LAWYERS ARE CRITICAL TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LABOUR JURISDICTION OF TRINIDAD & TOBAGO IN 2024

NEGATIVE VIEWS ON LAWYERS WHICH HAVE EMANATED FROM JUDGES FROM THE LABOUR JURISDICTION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FOR LAST FIVE (5) DECADES

At the end of May 2024, I concluded twenty-seven (27) years of continuous research on judgments dealing with the Labour Jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago. These judgments have emanated from the Industrial Court of Trinidad and Tobago; the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago; the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago; the Privy Council of the United Kingdom; the Court of Appeal of the United Kingdom; the House of Lords of the United Kingdom and its replacement, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. From the mentorship which I received at the Ministry of Labour and the work which I have been engaged with in the private sector, I can safely declare that no true industrial relations practitioner or professional could escape reading from the above-mentioned sources if they have a genuine desire to become competent in the field of Industrial Relations in Trinidad and Tobago. Therefore, from my many years of doing the said research, I have come to conclude that the Industrial Court and even the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago were definitely wrong when they gave the impression that lawyers did not have a positive role to play within this field of Industrial relations. In my humble opinion, once you read the judgments over the years, with the passing of time, all diligent readers will become familiar with the deficiencies which are identified by the courts in losing cases and the mandatory familiarity with the knowledge of such deficiencies will obviously influence all readers, including lawyers. Moreover, only two (2) parties appear before the Industrial Court, trade unions and employers, and either party may have had the need over the years to use lawyers if they had perceived that a ruling or a procedure at the Industrial Court may have denied them their rights on a point of law or where the Industrial Court may have exceeded its authority.

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The following are landmark judgments which had been delivered in writing by the Courts in which the said Courts had stated inferentially or pellucidly that lawyers did not fit into the labour jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago for one reason or another:

(1) Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1972, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, between Caribbean Printers Ltd. and Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers, delivered on February 27th 1975;

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(2) TD 717 of 2013 and IRO 23 of 2013 (Consolidated), in the Industrial Court, between Trinidad and Tobago National Petroleum Marketing Company Limited and Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union, delivered on November 19th 2014; and

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(3) GSD-MPD No. 003 of 2012, in the Industrial Court, between Oilfields Workers’ Trade Union and The Chief Personnel Officer, delivered on June 12th 2020. ???

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My 27 years of research in this field of Industrial Relations have also revealed to me that there are three (3) scenarios which are possible when a challenge is made out on a point of law against the Industrial Court (or even against the Minister of Labour). The following are those scenarios:

(a) Firstly, the judgment of the Industrial Court is challenged at the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago and even at the Privy Council and the ruling of the Industrial Court is overturned and remitted to the Industrial Court for a different Coram to hear the case for the first time (Trial de novo).

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(b) Secondly, the judgment of the Industrial Court which went in the favour of the union is challenged at the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago and even at the Privy Council and the ruling of the Industrial Court is upheld in favour of the union so there is no need for a trial de novo.

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(c) Thirdly, the judgment of the Industrial Court which went in the favour of the employer is challenged at the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago and even at the Privy Council and the ruling of the Industrial Court is upheld in favour of the employer so there is no need for a trial de novo.

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Understandably, the first scenario above is dreaded by the judges of the Industrial Court because under those circumstances, the judges at the Industrial Court look weak in their evaluations of certain topics which contain legalistic attributes. However, the second and third scenarios are highly desired by the judges of the Industrial Court because such rulings which uphold the judgments of the Industrial Court make the judges feel confident in the performances which culminated in the final judgment. For the purposes of this article, the one thing that is pervasive in all three (3) scenarios is that only a lawyer is empowered by Section 18 (1) and (2) of the Industrial Relations Act, Chapter 88:01, as amended, to make a challenge against the rulings of the Industrial Court, the High Court and the Court of Appeal. No other representative who may have the right to appear at the level of the Industrial Court such as a trade unionist, an industrial relations consultant and a human resources manager is empowered to make such a challenge under Section 18 unless they are lawyers authorized to practice in Trinidad and Tobago. Consequently, without the input of any lawyer which may result in a challenge to the ruling, the rulings would not benefit from any new ideas on the concepts, principles, doctrines and rules of thumb which are applied by the Industrial Court on a daily basis.

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The following are three (3) recent examples of scenario 1 in which the judgments from the Industrial Court were overturned and sent back to the Industrial Court to be heard de novo:

(1) Civil Appeal No. S363 of 2017, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between Superb Caterers Limited and All Trinidad General Workers Trade Union, delivered May 31st 2022 – Court’s application of service as equity and property was overturned due to the culpability of the worker in the instant matter;

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(2) Civil Appeal No. P295, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between The University of the West Indies and Occupational Safety and Health Authority and Agency, delivered April 5th 2023 – Court’s application of the statute of limitation was overturned; and

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(3) Privy Council Appeal No. 0043 of 2022, between The Special Tribunal (of the Industrial Court of Trinidad and Tobago) and The Estate Police Association of Trinidad and Tobago, delivered on February 29th 2024 – Court was ordered to hear the matter de novo because it has the jurisdiction to do so and its initial belief that it did not was wrong in law.

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The following are three (3) examples of scenario 2 identified above in which the judgment from the Industrial Court in favour of the unions were upheld without any issue at the higher court:

(1) Civil Appeal No. 78 of 2009, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between Eastern Commercial Lands Limited and Banking, Insurance and general Workers Union, delivered on May 18th 2010 – Principles dealing with successorship from previous judgments were deemed to be correct so the judgment from the Industrial Court was upheld.

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(2) Civil Appeal No. P332 of 2017, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between Caribbean Airlines Limited and Communication, Transport and General Workers’ Union, delivered on April 22nd 2024 – Principles dealing with successorship from previous judgments were deemed to be correct so the judgment from the Industrial Court was upheld.

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(3) Privy Council Appeal No. 0087 of 2013, between ArcelorMittal Point Lisas Limited and Steel Workers’ Union of Trinidad and Tobago, delivered on August 6th 2015 – The Company was deemed to be the true employer of the 80 aggrieved workers although they were supplied to the Company by a labour supplier contractor.

