Kosovo: Neverending Story
*This paper is written for the Conflict Resolution Couse of the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia University during the 2017 Spring Semester. It intends to show the evolution of the Kosovo conflict and the role of the international community.
A Brief Historical Background
The Balkans have been a battlefield for power struggles since the middle ages. The Ottomans conquered the Balkans including Kosovo in 1389 before they did Istanbul in 1453. When the nation-states started to emerge and big Empires dissolved, so did the Ottoman empire – at least a hundred years later than its western European counterparts – and the process was much bloodier. This late nationalism laid the grounds for ethnic conflicts and thus for the Balkan wars both at the beginning and at the end of the 20th century. With the withdrawal of the Ottomans, Kosovo went under the new Yugoslav Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes where (primarily) Muslim Albanians were left out of the ruling system. However, after the Second World War, Tito managed to gather all communities and gave them a voice in the ruling system. As Noel Malcolm[1] indicates, Albanians have always had a positive view of Tito. For them, Tito is the man who reversed the Serbian colonialism and the suppression of the Albanian language and gave an autonomous status to Kosovo in 1974. Yugoslavia also enjoyed a relative autonomy during the Cold War. It had the advantage of being one of the leading countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and could develop its economy under a relatively relaxed state-owned economy model. However, it could not overcome the ethnic nationalism. The Yugoslav state was still fighting in the 1980s against ethnic-nationalist parties which existed at the time of the Second World War. Therefore, we can claim that although Yugoslavia was created to overcome ethnic nationalism, it could not address it. The idea of unified Yugoslavia was attached to Tito’s charismatic leadership. After his death, the ties which bound the different ethnic groups dissolved. Tito’s death also corresponds to an era marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, thus a decrease in the NAM’s comparative importance, and domination of the neoliberal economies. The “zeitgeist” changed, so did Yugoslavia.
Kosovo in Domestic Politics during the 1980s and 1990s
Kosovo was expected to seek independence first among all states and provinces of Yugoslavia. The international community expected a deadly conflict in Kosovo, but the third Balkan war started in Slovenia. According to Charles T. Call, wars recur because of unresolved political and security issues and unaddressed peripheral groups/conflicts.[2] The third Balkan Wars occurred because of unresolved political issues centered around ethnic nationalism. For example, VMRO, the Macedonian ethnic nationalist party against which the Yugoslav Communist Party fought at Second World War, re-emerged during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The current President of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is the head of VMRO. The roots of many ethnic-nationalist groups can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century.[3] Besides, many civil war studies – including Call’s war recurrence study – show that a single man gathering political power in the expense of weakening state institutions is one of the major causes of the conflict. Likewise, Milosevic gathered all executive powers and suppressed the opposition during the 1980s. He abolished Kosovo’s autonomy and prohibited ethnic Albanians from working as civil servants in any government organization in 1989.[4] As a result, Kosovo Albanians organized their own public schools in private houses and their own judicial system – known as parallel structures. Politically speaking, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK headed by Ibrahim Rugova) filled the vacuum. Besides, there had been University protests against the Milosevic regime since the mid-1980s which had laid the ground for the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK). However, it was mostly a marginalized group until the mid-1990s.[5] Deriving lessons from the Bosnian War, Rugova’s LDK realized that they had no chance against the Yugoslav Army. Therefore, they assumed a political position of legality and non-violence. In 1990, the deputies of the abolished Kosovo assembly declared Kosovo a republic and in 1991 an independent state. Meanwhile, the Kosovo Albanian diaspora in Europe started to contribute three percent of their income to Rugova’s LDK. However, because of developments in Bosnia, many Albanians agreed that independence could wait a couple of years to avoid ethnic cleansing.[6]
LDK’s passive resistance led to a split. Many LPRK members in Europe accused Rugova and LDK members of being Serbian agents. Out of this split, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA-U?K) emerged in 1993. Hashim Tha?i, the current president of Kosovo, became the head of the political branch of the U?K. However, it would be wrong to think of the U?K as an army. There was no chain of command. People, especially in rural areas, gathered to resist the Serbian military and para-military forces and associated themselves with the U?K.
The developments in the Bosnian war brought an end to Rugova’s passive resistance. At the Dayton Accord, the great powers accepted that, as Kosovo had not been a Yugoslav Republic but a province, it had to remain part of Serbia. They also agreed that remaining Yugoslavia was comprised of Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo as a part of Serbia.[7]
The tension increased especially after 1996. The armed conflict escalated following the killing of a U?K fighter, Adem Jashari, together with his family in Drenica in February 1998. This massacre was used to legitimize the armed struggle on behalf of Albanians and the U?K became a major actor.
Security Council, NATO, G8, Contact Group for Yugoslavia: A Crowded Stage – ‘Herding the Cat’
The first Security Council resolution on Kosovo was adopted in August 1993 (UNSCR 855)[8]. By this resolution, the Security Council asked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to consider the deployment of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor and investigate the human rights situation in Kosovo. After the Dayton accord, the Council ended the arms embargo on FRY in 1995. In the meantime, the UN General Assembly also passed two resolutions condemning the Serbian repression of Kosovo Albanians.[9] By early 1998, the Contact Group for former Yugoslavia where Western powers (United States, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany) and Russia were working together decided that the situation had become so critical that the parties should be forced to accept a compromise. In March 1998, the Council adopted Resolution 1160 to impose a new weapons embargo on FRY and called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Kosovo.[10] While the situation worsened, the G8 country heads gathered and discussed Kosovo for the first time in June 1998.
