Kenya Under Siege: Examining the Government's Response to the Westgate Attack
Terrorist attacks have posed significant challenges to governments worldwide, and Kenya, tragically, is no exception. The country’s first recorded terrorist attack occurred in 1980 when pro-Palestinian militants bombed the Norfolk Hotel, reportedly in retaliation for Kenya’s support to Israel during Operation Entebbe. Since then, Kenya has been the target of numerous terrorist incidents, especially during the 1990s and 2000s, with various terror groups claiming responsibility and justifying their actions.
The devastating impact of these attacks—from the loss of lives to the destruction of property and long-term economic damage—cannot be fully covered within the scope of this article. However, according to the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE ), the toll by 2016 was staggering: since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi by Al Qaeda, nearly 900 people had been killed and over 6,000 severely injured due to terrorism in Kenya. The NSCVE also emphasizes that the primary threat to Kenya stems from Salafi-Jihadi ideology, predominantly championed by Al-Shabaab (Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen), an Al Qaeda affiliate in the Horn of Africa. Terrorist organizations such as Daesh (ISIS) have also sought to expand their influence in the region, exacerbating radicalization, recruitment, and violence.
The Kenyan government has responded to these threats with security-driven initiatives aimed at countering terrorism and violent extremism. However, while military and security responses are essential, they are not sufficient on their own. Effective crisis communication during such incidents is equally important. Scholars widely agree that terrorism is not just a form of violent extremism but also a communicative act. Experts like Jesper Falkheimer , Elijah Odhiambo et al . and Sara Thorne argue that terrorism must be countered not only militarily but also through strategic communication.
This article focuses on one of Kenya’s most significant terror attacks: the 2013 Westgate Mall siege. This event sparked major government responses and highlighted important lessons about the strengths and weaknesses of the Kenyan government’s crisis communication management. Here we analyse Government of Kenya (GOK) crisis communication response to the terror attack of 2013.
The Westgate Mall Attack
On September 21, 2013, around midday (EAT), the upscale Westgate Mall in Nairobi’s Westlands area was attacked by Somali militant group Al-Shabaab . Armed with hand grenades and automatic rifles, the terrorists unleashed terror on unsuspecting shoppers. According to eyewitness reports , the attack began with a grenade explosion during a rooftop cooking contest, followed by heavy gunfire throughout the mall, leaving many dead or injured.
Initially, the Kenya Police reported the incident as an armed robbery, but the situation quickly escalated into a terrorist hostage crisis, which lasted until September 24th. Kenyan security forces—including the military, paramilitary units, and police —worked to reclaim the mall over several days, using both ground and aerial forces. Emergency services were quick to assist the injured and their families while setting up a cordon around the shopping centre to manage the situation. The attack was broadcast worldwide , as the entire event was captured on the mall’s security cameras. In total, the siege resulted in the deaths of 67 people and left around 175 injured.
Westgate Shopping Mall, a popular hub for Kenyans , diplomats, and international visitors, was a multi-story complex with a basement and rooftop parking. It housed department stores, banks, electronics shops, coffee shops, movie theaters, and amusement areas. On an average weekend, the mall could see as many as 10,000 shoppers at lunchtime.
The siege left the mall extensively damaged. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack , stating on Twitter (now X) that it was in retaliation for Kenya’s military operations in Somalia.
Government of Kenya (GOK) Communication Response to the Crisis
The Kenyan government faced a significant crisis during the Westgate terror attack, which presented unique challenges and unexpected developments. The immediate priority was to confront the terrorists holding hostages inside the mall, but the authorities also needed to manage the attack from a communications perspective. They had to balance swift military action with effective crisis communication to mitigate panic, prevent misinformation, and maintain public trust.
As the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) points out , crises such as terror incidents often lead to confusion and misinformation spreading through the media and public discourse. This makes strategic crisis communication essential in supporting government efforts to counter terrorism. During the Westgate siege, effective communication was crucial in addressing both national and international audiences.
Twitter played a key role in enabling the Kenyan government, emergency personnel, and the public to communicate during the crisis.
