The Lebanese-Israeli Question of Peace

Outline:

I.???????????Introduction

II.???????????Main Obstacles to a Strategic Change in Relations

A.???Israel Perspective

1.?????Presence of Hezbollah

2.?????Weakness of Hezbollah’s Opponents in the Government

B.????Lebanese Perspective

1.?????Threat of Hezbollah’s Existence

2.?????Lebanese Public Opinion

3.?????Maritime Borders

III.???????????Ostensible Opportunity to Forge Relations

A.???The Collapse of Lebanon

B.????Israel’s New Peace Treaties with Arab Countries

C.????A Somehow Weakened Hezbollah

D.???Maritime Borders

IV.???????????US Mediation for Lebanese-Israeli Peace

V.??????????? Recommendations

VI.???????????Conclusion

Ideas about advancing talks to achieve a general settlement to forge relations between Israel and Lebanon are not new. Israel and Lebanon have had several direct and indirect interactions throughout the years, involving both official Lebanese parties and members from various communities, primarily in the aftermath of armed conflicts and usually with US and UN backing. Agreements, arrangements, and understandings were established, but they rarely lasted, and they were always broken later. This paper discusses the prospects of peace between Lebanon and Israel, focusing on the opportunities to forge relations between both states from a Lebanese and Israeli perspective, the obstacles or challenges that reduce the chances of peace between both states, US response or action in the Mediation of Peace in Lebanon and recommendations for improving the Lebanese and Israeli relations.

The March 1949 ceasefire agreement made Lebanon the first Arab country to sign an agreement with Israel; the peace treaty following the First Lebanon War, signed on May 17, 1983, which the Lebanese government repudiated under Syrian pressure (Andersen, 2021, p.12). Also, Lebanon took part in the unwritten understandings following Operation Accountability in 1993; and the written understandings following Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996 and the failed 1999-2000 discussions for an agreement on IDF departure from Lebanon, which ended in Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Security Zone in May 2000 (Aoude, 2020, p. 100).

Lebanon refused to participate in the UN-led team's demarcation of the Blue Line, which has served as the border since then. Indirect conversations on UN Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, particularly Resolution 1701 in 2006, were also held. Since the end of the Second Lebanon War, a joint military liaison committee has been in place to deal with border concerns, with UNIFIL, the Lebanese army, and the IDF all participating (Andersen, 2021, p. 13). Consequently, none of them were effective and couldn’t bring about peace between both parties to these agreements, arrangements and understandings.

From an Israeli perspective, Hezbollah is first and foremost the first challenge to improving relations in Lebanon. The organization, which is motivated by hardline religious doctrine and operates as a mouthpiece for Iran, is the major impediment to improving Israel-Lebanon relations (Kurtzer, 2020). Hezbollah agreed to the commencement of maritime boundary negotiations out of necessity, given the severe circumstances in Lebanon and the organization itself, but has stressed that these are not political negotiations (Mizrahi, 2020). In the Lebanese theater, Hezbollah continues to solidify its position. It has the country's largest military force and, despite the difficulties, continues to try to arm itself with sophisticated weapons. Hezbollah is also well-established in Lebanon's political system and exerts influence over decision-making, effectively running a "state within a state." As a result, it is likely to sabotage border talks and will vehemently oppose any further development in relations with Israel. Hezbollah is likewise likely to oppose any demand to give up its special status or hand up its weapons to any other entity, whether Lebanon-based or not. There appears to be no entity within Lebanon or outside player capable of disarming Hezbollah without a military battle at present time.

The weakness of Hezbollah's opponents in the Lebanese political system is a second factor. Given the obvious weakness of the pro-Western political parties opposed to Hezbollah, it is unclear which groups in the Lebanese political system will advocate for official contacts with Israel (the March 14 Alliance) (Hanna, 2020, p.89). ?Hezbollah's coalition controls Lebanon's current government, a shaky caretaker administration (which resigned after the port tragedy) (the March 8 Alliance). President Macron's attempt to build a working administration that would undermine Hezbollah's interests were recently stopped by Hezbollah and Amal.

From a Lebanese perspective, Lebanon has borne the consequences of Arab-Israeli conflicts, as well as Israeli attacks and occupation of Lebanese territory, since the 1948 war in Palestine. Lebanon did not take part in the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1967 or 1973, but its endeavor to avoid warfare was doomed to failure after 1970, when it became a battleground for Israeli military troops and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Barak, 2020, p.168). One of the longest and most damaging chapters of the Arab-Israeli conflict was Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. After a long blockade and bombs, the Israeli army invaded the Lebanese capital (Hanna, 2020, p. 92).

As a result, Lebanon's decision-making space is constrained by the presence of Palestinian refugees whose fate remains unknown, as well as its involvement in the strategic Israel–Lebanon–Syria triangle. These limits have an impact on domestic politics, causing divides between those who favor ceasing wars with Israel and Syria and Iran's friends.

Despite the UN Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) active engagement, these same limits prohibit Lebanon from attaining peace and progress through the delimitation of its southern borders and the utilization of its water resources (International Crisis Group, 2020).

