Kronstadt Raid August 1919

It is the perhaps worth recalling the events of this month 101 years ago when Royal Navy Coast Motor Boats (CMBs) and aircraft of the Royal Air Force made a daring raid on the great naval base of Kronstadt putting much of the Bolshevik fleet that menaced the Baltic region out of commission. It is worth looking at this raid in the broad context of the history of the Baltic region as well as in the context of general military history and military theory.??

Baltic Background

From 1815 to 1917, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were all part of the Russian Empire. These non-Russian peoples on empire’s western borders, were swept up in a rising tide of linguistic and cultural nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The outbreak of the World War in August 1914, the Baltic region immediately became a battleground between the Russian and German Empires with the fighting especially affecting Lithuania and Latvia. Tens of thousands of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian soldiers were put into Russian units, by all accounts they fought bravely.?In August 1915 Latvian politicians achieved the creation of national Latvian light-infantry units under their own officers. Using new tactics, they broke through German lines numerous times and their combat effectiveness won recognition from the international press and British and French military observers.[1]

In March 1917 the Tsarist government collapsed and Russian provisional government granted autonomous rule to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania was entirely under German occupation.?With the German Huiter offensive in summer 1917 which captured Riga and Albion Operation in October 1917 where the Germans took the strategically key Estonian islands, the Baltic region was all under German control before adequate national resistance could be organized. Operation Albion opened the maritime and land defenses of Petrograd and the ultimate political consequence was the total demoralization of the Russian Provisional government which allowed the German supported Bolsheviks to take power in Russia. [2]?Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin convinced members of the Latvian Rifle Regiments who were demoralized and embittered at the Provisional government for the disaster at Riga in September 1917 to seize public buildings in Moscow and Petrograd and install the Bolsheviks into power on 26 October 1917. Despite, the actions of Latvian Rifle Regiments in Petrograd and Moscow, the national leadership and populations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were more sympathetic Allied cause. In 1918 the national councils of all three countries declared independence and support for the Allied cause as German rule would mean continuance of the undesirable social structure and the eventual loss of national identity.

Estonia was the last of the three countries to be occupied by the Germans.?On the eve of German occupation on 24 February 1918, Estonian National Salvation Committee declared independence and authority of the national government, although the German Army occupied the country and held actual power until 11 November 1918. Their declaration of independence represented an important diplomatic move as it put Estonians in alliance with the Allied Powers, who would treat Estonia as a German-occupied country. German authorities disarmed the Estonian troops and ordered all weapons and supplies held by Estonians turned in to the occupation authorities. Estonian political leaders continued nationalist activities underground, however, and military leaders secured what arms they could into secret caches. Before the Germans occupied Tallinn—the Estonian provisional government sent out a foreign delegation to London and Paris to gain de facto recognition of their independence. The situation of Estonia and particularly, the Tallinn was quite familiar to certain elements of British officialdom.?

Submarines

The Royal Navy was very familiar with Tallinn as British submarines had operated out of Tallinn harbor 1914 – 1917 to support Imperial Russia’s naval efforts in the Baltic and strike at freighters moving iron ore from northern Sweden to Germany. After Operation Albion, the British submarine moved to Helsinki, but with the Finland declaration of independence and Germans landing troops in Finland to help so-called White Guard against in a civil conflict against Russian backed Red forces. With the Germans on the way to Finland, Lieutenant Commander Francis Newton Allen Cromie oversaw the towing of the seven submarines out of Helsinki harbor into the Gulf of Finland and their scuttling between 3 and 8 April 1918. After which the final thirty British bluejackets in Finland departed by rail for Murmansk for evacuation back to Britain.[3] Commander Cromie was killed in Petrograd in August 1918 attack by Cheka (Bolshevik Secret Police) on the British Consulate related to the so-called Lockhart Plot.

August 1918 - The Lockhart Plot?

The Lockhart Plot came out of efforts British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) headed by Captain Mansfield Cumming (Royal Navy). Cummings suggested to British Prime Minister Lloyd George that if any man could rid Russia of the Bolsheviks and keep it in the war against the Germans, it was the SIS’s Sidney Reilly. Reilly, a Ukrainian Jew originally from Odessa, was influent in Russian and German and his colorful life and career were the model for Ian Fleming’s James Bond character. Dispatched to Russia, SIS agents Reilly and George Hill began planning in early August 1918 an effort to assist an uprising by the Social Revolutionaries in Russia against Bolshevik government. Reilly had the plan convince the Latvian riflemen guarding the Kremlin to change sides and arrest Lenin and Leon Trotsky, the Bolshevik Minister of War and Marine. The hope was that with a new Social Revolutionary government Russia would re-enter or at end cooperation with Germany.??On 31 August 1918, Lenin was almost assassinated by a Social Revolutionary activist, Fanny (Dora) Kaplan who was acting independently of the plot.?Lenin was shot in the chest and the two bullets could not be removed by Kremlin doctors. The because of the assassination attempt, uprising against the Bolsheviks began prematurely, with not all the insurgent forces in place; the uprising was brutally suppressed by the Latvian riflemen and the Cheka.?Over 8,000 people were executed, the Social Revolutionaries were crushed. Bruce Lockhart the British diplomatic agent in Moscow was arrested and blamed for instigating plot.?British arrested Maxim Litvinoff the Bolshevik representative in London and a trade was arranged shortly afterwards. Reilly escaped and eventually returned to London. In the period leading up to the so-called plot, a small group of Estonians and Latvians worked with Hill’s and Reilly’s organization as couriers carrying coded messages “to and from Moscow to all points of compass…Lettish [Latvian] and Estonian couriers proved invaluable to Reilly.”[4] This had the effect increasing the reputation of the Estonians as steadfast friends to Britain, at least in the intelligence services. The Royal Navy would once again return to Tallinn in December 1918 to assist the Estonians.

