Lebanon's Fragility in Regional and International Agreements, Amid Its Embarrassing Local Disputes

Contrary to some Lebanese assumptions when analyzing the impact of Riyadh-Tehran relations on Lebanon, there is no real rift in the Saudi-Iranian agreement brokered by China. Rather, there is a serious litmus test underway of Iran’s goodwill and intention to practically translate the new direction in relations with the Arab world, such as with the case of the Dura gas field disputed between Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the other. While Lebanon is not a top priority in the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, it is not completely excluded from this stage of discussions either. Yet both parties have so far avoided discussing Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and according to well-informed diplomatic sources, the priority now is for implementing the bilateral element in the agreement, with Saudi Arabia now awaiting the visit of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.?

Lebanon's narcissism may explain why its internal turmoil is often blamed on foreign meddling, and also by way of deflecting responsibility. However, a realistic political reading will lead to the conclusion that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to hold Lebanon hostage through its indispensable ally Hezbollah. Indeed, not everyone in Iran’s regime favors the agreement with Saudi Arabia. A significant segment of Iranian leaders want escalation as US-Saudi relations are being boosted by a major reset, making the revival of the nuclear agreement, which would lift sanctions on Iran, unlikely before the US presidential elections. Consequently, Lebanon is a potential arena for escalation if Tehran deems it necessary. Lebanon is also linked to the Iranian agenda in Syria and rogue Palestinian agendas disguised as resistance with false claims of seeking the liberation of Palestine.?

Saudi Arabia's advisory to its citizens against travel to or remaining in Lebanon, a move followed by other Gulf countries, last week sparked fear among many. However, Lebanese authorities, as usual, demonstrated complacency, issuing "reassuring" statements and entirely ignoring security risks in Palestinian camps that had triggered the Gulf states’ warnings. The armed Palestinian factions' violent disputes within the camps are not superficial but rather reflect a struggle for influence and control between Fatah and Hamas, along with other Islamic factions, in a country already on the tip of a volcano. The Palestinian factions' arms outside the state's control are a mirror of Hezbollah's weapons, which challenge the state’s sovereignty to execute Iran's agenda in Lebanon.?

Gulf diplomatic sources who asked not to be named said, "We have not received any positive signals from Hezbollah after the bilateral Saudi-Iranian agreement given the statements of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and the party's continued support for Yemeni and Iraqi factions” making Hezbollah the main obstructing factor.?

The Gulf countries, and the Arab states in general, are conveying to Lebanon that total collapse will be inevitable if the ruling class continues its games and ploys for electing a president, forming a government, and appointing a central bank governor. The banality of some players is matched only by their narcissism, while Hezbollah is vying with the "Shia duo" to create a new system in Lebanon that officially legitimizes its weapons. However, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, want to fortify the Taif Agreement, bolster the National Accord Charter, and shore up the authority of the president and prime minister.?

According to a Gulf diplomat deployed to Lebanon, initiating a mechanism to develop radical solutions is the purview of the elected president, who should establish a dialogue based on the essence of the Taif Agreement and the "national partnership equation," as envisioned by former Lebanese Prime Minister Takieddine Solh who said that Lebanon's independence is the responsibility of its Christians, and its democracy the responsibility of its Muslims.?

The Gulf diplomat said that the broader framework for addressing this crisis lies with the Arab depth of Lebanon. Any solution, he added, requires examining the crisis from a political perspective, not just an economic one. In other words, Lebanon needs to reconsider its foreign policy priorities, rather than focusing solely on the economic aspects of its relations with the Gulf. Lebanon remains under Iran’s dominance, which tightens its hold through Hezbollah.?

What does Hezbollah want from the incoming president? They want one who is aligned with their interests, and one who provides them guarantees. The ‘Party of God’ might accept Army Commander Joseph Aoun’s presidency as a compromise—he is acceptable regionally and to the United States, as well as to significant Lebanese factions. However, what Hezbollah seeks to ensure from the army commander in return could be prohibitively costly, to the point of impossibility. The incident in Kahaleh when a truck loaded with Hezbollah weapons overturned at an infamous bend in the road, has proven to be a test for the army’s leadership and has laid bare Hezbollah's intentions.?

Here, the regional equation enters the fray of local Lebanese considerations. It might lead Hezbollah's Secretary-General to show some humility and settle for less than complete control over the president and the army commander. Indeed, Iran, or some of its leaders, do not want their domination over Lebanon to be labeled as brazen. Meanwhile, they are not comfortable with the developments in Syria, where Iran's relationship with Russia is under strain, and where the United States and Turkey are clearly converging. Meanwhile, Russia increasingly needs Turkey and is willing to make a deal on Syria, which unsettles Iran.?

These geopolitical considerations are driving policymaking within the governing Iranian establishment. This establishment is also grappling with internal restlessness due to its major policy pivots such as the agreement with Saudi Arabia. In Tehran, there are those who are not satisfied with consecrating Saudi Arabia's Sunni leadership and strengthening its role as a regional and even international player, as evidenced by its recent crucial Jeddah summit to find a solution to the Ukraine conflict, attended by more than 40 countries, including China and India, despite Russia's boycott. This faction in Iran wants to retain Hezbollah as a valuable card in Lebanon for disruptive purposes and for future negotiations with Saudi Arabia.?