I VEHEMENTLY AND CATEGORICALLY DISAGREE WITH THE NEGATIVE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE COURTS ABOUT THE ROLE OF LAWYERS WITHIN THE LABOUR JURISDICTION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

There are six (6) main reasons why I cannot agree with the courts whenever they state that lawyers are not suited to the labour jurisdiction and the following capture these reasons:

(1) It is hypocritical to condemn the presence of lawyers when Section 4 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act, Chapter 88:01, as amended, clearly outline that the President and Vice President of the Industrial Court must be qualified lawyers and they may be assisted by qualified lawyers and other experts in industrial relations, economics and accounting.

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(2) Section 9 (2) of the Industrial Relations Act, clearly identifies that lawyers have a role to play when representation is needed by a union or a company at the Industrial Court.

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(3) Section 18 (2) of the Industrial Relations Act, clearly states that the rulings of the Industrial Court may be challenged only on points of law or where there is a belief that the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction and there are many landmark judgments within the Labour Jurisdiction today which resulted from those challenges under Section 18 of the Industrial Relations Act.

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(4) Due to the many rulings by the Industrial Court on the concept of judge, jury and executioner going against companies, it has now become mandatory for most companies to need a lawyer as a representative at the Industrial Court because all competent industrial relations representatives of the companies will have to function as witnesses after being involved with either a fact-finding investigation or an inquiry hearing on the matters which are now before the Industrial Court.

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(5) The dangerous absence of the principle of separation of powers in the hiring of judges at the Industrial Court since 1965, because a properly functioning democracy ought to ensure that the legislature, the executive and the judiciary are to remain separate in order for there to be no political interference and bias on the part of any judges. This area of bias is even more pronounced because the judges at the Industrial Court are hired by the executive of the state under fixed term contracts of service which provide no job security because they are employed at will by the executive of the state and not the judiciary. Moreover, there is no rule of law with respect to ensuring that each Coram should be reflective of a tripartite arrangement. Therefore, there are times when there are imbalances of state nominated judges, union nominated judges and employer nominated judges. ?

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(6) Due to the changing of the guards at trade unions, so to speak, many lawyers who successfully represented unions and workers in the last three (3) decades have now been hired by employers such as multinational companies, and even the state so a gap or vacuum has developed for new legal champions on behalf of workers.

EXAMPLES AND PROOF OF LANDMARK JUDGMENTS WHICH ARE TODAY OF SIGNIFICANT JUDICIAL APPLICABILITY AND THEY ALL BECAME AVAILABLE AFTER LAWYERS MADE OUT THE CASES

The following are hard proof of the tremendous input which lawyers have made to the embellishment and development of the Labour Jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago:

1.?? Civil Appeal No. 53 of 1966, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between Trinidad Bakeries Limited and National Union of Foods, Hotels, Beverages and Allied Workers and The Attorney General on behalf of Trinidad and Tobago, delivered on May 30th 1967. This judgment overturned a decision of the Industrial Court to continue to hear a trade dispute and to make an award and an order even though the evidence was known to it during the hearing that the trade dispute had been otherwise determined. This judgment also affirmed management’s prerogative to dismiss an employee providing that such a dismissal is not harsh or oppressive.?

2.?? Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1969, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between Texaco Trinidad Inc. and Oilfield Workers Trade Union, delivered on February 8th 1972. In this appeal, the statute of limitation by itself was enough to overturn the ruling of the Industrial Court. Moreover, the contradictory statements by the aggrieved under oath was also able by itself to justify the trade dispute being dismissed.

3.?? Privy Council Appeal No. 34 of 1991, between Appellants Victor P. Herde and Christopher J. Kelshall and Respondent Courtney Mahabirsingh, delivered on July 23rd 1992. The Privy Council overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago to award severance as first priority where there was a mandatory receivership taking place.? ?

4.?? Privy Council Appeal No. 37 of 1993, between the Appellant Commercial Finance Company Limited (In Liquidation) and the Respondent Indira Ramsingh-Mahabir, delivered on July 26th 1994. The Privy Council overturned the ruling of the Industrial Court which had declared that the closure of a company could attract severance because it created a redundancy situation. The Privy Council held that neither a 3rd party termination of workers nor the complete closure of a business is a redundancy situation because there are no continuing operations against which a terminated worker could be surplus.

5.?? Civil Appeal Nos. 183 and 184 of 1994 (Consolidated), in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, between the Appellants The Registration, Recognition and Certification Board and the Bank Employees Union and the Respondent The Republic Bank Limited, delivered on September 30th 1998. In this appeal of a judicial review against the decision of the Minister of Labour to refer two (2) matters to the Registration Recognition and Certification Board in order to determine worker status under the Industrial Relations Act, the Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of the High Court. In overruling the High Court, the Court of Appeal stated that the Registration Recognition and Certification Board is the only entity in Trinidad and Tobago to make such a determination on who is a worker and that such a determination will have to be based on the functions being performed by the employees at that point when the referral was made and not their job titles.???

6.?? Civil Appeal No. 247 of 1998, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between Steel Workers Union of Trinidad and Tobago and Caribbean Ispat Limited, delivered on April 30th 2001. The Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of the Industrial Court because the Industrial Court had stated that it would not accept a trade dispute referral unless the trade dispute has been physically certified as being unresolved. In its justification for this decision to overturn the ruling of the Industrial Court, the Court of Appeal stated that the doctrine of separation of powers will be violated if the Minister of Labour is permitted to prevent the referral of a trade dispute to the Industrial Court once the conciliation process at the Ministry of Labour is completed.

7.?? Court of Appeal No. 164 of 2000, in the Court of Appeal between the Appellant Marketing Distribution Ltd – Formerly Grell Taurell and the Respondent The Managers and Supervisors Association of Trinidad and Tobago, delivered on October 22nd 2004. The ruling of the Industrial Court was overturned because the Industrial Court declared that the Employer had failed to meet and treat with the Recognized Majority Union at a point in time when the recognition status of the Recognized Majority Union was being challenged at the Registration, Recognition and Certification Board. ??