Social Media as a Tool for Crisis Communication
Tomer Simon et al . posit that in recent years, social media platforms, particularly Twitter, have emerged as vital tools for near real-time communication during emergency responses. Christopher A. Cassa et al . note that Twitter provides faster updates during developing emergencies compared to traditional media channels. Similarly, Andrea L. Kavanaugh et al. emphasize that Twitter has become essential for both official authorities and the public in crisis situations and they underscore the importance of these platforms for effective communication during emergencies.
During the Westgate attack, Twitter played a pivotal role in facilitating instantaneous communication among the government, emergency personnel, and the public. However, managing the flow of information proved challenging due to the numerous Twitter accounts disseminating official updates, which sometimes contradicted each other.
A variety of government officials , organizations, first responders, and NGOs shared information about the event via Twitter. Key participants are summarized in the table below:
In most organizations, communications were transmitted simultaneously by both the manager of the organization and the organization itself.
The large number of Twitter accounts sharing updates created confusion in the information stream. For instance, on September 22, the Kenya Police tweeted, "For systematic flow of information on the operation at Westgate, please follow @kdfinfo, @InteriorKE, @PoliceKE, @IGkimaiyo, @joelenku," which garnered 108 retweets. The following day, the Ministry of Interior urged the Kenyan Military to follow them back on Twitter for coordinated updates.
On the third day of the attack , Twitter reached out to the Kenyan government to verify accounts used for publishing information related to the crisis. The Presidential Strategic Communications Unit (@PSCU_Digital) tweeted, “@twitter has shared its support by contacting @PSCU_Digital to verify Government accounts—we have started with those communicating #WestGate.” Within three hours, many government accounts, including the Kenya Red Cross, were verified.
The first official tweet , issued an hour into the attack, came from the Ministry of Interior (@InteriorKE), characterizing the incident as an armed robbery and stating that the National Police Service was in pursuit of the attackers: “We've managed to evacuate some people to safety as @PoliceKE pursues the thugs cc @NDOCKenya.”
Fifteen minutes later , they tweeted that the Inspector General (IG) of Police (@IGkimaiyo) was heading to the scene to assess the situation. About 90 minutes after the attack began, the Cabinet Secretary (CS) Joseph Lenku (@joelenku) arrived on-site and tweeted, "I am at the scene and urge the public to remain calm and support @IGkimaiyo and @PoliceKE. We will resolve this quickly." This tweet was immediately retweeted by the Ministry of Interior, reinforcing their collaborative communication efforts.
The initial tweet misrepresented the situation as an armed robbery inside the mall, only for a later tweet to clarify that it had escalated into a hostage crisis. Three hours after the attack, Reuters reported that terrorists were indeed responsible for the incident.
This evolving narrative was further complicated by real-time commentary from journalists and the public on social media, leading to widespread speculation about the gravity of the situation. In response, @PSCU_Digital, tweeted, “Tweet what you are absolutely sure about #Westgate."
Throughout the Westgate crisis, responding organizations actively used Twitter to communicate and engage with both the public and each other. For instance, the Ministry of Interior tweeted, "Give way to ambulances making their way to #WestgateMall cc @NDOCKenya," a message aimed at the public that also served to alert the Kenyan Disaster Operation Center (@NDOCKenya), which retweeted the message two hours later.
Situational Awareness Updates by Government Officials and First Responders
Tomer Simon et al . emphasize that government officials and first responders utilized Twitter to provide critical situational updates during the Westgate Mall attack, categorized into five key areas:
Operational Security and Censorship
Responding organizations remained vigilant about operational security . Many bystanders and journalists broadcasted live updates of the operations, leading to direct requests for the removal of sensitive content. For example, the Kenya Police requested a Twitter user to delete pictures of military helicopters preparing for an operation.
On the second day, @NDOCKenya asked a news outlet to retract a misleading story, stating, “@CapitalFM_kenya, please take that story down. It is misleading and bound to confuse.” They continued to urge media houses to exercise caution in their reporting, emphasizing that the situation remained delicate.
Throughout the crisis, similar requests persisted, with the Ministry of Interior advising a specific user to privately share sensitive thoughts, warning, "The enemy is somewhere watching." On the third day, the police issued a warning about sharing content deemed "repugnant" to national unity, stating, “Those who have shared content that is repugnant to our sense of nationhood be warned that you will be found and charged.”
