Latin America, OAS, and Military Coups

Although economics and politics are two faces (sides) of the same coin, I prefer to write about topics/issues that are more directly related to the economic side. However, I have decided to write this short article to dispel misunderstandings as to why the Organization of American States (OAS) - the regional institution - was compelled to take action to return President Aristide to power in Haiti.

Latin America (LATAM) had been a cradle for coups and counter coups, which I refer to as coupcoups. In my August article entitled, "The United Nations, Military Interventions, and Haiti" (https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/united-nations-military-interventions-haiti-jclaude-germain-ph-d), I stated that democratically "elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed in a bloody coup d'état and forced into exile in September 1991". As military coups had been a practice in LATAM, and the United States - an OAS Member State - had usually had no problems with coupcoups in the region for reasons beyond the scope of this article, some people wonder why the OAS re-acted differently this time.

What had changed?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, OAS decided to put an end to the practice of non-democratic governments, and to "promote and consolidate representative democracy" in the Hemisphere. In June 1991, it adopted what is called the "Santiago Accord", also known as "Santiago Commitment" to democracy. The Accord "mandated non recognition of a regime that seized power from a democratically elected government and required diplomatic action to restore the constitutional authorities". As a consequence of this Commitment to representative democracy, adopted three months before the coup against President Aristide, OAS had the obligation to take actions.

What were the actions taken?

Without going into details, it suffices to say that the OAS at first dispatched a delegation to Port-au-Prince, the capital, to negotiate an end to the crisis, but "facing intimidation from the military, the delegation retreated to Washington to lead OAS in condemning the coup and imposing hemispheric trade sanctions". The United States reinforced the OAS sanctions by putting in place its own economic embargo against Haiti.

In addition to the above sanctions against the de facto military regime, all Haiti's financial assets abroad were frozen. However, the international community allowed Aristide to use the country's assets abroad to maintain his government in exile. This decision was politically "appropriate" but economically crippling because Haiti's limited financial assets were used to support two governments, one legitimate in exile, and another led by the coup leaders in the country.

At the end, all the actions taken to force the putschists to relinquish political power failed for several reasons, including the fact that some OAS members violated the imposed hemispheric embargo. As the embargo was regional (not international), a Latin American country, for example, used its own "oil tanker under Liberian registry to deliver millions of gallons of fuel" to the military regime. (And the case was eventually transferred to the United Nations).

In sum, the OAS was not successful in resolving the democratic/political crisis under the Santiago Accord, but Haiti's case served as a test and template to subsequently deal with non-democratic actions in other LATAM countries, including Peru in 1992, Guatemala in 1993, and Paraguay in 1996.

PS. Does the United Nations Security Council owe a debt to the deceased Lt General Urano Bacellar and Brazil for averting a "massacre" under the UN flag in Haiti?

PPS. Should the concept of immunity be used in cases of rape and the spread of deadly diseases?