By the end of 1998, there were more than 200 thousand displaced people in Kosovo. In response, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 (September 1998) and demanded from FRY under Chapter VII to “cease all actions by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units for civilian repression.”[11]Russia claimed that this resolution did not form the basis for any enforcement action. According to Heinbecker, [12]Russia continues to use the Contact Group and the G8 as platforms to bypass the Security Council and to block the use of force against Yugoslavia/Serbia.
However, in October 1998, the NATO Council authorized activation orders to prepare for airstrikes against Yugoslavia. This pushed Milosevic into diplomacy. Parties agreed on a temporary ceasefire. Milosevic agreed to pull back his forces and agreed on the deployment of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) from OSCE to monitor the ceasefire. While Serbs pulled back, the U?K gained control of the territory. OSCE monitors helped to calm down the situation but it was not enough. By the end of October 1998, the Security Council endorsed the agreement and demanded under Chapter VII that Yugoslavia complied fully with Resolution 1160 and 1199. Russia and China abstained.[13]
After the killings of 45 Albanian civilians in Racak in November 1998, the Contact Group countries decided to initiate the negotiations in Rambouillet (France) between the Yugoslav government and representatives of Kosovo, notably LDK headed by Ibrahim Rugova and U?K headed by Hashim Tha?i. By 6 February 1999, the talks started. Serbia tried to block the deployment of an international military force by promising greater autonomy to the Kosovo province. However, the Rambouillet talks ended without a result. Milosevic refused to sign any agreement as he was totally against the deployment of any foreign troops to Serbia. Tha?i was indecisive at the beginning but later agreed. According to Veton Surroi’s memoir[14] about Rambouillet Talks, Tha?i did not want to sign it because he did not want to abandon the power that he gained thanks to UCK as a successful Rambouillet agreement meant the dissolution of UCK. However, with Madeleine Albright’s intervention, Thaci had to agree. Albright made it clear that if the Albanian side did not accept, the US would have not intervened in the situation. Therefore, Tha?i had no other choice.
Rambouillet talks were the first direct talks between the Serbian government and Kosovo Albanian leadership during the conflict. However, Kosovo Albanians were not united. Rugova’s LDK and Thaci’s UCK were the main representatives of the Kosovo Albanians. The result of Rambouillet was the peace deal mentioned above. It was somehow similar to the Ahtisaari Plan. However, not only Thaci or Milosevic but also ordinary Kosovo Albanians for different reasons did not want this agreement. For UCK, it meant the loss of power; for ordinary Kosovo Albanians, it meant renouncing hopes of independence. Many Kosovo Albanians assert that they were relieved when Milosevic refused to sign the agreement. Therefore, all major parties could be identified as “spoilers” during the Rambouillet talks.
According to Stedman, spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interest and use of violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”[15] In Rambouillet, both Thaci and Milosevic clearly came under this definition. There was a peace process and both sides undermined it. However international “custodians” (as Stedman put it) of this process, namely the USA and its allies, approached them with different strategies. Stedman categorizes spoilers according to their positions – insiders/outsiders; their numbers; their types and their locus – followers/leaders. In this respect, Milosevic was a total spoiler to the peace process. He pursued total power and he saw the world in all-or-nothing terms. For a total spoiler, the peaceful settlement of the conflict does not work. Inducement – convincing them through special envoys, mediation, negotiation – or socializing – trying to change their behavior – strengthens them more as they understand they can continue to seize power. Therefore, the only strategy for an outsider to pursue against a total spoiler is the coercive action – use of force. The UCK side was more like a greedy spoiler with limited goals that would expand or shrink according to contract-based calculations. However, for Kosovo Albanians, independence from Serbian rule was the goal from the beginning. UCK leadership pursued sub-goals – economic benefits, etc.
With no result in Rambouillet, the situation deteriorated even more and OSCE had to withdraw its observers while Yugoslavia/Serbia increased its military presence in March 1999. NATO decided to take action. On 24 March 1999, it started the air bombardment called Operation Allied Force.[16] NATO countries chose the coercive strategy against the total spoiler (Milosevic), which was the only solution. Russia and China tried to stop the NATO strike by proposing a resolution to the Security Council. However, this proposal was vetoed by most of the Security Council members – only Russia, China, and Namibia voted in favor.[17] Moreover, the Secretary-General, while condemning the human rights violations perpetrated by Serbs against Kosovo Albanians, remained silent regarding the NATO intervention – which was interpreted as tacit approval.
While Russia was using other platforms such as the Contact Group, Canada – elected member of the Security Council in February 1999 – tried to reverse the situation and pressure the Security Council by reminding its members that the use of force in Kosovo was approved by the Resolutions 1160 and 1199 mentioning Chapter VII.