With the Armistice on 11 November 1918, the Estonian national government in Tallinn could function openly again and German troops were required to evacuate the country. As the Estonians were organizing their national government and armed forces, Bolshevik Russia began to mass forces on its border and started a deluge of propaganda in preparation to attack. On 19 November 1918, members of the Estonian foreign delegation in London requested that the British government send a naval squadron into the Baltic Sea to assist the Estonians and the other Baltic countries. The British Foreign Office agreed and instructed the Admiralty to send a squadron to the region. The squadron got underway from Britain on 27 November 1918.[5]

War of Independence

On 28 November, the Red Army invaded Estonia with a total strength of 12,000 soldiers, using Jamburg and Pskov in Russia as forward bases. To repel the invasion, the Estonian government could only send about 2,000 men to the front without artillery. Estonian forces withdrew into a perimeter in western Estonia which contained the ports of P?rnu, Paldiski and the capital of Tallinn which contained the most of the country's industry and the largest port facilities. Within the defensive perimeter the Estonian government began quickly to organize and mobilize all available men and material for the defense of the country.[6] On 12 December 1918 assistance for the Estonians began to arrive, the first ships of a thirty ship British squadron arrived in Tallinn and on the next day the first British transport began to off load light machine guns, naval guns (to equip armored trains), rifles, and stocks of spare clothing. Assistance also arrived from Finland in form of artillery, rifles and twenty-five hundred volunteers.[7]

On 6 January 1919, the Estonian forces went on the offensive, making maximum use of maneuver and mobility. The Estonian Navy made amphibious landings behind Bolshevik lines and armored trains made use of their mobile firepower to smash through the enemy lines. In February 1919, the Bolsheviks massed 75,000 to 80,000 troops at Pskov for a counter offensive. Estonian forces were greatly outnumbered and the Estonian Army could field only a third of that number on their southeastern front. It was not until December 1919 that the Estonian Army could field 75,000 men in four divisions. The Bolshevik offensive faltered, and Estonian lines held. The Estonian launched a series of local counteroffensives and the fighting raged back and forth through March and April. The hub which from which Bolshevik military power emanated was Petrograd and guarding its sea approaches in the Gulf of Finland, the great fortress island and naval base of Kronstadt which according to the Times of London in 1919, “has ranked with Gibraltar and Heligoland as one the impregnable fortresses of the world.”[8] It would of great value to Britain and its allies to get human intelligence out of Petrograd on impending military operations, the supply situation and political conditions.?

The Secret Intelligence Service and Coastal Motor Boats

The SIS had been unable to get any human intelligence of Russia since the beginning of February 1919, every courier or agent whom they sent had failed to get through or was captured and shot. There was a network in place, just no practical way to communicate with them. Captain Cummings, head of the SIS, asked Lieutenant Commander Augustus W.S. Agar a Royal Navy expert on the new Coastal Motor Boats (CMBs) to come up with a plan to infiltrate agents into the Petrograd by water on the Gulf of Finland. The CMBs built by Thornycroft were a revolutionary new naval vessel?- the 40-foot, 5-ton, the CMB had a crew of three and could do 40 knots (45 MPH) and was armed with 18-inch torpedo and two Lewis machine guns. The torpedo was dropped from a trough on the stern of the craft and the CMB would then turn hard over and get out of its path.

Photo: Coastal Motor Boat

Lieutenant Commander Agar came up with a plan using CMBs and was put in charge of it, being attached from the Royal Navy to the SIS.?In early May 1919, he set out from Great Britain with two CMBs and six volunteers from the Royal Navy. The party was divided into two travelling on separate cargo vessels to Sweden and then to Finland. One party went under the cover of British yachtsmen and the other as commercial agents, motorboat salesmen, in order not to attract attention.

Photo: Lieutenant Commander Agar (Imperial War Museum)

On arrival off Helsinki the freighters were met by a British destroyer which towed the offloaded CMBs to Biorko Sound to the east on the Finnish coast arriving on 8 June 1919 and the crews of the CMBs spent the next two days their boats for service. On 11 June 1919, the CMBs move further east to a small inlet at Terrioki. Terrioki was largely deserted except for local Finnish forces protecting the border region. The Reds had been defeated in Finland, but Finns were still facing a very hostile Russia on a long frontier. Despite, earlier pro-German sentiment in Finland, the Finns were glad to see the British they were anti-Russian and were helping the Finns’ Finno-Ugric kinsmen against the “cultureless” eastern hordes. Terrioki was actually a locale formerly favored Russian high society, as it was near Petrograd, it was the location of a former Russian yacht club. Lieutenant Commander Agar’s unit set up a small base in the disused wooden buildings of the yacht club.[9] There were also experienced Finnish smugglers in the area which the SIS could contract. Smuggling would soon become a lucrative business as prohibition was being enacted in Finland and suddenly much of the population wanted Estonian vodka. However, Agar generally wanted the operational security of using his own CMBs.