Communication Discrepancies and Contradictions
Edward Miring’u et al. analysis of Twitter content revealed differing thematic messages that various government agencies sought to communicate during the ongoing attack. There were glaring discrepancies and contradictions regarding the number and identity of the attackers, the fate of militants—whether they were killed or captured—the specifics of the hostages, and the exact number of casualties.
For example, eyewitness accounts from local and international media suggested a woman was leading the militants. President Kenyatta acknowledged these reports, stating that "intelligence reports had suggested that a British woman and two or three American citizens may have been involved.” This was corroborated by then-Foreign CS Ambassador Amina Mohamed, who stated in an interview with PBS that two or three Americans, along with a British woman—believed by the media to be Samantha Lewthwaite—were involved. However, military spokesperson Major Emmanuel Chirchir maintained that the militants were four men led by Abu Baara al-Sudani.
Another discrepancy arose regarding smoke emanating from the building. Initially, authorities claimed the smoke was a tactic by security forces to distract the militants. Later, they attributed it to the attackers burning mattresses inside.
Communication about prior intelligence concerning the attack also became contentious . Kenyan authorities asserted there was no advance warning, while reports from local newspaper The Star, the British Sunday Observer, and the BBC indicated that foreign missions in Kenya, particularly from Israel, had provided intelligence about potential targets, including the Westgate Mall, as early as January of that year. The Governor of Nairobi even mentioned he was aware of this intelligence.
Hashtags and Online Activity
Tomer Simon et al. content analysis identified four categories of hashtags used during the crisis:
In the initial days of the attack, many Twitter users expressed frustration about the excessive number of hashtags assocciated with the event. Phrases like "One incident, many hashtags" reflected the confusion caused by inconsistent usage across the public, media, and NGOs. On September 24, @PSCU_Digital announced that all social media managers had participated in a synchronization meeting via WhatsApp, resulting in the adoption of the hashtag #WithOneAccord for consistent communication among responders.
Twitter vs. Facebook
While both Twitter and Facebook were utilized during the Westgate crisis, Twitter was more actively employed. The Kenya Police began tweeting on September 21, but did not post on Facebook until September 23. Over the course of the crisis, the Kenya Police tweeted 569 times but made only 10 posts on Facebook, reflecting a significant disparity in engagement on the two platforms. At the time, they had 20,267 followers on Twitter compared to just 2,506 fans on Facebook. Similarly, while the @InteriorKe tweeted 1,533 times, they did not post a single message on their Facebook page during the crisis.
Misinformation
Twitter also became a significant source of misinformation during the first day of the Westgate attack. Two tweets, which allegedly showed images of the attackers, were retweeted 106 times—81 of those retweets occurring within the first 30 minutes. However, it was later revealed that the photos actually depicted Kenyan armed forces, not the attackers. Despite the misleading nature of these images, they remained online for about two days before eventually being taken down.
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Al-Shabaab's Propaganda Exploits Communication Gaps
Al-Shabaab effectively capitalized on the communication breakdown within the Kenyan government, taking control of the narrative through Twitter according to Mathias Muindi . Using their account @HSM_PR, the insurgents provided real-time updates, claimed responsibility for the attack, and issued threats. The group’s swift control of the narrative underscored the government’s failure to offer timely and accurate information.
According to Edward Miring’u et al. , it was through Al-Shabaab’s tweets that the media and public first grasped the gravity of the situation, with the group’s initial message being a declaration of responsibility for the attack: “The Mujahideen entered Westgate mall today at around noon…fighting the Kenyan kuffar inside their own turf.” (~@HSM_PR)
Al-Shabaab demonstrated a strategic advantage by staying ahead of Kenyan security forces on Twitter, using the platform to maintain control of the narrative throughout the siege. Their tweeting also served as a deliberate strategy to undermine the Kenyan government’s messaging, providing frequent updates to their supporters. Al-Shabaab tailored their content for different audiences, with English tweets targeting international readers and Somali tweets aimed at the Somali community. The use of the hashtag #Westgate was a key tactic to extend the reach of their propaganda.
The group tweeted over 250 times between 21 and 25 September. As the Kenyan security operation intensified and international attention grew, Al-Shabaab repeatedly had to switch Twitter accounts due to suspensions. Despite that, they continually created new accounts to resume their messaging. During the attack, three separate accounts were active: @hsmpress (21–22 September), @HSM_PRESOFFICE2 (22–23 September), and @HSM_PR (24–25 September).