However, Russia insisted on the G8 platform and Germany agreed. According to Heinbecker[18] there were two reasons for Germans to agree: first, the G8 was outside of the media attention but more importantly, it was neither as crowded as the Security Council and nor as small as the Contact Group. It was also more flexible than the Security Council. In April 1999, NATO set forth its principles towards the conflict.[19] Accordingly, NATO demanded the withdrawal of all Serbian military and para-military forces and the deployment of an international military presence; the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations, the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, the G8 set principles parallel to NATO and even approved the reengagement of the United Nations. After NATO and G8’s referral to the United Nations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1239 of May 14, 1999 “encouraging humanitarian assistance and endorsing the G8 principles as a basis for a political solution.” [20] Besides, a troika composed of Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, Strobe Talbott of the United States and Victor Chernomyrdin of Russia started negotiations with Milosevic parallel to the G8 attempts. During G8 and troika negotiations, NATO members of the G8 pushed for an “international military presence” in Kosovo without directly referring to a NATO force; however, Russia was against it on the basis of sovereignty. Many argue that during 1999, Russia was distracted by political division at home and was not able to define its position and pressure the Security Council to adopt a resolution under Chapter VI – pacific settlement of the disputes, meaning without NATO’s use of force. Within this atmosphere, G8 countries agreed on the conditions to transmit the job to the UN and NATO: signature of a military-technical agreement between Serbs and the NATO, withdrawal of Serbian forces, end of NATO air campaign and NATO’s entry into Kosovo from Macedonia. Therefore, the G8 managed to unify the permanent members of the Security Council outside of the UN and reengage them to the UN. Thanks to G8 negotiations, Russia and China secured the sovereignty of Yugoslavia/Serbia as a compromise for enforcement action under Chapter VII led by NATO forces. As a result, the UN Security Council adopted the famous Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999. Yet, China abstained. Accordingly, the Security Council authorized NATO forces to enter Kosovo (known as KFOR today), requested the withdrawal of Yugoslav Army including all military, police and paramilitary forces, the demilitarization of former fighters – namely U?K (KLA) – and the establishment of an international civil presence to provide an interim administration which is still a base for the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). Moreover, paragraph 10 of the Resolution provides substantial autonomy to Kosovo under international administration and authorizes the set-up of the “provisional democratic self-governing institutions”[21]. Paragraph 11 mentions that the transitional administration will prepare the ground for “a final settlement” but it does not mention that what the final political settlement would be. As Elizabeth Cousens points out, tough issues are sometimes deliberately avoided in initial mediation in order to get agreement around core issues where a compromise can be reached.[22]Resolution 1244, was therefore not a peace agreement but rather a compromise. Yugoslav Army’s withdrawal was a compromise in exchange of postponing Kosovo’s final status talks. However, once militarily intervened, NATO countries should have taken the issue further and finalize Kosovo’s final status in a shorter period. Nonetheless, for the reasons we will see later in this paper, the USA could not take the issue any further in 1999.
As Elizabeth Cousens puts it, this ‘early recovery’ of the post-conflict period in Kosovo created new uncertainties – including change in international personalities, institutional handovers, new flows of resources – which created new opportunities and incentives for backsliding and spoiling. [23] Resolution 1244 which also mandated UNMIK was unique in the sense that it established a body of an international organization to create a country’s institutions from scratch namely state-building. The only other example in this sense is Timor-Leste. After NATO intervention, not only the Yugoslav Army but all Yugoslav institutions collapsed. This was the main mistake of the international community. Power holders or institutions can change. However, there should be an institutional legacy for countries. If we look back to the First World War, many empires collapsed; yet the nation-states emerged from the ashes of those empires. They were the successors of their empires. Likewise, Nazis were defeated in Germany, but the German state was not allowed to collapse after the Second World War. As Benjamin Reilly asserts, UNMIK and OSCE did a good job in terms of the timing of the elections and the creation of democratic mechanisms after the conflict[24]. However, the destruction of other institutions such as the judiciary, health, and education sector together with the state’s oppressive apparatus – army and police – devastated the country. Therefore, the recovery has been much longer than expected.
If we write an alternative history to Kosovo in 1999, increasing LDK’s political presence during Rambouillet and after NATO intervention would be one of the best options. Ibrahim Rugova and his team were experienced enough to take over the institutions. However, this assumption was not realistic because LDK was not a party to the armed struggle. In all civil wars, the armed groups almost always end up leading the political processes. Having been aware of this fact, Bujar Bukoshi – one of the leading members of LDK – tried to challenge it by creating a legal army of Kosovo called Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK). However, it did not work. This group dissolved itself and joined to the UCK before the NATO airstrikes. Yet, UCK members were not experienced enough to carry out all responsibilities of the post-conflict situation. As I mentioned, there was no chain of command even among themselves and they had already been fighting with each other and with LDK. Moreover, the main leaders could be defined as ‘warlords’ – entrepreneurial users of violence. New elites (war profiteers, resource controllers, organized criminal networks) emerged from UCK to form two of the main political parties of today’s Kosovo: Hashim Thaci’s PDK and Ramush Haradinaj’s AAK.