8.?? Claim No. CV2013-04254, in the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, in the matter of the Judicial Review Act, Chapter 7:08, between the Claimant, ArcelorMittal Point Lisas Limited, and the Defendant, the Minister of Labour, Small and Micro Enterprise Development, delivered on January 27th 2017. In this ruling of the High Court, it was found that the Minister had breached the principles of natural justice by failing to deliver a letter to the Claimant containing critical information which deprived the Claimant an opportunity to respond to the trade union. Moreover, the High Court ruled that the Claimant cannot be blamed for the inability of the Defendant to prove its delivery of the letter to the Claimant.

9.?? Claim No. CV2016-03524, in the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, in the matter of the Judicial Review Act, Chapter 7:08, between the Claimant, Trinidad and Tobago Aviation Authority, and the Defendant, Registration, Recognition and Certification Board, delivered on February 20th 2017. In this matter the High Court decided to overturn the decision of the Defendant to certify as the recognized majority union the Public Services Association of Trinidad and Tobago on the following grounds:

? Firstly, Section 38 (4) of the Industrial Relations Act, Chapter 88:01, prevents any union from obtaining recognition status in more than one (1) essential industry; and

? Secondly, natural justice rules were violated by the defendant when it chose to use closed hearings with only one party at a time during its processing of this matter.??

10.??????????????? Civil Appeal No. P279 of 2017, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, between the Appellant, Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission and the Respondent, Oilfields Workers Trade Union, delivered on September 20th 2018. In this matter, the Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the Industrial Court in the following areas of the law:

? Firstly, the Employer cannot raise a challenge dealing with the 51 (3) statute of limitation because it never raised that challenge at the Industrial Court.

? Secondly, consultation with the worker and the union is critical when dealing with medical fitness to work.

? Thirdly, retirees are in fact workers under certain types of disputes.

? Fourthly, the Court of Appeal cannot review a decision founded on good industrial relations practice.

11.??????????????? Claim No. CV2016-01460, in the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, between the Claimant, Bisnath Maharaj (Former Director of the Strategic Services Agency) and the Defendant, the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (on behalf of the Strategic Services Agency), delivered on December 2nd 2019. This was a claim for constitutional relief. The High Court held that “The wording of the Act, though clear that termination could occur at any time, does not delve into the procedure to be followed in effecting such a termination. As the Claimant submits, it must have been the minimal intention of Parliament that the provision “terminable at any time” be construed as requiring basic procedural fairness and observance of the rules of natural justice.” Consequently, the High Court concluded that “the termination pf the Claimant in the way effected by the Defendant was unfair due to the failure to utilize a process that included natural justice.”

(12) Civil Appeal No. P411 of 2018, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, in the Matter of Judicial Review Act, No. 60 of 2000, between Strategic Services Agency (Appellant / Defendant) and Fazal Abdul Ghany (Respondent / Claimant), delivered on September 4th 2020. In this Appeal the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago that the Strategic Services Agency had failed to adhere to a two (2) stage disciplinary letter in its handling of Fazal Abdul Ghany and by doing so it legally deprived / denied itself the right to claim non-disclosure on the part of Fazal Abdul Ghany during its application of the bilateral disciplinary process.

THE JUDGE, JURY AND EXECUTIONER CONCEPT HAVE NOW MADE IT MANDATORY THAT AT LEAST SOME LAWYERS ENTER THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LANDSCAPE ON BEHALF OF COMPANIES

The wavering or vacillating approach by the Industrial Court over the years when dealing with the concept of the judge, jury and executioner, leaves a lot to be desired as I will demonstrate from extracted quotations from delivered judgments of the Industrial Court. Understandably, for me, this is the main area which needs the presence of lawyers on the side of companies because, as I write, employers are now being faulted by the Court for breaching natural justice and the principles of industrial relations practice where there is no separation of accuser and investigator.

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As long ago as January 28th 1990, in Trade Dispute 1 of 1989, in the Industrial Court between The Association of Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Staff and Caroni (1975) Limited, the Court ruled that natural justice had been denied to a worker because, amongst other things, the disciplinary proceedings failed to separate accuser from investigator and from the implementer of disciplinary action. Let us call this approach to disciplinary proceedings Paradigm 1. The following quotation from this judgment will be instructive in appreciating Paradigm 1:

“The worker alleged that his Union representatives had objected to the presence of Wotherspoon on the tribunal but that their objection had been overruled by Wotherspoon. Wotherspoon denied that the Union had so objected. In the absence of any other evidence on this matter, we make no finding of fact on this question but we find and hold that whether or not an objection had been raised by the Union to Wotherspoon’s membership on the tribunal, Wotherspoon should have disqualified himself from so sitting, since he himself had laid the charges against the worker. Having laid the charges against the worker, it was his duty to appear as a witness before the tribunal to support the charges. On the facts of this case, therefore, we find that there is much merit in the Union’s complaint that Wothrspoon (sic) acted in this instance as “prosecutor, judge, and executioner” since it was Wotherspoon who also signed the letter of dismissal to the worker. It must be remembered in this context that Wotherspoon is and was at the material time the General Manager of the Company and that the other members of the tribunal held positions in the Company subordinate to him. The impartiality of the tribunal was in the circumstances tainted by Wothrspoon (sic) appointing himself as its Chairman. This again we specifically hold to be offensive to the principles of good industrial relations practice.” ?(Emphasis by me – DPM)

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However, in stark contrast to the above quotation, a very contradictory approach to Paradigm 1 emerged in Trade Dispute No. 171 of 1998, in the Industrial Court between Oilfields Workers Trade Union and Lever Brothers (WI) Limited, delivered on February 5th 2001. For purposes of this article I will call this contradictory approach to disciplinary proceedings Paradigm 2. The following quotation from this judgment will definitely help any reader to appreciate the Court’s approach to disciplinary proceedings as called Paradigm 2. ?