Muindi and Miring’u et al. observe that Al-Shabaab messaging included taunts aimed at Kenyan forces and claims about the attackers’ origins, portraying the Kenyan troops as ineffective and dismissing any possibility of negotiation. They exploited the government’s communication gap to further spread propaganda and issue threats to the Kenyan government and its citizens.
Citizen-Led Messaging and Public Criticism During the Westgate Attack
During the Westgate attack, Kenyans were highly active on social media, particularly Twitter, engaging in various forms of online activity. Tomer Simon et al . categorized these contributions into six main areas: producing information about the event, sharing and consolidating updates, expressing emotional and social support for those affected, voicing concerns about privacy and security, offering or requesting volunteer assistance, and notably, criticizing the government and its security services.
Many citizens actively contributed to situational awareness by tweeting real-time updates and sharing photos from the scene. One bystander questioned the media's actions, tweeting, “Why is our media showing cops sneaking in?” In response, the Kenyan military urged caution, tweeting, "We urge all Kenyans to be careful about what is being communicated on social media." Similarly, @PSCU_ Digital appealed to the media to refrain from sharing images of soldiers and to only tweet verified information.
A significant portion of public criticism targeted the government's handling of the crisis, particularly its initial communication framing the incident as a robbery. Many Kenyans expressed scepticism about this portrayal and urged the Interior Ministry to investigate the possibility of a terrorist attack. Criticism was also directed at then-CS of Interior Joseph Ole Lenku for providing misleading updates, such as claiming that security forces were in control of the mall even as sporadic gunfire continued.
Further, Muindi observed that many citizens felt that the government had failed to anticipate and mitigate the threat effectively, especially given the history of Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya. The public expected clear explanations and decisive actions, but the official response was perceived as inadequate.
Additionally, accusations of incompetence and corruption within the security forces and the Ministry of Interior surfaced. Delays in updating official social media accounts and posts perceived as inappropriate, such as calls for unity amid an ongoing crisis, further undermined public confidence.
The government's communication strategy faced scrutiny as well. While the Ministry of Interior was the most active in disseminating information, the lack of synchronization across various Twitter accounts led to confusion and inconsistencies. For example, during a press conference, CS Lenku retracted an earlier statement acknowledging the military's role in the collapse of part of the mall, shifting blame to the terrorists, despite later investigations confirming military responsibility.
In an effort to manage the situation and restore public trust , the government emphasized themes of national unity and patriotism. President Kenyatta and the Ministry of Interior frequently invoked sentiments from the national anthem, stressing the importance of solidarity. In a national address, President Kenyatta remarked, “I salute your conscientious and selfless acts of solidarity in response to the terrorist attack.”
Moreover, the Ministry urged citizens and the media to avoid sharing graphic or false content online , framing this as a way to support affected families and to portray the government as empathetic and in control. However, delays in updating social media accounts and some posts viewed as inappropriate—such as calls for national unity while hostages remained unaccounted for—fuelled public doubt.
The Ministry framed the attack not as an isolated incident but as part of a broader pattern of global terrorism, emphasizing the need for collective action. On September 27, President Kenyatta reiterated this perspective, stating, "Terrorism is a global problem that requires global solutions."
Media Coverage of the Westgate Attack
Terror crises inevitably attract widespread media attention, and the Westgate attack was no exception. From local to international outlets, the tragedy dominated headlines across print, online, television, and radio platforms. News updates flowed from every source, capturing the world’s gaze on Kenya. The gravity of the incident resonated globally, with media coverage painting a vivid picture of the unfolding events and ensuring that the Westgate siege remained a focal point for audiences far and wide.
Mathias Muindi noted that local private media coverage of the Westgate attack closely mirrored the communication from state agencies, with minimal independent reporting. This alignment with government narratives was evident in the media's portrayal of the situation. For example, one national newspaper issued an apology for publishing a graphic image of a victim, resulting in the suspension of senior editors. The newspaper's board accused the editors of “glorifying terrorism” by publishing the photo .
Muindi's analysis highlighted a lack of consistent editorial narratives surrounding the attack. A former investigations editor remarked that many reporters demonstrated a limited understanding of terrorism, particularly regarding the ideological motivations of groups like al-Shabaab. Reports that touched on ideology were predominantly sourced from foreign outlets.
