Will the Limbo State in Global Conflicts Last Until 2025?

The anticipation, waiting, and uncertainty surrounding the fate of new and ongoing conflicts will persist as long as decisive resolutions are delayed—whether intentionally or due to failures and miscalculations. The U.S. presidential election cycle is prompting various actors to stall for time or engage in risky gambles and strategic bets on who will win the White House and shape critical issues, from postponed wars to potential deals. From Russia’s war in Ukraine—and now Ukraine's counteroffensive into Russian territory—to Iran’s proxy wars against Israel and the piracy of the Houthis in the Red Sea, the world remains in a state of suspense. Meanwhile, Sudanese women plead with their president, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to "Stop the war, Burhan," while the mothers and fathers of Gaza cry out, "Enough war, we're exhausted" from the pain, displacement, and loss of loved ones. For them, and others around the world—in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, for instance—the coming period, at least until the end of this year, will be marked by continued anxiety about the unknown, with the pendulum swinging between failed wars and deals that could lead to further bloodshed.

Sudan's tragedy is largely a self-inflicted disaster, exacerbated by the interests of foreign countries that choose to ignore what is needed to shift Sudan from the cycle of violence to hope, peace, and reconciliation. The bitter conflict in Sudan shows no signs of ending soon and there is still room for more bloodshed, with men finding grim satisfaction in wielding their power while women weep and plead amid the chants of "End this war, Burhan."

The war between Russia and Ukraine is unlikely to conclude this year. Now entering its third year, what Russia initially called "special operations" was expected to quickly impose Russian control over territories it considers its own within Ukraine, leading to the downfall of Volodymyr Zelensky and his government. Today, 923 days after the war in Ukraine began, there is no hope on the horizon for its end in 2024. Instead, its continuation into 2025 seems increasingly likely and even more dangerous.

Many Russians are comparing the duration of this war to the 418 days the Soviet Union was involved in World War II. Back then, as a friend with expertise in Russian war and peace history notes, Russia liberated the Donbas region within a month and a half. Today, Russia has captured more than 100,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory, but at a painfully slow pace. Ukraine still controls more than 400,000 square kilometres, and Russians wonder just how long it will take to prevail under such circumstances.

New developments have dashed any hopes of positive negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. The UK's approval for Ukraine to use "Storm Shadow" missiles to strike deep into Russian territory—without U.S. permission—is particularly significant. London will not publicly confirm this action, as the United States is cautious about the idea of striking deep into Russian territory with Western missiles. But the city of Kursk has become a focal point for Ukraine's military operations within Russia and is also a key element in the psychological landscape of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Indeed, this is the first time since 1941 that foreign forces have entered Russian territory, displacing more than 133,000 people and threatening the Kursk nuclear plant, just 40 kilometres from the city. These developments underscore Russia's vulnerability and is a significant psychological blow to the Russian people.

The humiliation is not only due to Ukraine's capture of Russian territory but is also compounded by the fear of another Chernobyl-like disaster, given that the Kursk nuclear plant is not designed to withstand missile attacks. President Vladimir Putin has accused Ukraine of planning to strike the Kursk reactor, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has concluded that the situation is extremely dangerous.

Russian diplomacy is meanwhile frustrated with India’s stance, after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who proposed a peace summit between Putin and Zelensky to be hosted in India, acknowledged the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president—a troubling move for Russia, which considers India a friend. However, what truly dashed hopes for negotiations was not any party’s invitation to mediate but the Kursk offensive, which surprised both Russia and some NATO members and was carried out with actual involvement and backing from NATO countries.

The Russia-Ukraine war has evolved into a global issue rather than a localized conflict and is now a significant element in the U.S. presidential campaign. Former President Donald Trump is promoting his plans to end the war if he returns to the White House, blaming current President Joe Biden for allegedly encouraging the conflict between NATO and Russia.