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“The Union also contended that the Company did not observe the rules of natural justice when it allowed Ms Alie the Manager who made accusations against the worker to decide disciplinary action against him. We find from the evidence before us, no support for these contentions of the Union. The workplace is not a court house and the employer is not required to provide separate accusers, prosecutors and judges in dealing with each and every disciplinary matter. An employer is perfectly entitled to decide which of its officials it will vest with authority to conduct an investigation and / or take disciplinary action. The requirement of good industrial relations practice in this regard, is the duty of the employer to provide the accused employee with fair opportunity to be heard by the person or persons with whom the power to take disciplinary action resides. Mr. Scott for the Company, on this question referred us to the Judgment of this Court in Trade Dispute No. 130 of 1994 between ATASS and Caroni Ltd. in which the principle was stated thus:

“The essence of a fair opportunity to be heard involves the provision of relevant information by the employer to the employee, to enable the latter to appreciate and understand the substance of the allegations made against him and an opportunity given to the employee to reply to such allegations and to put forward any reasons in mitigation of any penalty or penalties which may be possible having regard to the nature of the allegations made against him. It is a requirement of basic fairness and justice as well as of the principles of good industrial relations practice.”?

We agree completely with this position. We find that the worker had sufficient opportunity to be heard and we do not agree that because Ms. Allie made allegations against the worker, she was not entitled to be involved in the process which decided the extent of disciplinary action that should be taken against him. Ms. Allie as Production Manager was clearly vested by the company with the authority to take disciplinary action but only after consultation with the Works Manager, the Industrial Relations Manager and the Personnel Director, all of whom were her superiors in the company’s structure, and before whom the worker had a fair opportunity to state his case. She admitted that she made reports and kept them informed throughout and reported the outcome of her meeting with the worker and his Union’s representatives to them. In fact Mr. Dillon Baptiste, the Works Manager testified that he was kept fully informed by reports from Mrs. Allie concerning the events of the 26th and 27th January, 1998. Ms. Allie’s role in the inquiry process was essentially that of witness and although she participated in formulating the decision which the company eventually took, she was by no means the main authority in making that decision. We therefore reject the Union’s contention in this regard.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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Remarkably, in the last eight (8) years (from April 2017 to the August 2024), Paradigm 1 has once again become the correct approach to conducting disciplinary proceedings and in so happening at the Industrial Court, Paradigm 2 has fallen by the wayside as that approach is now deemed to be a deficient one. In this regard the following three (3) judgments from the Industrial Court have established Paradigm 1 as the preferred approach to disciplinary proceedings:

a.?? TRADE DISPUTE NO. 379 OF 2013, in the Industrial Court between STEEL WORKERS UNION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO and SOCIETY FOR FAMILY HEALTH, delivered on April 13th 2017. The following quotation from this judgment will be instructive:

“We took special note of the fact that Ms. J. Roberts, the worker’s supervisor, signed all these letters, meaning that she would not have played a superficial role, but rather would have participated in a more indepth, critical and decision making manner throughout the disciplinary process.

Having regard to this action taken by and the role played by Ms. J. Roberts in the allegations against the worker, it is clear that she should have been a witness in the disciplinary hearing instead of being a member of the tribunal investigating the allegations. Her role relative to the allegations would have been important in proving the guilt of the worker. It has to be explained that she was the worker’s supervisor and that her approval was necessary as far as the worker’s actions were concerned. On the basis of the submission of the parties, at no time, did the worker act on his own, he always acted with the knowledge and approval of Ms. Roberts.

The evidence shows that it was Ms. J. Roberts who accused the worker of wrongdoings and so, it was incumbent on her to present evidence as a witness in support of her accusations at the disciplinary hearing and to allow the worker to rebut her evidence but this was not to be as she was a member of the tribunal conducting the disciplinary hearing into the matter. To appoint her as a member of the tribunal was clearly disadvantageous and prejudicial to the worker.

It would have been unfair and unjust for Ms. Roberts to present evidence at the hearing of the Court into the dispute. Consequently, we did not allow her to give evidence. She was the only person who could give evidence on behalf of the Employer and not being able to do so, in the circumstances, the Employer would clearly be unable to prove its case, if any, and as such, we ruled as we did.

Those procedural irregularities would have affected the evidence tendered by the Employer in unimaginable proportions and in such a manner that the continuation of the hearing in this dispute would not have assisted the Court in its deliberation and would have been irreversibly unhelpful. Those was (sic) the grounds under which the Court ruled against the tendering of the evidence of Ms. J. Roberts and ruled in favour of the worker.”

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b.?? TRADE DISPUTE NOS. 292, 293 AND 294 OF 2011, in the Industrial Court between STEEL WORKERS UNION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO and CENTRAL TRINIDAD STEEL LIMITED, delivered on June 17th 2020. The following quotation from this judgment will be instructive:

“We are appalled by the Company’s conduct in this matter where a total disregard for good industrial relations practice was displayed. The Company had its Human Resource Officer conduct the investigation, he then represented the Company at the disciplinary hearing and proceeded to dismiss the worker. This Court has delivered a plethora of judgments over the years emphasizing the critical importance of adhering to the rules of natural justice when contemplating disciplinary action.”

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c.?? TRADE DISPUTE 371 OF 2011, in the Industrial Court of Trinidad and Tobago, between OILFIELDS WORKERS’ TRADE UNION and NESTLE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO LIMITED, delivered on December 14th 2023. The following quotation from this judgment will be instructive:

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“In its Closing Submissions, the Employer submitted that its “procedure was in keeping with the collective agreement and the principles of good industrial relations.”