From Resolution 1244 to Secretary General’s Special Envoys: Kosovo’s Final Status Discussions
After the establishment of UNMIK, the politics in Serbia started to change. Milosevic lost power in October 2000 and was replaced by the moderate leader Zoran Djindjic who prioritized Serbia’s integration to the European Union and building ties with the United States. In May 2001, the UN unveiled a Constitutional Framework establishing the Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.[25] Accordingly, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) such as assembly, presidency, executive and judiciary powers – democratic institutions – were established. While Kosovo Albanians perceived the document as a step forward to independence, Hans Haekkerup, the Secretary General’s Special Representative (SRSG) and head of UNMIK, assured Belgrade that UNMIK would not take any step further towards the final status of Kosovo.[26] By the time, the USA’s attention focused on the Middle East with the Iraq war and SRSGs started to take a stand against the final status of Kosovo without Serbia’s consent.[27] Within this environment, UNMIK released its “Standard before Status” policy on 6 February 2004 by which UN preconditioned progress in eight key areas to further the talks about Kosovo’s final status. These eight key areas were the functioning democratic institutions; rule of law; freedom of movement; return of refugees; market economy; property rights (referring to displaced Serbian minority); normalization of relations with Belgrade and transformation of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).[28] However, this attempt did not decrease the tension and in March 2004 Albanian ethnic nationalists attacked Kosovo Serbs (including by targeting Serbian-Orthodox holy sites) and other minorities. Meanwhile in Belgrade, the moderate Prime Minister Djindjic was assassinated. These events showed that the tensions still existed and reconciliations could not be achieved despite the international presence on the ground.
After these incidents, the debate again focused on Kosovo’s final status. Kosovo Albanians together with their Western partners claimed that Kosovo’s independence was necessary for the stabilization of the region. Kai Eide – a senior Norwegian diplomat and Special Envoy of Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2005, delivered a political assessment to the Security Council about the situation in Kosovo and came up with some proposals known as an exit strategy for UNMIK. He said that UNMIK was no longer the appropriate body to run Kosovo’s affairs. Pristina should govern itself and the European Union should take greater responsibility. He found that the standard before the status policy was not realistic and the talks about the status of Kosovo should start immediately.[29] Eide, realistically, mentioned that Kosovo was far from the implementation of standards; organized crime and corruption prevailed and there would not be a good time to start the talks about the final status. Secretary-General Annan welcomed the report. Besides, the Security Council endorsed Eide’s review and agreed on the need for direct talks between Pristina and Belgrade based on Resolution 1244. According to Ker-Lindsay[30], Eide noted that the negotiations would have to be different from the peace processes that had been held elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. This was due to the fact that the negotiations concerned a territory that was still part of a sovereign state but was administrated by the United Nations through provisional self-governing institutions. The direct talks between Pristina and Belgrade started by the beginning of 2006.
Arguments for and against Kosovo’s Independence
Kosovo Albanians consider that they have the right to self-determination as mentioned in the UN charter. Besides, Kosovo should be evaluated within the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The same right that Bosnia or Croatia enjoyed should be extended to Kosovo. However, Serbia always claimed that despite international administration, Kosovo was part of Serbia and Resolution 1244 confirms the sovereignty principles. In line with the UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia must be recognized and respected. Besides, the right of self-determination leading to independence did not apply in the case of Kosovo. Under international law, the principle was in fact only applicable in cases of colonization, thus it can only be exercised in case of decolonization. What Kosovo Albanians demand therefore is a right of secession. As for the argument of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia reinforced that Kosovo was never a republic like Bosnia or Croatia but rather an autonomous province.
Russia’s position has been always on the side of Serbia. Russia perceived the arguments for independence as against the international law which also serves as a precedent for separatist movements. In this respect, some European Union members which are affected by minority issues – Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Greece, and Cyprus - have taken the same attitude. Nevertheless, the USA, Britain, and France argued that since the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the reality has been different and sooner or later Russia must accept this new reality. Besides, the Western group of countries endorsed Kosovo’s independence as unique and thus it cannot set a precedent. The USA tried to convince Russia that Kosovo would not set a precedent over other territories like Chechnya. In-between the two main positions, some countries refrain from taking strong positions such as China, South Africa, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. While they will not rule out recognition in the future, they have concerns and they prefer not to endorse independence for the moment.
Ahtisaari Plan and Status Talks: The Road to Independence
After Eide, Martti Ahtisaari was appointed as Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Future Status Process for Kosovo in November 2005 [31] and the Office for Special Envoy (UNOSEK) was established in Vienna. The appointment of Ahtisaari was very much criticized by the Serbian side because of his relationship with the International Crises Group which supported and lobbied for Kosovo’s independence.[32] Ahtisaari recommended three principles for Kosovo namely: no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country. Meanwhile, in line with Ahtisaari’s recommendations, the Contact Group endorsed ten principles to guide the talks.[33] However, because of the division in the Security Council and in the Contact Group, the talks focused on decentralization, the return of refugees, protection of cultural and religious heritages without referring directly to independence. During the 2006 talks, the division between the USA and the Russian Federation deepened over the final status of Kosovo.