Photo: Base at Terrioki (Imperial War Museum)

Lieutenant Commander Agar’s operational plans were to have the CMBs cross the line of naval fortifications centered on Kronstadt protecting Petrograd shortly after midnight at slow speed. Once through, to push on at full speed to the mouth of the Neva River which flows through Petrograd, where speed would be reduced again until arriving at the pre-arranged spot near Kegostrov along the river. The rendezvous was changed from time to time for security. The CMBs carried a torpedo as well as a small rowing “pram” on board, which was launched to picking up an agent or taking one ashore. The return journey was made during early morning daylight hours under the Bolshevik flag and a special pennant flown only by Commissars. After passing the forts, CMBs headed towards Tolboukin Lighthouse off Kronstadt and when out of sight they turned and head north to Terrioki. Agar’s men made some thirteen trips into Petrograd, only twice were they challenged and came under fire. These efforts supplied Admiral Walter Cowan, Commander of the British Baltic Squadron with “correct and reliable information from inside Petrograd.”[10]

Paul Dukes

Controlling the network of agents was the SIS’s Paul Dukes, a former concert pianist who was influent in Russian. As according the Agar,

This man for a year and a half had carried his life in his hands, sometimes as a workman or a soldier, even as commissar, without any status or possible reward except the knowledge that he was serving the interests of his country and the Allies.[11]

Dukes was a master of disguise, the Cheka enforced brutal forms of control on the population, day to day survival was difficult. All food supply was in hands of the Bolshevik government.

Photo: Sir Paul Dukes

?For substance people in Petrograd secretly conducted “curbstone markets” at night. Hyperinflation struck and a million paper rubles became worth the equivalent of eight US cents at the time.[12] However, this facilitated intelligence work as gold rubles could easily buy information and purchased free movement.

Kransnaja Gorka and the Sinking of the Oleg

Harsh discipline inflicted by the Cheka, lack of food and inadequate medical care had its effect the morale of Bolshevik troops in the Baltic region. As a local correspondent of the Times of London pointed out, “It is the Bolshevist nature to rely upon machine guns; they serve in lieu of police, of political argument, and of persuasion.”[13] The Bolshevik High Command was also diverting more resources to the south to fight the Ukrainians and White Russian armies.?For the Estonians, May 1919 was an opportune time for an offensive to move enemy forces away from Estonian borders.

?The Russian Northern Corps which was subordinate to Estonian Army command structure would play a major role in the planned offensive as the Allied powers desperately wanted Petrograd captured by anti-Communist Russian forces. The Northern Corps was to attack from the Narva toward Jamburg, with the Estonians conducting amphibious landings east of Narva from the Baltic Sea. In the south, the capture of the road and rail hub of Pskov (Pihkva) was largely to be an Estonian operation with some participation of the Northern Corps. Estonian forces would also to drive toward Aluksne and Valmiera in Latvia. The offensive began on 13 May 1919, with the Northern Corps capturing Popkova Gora, Russia, where the headquarters of the 6th Red Division was located. From Tallinn, an Estonian naval force with a landing detachment got underway on the same night. The landing detachment consisted of 200 troops of the Estonian Navy’s Marine Assault Battalion and 400 from the Estonian Army’s Ingrian Battalion. The Ingrians, a Finno-Ugric people related to the Estonians and Finns, inhabited Ingria the area between Narva and Petrograd were also fighting for their self-determination.?Ingria had a population of about 100,000 and the Ingrian battalion would grow to the size of a regiment as more of the population joined its ranks. The detachment landed on 15 May 1919 on the Luuga River estuary and on 16 May at Koporje Bay. The Estonians suffered two wounded but no fatalities. The landings threw the Bolsheviks off balance, collapsing their front lines along the Gulf of Finland.[14]

In the south, the Estonians launched the assault against the important lakeside rail and road hub of Pskov on the night of the 23 May 1919 as a joint army–navy operation. Infantry forces of the 2d Division supported by armored train assault troops were joined in the operation the Lake Peipsi fleet of the Estonian Navy, including gunboats Vanemuine, Tartu, and Ahti, which supported the land forces with naval gunfire. The Peipsi fleet made amphibious landings at various key points with its small marine detachment. Bolshevik forces collapsed, and on 26 May, the Estonians occupied Pskov.[15]

With the taking of Pskov on 26 May 1919, the Northern Corps was now operating outside of Estonia, in accordance with an earlier agreement signed between the Estonian Commander-in-Chief Johan Laidoner and General Aleksander Rodzjanko, the Northern Corps was taken out of the Estonian command structure. The Northern Corps was reorganized as the Northwestern Army with purpose of fighting Bolshevism in Russia. Command went form General Aleksander Rodzjanko to General Nikolai Yudenitch. The Allied powers hoped to have the Northwestern Army capture Petrograd, but it would take some time to build the force up and equip it. Believing that Northwestern Army would soon take up offensive against Petrograd and the continuously worsening conditions, the garrison in the fortress of Krasnaja Gorka rose up believing relief would soon be at hand. The Ingrians also rose up in the areas that were controlled by the Bolsheviks with hopes of national independence or autonomous rule. The fortresses of Seraja Losad and Obruchev also rose up. Neklyoudov, the leader of the revolt in Krasnaja Gorka also tried to persuade the naval personnel of Kronstadt to join in the mutiny but was unsuccessful. It did cause a considerable of confusion and panic for the Bolshevik commissars on Kronstadt. On 13 June 1919 at 1500 Neklyudov opened fire from Krasnaja Gorka’s twelve-inch batteries across the straits on Kronstadt naval base. From the harbor of the Kronstadt, warships at anchor, the battleships the Petropavlovsk and the Andrei Pervozvanni, and the cruiser Oleg could not effectively hit the positions at Krasnaja Gorka. On 14 June 1919, the battleships, the cruiser Oleg, the destroyers Gavriil, Svoboda, Vsadnik and Gaidamak got underway and threw some 1,633 into the rebel positions. The Ingrian battalion advanced from Koporje Bay towards Krasnaya Gorka supported by a Finnish Naval vessel. The Ingrians took control of the positions at Krasnaja Gorka but really did not want anything to do with the Russians – rebels or Communists alike.[16] They would need active support and reinforcement from the Estonians if the Ingrians were going to hold Kransnaja Gorka.