What is the extent of influence of this camp within the ruling Iranian establishment? It is still too early to make a final judgment, and therefore, Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia are under no illusion that a radical and definitive change has really occurred in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy and ideology. But Iran’s behavior in the shared waterways is being monitored in the hope it would demonstrate good intentions and refrain from threatening the freedom of navigation there. The crucial aspect lies in implementation, whether it entails refraining from escalating the situation in Yemen or abstaining from increasing uranium enrichment for use in nuclear weapons production.?

Any significant economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states in general, and Iran is contingent upon lifting American and international sanctions on Tehran related to the nuclear issue. There doesn't seem to be an imminent nuclear agreement, but there are deals that could involve a commitment from Iran not to increase enrichment and to release American detainees in exchange for the release of Iranian funds held by third parties.?

Europeans remain uneasy about these exchanges, and China is also uncomfortable because it wants to return to the nuclear agreement. Neither party wants to involve the hostage issue in the nuclear deal. However, in practical terms, the revival of the nuclear agreement does not seem plausible before the US elections, thus Iran will not be able to benefit from full sanctions relief soon.?

The impact of Iran's critical economic situation will not be contained internally as it will affect its proxies and direct engagements – with Syria being an example. Tehran is observing Arab reactions towards Syria, and a forthcoming meeting of an Arab League ad-hoc committee will convene to follow the "step-by-step" agreement for Syria's comprehensive rehabilitation. Incidentally, a Gulf source has stressed that claims of setbacks in Saudi-Syrian relations as being one of the reasons behind the Saudi travel advisory for Lebanon are "completely untrue."?

Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to soon meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, and Syria will be a topic of discussion, not in the way Tehran necessarily desires. Erdogan will be resolute having bolstered his position within the NATO alliance. He wants to have a free hand in Syria while expecting Putin not to interfere – in exchange for giving Putin what he urgently needs from Erdogan, namely the transit of Russian goods through Turkey. Putin will have to be flexible in the face of Erdogan's steadfastness. Erdogan wants to renew the grain deal with Ukraine and obtain the ability to operate freely in Syria. This is bad news for Tehran, which has pledged to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to recover all Syrian territories while remaining the sole regional military player in Syria. However, this is less likely to materialize because Russia is no longer Iran's unwavering partner in Syria, in light of the changing dynamics in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict. The door now is open to Russia accepting what it was not prepared to concede before, regarding Turkey's demands in Syria. Turkey benefits, while Iran is concerned and uneasy for several reasons.?

One of these reasons is Turkey's mending of its relationship with NATO countries, led by the United States. Furthermore, President Joe Biden's administration has completely shifted its relations with Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is uneasy about the rise of Saudi influence regionally and internationally amidst significant American openness to Riyadh, despite the fact that Saudi leadership has raised the ceiling of its demands for achieving that "grand bargain" sought after by the United States.?

Irani’s leaders are aware of the significance of the Biden administration's pivot from the policies of the Obama administration, which had shown a clear tilt towards Iran and open antagonism towards the Arab Gulf states. Many figures in the Biden administration are, in fact, holdovers from the Obama era and did not serve in Republican administrations or under Donald Trump. This situation greatly favors Saudi Arabia because any negotiations aimed at bolstering security, military, intelligence, economic, and technological cooperation would then be guaranteed by a Democratic administration. This will prove advantageous for Saudi Arabia in the long run, regardless of the outcomes of presidential elections, given that Saudi relations with Republican administrations have generally been more positive than those with Democratic administrations.?

The critical components of the "grand bargain" are focused on US-Saudi relations, where Riyadh's demands are exceedingly high, leading to concerns in Iran. Iran is uncomfortable with Saudi Arabia's growing influence in the United States, or with its influence in China, India, Russia, and other nations.?

Moreover, because the Palestinian issue has been consistently exploited by the Iranian Islamic Republic to manipulate and disparage the Arab nations, the resolute Saudi position within the framework of the "grand deal" towards the Palestinian question is also unsettling for Tehran and the Revolutionary Guard who reject the notion of making concessions pursuant to the Saudi-Iranian agreement, guaranteed by China. Instead, they insist on leveraging Palestinian factions and Hezbollah's influence to validate their presence and exhibit their capabilities in the Lebanese arena while maintaining the latter’s fragility and vulnerability to eruption.?

Hezbollah is not the only ally of the Revolutionary Guard within Lebanon. The eagerness of some Christian factions to take the presidency has transformed them into de facto allies of the Iranian military entity that spawns militias and non-regular forces in Lebanon to serve its own interests, often at their expense.?

There was some hope that the Saudi-Iranian understandings might herald a substantial breakthrough in Lebanon, and there was also a bet on the capabilities of the Quintet Committee tasked with overseeing the Lebanese matter. This committee is comprised of the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar. Both possibilities remain viable. The Quintet countries have begun contemplating imposing sanctions and measures necessary to change the behavior of Lebanon's political class.?

France has played a negative role, albeit unintentionally, due to its erratic diplomatic approach characterized by a mixture of ignorance, arrogance, and appeasement. However, France has now adopted some corrective measures. Similarly, the Biden administration has displayed naivety in Lebanon, both due to conscious diplomatic decisions and because it perceived Lebanon as peripheral rather than a priority, except when it contributed to delineating maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel –the importance of this achievement should not be downplayed, nor should the indications of impending pressures be disregarded.?

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar are exerting considerable efforts. Nevertheless, the time has arrived for more stringent actions towards the Lebanese factions and for earnest discussions with the Iranian leadership concerning Hezbollah. Delaying these conversations could trigger catastrophic scenarios akin to Hezbollah’s "had I known” scenario [triggering the 2006 war with Israel] which inflicted substantial damage on Lebanon.?