Less Flash, More Bang: General James A. Van Fleet's Command Record in the Korean Conflict.

      Often overshadowed by the personality cult status surrounding his predecessors, Generals MacArthur and Ridgeway, it was General James A. Van Fleet who led the Allied forces for the bulk of the Korean War and who was most influential in affecting its martial resolution, including his participation in the negotiations for the cease-fire that remains in effect to this day. A combat veteran of both WWI and WWII as well as against the Communists in Greece, van Fleet lacked the flamboyancy of MacArthur and the paternal endearment of Ridgeway, but brought a cool calculating nature to the American military leadership in Korea at a point when it was direly needed. Capable of both executions of astute military operations in America’s emergent post-WWII reality, the occasionally candid and politically bumbling General James A. Van Fleet’s efforts in Korea earned him Truman’s endorsement, which the president used as a stab at MacArthur, as “the greatest general we have ever had.”[1]

           Van Fleet arrived in Korea on April 16, 1951, replacing General Ridgeway, as commander of the 8th Army. Wise enough initially to avoid boxing in or stepping on the toes of his superiors as MacArthur had, Van Fleet eschewed the press, referring them instead to the decision-makers in Washington.[2] Van Fleet’s immediate assignment was to avoid unnecessary offensive operations and to defend established territories.[3] Not long after he took command, the Chinese initiated their “Fifth Phase Offensive”, with massed nocturnal assaults, heavy armor and artillery in support testing the American and ROK resolve and capacity to hold. Only the logistical limitations of the Chinese forces and Van Fleet’s astute employment of reserves prevented continued assaults, the Allied superior firepower decimating the Chinese ranks while enjoying extremely favorable casualty exchange rates.[4]

           This opus to his command in Korea resulted from Van Fleet’s strong belief in employing the American capacity for firepower and logistics as force-multipliers against the more numerous Chinese; “expend fire and steel, not men” being his mantra; his requirement that his troops be supplied with five times the normal ammunition ration when in defense led to the coining of “the Van Fleet load” among the troops to describe a large load of rations.[5] However it was not only on the defensive where Van Fleet excelled. Realizing an over-extension on the part of the Chinese in the wake of the “fifth phase offensive”, Van Fleet struck with a major offensive that cost the Communists as many as 1.6 million casualties, captured recaptured Pyongyang and placed the Allies in a position to negotiate from a position of military advantage.[6]

           While these negotiations took place starting in July 1951, the fighting continued with Van Fleet instructed to achieve and hold a reasonable and defendable line.[7] During the course of events, with the Chinese re-gearing and reorganizing throughout July and August, Van Fleet and his fellow commanders grew increasingly wary, but were forced to shelve plans for a preemptive offensive.[8] Instead, to contain and destroy NK guerrilla units operating in South Korea, Van Fleet focused two ROK divisions against them, ultimately capturing or killing some 20,000; a major success that freed units for front line efforts and increased the efficiency of the logistics net that supported the troops at the front.[9]

           Van Fleet’s lack of political acumen was revealed when he sided with ROK President Rhee in his demand for a larger 22 division army than the proposed ten negotiators would allow. The pair were chastised and rebuked by Ridgeway, who thought that the expenditure would be better served supporting an air force anyway.[10] The inaction in the interim caused Van Fleet some dismay; the land war slowing while the air war flared, causing him to proffer plans for an aggressive offensive to force the Chinese to settle. However, he was overridden by his new superior, General Mark Clark who saw little to be gained and only blood to be lost in any such venture at that time. Clark did approve, however, a plan by Van Fleet to advance toward Kumhwa, east of the Chorwon Valley, a five day operation which descended into an expanding six-week conflict.[11]

           The above example aside, General Van Fleet’s capacity for staging limited advances and artful defenses, his “solid professionalism” and his emphasis on overwhelming firepower, brought him a steady series of victories in both defensive and offensive action against Communist forces in the Korean War.[12] Politically candid if not inept, General Van Fleet’s role as commander of the 8th Army cannot be denied as the most enduring and effective of the American commanding generals in Korea. Truman’s positive assessment, if partially motivated by his dislike for MacArthur, was warranted: Van Fleet’s contribution to the American and Allied effort in the Korean Conflict is an example of resolute determination, cunning and a capacity to fight within the bounds of the limitations of the emerging geostrategic environment.

[1] Los Angeles Times. "Gen. James Van Fleet, 100; Hero Exalted by Truman." September 24, 1992: A28.

[2] Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of the Korean War. New York: Quill William Morrow, 1988, 127.

[3]Ibid, 126.

[4] Morillo, Stephan. War in World History. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009, 577.

[5] Stokesbury, 132.

[6] Ibid, 138.

[7] Millett, Allan R., Peter Maslowski, and William Feis. For the Common Defense. New York: Free Press, 2012, 468.

[8] Stokesbury, 158-161.

[9] Ibid, 166.

[10] Ibid, 198.

[11] Ibid, 240.

[12] Millett, Allan R., Peter Maslowski, and William Feis. For the Common Defense. New York: Free Press, 2012, 467.

Bibliography

Los Angeles Times. "Gen. James Van Fleet, 100; Hero Exalted by Truman." September 24, 1992: A28.

Millett, Allan R., Peter Maslowski, and William Feis. For the Common Defense. New York: Free Press, 2012.

Morillo, Stephan. War in World History. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009.

Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of the Korean War. New York: Quill William Morrow, 1988.