For the Estonians, a new menace developed to their south. Some 30,000 German troops threatened southern Estonia. These German forces, the Landeswehr and the Iron Division, under General Rüdiger von der Goltz helped liberate Riga but did pursue the Bolsheviks to the east, instead they moved north from Riga and attacked Estonian Armored Train Nr. 2 south of the Latvian town of Cesis on 5 June 1919. The Germans continued to advance on Cesis and attacked the Estonian – Latvian forces holding the town, after three days of fighting, the Germans took control of the town. The Allied military missions pressured the Estonians and Germans to sign an armistice on 10 June and to enter negotiations.[17]?During the next nine days, the Germans and Estonians concentrated forces in the area while a fruitless series of series of talks took place. On 19 June, the Germans attacked and fighting raged for three days in the vicinity of Cesis. On 23 June, the Estonians launched a counteroffensive, using all units of the Estonian 3rd Division simultaneously. Most of the resources of the Estonian Navy were drawn to the Gulf of Riga to support the 3rd Division’s operations against German forces in the vicinity of Riga. Hence the Estonians were pre-occupied in the south.[18]?

While the Estonians were pre-occupied in the south, the Ingrians withdrew from the vicinity of Krasnaja Gorka as further assistance from the Estonians or Finns was not available at the time. Commander Agar, however, wanted to assist the Russians forces in Kransnaja Gorka. Agar sent a courier to the Finnish city of Viburii (Viborg) to the British Consul asking him to cable London for permission to attack the bombarding ships. The reply as according to Agar had a:

disappointing result that permission was withheld. The terms of the telegram however, did not definitely forbid me attacking, the actual wording that was “that I was to confine myself to intelligence work only.” In view of this I felt that I had been given a certain degree of latitude, as I was on the spot and best able to judge.”[19]?

Within time in which the reply to the cable came, Agar had already landed one agent in Petrograd and he made the decision given the feedback he received that he was at liberty to make an attack. On the 15 June 1919, an agent was extracted from Petrograd in the early morning. At 2300, that night he set out with one CMB to make an attempt on one of the battleships. However, the propeller of the CMB hit an obstruction halfway across the Gulf of Finland and the boat had to return to Terrioki at diminished speed. Also, on 15 June 1919, the destroyer Gaidamak landed troops near the fortress allowing the Bolsheviks to attack the fortress from two sides. On the next day, the battleships returned to Kronstadt to replenish with ammunition leaving the Oleg and the destroyers to continue the bombardment. Lieutenant Commander Agar at 2300 on the night of 17 June 1919, with six men in two CMBs set out from Terrioki to sink the Oleg. Although one CMB had to turn back with engine failure, at three minutes past midnight, Agar commanding CMB No. 4 slipped between three destroyers in the dark and got within 900 meters of the Oleg and launched the torpedo. The torpedo struck the Oleg’s engine room, "there was a brilliant flash which lit up the entire night sky as a column of thick smoke began to billow out behind the Oleg's foremost funnel. Her sirens wailed as she immediately began to keel over."[20] Panic reigned aboard the stricken cruiser as no one listened to the orders of ship’s commander N. Milashevich to attempt to save the vessel. The Bolshevik destroyers were uncertain what had happened started firing wildly in all directions.

Photo: the Oleg Torpedoed

CMB No. 4 made its escape, with the Bolshevik command receiving only a report of a large wake in the Gulf of Finland. As the Oleg disappeared under the surface the destroyers Gaidamak and Vsadnik plucked survivors out of the water. Of the 565 men aboard only forty went down with the Oleg.?As the presence of the CMBs were a closely guarded secret at the time, Admiral Cowan put out disinformation that the Oleg was torpedoed by a submarine and alternatively struck a floating mine.[21]

The sinking of Oleg perhaps came too late to help the forces in Kransnaja Gorka, five hours after the Oleg was torpedoed, the fortress surrendered having given up all of hope of relief from the land or sea. As according to Lieutenant Commander Agar,

The gallant defenders were huddled into two gun pits and shot down by the Bolsheviks in the most brutal manner as a less to the others. Had they known that relief had already arrived, and no further bombardments could be expected from Kronstadt men-o’-war perhaps a different story might have been told. For with the fortress, commanding as it does the entrance to the Petrograd Gulf, in our possession, the whole strategic situation would have been recast in an entirely different mould.[22]

While the situation at Kransnaja Gorka was lost for the British despite the destruction of the Oleg, from Seraja Losad, the Russian guardship Kitovoi made its way towards Biorko to surrender to the Royal Navy. The captain of the vessel, Moisseyev, supplied the Royal Navy with the latest Bolshevik codes and ciphers.[23] Other outcome of the attack, was that it proved the effectiveness of a CMB against a capital ship. As operations continued more CMBs were on the way to the Baltic from Great Britain.

