Leading an engineering company is too a complex business to leave it to engineers...

Before you read, I want to clarify: I am an engineer, to the deep core of my brain. I am one of those who wants to know how things work, who always wants to build something, find new solutions to problems, face new challenges.

And of course: generalising is always an error. Not all engineers are hard-core technicians; many pursue non-technical careers and become very effective managers, directors, senior executives.

The conflict between the technical side of the engineering profession and the broader set of skills that are required to move from the technical to the managerial career has always haunted me (I lack those skills) - hence this little article I am writing.

Over the past months, I have been stricken by what is happening to Boeing after the two fatal crashes of the Boeing 737 Max. It made me think how brilliant engineers, when put in a management position, can fail miserably.

I think that Dennis Muilenberg, Boeing CEO, is a "real engineer", and a very capable one - in fact too "engineer" to be a good CEO.

In all the interviews and articles I read on the subject, a key point was never (or just slightly) touched: as the CEO of Boeing, Mr Muilenberg's role is not to find or discuss technical solutions (the MCAS or whatever else), but to design and shape the structure of the company so that it can fulfill its mission and remain faithful to its core values.

Because in the end, however you put it, the decision to retrofit an airplane designed in the '60s was driven by purely commercial motives: minimising the cost of the development of a completely new aircraft; avoiding the lengthy process to certify a new airplane; sparing the air carriers the cost of training their pilots on a new airplane; and hitting the market as soon as possible to compete with Airbus, who had launched the new energy efficient A320 neo. No consideration for Boeing tradition and values was taken into account.

It is true that the decision to retrofit the 737 with MCAS to avoid a complete redesign was not taken by Mr Muilenberg, and happened before he stepped up as CEO, but when the first accident occurred I would have expected him to react in a complete different way - in a managerial way.

Instead of minimising what happened (Boeing asked the FAA to ground the 737 Max only after the second accident), he should have immediately raised an internal investigation to get all the facts and ascertain whether the accident could be related to a defect in the aircraft. A great manager would have immediately ordered an audit of the design process, of how key decisions where made, of who decided what - in order to have a very clear picture of the situation and what led to it. He would have been abreast of the developments of the many inquests that followed the two crashes.

Not having ordered such investigation, as a second accident occurred and more and more evidence of a questionable approach to the design of the 737 Max piled up, he was led by the events and had to continually change the tone of his declarations.

Only at a very late stage the Director of Commercial Airplanes was sacked, and the title of chairman of the BoD stripped from Mr Muilenberg.

The outcome is that, even today, there are questions that Mr Muilenberg has left unanswered:

• How is it possible that the biggest aircraft producer of the world made such a technical decision, violating its core values of putting safety ahead of everything else?
• Who made that decision?
• Why were the comments of engineers and test pilots ignored?
• Did anybody ever conducted a risk analysis, considering the consequences of a critical failure would have on the passengers, on the brand of Boeing, on the shareholders?
• Assuming that such an analysis was performed, how it is possible that the risk analysis did not land on the table of the senior executives for a final decision?

That's where the engineering roots of Mr Muilenberg played a key (negative) role. Instead of putting himself in the shoes of the customers, passengers, pilots, flight crews, etc. - i.e. the stakeholders, instead of looking at the facts and the bigger picture, he focused just on the technical aspects of the problem, entrenching himself in the defense of a clever (but risky, as proven by the facts) technical solution.

I learnt on my skin how focusing on technical details blocks you from appreciating the bigger picture. I learnt on my skin how defending my technical competencies put the customer off and prevented us from understanding each other and building a constructive relationship. However hard you try, if you don't have the soft skills you need to be a manager. you can try and learn some - but they will never be your strengths in your personal SWOT chart.

So, quoting General Clemenceau: leading an engineering company is too a complex business to leave it to engineers.