Much of the media reporting relied heavily on government sources , such as military spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir and the Ministry of Interior, both of whom were active on Twitter during the crisis. Many media houses avoided reporting messages from Al-Shabaab, maintaining a focus on government communications.
However, the media also played a role in holding the government accountable for its handling of the crisis. Like the public, journalists perceived the event as an act of terrorism. In an editorial titled "Bring Perpetrators of Brazen Attack to Book," published on September 22, The Standard newspaper criticized the government's hesitance to classify the incident as a terrorist attack, despite clear indications to the contrary.
The Ministry of Interior appealed to the media to avoid sharing graphic or false content online, framing this as a way to support affected families. This approach aimed to portray the government as empathetic and in control while encouraging responsible reporting to avoid jeopardizing the safety of hostages. The Media Council of Kenya (MCK ), the regulatory body for media and journalism in the country, also advised caution in reporting to ensure the safety of the hostages was not compromised.
Lack of Centralized Communication Command
Edward Miring’u et al. , analysis uncovered significant flaws in coordination and command during the Westgate attack, particularly in the government’s communication efforts. A report from The Guardian revealed that, four hours into the siege, there was still no clear command structure in place, which led to confusion and deadly friendly fire. Due to a lack of radio communication between the police and military, the KDF soldiers mistakenly shot a commander from the elite Recce Squad, believing him to be a suspect.
Similarly, a review by the BBC echoed these findings , quoting an anonymous military officer involved in the operation. He described how the security forces entered the mall "blindly," without proper guidance or any operational plan. Both the police and military felt disconnected, with each side blaming the other for withholding vital information, resulting in a chaotic response.
This breakdown in command and control was evident in the mixed, uncoordinated, and often contradictory information being disseminated by various government bodies during the crisis according to Miring’u et al. . The various participants actively communicated through at least twelve Twitter accounts, but without a unified message or a designated spokesperson. This disorganized communication led to inaccurate information, conflicting reports, and delays in delivering reliable updates, which only fuelled public confusion and panic.
In terms of alliance building and collaborative messaging, Miring’u et al. , analysis revealed little effort before, during, or after the attack. The conflicting reports from local and international media, government authorities, and even foreign embassies on the nature of the attack, the number of casualties, and the presence of prior intelligence further illustrated this lack of coordination. Foreign missions, particularly from the US and UK, had issued travel advisories before the attack, but Kenyan officials downplayed these warnings, emphasizing that the country was safe and lamenting the potential negative economic impact of such advisories.
Despite government claim s that there had been no prior intelligence warning of the attack, the Governor of Nairobi and international media outlets like Al Jazeera and the BBC later reported that intelligence had, in fact, been available before the attack occurred.
Kenya Red Cross: Emergency Response and Public Engagement
The Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) reported that its emergency response efforts were coordinated in collaboration with various government departments, agencies, organizations, media, and other groups. In the health sector, the University of Nairobi pathologists managed the viewing of bodies at the City Mortuary, while Kenya National Blood Transfusion Services (under the Ministry of Health) and the Kenya Psychological Association supported blood donation campaigns and psychosocial activities, respectively. As the primary organization responsible for emergency response, KRCS was tasked by the government to lead the coordination of interventions for both the public and those directly affected by the attack.
KRCS also partnered with several relevant organizations and agencies, including St. John’s Ambulance, hospitals, and Military Disaster Response Units. Other partners included the Blood Link Foundation, Hope Worldwide Kenya, Blood Life Initiative Kenya, Save the Children, and the Child Welfare Society of Kenya.
Through its External Relations and Public Relations Office, KRCS took charge of awareness and publicity activities aimed at educating the public and media on the psychosocial needs of victims, their families, and the community impacted by the Westgate Mall tragedy. Updates on assessments, program activities, and feedback were shared with beneficiaries and the public through meetings, committees, and Information Education and Communication (IEC) materials.
During the crisis, crowdsourcing played a crucial role , with emergency authorities leveraging the Twitter platform to seek public assistance in two primary ways. First, they made direct requests for information. For instance, the IG of Police appealed for details about potential hostages, tweeting, "Please share information about families who were shopping and are unaccounted for." Second, authorities encouraged the public to help spread information by retweeting or sharing updates on Facebook. An example of this was when the Kenya Police tweeted, "A forensic investigation is underway. We urge the public to stay away for their own safety. Please retweet."