To elaborate more, direct political or diplomatic contact between Lebanon and Israel has been avoided. Any deviation from this rule is viewed as a national betrayal by Lebanese of all religious affiliations, as well as by neighboring Arab countries.

This has been demonstrated on a number of occasions, including in response to President émile Eddé's contacts with Israel in the 1940s, the collaboration of the Lebanese Forces, with the Israeli Defense Forces between 1976 and 1985, and the dormant bilateral treaty signed by President Amin Gemayel on May 17, 1983. Even today, the Lebanese adhere to the Arab League's boycott more than other Arab states (Mizrahi, 2020).

Lebanon has also refused to negotiate with Israel because it does not want Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to become permanent settlements. If these refugees become permanent residents in Lebanon, the demographic balance in Lebanon would shift in favor of Sunnis. As a result, Lebanon's official position is the same as the PLO's: no agreement with Israel should be reached that consecrates the settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Furthermore, Lebanon's determination not to make peace with Israel was greatly influenced by Syrian tutelage and Iranian interests. Following military triumphs over its Arab neighbors in 1967, Israel enforced “faits accomplis”, which did little to promote trust. Its reluctance to withdraw from occupied Palestinian territories and adhere to UN resolutions diminishes the position of'moderate' Arabs who do want to negotiate (Rabinovich, 2021, p.535). It’s easier for Hezbollah to just maintain this hostility between Israel and Lebanon for his existence to remain intact and not be questioned. As such, he would remain armed and maintain his existence on the Lebanese grounds as a resistance fighting the enemy in the South, being an integral part of day-to-day Lebanese decision-making.

In addition to that, Lebanon is unable to make the crucial decision of signing a bilateral peace deal with Israel due to internal disagreements. It couldn't bear the consequences if it did. Lebanon's political history has been marked by a series of crises and a destructive civil war since independence as mentioned before.

The fundamental tension between Arab unity and Western protection persists, despite the 1943 National Pact between Christian and Muslim elites. There is pervasive hostility to Israel in Lebanese public opinion, and this feeling is not confined to Hezbollah supporters. This is a result of the anti-Israel narrative in popular opinion and the media prevalent for decades, as well as the destructive effects of the wars with Israel on Lebanon and its people. Evidence of this attitude is the absolute rejection by the public of Israel's offers of aid following the disaster at the Lebanese port.

However, the changes in the regional environment (the weakening of the Shiite axis on the one hand and Israel's new agreements with Arab countries on the other), combined with the difficult internal situation in Lebanon, have ostensibly created an opportunity for progress toward a strategic change in relations between the two countries (Salem, 2020, p. 13). More specifically are four central developments:

Firstly, the collapse of Lebanon, which is suffering a three-pronged crisis: economic, political, and health. This crisis, which worsened following the August 4 disaster at Beirut Port, is the most acute that Lebanon has experienced in recent decades, and has created a desperate need for massive external aid. Arab countries and most of the international agencies are unwilling and/or unable to bear the heavy burden of this aid by themselves (Salem, 2020, p. 15). A Western initiative, led by French President Emmanuel Macron and the US administration, proposes to raise a package of aid and loans for Lebanon, contingent on passage of economic and political reforms. Some parties in Israel are proposing that understandings on security and relations with Israel be added to these conditions, but it appears that achievement of this goal is not at hand (Barak, 2020, p. 625). However, given Lebanon's dire political and economic situation, picturing what such a peace may look like is a fruitless exercise. The Lebanese state is currently fragile and on the point of disintegration. Whereas any decision to seek peace, or even war, necessitates complete sovereignty and genuine statehood, Lebanon lacks both the status and the ability to do so.

Secondly, especially with Trump’s active assistance, Israel’s new peace treaties with Arab countries represent a strategic turning point for Israel in the Arab World, effectively providing legitimacy to any other Arab country willing to actually negotiate with Israel (Hanna, 2020, p.115). These agreements show the benefits and advantages of having relations with Israel, which Lebanon may profit from as well, particularly in securing aid and establishing good relations with the US and other Western countries, as well as benefitting the Lebanese economy in areas like energy (gas and electricity), water, health, agriculture, tourism and industry.

Thirdly, Hezbollah and Lebanon’s dire straits: Hezbollah has been undergoing financial challenges since becoming embroiled in the Syrian Conflict. Not to forget that the collapse of Lebanon is also affecting Hezbollah as well as US sanctions against the organization as a whole such as the Banks and Shiite Government aiding it and Iran’s cut back of funds to the organization as a whole (International Crisis Group, 2020). Also, his political operations witnessed a setback, given the growing momentum of labeling the group, including both the civil and political wings as a terrorist organization. The US, Netherlands, Canada, UK, the Gulf states and most recently Germany have all responded this way, with Germany attempting to persuade the European Union to follow this stance (Barak, 2020, p. 170). On the internal Lebanese theater, Hezbollah is also a focus of increased criticism; it is blamed for the country’s failed administration and for its threats against the Lebanese population, as well as the demand for Hezbollah to be disarmed. These circumstances prompted Hezbollah to agree to begin negotiations on establishing a maritime border, which it had previously refused to do.