It was clear from the beginning that Ahtisaari had made up his mind that the process would lead to independence. Nevertheless, Belgrade insisted on ‘less than independence and more than autonomy’ over a prolonged period such as 20 years. The Contact Group informed the Serbian Government that the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule is not a viable option.[34] The Contact Group also agreed on an eight-point vision for status talks which focused on decentralization and multi-ethnicity. The direct talks within the guidance of the Contact Group and under the auspices of UNOSEK started on 17 March 2016 in Vienna by focusing on decentralization. A Unity Team headed by Hashim Tha?i represented the Kosovo side. Meanwhile, on 23 May 2006, Montenegro voted for its independence which weakened Serbia’s position. However, they continued to argue that Montenegro was already granted state status during Yugoslavia. During the talks, there were many disagreements; for instance, the Serbian government claimed control over many enterprises including factories, mines, and power plants. Serbia argued that the privatization of many of these assets by international administrators since 1999 had been illegal. Another area of disagreement was foreign debt. Besides, Kosovo Albanians were also demanding repatriation of assets from the Serbian Government.[35]Russians continued to insist that before a final decision was taken, the standards must be met. Americans challenged them to be realistic about it. Differences in the Contact Group became even more visible. Yet, during the G8 Summit in July 2006, Putin mentioned their continuing support to Ahtisaari. On 14 August 2006, the new SRSG Rücker announced that his role was to oversee UNMIK’s withdrawal and hand-over a post status international mission.[36]
During the Security Council meeting of 13 September 2006, Russia reiterated its position that there is no difference between the case of Kosovo and those of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Any decision on the former would create a universal precedent that would be applicable to other situations not just to South Caucasus but also Iraq and other parts of Europe. French and American representatives, on the other hand, said that by the end of 2006 a status decision should be taken based on the Contact Group principle. Britain also said that Kosovo is a unique case in international politics.[37] Following the Security Council meeting, the Contact Group also met in New York on 20 September 2006. In addition to Ahtisaari, the Foreign Minister of six countries, Solana, Rehn and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer the NATO Secretary-General also attended the meeting. After seven months of talks, Permanent Members of the Security Council concluded that it was not possible to reach an agreement. Therefore, the Contact Group authorized Ahtisaari to prepare a comprehensive proposal for a status settlement. On 13 December 2006, the Security Council met again. France and the USA restated the Contact group principles and reiterated the need for a quick settlement. Russia argued that the comprehensive status proposals put forward by Ahtisaari should form the basis of further negotiations without time frames. China supported Russia.[38]
Status Proposals
From September 2006 to January 2007, the countries position did not change. During this period, on the one hand, Serbia went to a referendum on a new constitution and a general election which postponed the Ahtisaari’s plan. Besides, NATO invited Serbia to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. On the other hand, Kosovo Albanians started to protest for independence. On 26 January 2007, Ahtisaari finally delivered his proposal to the Contact Group in Vienna. On February 2, he presented his proposal to the two sides.[39] The UN envoy explained that it was a comprehensive plan for a viable, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo. Included within its provisions were annexes on the new constitution, decentralization (including the delineation of new municipalities), justice, religious and cultural heritage, external depth, property, and security sector. However, it made no final explicit mention of the final status of the province. Instead, Ahtisaari explained that he would reveal his views on this at a later stage. At this point, he wanted to focus on technical issues. Although the document made no mention of independence, this was seen by both sides as the natural outcome. Kosovo Albanian leadership announced that Kosovo was on its way to statehood and that a Security Council resolution is expected in April 2007. Belgrade declared that the proposals were unacceptable and accused UN Envoy of having exceeded his mandate. [40]
March 15, 2007: Ahtisaari sent the final proposal and the recommendations for Kosovo’s final status to the UN Secretary-General. On 26 March 2007, the Secretary-General presented the proposal to the Security Council[41]. During the meeting, Ahtisaari delivered his long-awaited speech. Given the recent history of Kosovo, the current realities on the ground and the way in which the negotiation process had unfolded, the UN Envoy concluded that Kosovo’s reintegration into Serbia was not possible. Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Besides, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon expressed his full support for the package of proposals including the report recommending supervised independence. France, UK, and USA endorsed the plan for supervised independence. So did the German government in its capacity of EU president. [42] However, not all EU countries agreed to it.
Serbia said it was an absolute violation of the UN Charter, international law and the Serbian Constitution. Moscow remained silent. Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative to the UN already at the time instead proposed they should examine the implementation of resolution 1244 and the standards, and proposed a Fact-Finding mission to Belgrade and Pristina. USA and Britain viewed this proposal as postponing the inevitable but still agreed on this new mission.
On 3 April 2007, the Security Council discussions began on the Ahtisaari plan. Russia was careful not to dismiss the plan altogether. Rather, it insisted on the fact that only three or four countries in the Council supported the proposals. China, as well as several African and Asian countries, shared Russia’s worries about changes to the territorial integrity of the states. Serbia also announced that it secured the votes of five non-permanent members of the Council. The British rejected that there was widespread opposition to the Ahtisaari Plan but concluded by accepting the Russian proposal for a fact-finding mission.