The Kronstadt Raid

As the Royal Navy’s operations continued in the Gulf of Finland, to the south, in the Gulf of Riga, the Estonian had effectively dealt with their German threat for the time being. The Royal Navy was still outmatched in the Baltic if it came to all out encounter with the Bolshevik fleet. The Royal Navy had three light cruisers, eight destroyers, and five submarines. Added to this were Estonian Navy’s two destroyers and one gunboat. The operational Bolshevik fleet had two battleships, two cruisers, six destroyers, four submarines and three gunboats.[24] However, reinforcement was on its way from Great Britain.?On 14 July 1919, the aircraft carrier HMS Vindictive arrived in Biorko, the carrier had been in Tallinn where it had some problems on 6 July 1919 as it ran aground. The HMS Vindictive carried twelve aircraft, Grain Griffins, Sopwith Camels, Sopwith 1 ? Strutters and Short 184 seaplanes.

Photo: HMS Vindictive

At Biorko Sound the British put up anti-submarine nets, set up observation posts and built an airfield and a seaplane station for the Short 184s. While HMS Vindictive carried the aircraft, air operations and the aircraft themselves were under the newly established Royal Air Force (RAF) which the naval air service had become a part. Under the command of RAF Squadron Leader David G. Donald, they started reconnaissance flights of Kronstadt on 26 July 1919 to disclose the position of Bolshevik ships. Biorko Sound was some 40 miles or 64 kilometers from Kronstadt[25] The Royal Navy at Biorko Sound was further reinforced with the arrival of seven more CMBs 30 July 1919 which had made a 1,400-mile journey for Sheerness to Finland towed by destroyers. An eighth CMB sank in a gale in the North Sea. Within 48-hours after arriving at Biorko, all seven CMB were fully operational, being put under the direct command of Commander C.C. Dobson who had accompanied the boats from Great Britain.[26]?

Photo: Short Type 184

With this build-up of capabilities, Admiral Cowan wanted to take action. He was an inheritor of the offensive spirit of the Royal Navy of Drake and Nielson. Cowan wanted to the secure the sea flanks of the Estonians and Finns and as according to overall Allied policy support to the advance of Yudenitch’s Northwest Army on Petrograd. Furthermore, the British government wanted to withdraw the bulk of the Baltic squadron back to British waters as quickly as it was practically possible. Lieutenant Commander Agar framed the situation in late summer 1919 this way, “How could we at this juncture possibly with withdraw without first obtaining for those people the sea security they asked for? The only way to achieve this was to neutralize or destroy the Bolshevik fleet.”[27]

Photo: Kronstadt Harbor (Imperial War Museum)

Hence, in the first days of August 1919, the joint staff at Biorko started to plan a surprise attack on the heavily fortified and naturally protected principal Bolshevik naval base of Kronstadt. One of the many difficulties the British faced was the problem of getting over a boom consisting of submerged palisades and so constructed as close the approaches to the island fortress even to light vessels. However, the British noticed that, with the wind coming from a westerly direction, the water was forced up into the narrow Bay of Petrograd, thus creating an artificial “high tide.” Under such conditions the extra depth of water would enable CMBs to cross the barrier without risk. Therefore, it was necessary to choose a day when such conditions prevailed.[28]?The attack on Kronstadt took place on such a dark early morning on 18 August 1919. The harbor consisted of several breakwaters built out from the island on which the fortress was situated. The large Bolshevik ships were tied alongside the moles in the so-called Middle Harbor. Thanks to their daily reconnaissance flights over Kronstadt and their efficient intelligence services, the British knew thoroughly all details of the harbor and fortress. Reportedly, SIS agent Paul Dukes received details of the defense system of Kronstadt from a Russian naval officer V.V. Diederichs for 100,000 gold rubles.?All available RAF aircraft were to be sent to attack the fortress and harbor with 100-pound bombs and?machine -gun fire and concentrate their attack was focus on searchlights, oil tanks, and workshops thus creating a diversion; while eight CMBs under Dobson and Agar would attack the ships in the Middle Harbor - CMB No. 1 was to gun cotton hose the boom if necessary and attack the Submarine Tender Pamiaty Azova, No. 2 the battleship Andrei Pervosvanni, No. 3 the cruiser Rurik, No.4 the battleship Petropavlosk, No. 5 the dry dock, No. 6 the same objective as No. 2 and No. 4, No. 7 watch the eastern harbor where the destroyers were moored and to attack if any tried to get underway, and No. 8 attack the destroyer guardship Graviel, off the harbor entrance. The attack was to be a 0100 as daylight would come at 0230.[29]?

The CMBs arrived at the rendezvous point outside Kronstadt on schedule and the RAF began their air raid. As with any good maneuverist operation, the British generated confusion for their Bolshevik enemies while thriving in it, as according to a newspaper account provided shortly after the attack,

At the first instance the attacking force was unperceived owing to the preoccupation of the Bolshevists with the air raid, which was timed to start just five minutes before the ships were due to enter the harbour. But few instants later fire was opened upon them from every side…The Middle Harbour was a inferno of confusion, torn by the fierce white wakes of torpedoes, churned by machine-gun bullets, illuminated by the flash of explosions and the flicker of gun fire, yet through it and across it objectives were pursued and attained.[30]

Photo: Kronstadt Raid

Heavy explosions heralded the success of the of the British operation. However, this success created a dangerous situation for CMBs because they had to exit the harbor the same way they came. The now flaming Pamyaty Azova with its exploding stores illuminated the harbor. Searchlights now dazzled the escaping CMBs, the RAF Short 184s strafed the searchlight positions in order to help the small boats make their escape.

Photo: Kronstadt Raid

The raid was quickly over, but Kronstadt remained in state of pandemonium for many hours as fires burned, ordnance exploded, and fear of a second wave gripped Bolshevik naval personnel.?The Pamyaty Azova rolled and sank almost immediately, while the backbone of the Bolshevik fleet, the Andrei Pervozvanni and the Petropavlovsk were heavily damaged, they sank in shallow waters and were repaired only in 1921. Bolshevik naval capabilities were seriously eroded after the raid. However, the raid, did come at a cost for the Royal Navy, three CMBs destroyed, eight killed and nine captured.