On the other hand, in its Closing Submissions, the Union stated that:-

“Your Honour what’s concerning about the investigation process when His. Hon Mr. Rabathaly asked the Worker if Mr. Spencer chair the investigation his response was “yes” Your Honour interestingly the company’s evidence and argument, Mr. Spencer letter 2nd September 2010 invited the Worker to a disciplinary hearing and again Mr. Spencer letter 17th September 2010 dismissing the Worker services, this action by Mr. Spencer tantamount in local palance as “Chief, Cook and Bottle Washer.” (sic)

In this regard, the Court noted that Mr. Dhanoolal had allegedly complained to Mr. M. Spencer, the Distribution Operations Manager, about the worker’s conduct and performance, Mr. N. Spencer preferred the charges against the worker, then Mr. Spencer had co-chaired the disciplinary hearing which found the worker guilty and Mr. Spencer signed the dismissal letter to the worker. (Emphasis by me - DPM)

To this end, the Court adopts the following statement in the Judgment of the Court in Trade Dispute No. 1 of 1989 between the Association of Technical Administrative and Supervisory Staff and Caroni (1975) Ltd ….

“… we find and hold that whether or not an objection had been raised by the Union to Wotherspoon’s membership of the tribunal, Wotherspoon should have disqualified himself from so sitting, since he himself had laid the charges against the worker. Having laid the charges against the worker, it was his duty to appear as a witness before the tribunal to support the charges. On the facts of this case, therefore, we find that there is much merit in the Union’s complaint that Wotherspoon acted in this instance as “prosecutor, judge, and executioner” since it was Wotherspoon who also signed the letter of dismissal to the worker. It must be remembered in this context that Wotherspoon is and was at the material time the General Manager of the Company and that the other members of the tribunal held positions in the Company subordinate to him. The impartiality of the tribunal was in the circumstances tainted by Wotherspoon appointing himself as its Chairman. This again we specifically hold to be offensive to the principles of good industrial relations practice.” (Emphasis by me - DPM)

Contrary to the Employer’s submission, it is clear and undeniable that the Employer infringed the principle of good industrial relations practice regarding the procedure.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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In view of the fact that Paradigm 1 has once again become the mainstream approach to the usage of disciplinary proceedings, employers, whether small, medium or large, have to ensure that they have in place the following mandatory levels dealing with disciplinary proceedings:

LEVEL 1: Members of staff of the Human Resources Department who could always receive complaints from line managers, line supervisors, workers and members of the public so that there is a proper record keeping on allegations which may result in disciplinary proceedings.

LEVEL 2: Access to either an internal or external expert in the principles of industrial relations practice who could function as a neutral investigator during the mandatory fact-finding investigation before there is any decision to charge any worker with any violation of any policies or any misconduct, etc, which could attract disciplinary action if the worker is deemed to be guilty.

LEVEL 3: Access to an external expert or tribunal of experts in the principles of industrial relations practice who could function on the disciplinary tribunal in a neutral manner in the event that a company has decided to charge a worker with any workplace infraction that warrants a disciplinary inquiry.

LEVEL 4: Access to an external lawyer who would be able to represent the Company beyond the disciplinary inquiry at such places as at the Ministry of Labour, at the Industrial Court, at the Registration Recognition and Certification Board, at the High Court of Justice, at the Court of Appeal and even at the Privy Council, in the event that the Company sees the need to challenge any actions or rulings which may offend its sense of justice during its processing of these types of matters. It goes without saying that lawyers operating under these circumstances ought to keep themselves well informed about the areas of law which they may need to enforce and they will almost certainly need to understand the principles of industrial relations practices by reading the routine judgments which emanate from the Industrial Court or Trinidad and Tobago as well as other sources of good industrial relations such as conventions and recommendations which are constructed and disseminated by the International Labour Organization.

THE FAILURE BY THE INDUSTRIAL COURT TO ACCEPT THAT IT IS A LEGITIMATE MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE TO USE COVERT SURVEILLANCE BEGS THE INPUTS FROM LAWYERS ON BEHALF OF COMPANIES

The proper usage of closed-circuit television surveillance needs to be treated as a right of all companies at the Industrial Court whether the footage is gathered from overt or covert cameras. This is currently another area in which the Industrial Court appears to be vacillating. While the Industrial Court of Trinidad and Tobago has not emphatically declared that it is the right of every company to use hidden cameras under special circumstances, it appears that other Courts within the United Kingdom and even within the European Union have definitely done so within the last twelve years. The following authorities are humbly submitted for your consideration:

a.?????????? SUMMERS v FAIRCLOUGH HOMES LIMITED [2012] UKSC 26.

In this matter a worker who was genuinely injured on May 13th 2003, was able to get his employer to admit liability on October 28th 2003. The value of the claim which the worker made was amounting to over ￡800,000. However, due to surveillance evidence which the Court received from the employer in 2008, the Court reduced the damages to the worker to under ￡90,000. The Court also held that the worker’s fraudulent claims whereby he exaggerated his injury could be processed as a contempt of court because the evidence from the surveillance footage as well as other medical assessments met the standard of proof for a criminal matter, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also held that it was a duty on Courts to process workers for contempt for court who make false claims in order to serve as a deterrent to others in the future.

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b.?????????? TRADE DISPUTE NO. 720 OF 2013, in the Industrial Court between STEEL WORKERS’ UNION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO and ARCELORMITTAL POINT LISAS LIMITED, delivered on December 15th 2022.

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“49.??????? The private investigator had no credible evidence to confirm that the worker was in good health and without impediments or discomfort generally. He observed the Worker on only one occasion and also, it was done surreptitiously.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

c.?????????? CASE OF LOPEZ RIBALDA AND OTHERS v SPAIN (Applications Nos. 1874 / 13 and 8567 / 13) in the GRAND CHAMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, delivered on October 17th 2019.