On 24 April 2007, the 15 representatives of the UN Security Council began their fact-finding mission. [43] In the meantime, Serbia proposed ‘supervised autonomy’. According to this proposal, all legislative, executive and judicial powers would be transferred to Pristina, except foreign, affairs, defense, customs, monetary policies and the protection of Serbian cultural sites. Moreover, the Kosovo Albanians could also have representatives in the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As for Security, apart from border forces, Kosovo would be demilitarized with international forces safeguarding peace and security. While making these proposals, Serbia lobbied especially South Africa, Ghana, Indonesia, Qatar, Panama, Peru and the Congo against the P3’s new draft resolutions of the Ahtisaari plan.[44]
During 2007, three versions of the same draft Resolution circulated in the Security Council.[45] Besides, leaders continued to meet in the Contact Group and in the G8. However, the deadlock could not be overcome. The P3, USA, UK and France, on June 20, 2007, circulated a third version of the resolution that explicitly called on the UN Secretary-General or his representative to hold further negotiations within 120 days of the resolution. If no agreement had been reached by the end of this period, the Ahtisaari plan would automatically come into the force – unless the Security Council expressed otherwise. Nevertheless, Russia and China rejected this proposal as well.
Because of the deadlock in the Security Council, Washington revised its strategy and decided to abandon their resolution proposals. For Russia and Serbia, this was a sort of victory. Nevertheless, fearing an attempt by Washington to bypass the Security Council, Russia reiterated that only the Security Council could take a legitimate decision on Kosovo and that any attempt to bypass the UN would not only destabilize the Balkans, it would also negatively affect the conflicts elsewhere.[46]
Germany tried to overcome the deadlock situation by proposing a new round of talks under the mediation of a new Troika that was composed of Russian, US and EU representatives. Russia and the US also agreed on the idea.[47] While the Ahtisaari plan did in fact remain on the table, even though it had not been ratified by the Security Council, the Troika would not be presenting any specific solutions to the sides. The Troika talks were planned to last 120 days and ended on 10 December 2007. During the Troika Talks, Serbia suggested the Hong Kong and Aland Islands models[48] where Kosovo would have its own police, judiciary, and currency but regarding external affairs, it would remain part of Serbia. At the same time, the Unity Team of Kosovo proposed a draft treaty of friendship that would be signed by Serbia and an independent Kosovo. Washington remained committed to the Ahtisaari plan and asserted once again that Kosovo would not be reunited with Serbia. The Troika talks ended with a document omitting the word independence.[49]
Independence and Beyond
The process from Kei Eide to Martti Ahtisaari’s Plan was marked by deadlocks in the Security Council. Direct talks, a Fact-finding mission or Troika talks could not help formulate a peace agreement acceptable to both sides. As a result, the Provisional Democratic Self-Governing institutions declared independence on 17 February 2008. As it was expected, Kosovo’s independence was not recognized by Serbia, Russia, China and some EU countries like Spain, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia continues to block Kosovo’s membership application to the United Nations.
In an attempt to question the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence, Serbia requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) whether the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law. Two years later in 2010, ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion and concluded that the declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law.[50] Since then, Serbia has been lobbying to block Kosovo from becoming a member of any international organization.
Nevertheless, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in his famous speech, “let the river of history flow.” After the unilateral declaration of independence, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan, Kosovo went through a period called “supervised independence” under the auspices of the European Union. To this end, the EU created the International Civilian Office, International Steering Group to guide the independence until 2012 and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) to guide the police and judicial institutions. Likewise, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) opened its mission in Kosovo. Within this development, UNMIK delegated most of its duties to these organizations and kept a status-neutral and low-profile role. The EU also started to facilitate a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. The deadlock in the Security Council caused the European Union to take a step forward.
Kosovo Today
Since the declaration of Independence, Kosovo’s foreign policy is to increase the number of recognizing countries, to obtain membership to the UN, visa liberalization with EU and integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, according to the Security Council and the UN General Assembly, Kosovo is not a state. For Serbia, Russia, and China, Kosovo is still governed by UNMIK under Resolution 1244.
Moreover, the North of Kosovo has been de facto under the Serbian government’s control since the NATO intervention in 1999. The Ibar river which divides Mitrovica is another de facto border between Kosovo and Serbia. This frozen conflict could cause bigger incidents in the region. To address this, the European Union started a high-level political dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade in 2013. The purpose of the dialogue was the normalization of the relations between two parties. It was designed to address very specific issues such as freedom of movement, communication, energy, and justice. The EU and the Security Council understand that the separation of Northern Mitrovica from Kosovo would start re-Balkanization of the Balkans. Serbs in Bosnia or other ethnic groups in different parts of the Balkans could come up with the same demand. It is impossible to divide the Balkans according to ethnicity. Therefore, a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and independent Kosovo as Ahtisaari mapped out is a necessity for the stabilization of the Balkans.
Kosovo today is basically a frozen issue. As long as Russia continues to block its membership to the United Nations, it will remain so. To justify its alignment with Serbia’s position, Russia points to the many problems and challenges in Kosovo as proof that Kosovo must stay under UN supervision. Kosovo is plagued by corruption, unemployment, organized crime and still, knows outbursts of interethnic (although largely politically motivated) tensions. The two major political parties (PDK led by Hashim Tha?i and AAK led by Ramush Haradinaj) originated from U?K, which Serbia still considers as a terrorist organization. During the Kosovo conflict, U?K allegedly committed war crimes against Serbian (and Albanian) civilians. Some of these questions remain unsolved; Swiss Parliamentarian Dick Marty’s 2010 report on “Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” still looms over Kosovo and a new court called The Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office[51] has been recently established in The Hague to investigate some of these alleged war crimes committed by U?K.
