JFK and the Art of Negotiation

First, a personal note?

Sixty years ago today President John F. Kennedy was shot and killed in Dallas, Texas. On October 26, 1963, just four weeks earlier, Kennedy had given what proved to be his last major speech. It was ?at the ground-breaking for a new library at Amherst College honoring the poet Robert Frost. I was there.?

His speech is largely remembered as celebrating the arts and their role in our society. Kennedy said that, “Robert Frost coupled poetry and power, for he saw poetry as the means of saving power from itself. When power leads man towards arrogance, poetry reminds him of his limitations. When power narrows the areas of man's concern, poetry reminds him of the richness and diversity of his existence. When power corrupts, poetry cleanses. For art establishes the basic human truths which must serve as the touchstone of our judgment.”?

JFK: The Negotiator?

Kennedy practiced what he preached. Rigorous judgment is essential in any negotiation, especially when the stakes are high.

The greatest achievement of John F. Kennedy’s presidency was resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962. Agreement wasn’t a foregone conclusion. Kennedy himself calculated that the chance of a nuclear catastrophe was at least one in three, maybe higher. But he had learned a lot about negotiating from his failed summit talk with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev a year earlier in Vienna. That piece of history provides lessons that still apply today even in seemingly everyday transactions.?

First, Kennedy was agile strategically. Among his own advisors, hawks argued strongly for immediate attacks on the missile sites being built in Cuba. Kennedy understood that military action might soon be necessary, but he was determined to use the limited time available to pursue alternatives that wouldn’t trigger World War III. Imposing a blockade on Cuba (he called it a “quarantine”) was less provocative and gave him the chance to negotiate.?

Second, he stress-tested his options by actively seeking counsel from experts with widely divergent views. As a result, he avoided the “confirmation bias” trap, that is, being told only what others thought he wanted to hear. As a result, he fully understood the risks entailed in whatever path he might take.?

Third, he used multiple channels of communication, instead of relying solely on formal messages sent back-and-forth between Washington and Moscow. Much later it was learned that Kennedy’s brother Robert (who was also Attorney General) held three secret meetings with Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin. In these private sessions they floated proposals and developed a measure of personal trust.?

Fourth, the President understood that the other side was not monolithic. Just as with his White House advisers, there were hawks and doves within the Kremlin. He had to craft a resolution that would have sufficient support within both governments, but he didn’t have to please the hardest-to-please parties.?

Fifth, Kennedy allowed Khrushchev to save face. In return for the Soviets’ removing their missiles in Cuba, the president publicly pledged that the United States would never invade that country. Given the humiliating Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, there was little likelihood that the US would make another such attempt, but the guarantee gave the Premier something he could trumpet as a victory. My friend William Ury calls this tactic “building a golden bridge.” It enables a counterpart to justify an agreement to others (and also to him or herself).?

Finally, Kennedy enriched the deal with a side agreement. On the twelfth day of the standoff, with tensions mounting, Khrushchev sent a letter that made it seem that a deal was imminent. But then several hours later a more belligerent message appeared, with added demands, including insistence on US removal of Jupiter missiles it had installed in Turkey, bordering the Soviet Union.?

That issue was potentially a deal-killer, as the Americans didn’t want to appear as if they were blackmailed into making a significant military concession. But it was suggested (apparently by Secretary of State Dean Rusk) that President Kennedy reply formally to the initial, more conciliatory Soviet proposal, and then have Robert Kennedy privately ask Ambassador Dobrynin deliver the written letter to Khrushchev along with an oral message to Khrushchev that the US missiles in Turkey would be withdrawn.?

These six elements were all critical parts Kennedy’s negotiation strategy. They were bound together by a tough-minded appraisal of the situation. Like a chess master, Kennedy played both sides of the table, thinking several moves ahead, trying to anticipate how the Soviets might respond to American actions. He didn’t wish away the risks. He allowed for possible miscalculation on their part, rather than counting on them to respond “rationally” to the carrots and sticks he might deploy.?

The same kind of tough-mindedness is essential in our own negotiations, even when far less is at stake. Having that attitude compels us to confront that whatever unfolds is never fully under our control. Whoever we deal with may be as determined—and imperfect—as we are ourselves. Recognizing that reality compels us to be both agile strategically and creative in executing our plans.??

Postscript: A largely forgotten theme

The President also spoke at length about social equity. “Privilege is here,” Kennedy said, “and with privilege goes responsibility.” He knew of privilege himself, of course, and looking out at us from the podium, he didn’t mince words.?

“There is inherited wealth in this country and also inherited poverty. And unless the graduates of this College and other colleges like it who are given a running start in life -- unless they are willing to put back into our society those talents, the broad sympathy, the understanding, the compassion--unless they're willing to put those qualities back into the service of the Great Republic, then obviously the presuppositions upon which our democracy are based are bound to be fallible.”?

For more on the Missile Crisis, see Robert Kennedy’s Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. And if you’re interested in hearing President Kennedy’s inspiring 14-minute speech, here is a link. It is as relevant today as it was 60 years ago when I first heard it.. Actually, even more so.

#negotiation #conflictresolution #CubanMissleCrisis #PresidentKennedy