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“134. …, in the specific circumstances of the present case, having regard particularly to the degree of intrusion into the applicant’s privacy and to the legitimate reasons justifying the installation of the video-surveillance, the Court finds that the employment courts were able, without overstepping the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities, to take the view that the interference with the applicants’ privacy was proportionate. Thus, while it cannot accept the proposition that, generally speaking, the slightest suspicion of misappropriation or any other wrongdoing on the part of employees might justify the installation of covert video-surveillance by the employer, the existence of reasonable suspicion that serious misconduct has been committed and the extent of the losses identified in the present case may appear to constitute weighty justification. This is all the more so in a situation where the smooth functioning of a company is endangered not merely by the suspected misbehaviour of one single employee, but rather by the suspicion of concerted action by several employees, as this creates a general atmosphere of mistrust in the workplace.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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“156. …, As regards the quality of evidence, the Court notes that the applicants did not at any time dispute the authenticity or accuracy of the footage recorded by means of video-surveillance, their main complaint being based on the lack of prior information about the installation of the cameras. The domestic courts, for their part, found that the recordings presented sufficient guarantees of authenticity. Given the circumstances in which the recordings were obtained, the Court does not see any reason to question their authenticity or reliability. It thus takes the view that they constituted sound evidence which did not necessarily need to be corroborated by other material.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

EXAMPLES OF CERTAIN CONCEPTS WHICH MAKE IT MANDATORY AND A NECESSITY FOR LAWYERS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF UNIONS

There are three significant areas which emerge from time to time at the Industrial Court which beg the presence of lawyers to protect the rights of workers in Trinidad and Tobago because, given the warnings from the Privy Council and also from the Court of Appeal, separation of powers is a necessity for a democracy and for justice to prevail. Obviously, readers should never take such warnings lightly. Such warnings would never have been given if we could all take it for granted that every Coram at the Industrial Court would act perfectly using the principles of democracy while at the same time the judges of the said Industrial Court function under fixed-term contracts which are offered and renewed by the Minister of Labour as part of the Executive Arm of the State and not by the Judiciary of the State. The fear is even greater if we are referring to workers from state enterprises such as statutory bodies which fall under a line minister or the Personnel Department or both.

In Privy Council Appeals No. 007 and 0008 of 2018, between Smart (Appellant) v Director of Personnel Administration and another (Trinidad and Tobago), delivered on July 15th 2019, the Board of the Privy Council stated the following:

“LORD CARNWATH:

Introduction

1.?? This appeal concerns the legality of the process adopted by the respondent Commission in making appointments to the Judicial and Legal Service (“the Service”) as long ago as October 2013. The appellants were all legal officers employed in the Chief Solicitor’s Department (“the Department”), which is part of the Ministry of the Attorney General.

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2.?? The respondents are the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (“the Commission”) and the Director of Personnel Administration (“the Director”). The Commission is the body established under the Constitution (sections 110-111) to make appointments to offices in the Service. Under the Public Service Commission Regulations (“the Regulations”) the administration of the process of appointment by the Commission is entrusted to the Director. As this Board explained in Endell Thomas v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [1982] AC 113, 124 per Lord Diplock, the purpose of vesting powers of appointment and dismissal in an independent commission was to “insulate [them] … from political influence exercised directly upon them by the government of the day”.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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Similarly, in the earlier mentioned case of Civil Appeal No. 247 of 1998, in the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago between Steel Workers Union of Trinidad and Tobago and Caribbean Ispat Limited, delivered on April 30th 2001, the following quotation will be very instructive on the doctrine of separation of powers:

“In any civilized country which boasts of an independent judiciary and a proper system of justice, all citizens must be allowed unimpeded access to the courts, subject only to those limitations imposed to the law of the land and to rules of practice and procedure imposed by the Court to protect its process from being abused.

It is in this context that the Court should be viewed. The Court is often described as the “People’s Court”. Lay persons as well as lawyers are qualified to sit as members. Representatives of trade unions (lay persons) as well as lawyers are entitled to appear.

It can only be a blot on our system of justice that access by a trade union, should depend on the Act of a Third Party (the Minister) in order to access the Court. It is not to the point that the matter could be resolved by the trade union taking steps by way of mandamus to compel the Minister to do his duty as the Court held. Further, one could see the havoc such an approach could wreak if for instance, the particular Minister, of for that matter the executive was at odds with a particular trade union.

Indeed it may arguably be urged that any restraint in access to the Courts which depended on the fulfillment of a duty by a Minister to do something, can be said to breach the doctrine of the separation of powers. The Court is a Superior Court of Record. I make this remark only in passing since the issue was not agitated before us, but in my view it helps to show that Parliament could never have intended the certification to be mandatory before the Court could entertain jurisdiction.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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The above Court of Appeal ruling may very well have been influenced by the following quotation from the Hansard from the Lower House of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago dated June 14th 1972, when the Honourable Minister of Labour Mr. Errol Mahabir saw the need to state the following when he was trying to convince the members of the Lower House to support the Industrial Relations Bill and concurrently allay the fears of the trade union movement at that unstable point in the Country’s history:

“Mr. Speaker, in order to emphasize that the Court is an independent court free from control, directions or influences of the Executive, members of Parliament, political parties and personalities and in order to ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court is not fettered in any way by any of the provisions of the bill, an important amendment has been made to a provision which exists in the Industrial Stabilisation Act and this refers to the economic consideration which the Court was required to bear in mind when hearing disputes brought before it under that act. These economic considerations may now be advanced by the Attorney General and the Court may take his arguments into condiseration in arriving at its decision.” (Emphasis by me – DPM) ?

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Under this sub-heading of “EXAMPLES OF CERTAIN CONCEPTS WHICH MAKE IT MANDATORY AND A NECESSITY FOR LAWYERS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF UNIONS”, I am referring to the following areas:

1.?? The abolition of a job classification from the organizational structure of a company mid-way through a fixed-term contract and the procedures which should be utilized by the company in order for the abolition not to be deemed to be unfair, harsh and oppressive and not in keeping with the principles of industrial relations practice.

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2.?? The obstinate and illegal usage by companies of a termination of employment clause within the contracts of service after merely providing a period of notice or providing compensation in lieu of notice but nothing else.

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3.?? The unfair burdening of any employee who has been terminated with the obligation to prove that he sought to mitigate his losses after the termination in order for the terminated employee to be able to justify being the recipient of any type of compensatory damages and / or exemplary damages from the employer.

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With regards to No. 1 above, readers will be well served if they locate the following landmark documents:

a.?? House of Lords ruling between Polkey (Appellant) and A.E. Dayton Services Ltd (Respondents), delivered in 1988, in which the Lords concluded that the Employment Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the Employer had acted unfair with the Worker on the date of the retrenchment if it did not explore options whereby the Worker could have been placed somewhere else in the group.

