accordance with all forecasts the demand for uranium will prevail over supply already from 2023. The uranium production from 2035 should increase by 1.5 times.

Despite the fact that the current world price for uranium is unfavorable, but at the same time, if the concentrate production is brought to the volumes equal to our needs, there will be an explicit confidence that in the event of global cataclysms of a different, including political nature, the country will not be left without developed deposits, uranium raw materials for the nuclear power plants and, accordingly, without electricity.

The important thing is that the leaders of the country can use opportunities to fully ensure the nuclear energy of Ukraine until 2026 with its own needs for strategic raw materials - uranium concentrate, as a necessary condition for energy independence, relying on its scientific and technical, geological, development and industrial capacities, for a sustainable and independent economic development of Ukraine and likely with the possibility of exporting uranium concentrate for the international market.