Transitional Justice
Charles Call defines the transitional justice as “how societies ‘transitioning’ from repressive rule or armed conflict deal with past atrocities, how they overcome social divisions or seek ‘reconciliation’, and how they create justice systems so as to prevent future human right atrocities.”[52] In the case of Kosovo, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the main body to deal with this issue. Nevertheless, there are still a number of missing persons from the conflict (mostly Albanians) and some perpetrators (of various ethnicity) have not been prosecuted or even identified yet. On the other hand, Serbia issued and maintains an Interpol warrant against Ramush Haradinaj who was judged by ICTY and acquitted because of a lack of evidence. Now, a new special delocalized court under Kosovo law – The Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office – has been established in The Hague. These developments are perceived by Kosovo Albanians as unjust. It is hard to say that there is ‘reconciliation’ among the parties. ICTY and this new special court have not contributed and will not contribute to reconciliation. Both sides perceive initiatives from the international community as a move against their sovereignty. In this environment, UNMIK is working on confidence-building measures on the local municipal level where there is either no Albanian or no Serbian left.
In May 2017, the upcoming operationalization of the Special Court might have played a role in political tensions leading to the Parliament’s vote of non-confidence against the government. For two and a half years, Thaci’s PDK and Isa Mustafa’s LDK had been coalition partners. The other political parties Vetevendosje, Nisma and AAK (the last two originating from UCK) had been united among other things against the government allowing this new court, LDK and PDK approved it under international pressure but LDK might have felt more at ease as the Special Court is perceived to target former UCK personnel; moreover, they suspect UCK was behind the assassination of some LDK militants early on. PDK MPs voted together with the opposition to put an end to the LDK-PDK government; after the early elections on June 11th of this year, PDK might envisage forming a coalition with its former brothers-in-arms.
Obstacles to Peace: War Economies, Organized Crime, and New Security Challenges
Like all conflicts, the war in Kosovo created its own economy. Nitzschke and Studddar differentiate the war economies as combat, shadow, and coping economies. The combat economy refers to the arms smuggling or any income generation mechanism for the actual fighting. The shadow economies are the interactions outside the state regulations; black markets and smuggling which can provide survival to the civilian population and turn out to be a coping mechanism. In Kosovo, the economy during the conflict was very much characterized by these three types of war economies. After the war, the new political elite thrived thanks to the continuation of those structures. However, it is not unique to Kosovo. All neighboring countries –Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro – fit the description of those post-war economies.
Ordinary Kosovo citizens rely on the remittances from the diaspora. Apart from two big Turkish investments – the airport and the main highway – there is no economic wealth to be redistributed. Therefore, former rebels and ensuing new government elites who benefited from predation during the war thus act as ‘spoilers’; yet they do not act violently. The political tension around ethnic nationalism keeps them in power.
The challenges related to post-war economies are taking new dimensions. The new elite of Kosovo was born from the ashes of mafia-related structures. Yet, the ethnic nationalism that fed these economies is now taking a new dimension, as shown by the recruitment of warriors to terrorist organizations like the so-called Islamic State (IS-Daesh). As Kosovo did not have any visa regulation towards any country, extremist Islamists traveled through Kosovo, and on by plane to Turkey, and took advantage of the loose border control in Turkey to go to Syria. Although for one year, border control has been tightened, this route was used intensively from 2011 to 2016. Other IS recruits are from Kosovo or the region and were children during the conflicts. Criminal networks from Kosovo and neighboring countries took advantage of these activities.
Turkey has had close relations to Kosovo Albanians, and the same can be said of Turkish criminal networks of the 1990s. These networks have flourished again since 2015. Thanks to the European Union’s influence on Kosovo, the government is trying to put some distance between itself and these networks and through law enforcement is trying to cut the links. Nevertheless, small villages which are totally forgotten during the “peacebuilding” process located near Kosovo’s borders with Serbia, Montenegro or Albania (on both sides of the border) are prone to connections with criminal networks and fertile ground for radicalization.
Overall, as James Cockayne asserts,[53] Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) uses the shadowy “sovereign-state” areas of the internationalized system, where state control is weak or ineffective. Especially at the beginning of the 2000s, organized crime in Kosovo took advantage of this governance vacuum. Besides, TOC can be in different forms, such as symbiotic (coexisting with the state authority) or parasitic (relying on its connections to existing authority, but targeting is not only for protection but also for revenues) or predatory (preying on the resources of state in violent existential competition, which in some cases comes to resemble transnational terrorism). A symbiotic relationship can develop between state-controlling elites and organized crime groups that sustain or enlarge those elites’ power like in Serbia under Milosevic. It is known that although they are using the ethnic and political tensions, both Serbian and Albanian criminal networks are in contact and collaboration with each other. Moreover, in Cockayne’s terms,[54]transnational organized crime is the by-product of the armed conflict in the Balkans: commercialization of war and institutionalization of the violent criminal disorder as a shadow economic system carried out through large-scale criminal enterprises connecting local and global markets.
