Level crossing safety and the Hierarchy of Controls
Railway level crossing safety in New Zealand is framed as ‘controlled’ vs ‘uncontrolled’, with ‘active’ or ‘passive’ crossing protection. ?
Another common paradigm for describing safety controls is the ‘Hierarchy of Controls’. The Hierarchy of controls uses the categories of elimination, substitution, engineering, administrative, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
This article aims to compare and align these two paradigms. ?
The Railway Terminology:
TrackSafe New Zealand classify level crossings as protected, unprotected, and as having active or passive safety measures.
TrackSafe describe active measures as “barrier arms (either half or full), flashing lights or bells – or a combination of these”, while passive measures are “Stop signs or Give Way signs”.
Protected crossings are those that are protected by:
TrackSafe also note that level crossings can be grade separated where “engineering has physically separated the crossing".
The KiwiRail level crossing risk assessment guide aligns to this terminology.
While the term unprotected is not defined it is implied as being those crossings that do not have active or passive measures.
Here's a summary of the railway terms....
The Hierarchy of Controls
The Hierarchy of Controls (HoC) is the principle that there is an order of preference of safety controls categories based on their effectiveness (p.36).
While the wording in literature varies, I've distilled the definitions from multiple sources (1, 2, 3) into the following:
Hopefully there’s no disagreement on these definitions, though feel free to comment below.
Hierarchy of Controls and Level Crossing measures
The next step is to combine the two tables.
In preparation for this, I thought I’d ask others where they considered lights and bells (without barriers) sit within the HoC. I created a linkedIn poll which received 83 votes over a three-day period.
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Reconciling active measures and administrative controls?
There seems to be general agreement that a stop or give way sign is an administrative control. If we shine a light on the sign I'm sure most would still consider this an administrative control – it now has some minor electrical engineering.
If the light shining on the sign flashes, the sign is still an administrative control, now with slightly more advanced electrical engineering.
If we turn the light to flash toward the person, I argue this is still an administrative control – the light is just taking a different path.
We are still expecting the person to alter their behaviour.
Adding a bell brings our attention to the light, and still remains in the administrative category of altering behaviour.
I acknowledge that creating lights and bells on a mast requires more 'engineering' than stamping a metal sign and pouring a concrete base, though it still remains an instruction to the person which aims to alter their behavior and remains administrative.
The results
The table below aligns the HoC with the Railway Level Crossing controls.
Closing the road or the railway at the crossing eliminates the risk. Removal of the crossing also substitutes the risk from 'train vs person or car' to 'train vs train' or 'car vs car'.
Grade separation isolates the train from the people, and barrier arms provide a physical control defined by HoC as an engineering control.
Lights, bells, instruction signs (give way, stop), path markings, and rumble strips aim to change the way people act, are are administrative controls.
There doesn't seem to be any notion of PPE associated with level crossing safety.
What’s next?
Why have I done this? My next article will examine the stats on level crossings controls against the hierarchy of controls. This aims to explore the percentage of elimination, substitution, isolation, engineering, administrative controls across New Zealand's Railway Level Crossings.
Preliminary review of the data suggests we rely very heavily on administrative controls where we expect people to modify their behaviour, rather than higher order, and more effective, controls that provide some sort of physical separation.
I aim to have this published here in the next week or so, ahead of the New Zealand Rail Conference.
Senior Project Manager
1 年Nice article Russ.
Railway Signalling Engineer
1 年I still disagree that active controls at a level crossing are only administrative. Maybe it is the hierarchy of controls that is defined badly/incorrectly but there is a big difference between an admin control which is passive e.g. an instruction/sign/rule that is normally seen/read once and then forgotten about, vs an active warning that only occurs when there is a hazard. Also, half arm barriers are very easy to drive around if you want to, so why aren't they considered administrative too by your rules, it only takes two turns of a steering wheel. I don't believe anyone who has entered an active LX illegally has done so because they didn't notice the big flashing red lights! They did it by choice. Another equivalent example: Consider an admin control that tells people to ventilate a room when operating a heater vs an active carbon monoxide alarm. One of those controls is massively safer than the other, so to group them all in the same category as "put up a sign" does a disservice to the people who invented/engineered such an intelligent device to save lives. PS: Active controls at a level crossing don't just "shine a light on a sign", they are carefully engineered to only activate when a train is a set time from the crossing.
Principal Engineer
1 年What this control hierarchy does not provide is system failure responsibility and accountability. There are daily risks to service and business activities from this lowest cost infrastructure planning, gold plated design and the inability to invest in an update efficient and safe rail system for urban and intercity freight and people movement.
Director at Rail Infrastructure Consultants (NZ) Limited
1 年Great article Russell. Unfortunately the engineering control of closure has some significant indirect safety consequences due to resulting trespass issues. If walking routes are made too long then people soon establish short cuts even if this means cutting through fences and other barriers. The engineering control soon creates a hazard with no controls at all.
System, Safety & RAM Manager
1 年Perhaps the weakness of man(generic) is the key aspect. But what is the acceptability of risk ? Sfairp / alarm when taken to its conclusion is a cold mistress.