Judicial Doctrines Like Chevron and Stare Decisis Violate Existing US Constitutional Principles

From my viewpoint, shared by thousands of others, the Chevron Doctrine and stare decisis operate as ultra vires and raise judicial principles and concerns about judicial overreach, exceeding constitutional limits by enabling administrative agencies to exercise quasi-legislative powers without explicit Congressional approval. ??

Doctrines like Chevron, crafted through judicial interpretation rather than legislative or executive approval, highlight the tension between the judiciary's role in interpreting the law and Congress's exclusive authority to create it. These doctrines can and should be challenged through legislative action and judicial review, without necessitating constitutional amendments, as the existing constitutional framework provides mechanisms to address such overreaches. Stare decisis, while essential for legal stability, becomes problematic when used to uphold unconstitutional interpretations, effectively bypassing the balance of powers established by the Constitution. Addressing these issues reinforces the separation of powers and ensures that policymaking authority remains with elected representatives, preserving democratic accountability and the integrity of the U.S. Constitution

Judicial overreach and its impact on the separation of powers, as policymaking authority constitutionally resides with elected representatives. While Chevron remains a binding precedent for now, its future is uncertain as the judiciary increasingly scrutinizes its constitutional basis. Addressing such doctrines through legislative action and judicial review—without requiring constitutional amendments—strengthens democratic accountability and preserves the integrity of the Constitution. Stare decisis, though essential for legal stability, must not be used to perpetuate interpretations that conflict with constitutional principles or bypass the balance of powers established by the framers.

Several existing statutes allow Congress to revise and reduce the judicial deference granted to agencies under the Chevron Doctrine. These statutes establish the framework for how federal agencies operate, interpret laws, and make rules. By amending these statutes, Congress can redefine the balance of power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

The Chevron Doctrine could be viewed as ultra vires—beyond the constitutional authority of the judiciary—if it is seen as improperly delegating legislative power to administrative agencies or courts. Here's why:

Chevron as Ultra Vires:

1. Legislative Power Rests with Congress: Under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, all legislative powers are vested in Congress. If the Chevron Doctrine enables administrative agencies to make binding rules without clear Congressional authorization, it could be considered an unconstitutional legislative power delegation.
2. Judiciary’s Role is Limited: The judiciary's role is to interpret the law, not create or delegate legislative authority. The Chevron Doctrine arguably allows courts to abdicate their duty to independently interpret statutes by deferring to agency interpretations, even when those interpretations significantly shape public policy.
3. Accountability and Separation of Powers: Administrative agencies are part of the Executive Branch, and their power should be limited to executing laws passed by Congress. Allowing them to effectively "fill in the gaps" of ambiguous statutes via regulations stretches the Constitution's separation of powers.
4. Ultra Vires Concerns: The Chevron Doctrine was judicially created, not legislatively enacted. Critics argue that since Congress did not explicitly authorize this standard of judicial deference, the doctrine operates outside the constitutional framework, making it ultra vires.

While Chevron's origins and application can be viewed as ultra vires under a strict constitutional interpretation, it remains binding precedent because:

• The Supreme Court has not overturned it.
• The judiciary operates under stare decisis, adhering to past decisions for consistency.
• Congress has not acted to legislatively override the doctrine.

Yet, changing the binding status of Chevron as a precedent requires action by either the Supreme Court or Congress. Without such action, Chevron remains enforceable law, even as its constitutional legitimacy is increasingly questioned.

Key Statutes Congress Can Revise:

1. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) - 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.: Purpose: Governs the process by which federal agencies propose and implement regulations and provides standards for judicial review of agency actions. How Congress Could Revise: Add provisions explicitly requiring courts to perform de novo review of agency interpretations of statutes, eliminating judicial deference to agency interpretations. Clarify that agencies may not interpret ambiguous statutes beyond their clear textual authority. Impose stricter procedural requirements for agency rulemaking, such as enhanced public participation or additional Congressional oversight.
2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984): While this is not a statute but a judicial precedent, Congress can pass legislation codifying limits on the doctrine itself, such as: A requirement that courts may only defer to agency interpretations when Congress has explicitly authorized such deference in the statute.
3. Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.): Purpose: Mandates publication of agency rules, regulations, and orders in the Federal Register. How Congress Could Revise: Specify that rules published under ambiguous statutory authority require Congressional approval before taking effect.
4. Congressional Review Act (CRA) - 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808: Purpose: Allows Congress to review and disapprove newly promulgated federal regulations. How Congress Could Revise: Expand the scope of the CRA to allow retroactive review and disapproval of existing regulations that rely on ambiguous statutory authority. Strengthen procedural requirements for agency rules by requiring additional Congressional involvement before they become law.
5. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) - 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612: Purpose: Ensures that agencies consider the impact of their regulations on small entities. How Congress Could Revise: Introduce additional limitations on the scope of agency rulemaking authority, especially where statutes are ambiguous.
6. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - 5 U.S.C. § 552: Purpose: Promotes transparency in government by requiring agencies to disclose information upon request. How Congress Could Revise: Amend to require detailed disclosure of the statutory basis for all regulations and agency interpretations, ensuring greater accountability.
7. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) - 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521: Purpose: Reduces the burden of federal paperwork and streamlines agency data collection. How Congress Could Revise: Restrict agencies from using ambiguous statutory authority to impose burdensome regulations without explicit Congressional approval.
8. Independent Agencies and Other Special Statutes: Congress can target specific enabling statutes of independent agencies (e.g., SEC, EPA, FCC) to clarify the limits of their interpretive authority.

Example: The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.), the statute at issue in Chevron, could be amended to limit the EPA’s ability to interpret ambiguities without explicit Congressional direction.

Potential Legislative Language:

• "No Deference Clause": "In interpreting this Act, no court shall afford deference to an agency's interpretation of its provisions unless explicitly authorized by Congress."
• Enhanced Congressional Oversight: "All rules promulgated under this statute shall require approval by a joint resolution of Congress before taking effect."

Stare Decisis and Its Constitutional Implications:

Further, stare decisis itself can be viewed as an overreach under the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, particularly when it leads to the perpetuation of judicial decisions that may conflict with constitutional principles. Here's why:

1. Judicial Authority and Separation of Powers: The Constitution explicitly assigns distinct roles to the three branches of government: legislative (Article I), executive (Article II), and judicial (Article III). Judicial decisions that interpret laws or establish legal doctrines may, in some cases, go beyond mere interpretation and enter the realm of policymaking or lawmaking—activities constitutionally reserved for the legislative branch.
2. Challenges of Stare Decisis: Stare decisis means "to stand by things decided," and it suggests that courts should generally follow established precedents. While this principle promotes legal stability and consistency, it can perpetuate unconstitutional interpretations or doctrines, like Chevron or other expansive judicial doctrines, that undermine the separation of powers.
3. Judicial Overreach: If courts rely too heavily on stare decisis to uphold judicial doctrines or precedents that conflict with constitutional limits, it risks institutional overreach. By consistently deferring to past decisions—even when those decisions overstep constitutional boundaries—courts may effectively legislate from the bench, which is not their constitutional mandate.
4. Impact on Legislation and Executive Power: Courts using stare decisis to maintain doctrines like Chevron can effectively allow administrative agencies to create binding regulations without clear Congressional authorization. This weakens legislative oversight and executive accountability, which are foundational principles of the constitutional system.

Checks on Stare Decisis Overreach:

1. Judicial Review and Overturning Precedent: While courts generally respect precedent, they have the authority to overturn decisions if those decisions conflict with constitutional principles. Recent cases reflect increasing scrutiny of precedents like Chevron, signalling potential shifts in judicial interpretation.
2. Legislative Action: Congress can act to counter judicial doctrines by clarifying statutory language, potentially limiting or overriding court decisions through new legislation.

Stare decisis seen as an overreach aligns with broader critiques about judicial activism. While stare decisis serves an important role in maintaining legal stability, when used to perpetuate unconstitutional interpretations or doctrines, it risks bypassing the constitutional framework designed for the balance of powers. This creates a space where the judiciary may overstep its boundaries, conflicting with the roles reserved for the legislative branch under the U.S. Constitution.