Conclusion
The international community has been using mixed strategies combining coercive elements with inducement and other reassurances that provide positive incentives in Kosovo. Although the coercive measure was the only option to deter a total spoiler like Milosevic at the beginning of the crisis, yet mixed tools remind us of the “garbage can” approach – as International Crisis Group defines it, it consists in throwing whatever policy tools you have at the problem and hoping that something will work.[55] Applying “mixed strategies” to manage emerging or ongoing crises typically involves bringing together not only the tools available to a single government or international organization but also pooling the influence and resources of multiple actors, who often have very different short-term and long-term perspectives. Therefore, the mixed strategies combined with UN’s and EU’s state-building efforts created an influx of NGOs and development agencies that made Kosovo a crowded stage – what Chester Crocker nicknames as ‘herding the cat’. Eighteen years after the conflict, despite all agencies and NGOs, there is no tangible economic development in Kosovo. The unemployment rate is extremely high and economic migration is one of the biggest problems. This pushes people into the hands of organizers of human trafficking or human smuggling and different ways of organized crime.
As the International Crisis Group rightfully points out,[56] the long-term presence of a peacekeeping mission – although there are only 15 military peacekeepers in UNMIK – can freeze political divisions rather than providing a framework for their resolution.
[1] Malcolm, Noel (2002, p.335)
[2] Call, Charles T. (2012) Why Peace Fails: The Causes and the prevention of Civil War Recurrence.
[3] Albanian Source: Eduard Kardel Marxist Working Center Publication in 1982.
[4] Silber L. and Little A. (1996, 37-48) The Death of Yugoslavia. Laura Silber and Alan Little 1996. BBC Books.
[5] Judah T. (September-November 2000, page 64-66)
[6] Judah T. (2008, pages 64-75)
[7] idem Judah T. (September-November 2000)
[8] Security Council Resolution S/RES/855 (1993) Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2oGXizE
[9] General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/204 Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2oIELUt
[10] Security Council Resolution S/RES/1160 Retrieved From https://bit.ly/2pePCqu
[11] Security Council Resolution S/RES/1199 (1998) Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2pHlK5G
[12] Heinbecker, P. (2004 page 540-541)
[13] idem Heinbecker
[14] Surroi, V. (2014)
[15] Stedman, S. J. (1997) page 5
[16] Johnson R. J. (No date pages 292-300) Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2oqSwax
[17] idem Heinbecker
[18] idem Heinbecker
[19] Nato’s Role in Kosovo. 15 July 1999. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2llt7QP
[20] Security Council Resolution S/RES/1239 (14 May 1999) Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2pjY62n
[21] Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) Retrieved From https://bit.ly/21hEUM0
[22] Cousens, Elizabeth M. 2008. It Ain't Over 'til It's Over: What Role for Mediation in Post-agreement Contexts?, Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
[23] idem Cousens, Elizabeth (page 67)
[24] Reilly, Benjamin. 2002 "Elections in post-conflict scenarios: constraints and dangers." International Peacekeeping 9.2: 118-139.
[25] Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (May 15, 2001) Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2nRed7i
[26] Ker-Lindsay J. (2012, 18)
[27] Ker-Lindsay J. (2012, 18-20)
[28] Security Council Press Release 6 February 2004. Implementing ‘Standards Before Status’ Policy Core Political Project for Un Kosovo Mission, Security Council Told SC/7999 retrieved from https://bit.ly/2qbODXe
[29] NATO Document. 4 November 2008. Kosovo: The way forward Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2qc7H7O
[30] idem Ker-Lindsay (2012, 2)
[31] Secretary-General’s Appointments Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2oJgDkG
[32] idem Ker-Linday (page 27)
[33] Kosovo Contact Group Statement, 31 January 2006, London Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2pwPbKU
[34] idem Ker-Lindsay J. (page 27)
[35] idem Ker-Lindsay J. (page 37)
[36] idem Ker-Lindsay J. (page 42)
[37] Security Council Press Release.13 September 2006. Kosovo Special Representative Briefs Security Council on Status Process Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2pxzvYa
[38] Security Council Press Release 13 December 2006. Kosovo Envoy Tells Security Council Delay of Status Proposal Raised Tension Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2ou5Y1h
[39] Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. 2 February 2007. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/1Or4O7J
[40] Tzortzi E. & Robinson M. 2 February 2007. Kosovo says Yes to U.N. plan but Serbia says No
Read Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2q55Aq6
[41] Secretary-General’s letter to the Security Council. 26 March 2007. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2oIam7Z
[42] Secretary-General’s letter to the Security Council. 26 March 2007. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2oIam7Z
[43] Press Conference on Security Council Fact-Finding Mission to Belgrade And Kosovo. 24 April 2007. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2otTLtu
[44] idem Ker-Lindsay (page 68)
[45] Kosovo: Chronology of events Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2oIadRV
[46] idem Ker-Lindsay J. (page 81)
[47] Letter dated 10 December 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2p2dDTg
[48] idem Ker-Lindsay J. (page 86)
[49] idem Ker-Lindsay J. (page 96)
[50] The decision of the International Court of Justice Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2pgk97h
[51] Kosovo The Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2q3fEg9
[52] Call, Charles T. 2004. “Is Transitional Justice Really Just?” Brown J. World Aff. 11: 101.
[53] Cockayne, James. "Transnational organized crime: Multilateral responses to a rising threat." (IPA, 2007).
[54] idem Cockayne, James
[55] International Crisis Group 2016 Report “Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to Early Action” (pp47-74).
[56] idem ICG 2016 report
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· Security Council Resolution S/RES/1160 Retrieved From https://bit.ly/2pePCqu
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