Lebanon at the Intersection of Cooperation Between Biden and Trump: What’s Next for Iran and Israel?

The cooperation between President Joe Biden and President-elect Donald Trump on Lebanon and Israel is remarkable, resulting in a ceasefire between the two sides and a draft agreement aimed at demarcating their borders and resolving their disputes. Both men stand to take credit for this achievement. Some might argue that it is premature to assume that Israel, Hezbollah—and by extension, Iran—will fully adhere to the agreement endorsed by the Lebanese government, as they may have had already intended to violate it. However, the determination and clarity shown by both Biden and Trump in dealing with Israel and Iran suggest that this is not merely a temporary arrangement but rather a framework for a lasting peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel, endorsed by both the Democratic and Republican leaderships at the highest levels. But while this effort is significant in itself, it could take on greater regional importance if Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, invest in it. Indeed, the timing is ideal for the Gulf to reengage with Lebanon, benefiting all parties involved. This also aligns with Trump’s broader vision for the “Deal of the Century,” a plan that extends beyond Arab-Israeli normalization to include recalibrated relations between Israel and Iran.

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The collaboration between Biden and Trump is a positive indicator of the resilience of the United States as a major global power, despite deep divisions between the two parties and an electoral contest marked by contentious and even obscene rhetoric. But ultimately, the U.S. Constitution has emerged as the true winner, with the American people maintaining faith in the democratic process, regardless of its outcomes.

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Lebanon has become a focal point of this bipartisanship for substantive reasons, even as fundamental differences persist on other strategic issues, such as the Ukraine war and relations with Russia. Here, it may be necessary to address the Ukraine issue before diving deeper into the Lebanese story.

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In truth, President Biden can be credited with a strategic feat on at least two fronts. First, he successfully persuaded Trump to facilitate the Democratic administration’s efforts to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon, enabling Biden to conclude his term with a significant achievement. Second, he limited Trump’s freedom of action on Ukraine by allowing Ukraine to use American missiles deep inside Russian territory. This strategy would likely provoke retaliation from Russian President Vladimir Putin, complicating Trump’s ability to deliver on his promises to end the war hastily. Consequently, Trump is hindered in starting his presidency with a major diplomatic breakthrough, particularly concerning Russia and Ukraine.

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During this transition period, Trump as president elect cannot circumvent the current administration on critical strategic issues, such as relations with Russia, NATO, or the Ukraine war. Moreover, his immediate focus remains on assembling his team and securing Congressional approval for his key nominations—which is proving more difficult than he probably expected.

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On matters of strategy such as Russia, NATO, and the war in Ukraine, Biden and Trump fundamentally differ. Biden is seeking to compel the Republican administration into supporting Ukraine by introducing a fait accompli, even at the risk of provoking Putin into taking dangerous actions. The potential use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia and retaliation against Poland are plausible scenarios that could escalate the war into a direct conflict between Russia and NATO.

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For both the Democrats and Republicans, a primary objective in the U.S. grand strategy is to separate Russia from China. Therefore, Biden’s approach of provoking Putin could inadvertently align with Trump’s interests, as China would oppose Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons, potentially driving a wedge between the two powers—a development welcomed by the U.S. Such a move could also strain Russia’s relations with India, further isolating Putin.

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But ultimately, Biden’s administration’s aim is to ensure that Trump does not grant Putin an opportunity to escape the consequences of his invasion of Ukraine or negotiate a settlement that disproportionately favours Russia, ending the conflict with concessions by Ukraine rather than Russia as Trump plans.

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The purpose of examining the Ukraine issue in the context of the strategies of Presidents Biden and Trump is to illustrate how the overarching American national interest can unite the two leaders and their parties, even amid their profound differences. Lebanon, too serves as an example of bipartisan tactical cooperation and broader strategic alignment. Indeed, both presidents have pursued the grand bargain of achieving normalization between Arab states and Israel. Both have sensed the seriousness of the Arab position, particularly Saudi Arabia’s insistence on a two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state as prerequisites for normalization. Both have also acknowledged that resolving the Gaza conflict is far more complex than addressing the conflict in Lebanon. Finally, they both have understood Iran’s central role in the equation with Israel and adopted a policy focused on dismantling Iran’s regional influence as a prerequisite for any future negotiations with Tehran.