While Ukraine remains more of a European priority than an American one the U.S. elections will have a significant impact on Ukraine and its war with Russia, as well as on the future of NATO in this seemingly endless conflict, with no end in sight for 2024.

Indeed, even if Donald Trump is inclined to pressure both sides, he would not take office until January 2025. What is likely to happen on the ground is further escalation and an increasingly challenging conflict as autumn approaches. For the first time, Russian forces have been forced to bomb areas they had once been the liberators of. This, too, carries a psychological weight. Interestingly, this war does not dominate the U.S. presidential election discussions except in terms of mutual accusations regarding relationships with Vladimir Putin and, more broadly, U.S.-Russia relations.

By contrast, the Gaza war has imposed itself more prominently on the elections, primarily because it involves Israel, which both presidential candidates—Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump—pledge their unwavering support for as it "defends itself." Secondly, Israel's war on Gaza has exposed the official and popular Israeli disregard for civilian lives, as well as the extent of popular support for an Israeli ideology that rejects the two-state solution, forcibly expels Palestinians, and imposes one fait accompli after another. Crushing Hamas is a new Israeli commitment, not a long-standing doctrine. Indeed, Israel contributed to the creation of Hamas to weaken the Fatah movement, which then signed the Oslo Accords, and established the Palestinian Authority as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians with international recognition and the goal of achieving the two-state solution.

As long as attempts to contain the Gaza war remain disjointed, transitional, and driven by appeasement and covert deals, not only between Israel and Hamas but also between the Biden administration and Iran, the world will remain in a state of anxiety, anticipating wars, small and large.

As long as Hezbollah and Israel agree on rules of engagement, with one party exceeding these rules only after informing the other, Lebanon will not stabilize, and its youth will not return to work in their homeland. The country will not transition from being a gloomy, torn land to one living in safety under a sovereign state and government, instead of remaining subject to the whims and calculations of Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran.

Like the women of Sudan and the mothers of Gaza, Lebanese families from various classes and political affiliations are anxious, carrying the burdens of tomorrow on their faces, looking for an answer to reassure them: "Is the war over?" It is not enough for Hezbollah’s Secretary-General to assure those who panicked and fled to safer places that they can return. This does not provide lasting reassurance, nor does it respect Lebanon’s need for state sovereignty and secure living. It also does not guarantee that Lebanon will not be dragged into the trap set by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and fanatics like him to embroil Lebanon in a broader war that neither side will win.

The Gaza war may remain in a state of limbo and could even fade into obscurity and neglect in the coming months unless the Biden team’s optimism materializes and a deal for a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and prisoners is reached—along with some kind of deal with Iran, especially following the return of Mohammad Javad Zarif, the architect of the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal during former President Barack Obama’s term, to the position of advisor to the Iranian president on strategic affairs.

All of Hamas’s bets on the October 7 operations fundamentally changing American and global public opinion will be met with the shock of political realism. Emotions do not drive state policy, and operations like those on October 7 do not alter the course of history as Hamas and the resistance axis might believe.

Lebanon’s interests, and those of Hezbollah, are not served by linking Lebanon’s fate with Gaza’s. It is time to separate the two and stop the game of support and face-saving measures. Iran is negotiating behind closed doors with the Americans without consulting Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, or the Houthis in Yemen. This is the language of interests between states.

By the end of the year, the Gaza issue may be resolved because neither Hamas can sustain the current situation, nor can Israel endure an open-ended war of attrition. The next phase may be a relatively quiet transitional period until the U.S. elections in November, influenced by an Iranian decision.

As for the Houthis, who claim independence from Iran’s decisions, prioritizing lucrative piracy above all else, it would be wise for them to show some compassion for the Yemeni people, who are facing a cholera outbreak following the floods. And it would be beneficial if all global powers, from the West to China and Russia, made the unlikely decision to consider, even once, the consequences of their silence on the catastrophic policies and adventures in Yemen, Sudan, Gaza, and Lebanon.