Moreover, regional developments, as well as American mediation to demarcate the maritime borders between Israel and Lebanon have resulted in a shift in the Lebanese discourse, which had previously rejected normalization with Israel in full statements, expressing conditional openness to a settlement with Israel, reigniting Lebanese division on the issue.

Without an agreement on boundary demarcation and water sharing, there can be no peace between Lebanon and Israel. Regardless of their political allegiance, Lebanese citizens see Israel as a military entity with plans for Lebanese land and water, so the agreement to start negotiations on establishing a maritime border, which came after a decade of effort, is a welcome omen (Kurtzer, 2020). If the negotiations do result in some sort of deal or agreement, this could produce a positive atmosphere that encourages dialogue and could perhaps pave the way for agreements on other issues such as energy understandings and cooperation, establishing a common ground on the disputed points of the Lebanon-Israel land border and distancing Hezbollah from the 1701 UN Resolution and the Blue Line upon consensus and agreement. A genuine and warm peace between Lebanon and Israel would usher in a new age of unprecedented economic prosperity and tranquility for both nations. More cooperation between the world's most successful diasporas would result from such a peace.

However, even if Israel and Lebanon succeed on agreeing on the maritime borders it remains unlikely that this achievement will result in a strategic shift in the parties' relations. As long as Hezbollah maintains its power and influence in Lebanon, especially under the current Lebanese government, the animosity will certainly persist (Hanna, 2020, p.135).

Could the US, eager to find methods to assist the Lebanese in climbing out of the terrible pit made for them by their political elite, raise the issue with Israel and then Iran (as part of sanctions relief)? After all, Iran has a substantial influence over Hezbollah (despite al-2011 Assad's assertion). And, in its connections with Iran and Hezbollah, Syria under al-Assad is very much the subordinate partner. They will bound him to whatever decision they make. The chances of Israel (or anybody else) initiating a bold diplomatic move, or of Iran allowing anything acceptable to pass muster, are slim to none. Washington, on the other hand, is not powerless in all of this until it chooses to be.

The Biden administration can and must work to enable a new maritime deal between Lebanon and Israel, an interim arrangement with provisions that might be changed if the two countries achieve full normalization (US and Lebanon, 2021, p. 450). It can actively strive to resolve other issues between Lebanon and Israel (typically along the "Blue Line") that potentially lead to bloodshed. And, considering the dire situation in which millions of Lebanese find themselves, it has even more room to think large (Einay, 2021).

At the same time, Israel might take a variety of steps to pave the ground for the chance for more favorable conditions of an agreement to rise:

A dialogue with France and the United States, which are leading the efforts to improve the situation in Lebanon, should be held (Mizrahi, 2020). To achieve security stability, it should be advocated that Western aid to Lebanon be conditional on the establishment of a plan for resolving matters of contention between Lebanon and Israel. Measures to limit Hezbollah's influence should be discussed jointly in this debate.

In conversations with Israel's old and new Gulf allies, the Lebanese crisis should be brought up. They should be urged to help improve Israel-Lebanon relations, in part by committing to renew their contributions in exchange for a gradual shift in Lebanese policy (Aoude, 2021, p. 100). Israel should engage in an unofficial discussion with Lebanese groups from all sects and political parties to learn about potential areas of cooperation and to try to establish agreements on disputed issues.

Moreover, an effort should be made to raise awareness among various sectors of Lebanon's public opinion in order to expose Hezbollah's policies and actions that are harmful to Lebanese state interests and that threat the state’s security and sovereignty instead of protecting them, as well as to emphasize the positive contribution that Israel-Lebanon relations can make to improving the situation in Lebanon.

To conclude, Lebanon and Israel still have a long way to achieve peace. The obstacles and challenges outweigh the opportunities to forge or improve relations between both sides due to the several reasons mentioned above. The recent peace agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain are a sober reminder to the Lebanese that their country is stuck in a political limbo, with no way to examine or engage in any discussion that could help Lebanon reposition itself as a desirable regional partner. Given that Lebanon and Israel are still formally at war, there is no hope for any type of peace or meaningful closure after decades of turmoil - even if such a deal would resolve the historical grievances of all parties involved.

It's one thing for Lebanon to refuse to board the normalization train; it's quite another to refuse to board the train being driven by Iran and Hezbollah, which is dragging Lebanon farther into obscurity. The failure of Beirut to change its attitude toward Israel is neither clever nor helpful, and professing neutrality while functioning as a pawn in Iran's regional strategy is a losing game. The challenges are formidable, but no natural law prescribes that Lebanon should be last in line to reach an honest and comprehensive peace with its southern neighbor, one that safeguards the "Precarious Republic's" and its people’s interests, all of which fall under the establishment of a functional and effective Lebanese state.