However, Congress can indirectly influence how courts apply stare decisis and the Chevron doctrine by addressing the legal foundations of the doctrine through legislative means. Here are the key avenues Congress can explore within the confines of the U.S. Constitution:

1. Revising the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts (Article III, Section 1 and 2):

• Existing Statutes: Judiciary Act of 1789 (28 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.): Establishes the structure and jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (Appeals from Federal Courts of Appeals): Governs how cases reach the Supreme Court.
• How Congress Can Revise: Pass statutes restricting the types of cases where stare decisis applies, such as cases involving constitutional interpretation versus statutory interpretation. Limit federal court jurisdiction in specific areas where precedent has led to outcomes perceived as overreach, thus minimizing the application of stare decisis in those areas.

2. Enabling New Laws to Override Judicial Precedents:

• Existing Statutes: Administrative Procedure Act (APA) – 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.: Provides mechanisms for reviewing agency decisions and judicial interpretations.
• How Congress Can Revise: Enact laws that directly counteract problematic precedents by explicitly addressing the issues raised in those rulings. For example, Congress can rewrite statutes interpreted by courts in ways that have entrenched unwanted precedents. Insert explicit "override" language to clarify legislative intent, thereby diminishing the weight of judicial precedents based on previous ambiguous statutory language.

3. Defining Rules of Construction and Interpretation:

• Existing Statutes: Rules of Construction Statutes – 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8: These statutes guide courts in interpreting Congressional laws.
• How Congress Can Revise: Pass legislation mandating that courts prioritize the most recent statutory language over judicial precedents when conflicts arise, effectively limiting stare decisis in statutory cases. Establish rules that emphasize the textual or originalist approach to interpretation, curbing judicial reliance on prior decisions that deviate from these principles.

4. Congressional Power to Limit Remedies or Applications:

• Existing Statutes: Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and similar statutes: Congress often revisits these laws to clarify their applications in response to judicial precedents.
• How Congress Can Revise: Amend specific laws to explicitly state that judicial precedents interpreting the law in certain ways are no longer valid. By providing clear statutory guidelines, Congress can effectively override precedents that it views as problematic.

5. Addressing Constitutional Interpretation Through Legislation:

• Existing Statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal Question Jurisdiction): Grants federal courts jurisdiction over constitutional questions.
• How Congress Can Revise: While Congress cannot directly change constitutional interpretations upheld under stare decisis, it can propose statutory clarifications or even Constitutional amendments (if necessary) to counteract entrenched precedents.

6. Creating Oversight Mechanisms to Challenge Precedents:

• Existing Statutes: Congressional Review Act (CRA) – 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808: Allows Congress to review and disapprove federal regulations.
• How Congress Can Revise: Expand the scope of Congressional oversight to include challenges to judicial precedents that misinterpret statutes, requiring courts to revisit such precedents under new Congressional findings.

7. Limiting the Doctrine’s Scope Through Legislation:

• Potential Statutory Amendments: Congress can include language in new laws stating that courts should not rely on prior precedents when interpreting the statute. For instance: “No prior judicial interpretation of this statute shall be binding in subsequent litigation involving its provisions.”

8. Encouraging Judicial Reform:

• Existing Statutes: Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364): Regulates judicial behavior and accountability.
• How Congress Can Revise: Introduce measures requiring judges to justify reliance on stare decisis in decisions, particularly when overturning it would align better with constitutional or legislative intent.

Conclusion:

Congress cannot directly repeal or eliminate stare decisis because it is a judicial principle, not a statutory rule. However, by revising statutes like the Judiciary Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and other laws governing statutory interpretation and judicial review, Congress can constrain the influence of judicial precedents. Additionally, Congress can pass legislation clarifying legislative intent, thereby counteracting entrenched precedents that deviate from the Constitution or statutory framework. These measures, within constitutional boundaries, allow the people’s elected representatives to address perceived judicial overreach.