Photo: Pamyaty Azova

The Bolsheviks lost some 50,000 tons of shipping versus a Royal Navy loss of 15 tons. Bolshevik casualties most likely ran into the hundreds. While it was a great operational success from Admiral Cowan’s standpoint, but not everyone in the British Cabinet were delighted over his success. Despite openly disavowing the Bolsheviks the British government had been secretly negotiating with them and the sinking of the Bolshevik fleet was the last thing they desired.[31] The raid also made infiltration and extrication of agents more difficult as the Bolsheviks were on the lookout for the CMBs and other small vessels, Paul Dukes would have to make his departure from Russia overland passing between Bolshevik and Latvian frontlines in the Lake Luban area.[32]

Final Operations

The last operations for the CMBs came on 10 October 1919 as the Northwest Army launched a major offensive from Jamburg due east of Narva toward Petrograd. Estonian carried out an amphibious operation as part of this offensive. The operation was planned for the landing of 1,600 troops and four artillery pieces at Kaporje Bay, where they moved against Bolshevik positions at Krasnaja Gorka. Unlike previous Estonian amphibious it was a combined operation with the British. Though the stated purpose was to support the offensive of the Russian Northwest Army, the actual secret reason was to have a position from where the Baltic fleet at Kronstadt could be destroyed so it could not be used by Russians red or white against Estonian or British interests.[33] Commander of the Estonian Navy, Johan Pitka was in overall command of the Estonian landing operations, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Parts, commander of the Estonian Armored Train Division, commanded the landing force comprised of troops from different Estonian units and the Ingrian Regiment. The British Baltic squadron provided naval gunfire support, notably from the monitor HMS Erebus with its 15-inch guns. Roaming CMBs kept Bolshevik vessels wary from leaving Kronstadt. In addition to the CMBs and the HMS Erebus, British support of the landing operation also included cruisers, destroyers and RAF Short Type 184 seaplanes.[34] The Estonian destroyers Vambola and Lennuk were the primary Estonian vessels in the operation as well as the steamer Baltonia serving as a transport. The hope was to take Krasnaja Gorka rapidly with the element of surprise.?The landing took place on 13–14 October 1919, at Kaporje Bay with the Estonians achieving initial shock as Bolshevik forces provided no opposition. The Estonians advanced quickly, outdistancing the covering fire of the British squadron. However, at Krasnaja Gorka, the landing force met with stiff opposition from 3,000 troops with twelve guns in well-fortified positions. The Estonians landed reinforcements, increasing the size of the landing force to 2,200 troops, but even with additional forces they were not able to achieve a breakthrough. The Estonians nor the British could commit any further resources to the operation at the time.

Photo: Krasnaja Gorka Operation (Estonian National Archives)

As the operation was taking place, another crisis developed for the Estonians to their south which also involved the British. General von der Goltz built up a white Russian force under the nominal leadership of Prince Pavel Rafalovich Bermondt-Avalov, a shady Caucasian adventurer who was formerly a choir master in the Tsarist army.[35] Formally designed the Western Volunteer Army, the Bermondt-Avalov forces consisted of former Russian prisoners of war in Germany and German volunteers who were given Russian naturalization papers. The stated purpose of this force was to fight the Bolsheviks in order not to arouse the objections of the Allied powers. The Western Volunteer Army built up to some 20,000 men and on 8 October, it attacked the Latvian army. Within two days, the Russian—German forces occupied the suburbs of Riga, south of the Daugava River. The Estonians immediately rushed two armored trains to Riga assist the Latvian army. Armored trains Nr. 2 and Nr. 5 arrived from Valga in Riga at 0300 on 10 October 1919.?

Photo: Estonian Armored Train Nr. 2 in Riga 10 October 1919 (Estonian National Archives)

The British also sent part of the Baltic squadron to help with the situation at Riga. With the support of the armored trains, as well as naval fire support and landing parties from British and French warships, the Latvians halted the advance of the Bermondt-Avalov forces. On 3 November, the Latvian army went on counter offensive and forced the Bermondt— Avalov army to retreat into Kurzeme and Zemgale. The Latvian offensive was supported from the sea by Royal Navy’s cruiser HMS Dragon, four destroyers and four smaller French vessels. On 21 November 1919 the Latvians and Lithuanians took coordinated action with the Latvian Army launching an offensive in Zemgale and Kurzeme and the Lithuanian Army against key Lithuanian railway center of Radvili?kis which was held by the Western Volunteer Army. The combined action drove the Bermondt – Avalov forces out of Latvia and Lithuania into East Prussia.[36] From Lieutenant Commander Agar’s perspective, the Bermondt – Avalov episode had detrimental effect on the British – Estonian combined operations against Krasnaja Gorka as the combined forces could not commit any further men or materiel due to the German threat in the south.[37]

However, during the Krasnaja Gorka landing operations the British and Estonians inflicted significant naval losses on the Bolsheviks, but this time it was not by the CMBs. On the morning of 21 October 1919, three Bolshevik destroyers Gavriil, Konstantin, and Svaboda sortied from Kronstadt and attempted to attack the amphibious group but ran into the defensive minefield that the British and Estonians had laid. All three vessels struck mines and went down with nearly all hands lost. Ultimately, the landing force was not able to break through and take Krasnaja Gorka. With the failure of the Northwest Army’s offensive and after consultation with the British military mission group and Admiral Cowan, commander of the British Baltic Squadron, Estonian commanders Pitka and Laidoner agreed to reembark the landing force from 2–9 November 1919. The operation cost the Estonians 41 dead and 278 wounded.[38]?