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b.?? Privy Council Appeal No. 69 of 2003, between Jamaica Flour Mills Limited (Appellant) and The Industrial Disputes Tribunal (Respondent #1) and National Workers Union (Intervenor) (Respondent #2) delivered on March 23rd 2005, in which the Board of the Privy Council concluded that communication and consultation have to be applied before a retrenchment is implemented.

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With regards to No. 2 above, readers will be well served if they locate the following landmark documents:

a.?? Act No. 7 of 2012, which, in 2012, repealed the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1938 by special majorities within the Lower House and the Senate of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago, respectively.

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b.?? Privy Council Appeal No. 0106 of 2013, between University of Technology Jamaica (Appellant) v Industrial Disputes Tribunal and others (Respondents) (Jamaica), delivered on July 17th 2017. In this judgment, the Privy Council stated that the imbalance of bargaining power under the common law of wrongful dismissal has been replaced by the statutory criteria of unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom and in Jamaica whereby the statutes seek to equalize the contractual relationship between employees and employers. Furthermore, the Privy Council also stated that the common law has been humanized by the concept of equity and this is evident in the law of employment because the workers have transitioned in Jamaica from the status of a slave to the strictness of contract law and now to an accommodation between status and contract.?

c.?? Hansard from the Lower House of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago dated June 14th 1972, when the Honourable Minister of Labour Mr. Errol Mahabir stated the following when he was trying to convince the members of the Lower House to support the Industrial Relations Bill:

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“Hon. Members will note, Sir, that the provision of this Part are so designed as to ensure that the Court will be an Industrial Court in the truest sense of that expression. In fact, it will be essentially a Court of human relations. Clause 9 has been introduced to allow the Court to have wide and liberal jurisdiction to dispense social justice in accordance with the principles of equity, good conscience and good industrial relations.

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The jurisdiction will be completely divorced from the shackles of common law and legal technicalities will have no place in its proceedings.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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d.?? CLAIM NO. 2017 HCV 00659, a pursuit for judicial review IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF JAMAICA, BETWEEN Cable & Wireless Jamaica Limited (Claimant) and The Industrial Disputes Tribunal (Defendant) and Winston Sewell (Interested Party), heard on March 19th, 20th & 21st 2018 and February 14th 2020. In this ruling a number of sources from the United Kingdom were identified as critical to use when dealing with the relationship between a special legislation and a subsequent general legislation which made no mention that it intended to alter and override the previous special legislation. Accordingly, the following quotations from these UK authorities are most definitely of the same relevance within the Labour Jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago in 2024 and continuing as they were in Jamaica in 2018 and 2020:

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“[23]? It is the claimant’s contention that the IDT (Industrial Disputes Tribunal) erred in law, in having exercised jurisdiction in respect of the dispute which was referred to it, by the Minister of Labour.

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[24]?? I am of the view that in order to properly address and resolve that contention, this court must carefully consider and apply the pertinent principles of statutory interpretation.

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[25]?? Before doing so however, it ought to be noted that the ETRPA (Employment (Termination & Redundancy Payment, etc) Act 1974) was enacted in 1974, whereas the LRIDA (Labour Relations & Industrial Disputes Act 1975) was enacted in 1975 and in particular, section 11A thereof, was acted in 1978. That is the section of that Act, under which the referral to the IDT by the Minister of Labour was made.

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[26]?? I can, I think, do no better for present purposes, than quote from the Earl of Selborne LC in The Vera Cruz [1884] 10 App. Cas. 59, at 68 – ‘Now if anything be certain, it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so.’

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[27]?? In Blackpool Corporation v Starr Estate Co. Ltd. [1922] 1 AC 27, at 34, Viscount Haldane stated: ‘We are bound … to apply a rule of construction which has been repeatedly laid down and is firmly established. It is that wherever Parliament in an earlier statute has directed its attention to an individual case and has made provision for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that if in a subsequent statute the legislative lays down a general principle, that general principle is not to be taken as meant to rip up what the legislature had before provided for individually, unless an intention to do so is specially declared. A merely general rule is not enough, even though by its terms it is stated so widely that it would, taken by itself, cover special cases, of the kind I have referred to.’ See: Attorney General of Jamaica v Exeter Corpn. [1911] 1k B 1092; and Harlow v Minister of Transport [1951] 2KB 98.” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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“[31]? The Privy Council has applied this principle of, ‘generalia specialibus non derogant,’ in the case: Barker v Edger and ors. [1898] AC 748, at 754, per Ld. Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council.

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[32]?? In Garnett v Bradley [1877] 2 Ex D 349, at pp 351, Ld. Justice Bramwell, summed it up perfectly, as follows: ‘That rule [that posterior laws repeal prior ones to the contrary] is subject to qualification excellently, as it seems to me, expressed by Sir PB Maxwell in his book on the interpretation of statutes. He says, at p. 157, under the heading ‘generalia specialibus non derogant,’ ‘It is but a particular application of the general presumption against an intention to alter the law beyond the immediate scope of the statute to say that a general Act is to be construed as not repealing a particular one by mere implication. A general law does not abrogate an earlier special one. It is presumed to have only general cases in view and not particular cases, which have already been provided for by a special or local Act, or, which is the same thing, by custom. Having already given its attention to the particular subject and provided for it, the legislature is reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that special provision by a subsequent general enactment, unless it manifests that intention in explicit language.’ ” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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“[39]? I will therefore end my reasoning, by echoing the words of Sir Alfred Wills, in delivering the Privy Council’s judgment, in the case: Esquimalt Waterworks Co. v City of Victoria Corporation [1907] AC 499 at 507 – ‘To hold that a subsequent general statute, the application of which might seriously interfere with the rights granted by special legislation to the appellants and might prevent them from fulfilling statutory obligations, can have been intended to override the special legislation, would be contrary to sound and well-established principles.’ ” (Emphasis by me – DPM)

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With regards to No. 3 above, readers will be well served if they locate the following landmark documents:

a.?? Trade Dispute No. 118 of 2006, in the Industrial Court, between Communication Workers Union and Illuminat (Trinidad and Tobago) Limited, delivered on September 22nd 2011, in which the Court ruled that mitigation of losses should no longer be used by the Court when determining the quantum of damages which should be awarded because it is a remnant or residue of the common law which has been eradicated by the passing of the Industrial Relations Act, Chapter 88:01, and the modern era of the principles of industrial relations practice.