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For their part, the Iranian leaders have understood the core strategic message of the United States at this critical juncture: the door to normalization with Iran remains open if Tehran fundamentally revises its ideology, which relies on proxies to expand its influence in the Middle East, and abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of its regional dominance. Tehran realizes that if it continues to adhere to its proxy and nuclear doctrines, the Trump administration will escalate sanctions to the point of triggering Iran’s economic collapse and authorize Israel to systematically eliminate Iran’s proxies. Additionally, Israel would receive full U.S. support for military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

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Notably, the Biden administration has already empowered Israel with the tools to counter Iran’s regional proxies and tacitly endorsed recent Israeli military operations inside Iran, which delivered a severe blow to Iran’s air defence capabilities. Tehran now recognizes that Biden is not former President Barack Obama, who offered concessions, tolerated Iranian proxies and rewarded its regional conduct, and refrained from applying pressure. While Biden avoided escalating tensions by shielding Iran’s nuclear facilities from direct Israeli strikes and provided economic relief by lifting sanctions to avoid a broader conflict, his administration ultimately strengthened Israel’s ability to dismantle Iran’s regional network of proxies. This strategy is endorsed by the U.S. military, which considers Iran’s proxies as dangerous as its nuclear program, if not more so, given their decentralized and elusive nature.

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The Trump administration is expected to continue this approach, employing a combination of strategies to deal with Iranian-affiliated militias. These may include direct destruction, as in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, containment efforts targeting the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, or military confrontation, as with the Houthis in Yemen. Trump will likely fully support Israel, block any efforts to lift sanctions on Iran, and prevent the resumption of nuclear negotiations if Tehran responds with defiance and if the IRGC dodge the demand to rein in their proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

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This American strategic policy requires Tehran to take it seriously and not dismiss it as a temporary or superficial stance that can be countered with short-term gestures or cosmetic adjustments.

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Iran’s compliance with the ceasefire in Lebanon and its pressure on Hezbollah to accept the agreement stem from significant U.S. political and strategic pressure, coupled with clear Israeli military escalation supported by the U.S. Iran had no other choice, especially after Lebanese leaders conveyed that the time had come to end Tehran’s control over Lebanon and its use of the country as a pawn for its regional ambitions.

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Neither Biden nor Trump offered Iran secret concessions regarding its influence in Lebanon or Hezbollah’s ability to retain and use its remaining arsenal to impose internal dominance. The developments in Lebanon do not represent a victory for Iran or Hezbollah, despite their public claims to the contrary. Hezbollah is the biggest loser in this equation, having lost at least 70% of its military capabilities and the ability to continue importing missiles from Iran through Syria or other routes. Its miscalculations have alienated its base and forced Lebanon as a whole to pay the price for its flawed strategies in support of Gaza against Lebanon’s will, leading Israel to reoccupy parts of Lebanon. Hezbollah has lost because the costly outcome of its actions was to force the separation of the fates of Lebanon and Gaza, abolish the equation of the ‘people, the army, and the resistance’, and even abolish the logic of resistance itself because now borders will be eventually demarcated between Lebanon and Israel, ending the occupation officially instead of freezing it in place as Hezbollah had sought to legitimise its weapons.

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In contrast, the Lebanese state emerges as a big winner. The agreement ratified by the cabinet strengthens Lebanon’s military and security institutions, particularly in the area south of the Litani, and enforces full implementation of UN Resolution 1701. Its terms include the disarmament of Hezbollah and Palestinian factions, effectively restoring the state’s monopoly on arms. Meanwhile, U.S. and French guarantees for adherence to the ceasefire by Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran lend credibility to the agreement and underscore its seriousness.

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Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati played crucial roles during this critical phase. However, significant challenges remain, particularly in finalizing the demarcation of land borders within the next 60 days. The announcement of a presidential election early next month is another major development, reflecting a shift in Berri’s priorities. He appears determined to leave behind a legacy of reconstruction in the south—not through Iranian influence, but via international and Arab partnerships that would facilitate the return of Gulf states to Lebanon and reintegrate Lebanon into the Arab fold.

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It is hoped that Gulf countries will respond positively to calls from the United States, Europe, and Lebanon for their return to playing a role in Lebanon. However, this historic opportunity for Lebanon to rebuild itself depends on addressing its endemic corruption. Without meaningful reforms to ensure accountability and transparency, Lebanon risks squandering this unique chance to reinvent itself on new foundations.