Peace Negotiations

The failure of the Northwest Army to take Petrograd dashed Allied hopes of overthrowing the Bolshevik government. The Allied governments now accepted the Estonian desire to enter peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were also anxious to end the war as well, although on their own terms. The Estonian and Bolshevik governments agreed to open peace talks at Tartu, Estonia, on 5 December 1919. Lieutenant Commander Agar had one more task before his duties in the Baltic region ended, he secretly attended the peace talks in Tartu as the representative of Admiral Cowan. The Admiralty had given Cowan much a free hand in making policy in the Baltic and the Estonians and Finns trusted him because they knew that he was working for their national independence and would support him in every action. Dealings with the White Russians were left up to the British Military Mission under General Hubert Gough. The other Allied powers, particularly the United States and to lesser degree France wanted the Russian Empire restored as much as possible. The official public policy of the British Foreign Office was to support the white Russian forces. However, as according to Agar, “Walter Cowan always favored initiative and originality. His career had been spent that way by seeing and doing things himself.”[39]?

Photo: Sir Admiral Walter H. Cowan (Imperial War Museum)

Agar had two objectives at the conference, secure the release of the British prisoners taken at Kronstadt and the ensure with pressure of the Royal Navy that Estonians receive fair and reasonable terms in the peace treaty. The leverage was simple, if the Bolsheviks wanted to continue fighting the Royal Navy would destroy everything with a red flag that floated in the Gulf of Finland once navigation season opened again in spring 1920. That was the stick, the carrot was that if the Bolsheviks agreed to a fair peace, the Royal Navy would clear a channel of mines, trade could resume on the Baltic and food ships could reach Petrograd. The Bolsheviks saw they had to make peace but wanted to gain as much leverage on the Estonians as possible and thus the fighting continued unabated during the talks as the Bolshevik political leadership commanded their army to occupy strategic border city on the Gulf of Finland, Narva, at any cost. These attacks were repeatedly repulsed with heavy losses. On 30 December 1919, the commander of the 7th Red Army reported to the Bolshevik High Command that their units could no longer continue offensive action. This failure and the influence of British seapower made things clear for the Bolshevik government. On the following day, the Bolshevik peace delegation agreed to an armistice ending the fighting. The armistice came into effect on 3 January 1920 and the final peace treaty was signed between Estonia and Bolshevik Russia on 2 February 1920.[40] The overall peace agreement was a quite favorable to the Estonians. As according to Agar, “the pressure of the Fleet in the Gulf of Finland served the useful purpose of obtaining for our friends and allies, the reasonable peace terms they so ardently desired. My official mission was over, and the Bolshevik delegates were under no illusions as to the intentions of the British Admiral.”[41] The Bolshevik soon after released the Royal Navy prisoners which were being held at a monastery outside of Moscow.

Conclusions?

Lieutenant Commander Agar later suggested that the operational lessons learnt from the naval operations in the Gulf of Finland and, in particular, the Raid on Kronstadt, were as follows:

(1)???The need for a clear-cut policy in war from the Higher Command at home

(2)???The value of the “Offensive Spirit” coupled with “Surprise” and the whole based on reliable “Intelligence”

(3)???The value of good co-operation between the different fighting Services[42]

The CMB operations, in particular, were much in line with later concepts of special operations - a small force was tactically employed at critical point to have a greater operational and strategic effect. The initiative and freedom action within the commander’s intent of operations also made the Royal Navy an effective and influential force in the Baltic – in more modern terminology, the practice of mission command. This command philosophy allowed the British to effectively practice maneuver warfare such as taking unexpected actions and generating chaos and confusion for the enemy while operating successful in it, the raid on Kronstadt was a clear example of this.?Although, this command approach did generate some self-imposed friction as operational actions and strategic policy were not always effectively coordinated. It is also significant that the importance of effective joint operations was clearly recognized. Other large armed forces were slower to learn this lesson, politicians had to force appreciation of joint operations on senior US military officers with Goldwater – Nichols Act in the late year of 1986. Looking back, the bravery, fighting spirit and sacrifice of the Royal Navy is something that the Baltic peoples are eternally grateful for, as Commander Agar, reflected on the events of 1918 – 1920 in the Baltic region in 1928,

?Of the Allied nations, the United States refused to have anything to do with the Baltic States, except as regards relief commissions. France and Italy were too engrossed at Versailles over their own frontier delimitations. Britain alone listened and came to their help. And this will always be remembered to our lasting honour.[43]

[1] Edgar Anderson, “The Role of the Latvian Riflemen During the Russian Civil War,” Strenlnieks.34 – 35 (1974): 7 – 10, Arthur Tupin, “The Lettish Regiments,” The New Europe (19 September 1918): 228 – 230

[2] G. Von Koblinski, “The Conquest of the Baltic Islands.” Naval Institute Proceedings. (July 1932):?984

[3] Donlad Macintyre, “A Forgotten Campaign – IV Forlorn Hope,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. (1 November 1961): 559

[4] Robin Bruce Lockhart. Reilly: Ace of Spies (New York: Penguin Books. 1984) 90 - 91

[5] Estonian War of Independence, 1918–1920: Reprint of a Summary of prepared in 1938–1939 (New York. Eesti Vabadusv?itlejate Litt., 1968), 11–13; O. Toomara, “British Squadron to Tallinn: Its Gallant Record during the War of Liberation,” Baltic Times, 19 December 1938, 4; and Evald Uustalu, The History of the Estonian People (London: Boreas Publishing, 1952), 155–61.