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b. Trade Dispute No. 160 of 2007, in the Industrial Court between Banking Insurance and General Workers Union and National Insurance Property Development Company Limited, delivered on December 12th 2013, in which the Coram unanimously affirmed the ruling from Trade Dispute No. 118 of 2006, as it relates to the rejection that a modern Court operating under the principles of industrial relations practice should be influenced by the common law concept of mitigation of losses.

CONCLUSION

From the information provided throughout this article, I am convinced, more than ever, that lawyers have always made an invaluable contribution to the growth and development of the Labour Jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago and they are still needed today, even more, in a global labour jurisdiction which seeks to impose foreign value systems upon regional and national labour laws without appreciating the socio-political dimension of the labour laws of the countries being impacted. Moreover, it is also pellucid that lawyers can make their contribution at times on behalf of the companies and at times on behalf of the Unions. I intentionally did not mention that lawyers are very useful when making their contribution on behalf of the state within the Labour Jurisdiction because I have taken it for granted that it is understood by all readers that the state is built upon the pillars of laws which are needed for any state to be operating on this planet.

If we can believe the genuineness of the intentions of the Minister of Labour as captured within the Hansard of June 14th 1972, then it is clear that the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago has failed the citizens of this Country up to the date of this article (August 8th 2024) because it has not completed the legislative work needed to achieve the much praised separation of powers as it relates to the eradication of executive interference, security of tenure and performance of judges from the Industrial Court. Maybe the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago (LATT) is in the best intellectual position to agitate for the completion of that legislative agenda to achieve separation of powers against the backdrop of the concept of a court which is comprised of a tripartite representation with the word tripartite using the meaning which is endorsed by the International Labour Organization. LATT will arguably be in the best position not to forget the relevance to this article in view of the judicial review ruling in CV2016-01605, in the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, in the matter of an application for judicial review pursuant to Part 56 of the Civil Proceedings Rules, 1998 (Amended) and pursuant to Section 6 of the Judicial Review Act, Chapter 7:08, between National Trade Union Centre of Trinidad and Tobago (Claimant) and The Honourable Jennifer Baptiste Primus (Minister of Labour) (Defendant) and Joint Trade Union Movement (Intervener), delivered on December 9th 2016. In this judgment, the learnt judge ordered the following:

“42. ? ?In my view, the Minister was under a duty to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice or in a fair manner to the claimant, NATUC. In the past, NATUC’s nominees were appointed. It therefore had the ability, through its nominees, to influence the plans and programmes of the Cipriani Labour College, an important institution to the labour movement. NATUC had gained an interest in these appointments being made over the time its nominees were appointed without challenge.

43.??? There was no indication by the Minister to NATUC that her thinking on which organization was most representative had changed or was changing. There were also no circumstances arising that required a change to be made. As noted before the appointments were for a fixed period.

44.??? Fairness would have required, in these circumstances, for the Minister to inform NATUC that its “most representative” status was being reviewed and as a result she was proposing to make changes to the Board. She ought then to have invited NATUC to make any representations which it wished for her consideration on this matter. This determination would have to be evidence driven. The decision has also to be approached in the right spirit that is not actuated by bias, chance or pre-disposition: See Fordham QC, Judicial Review Handbook, Sixth edition, Hart Publishing, 2012, paras 60.1.1 to 60.1.11.

45. ?? It is a different matter when there is no issue as to whether an organization is the “most representative” as was the situation before the consultations with JTUM. Where there is an issue or challenge, a proper process has to be followed to make a determination. Giving effect to a MOU between a political party and a grouping would be an irrelevant consideration in this context where there is a statutory obligation to appoint on the basis of fixed criteria.

46.??? This duty to act in accordance with natural justice and fairly was in my view breached by the Minister. Further, given the statutory framework, no occasion had arisen for the termination of the appointment of Mr. Annisette.

47.??? I now come, therefore, to the appropriate reliefs and orders. I conclude and therefore declare that the decision to terminate Mr. Annisette’s appointment was contrary to the law and therefore void. I do not conclude that the Minister was actuated by bad faith since there is insufficient evidence for me to arrive at that conclusion. I declare that the Minister acted in breach of principles of natural justice and fairness in relation to NATUC in failing to consult it about the changed status in which she viewed the organization. It is not necessary to quash the decision to terminate Mr. Annisette’s appointment since it was made unlawfully and was therefore void from the beginning. The position is as if the termination never happened. It follows therefore that Mr. Devanand Sinanan was not properly appointed to the Board in that he purported to replace Mr. Annisette. It is unnecessary to compel the Minister to appoint the Board in accordance with the provisions of the Act since the decision to terminate Mr. Annisette’s appointment was void. It is unnecessary for Mr. Johnson’s appointment to be reviewed at this stage since NATUC has accepted that he was their representative.? ??

48.??? By way of guidance, if when the term of the present Board is to expire there is an intention by the Minister to review the status of NATUC as the organization most representative of trade unions for the purposes of making appointments, then she must so inform NATUC. She must give an opportunity to make representations and to respond to the representations made by any other interested organization such as JTUM. The decision must be made using objective criteria. It must also be made fairly and reasonably taking account of relevant considerations and staying clear of irrelevant ones. These are the requirements for the performance of a public duty under the statute.” (Emphasis by me – DPM) ?

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Following the ruling in this judicial review, the Minister never challenged the decision of the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago at the Court of Appeal, therefore, for all intents and purposes, the lawyers were once again able to improve the Labour Jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago without further delay, as only their profession can. This was indeed the first case in which the Minister directly furnished the High Court with an affidavit to explain her actions. I am guessing that it has set a precedent for similar approaches by other Ministers in the future.

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END.