Fundraising and Public Support
In response to a national appeal by the KRCS , a partnership was formed with Safaricom PLC under the initiative "We Are One" to raise funds for the Westgate attack emergency response. The campaign successfully mobilized 102,331,349 Kenya Shillings (around CHF 1.07 million). These funds were distributed across several critical areas, with 15 percent allocated to trauma counselling. Other allocations supported medical emergencies, ambulance services, blood donations, and longer-term medical care.
GOK Response: A SCCT Perspective
Stephen Kimotho and Carolyne Nyarang’o ’s analysis of the Kenyan government’s response to the Westgate terror attack through the lens of Timothy Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) reveals how different crisis response strategies impacted public perception and the government's ability to manage reputational damage. SCCT, grounded in attribution theory , explains how organizations are held responsible during crises and how they can protect their reputation using various response strategies.
Initially, the government employed a defensive strategy, which included denial and scapegoating according to Kimotho and Nyarang’o . The Government downplayed the severity of the attack by labelling it a robbery, leading to confusion and damaging credibility. As public criticism grew, the government shifted to attack-the-accuser tactics, defending its preparedness and blaming external actors like Al-Shabaab to divert responsibility.
Later, the government adopted more accommodative strategies by expressing compassion and promoting unity, especially through public messaging that emphasized solidarity in the face of tragedy. This strategy, known as ingratiation, aimed to reduce public anger by aligning the government with the national suffering. Corrective actions, such as the introduction of the Nyumba Kumi community security initiative, were also implemented to reassure the public that future crises would be handled better.
In the rebuilding phase, the government focused on patriotism and solidarity by acknowledging the nation’s resilience and praising the efforts of security forces. Although no formal apology was issued, these bolstering strategies helped shift the narrative away from failure and toward unity.
Despite these efforts, public perception remained critical. According to SCCT , the government’s prior security failures contributed to increased attribution of responsibility during the Westgate attack, placing the crisis in the intentional/preventable crisis cluster, where stakeholders believe it could have been prevented. This classification heightened public criticism and resulted in significant reputational damage, necessitating long-term efforts to restore trust.
Conclusion
In July 2015, Westgate Shopping Mall re-opened after the devastating terrorist attack in 2013. The reopening was officiated by then Nairobi County Governor Evans Kidero, accompanied by the IG of Police, Joseph Boinnet. Both leaders described the reopening as a symbol of Kenyans' resilience and determination to move forward despite the tragedy of 2013.
In October 2020, former Chief Magistrate Francis Andayi sentenced two men, Mohamed Ahmed Abdi and Hussein Hassan Mustafa, to lengthy prison terms for aiding the Islamist militants responsible for the Westgate Mall attack. Both were sentenced to 18 years for their involvement, with Abdi receiving an additional 15 years for possessing materials promoting terrorism. A third suspect, Liban Abdullahi, was acquitted .
By June 2024, the Kenyan High Court upheld these sentences . Lady Justice Grace Nzioka reaffirmed that the two convicts deserved the harsh penalties due to the gravity of their crimes, which left deep emotional scars on the victims and their families.
The Westgate Mall attack exposed significant communication failures within the Kenyan government and security forces, emphasizing the need for a more coordinated crisis response strategy. Platforms like Twitter proved critical for real-time updates and public engagement, but the attack also highlighted the risks of disjointed messaging. Multiple government agencies released conflicting information, leading to public confusion and criticism. This mismanagement of communication allowed Al-Shabaab to exploit social media, complicating the government's efforts to control the narrative and manage the crisis.
However, amidst these challenges, the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) emerged as a key player, leading efficient emergency response efforts. The attack underscored the need for more streamlined communication within government agencies, ensuring accurate, timely, and consistent messaging in future emergencies.
The Westgate incident also revealed the power of digital platforms in shaping public perception. It became clear that both governments and humanitarian organizations must implement coordinated strategies to counter misinformation and manage public narratives during crises.
Moving forward, the lessons learned from Westgate highlight the importance of strengthening communication synchronization, fostering closer collaboration between the media and government, and restoring public trust in emergency response systems. By implementing these improvements, Kenya can enhance its ability to respond to future crises with greater effectiveness and resilience.