[6] United Kingdom National Archives Admiralty (hereafter cited as ADM 116 1864) “Memorandum giving a narrative of events in the Baltic States for the time of the Armistice, November 1918 up to August 1919,” Estonian War of Independence, 1918 – 1920., 15 -16, Robert Hale. The Baltic Provinces: Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office. 1919): 14, Evald Uustalu. The History of the Estonian People. (London, Boreas Publishing Company. Ltd, 1952): 163- 166

[7] United Kingdom National Archives Foreign Office (hereafter cited as FO) 608 267 Jan 25 1919 “Supply of Madsen Machine Guns to Esthonians,” ADM 116 1864 “Memorandum giving a narrative of events in the Baltic States for the time of the Armistice, November 1918 up to August 1919.”?Estonian War of Independence, 1918 – 1920: 21, Hale. The Baltic Provinces: Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania., 14, Paravane, [pseudonym] “With the Baltic Squadron, 1918- 1920,” Fortnightly Review. (2 May 1920): 707

[8] The Kronstadt Raid,” The Times of London (5 September 1919): 14

[9] A.W.S. Agar, Naval Operations in the Baltic,” The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (November 1928): 669 - 670

[10] Ibid: 670

[11] Ibid.

[12] “Secret Agent’s Work in Russia as told by Sir Paul Dukes,” The Chicago Daily Tribune (2 February 1923): 23

[13] “The Kronstadt Raid,” 14

[14]Jaan Maide, ülevaade Eesti Vabaduss?dast 1918–1920 [Overview of the Estonian War of Independence 1918–1920] (Tallinn, Estonia: Kaitseliidu Kirjastus, 1933): 277; and Arto Oll, “Meremehed Rindel: Meredessantpataljon Eesti Vabaduss?jas [Sailors’ Front: The Marine Assault Battalion in the War of Independence], Acta Historica Tallinnensia, no. 18 (2012): 66.

[15] Maide, ülevaade Eesti Vabaduss?dast 1918–1920, 290.

[16] Edgar Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” Journal of Central European Affairs 22 (April 1962): 61

[17]??United Kingdom National Archives FO 608/191 “Military activity on the front of the Esthonian Republic for the Period of 3rd – 10th June 1919.?Laiaroopaline Soomusrong N2 Eesti Vabaduss?jas [Broad-gauge Armored Train N2 in the Estonian Independence War]. (Stockholm. LR Soomusrong N2 Soprusuning Rootsis, 1959.): 13, “Esthonian Advance,” Times of London?(26 June 1919): 14

[18] “Caledon at Libau 30th June 1919 Report on the Situation in Latvia,”, ADM 116, 1864, United Kingdom National Archives, Kews, Eesti Vabaduss?da, 1918–1920, vol. II, [The Estonian War of Independence] (Tallinn, Estonia: Vabaduss?ja Ajaloo Komitee, 1939): 178–87, Johan Pitka. Rajus?lmed: M?lestusi Aastatest 1914–1919, 2d ed. [Storm Front: Memoirs of the Years 1914–1919] (Stockholm, Sweden: Free Europe Press, 1972): 196

[19] A.W.S. Agar, Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 670

[20] Quoted in Andrew Roberts, “Operation Kronstadt: revealed, the full story of the mission to pluck a spy from the jaws of death in Bolshevik Russia,” The Daily Mail. (09 May 2008) [https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-565220/Operation-Kronstadt-revealed-story-mission-pluck-spy-jaws-death-Bolshevik-Russia.html#ixzz2b3ME4kzQ] (accessed 11 August 2020)

[21] Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” 61

[22] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 671

[23] Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” 61

[24] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 668

[25] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 671, Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” 63

[26] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 671, Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” 63-64

[27] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 672

[28] Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” 65

[29] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 673 – 675, Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” 65

[30] “The Kronstadt Raid,” 14

[31] Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” 65 - 66

[32] Paul Dukes. Red at Dusk and the Marrow: Adventures and Investigations in Red Russia. (London: Williams and Norgate. 1923):?286 – 292

[33] Kari Alenius, “Ingrians in the Estonian War of Independence: Between Estonia, Russia and Finland,” Baltic Security and Defence Review 15, no. 2 (2013): 17; and August Traksmaa, Lühike Vabaduss?ja Ajalugu, 3d ed. [A Brief History of the War of Independence] (Tallinn, Estonia: Olion, 1992): 181–82.

[34]Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War,” 70,?Paravane, “With the Baltic Squadron, 1918–1920,” 710 - 711

[35] Uustalu. The History of the Estonian People: 180

[36] Saulius A. Sziedelis Historical Dictionary of Lithuania.?(Plymouth: Scarecrow Press. Inc. 2011): 6, Uustalu. The History of the Estonian People: 181

[37] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,”677

[38] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,” 667, Geoffrey Bennett, Freeing the Baltic (Edinburgh, UK: Birlinn General, 2001): 183–87; Estonian War of Independence, 1918–1920, 39; Maide, ülevaade Eesti Vabaduss?dast 1918–1920: 411–12.

[39] Augustus Agar. Baltic Episode: A Classic of Secret Service in Baltic Waters. (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press. 1963): 239,

[40] Estonian War of Independence, 1918–1920, 42; and Uustalu. The History of the Estonian People, 191–93.

[41] Agar. Baltic Episode: A Classic of Secret Service in Baltic Waters:248

[42] Agar, “Naval Operations in the Baltic,”677

[43] Ibid. 661