Je m' appelle Emmanuel

During the last four years, German politics have been dominated by an endless struggle for consensus decision making and - for most of the time - unproductive indecisiveness. Faced by one crisis followed by another, Germany, which by grace of her geographic location, economic prosperity and population size, is at the helm of the European Union, has usually remained in the wings. In all the great calls and challenges, the German answer has been one of cautiousness and willingness to preserve a dysfunctional (most of the times) status quo.

The outgoing chancellor, Angela Merkel, who was already in office for twelve consecutive years, won clearly the last election, in 2017, albeit with a curtailed majority. Her failure to achieve a 'Jamaica coalition' of her party, CDU/CSU, the Free Democrats and the Greens, was the first nail in the Christian Democratic coffin; the CDU had governed as member of a grand coalition with the centre-left Social Democrats both after the election of 2005 and of 2013, forced to tame down conservative policy making. Christian Lindner's refusal to let his party, the Free Democrats, to join government in the outcome of the last election, paved the way for a third term of grand coalition. But the CDU was third time unlucky.

Having suffered a miserable defeat in 2017, securing a mere 20% of the vote, the Social Democrats were thought to have entered the process of 'pasokification', with their fate being one of becoming a small party. In order to avoid that call of fate, the party's then-leader, Martin Schulz declared that there was not going to be any other grand coalition. His calls were ignored and a new coalition was forged in February 2018. Schulz resigned from party leadership, leaving the position to Andrea Nahles, whereas Mrs Merkel, although retaining the chancellery, looked too frail to take risks and initiatives, both within Germany and abroad.

Dr Merkel had a great opportunity in the last four years of leaving a legacy of not only a successful German chancellor and a cornerstone of European stability, but also as a flag-bearer of the West, in an era in which president Donald Trump looked poised to pull the United States out of its alliances' spotlight, diplomatically and militarily, and in which Europe was in great need of further integration and strategic autonomy. She failed to do so, concentrating in Germany's trade balance problems, especially in the light of the Sino-American trade war, and to holding the centrifuge waves within Europe in check. Brexit and the coronavirus aside, the last four years of German politics, and CDU/CSU leadership especially, may be perfectly described with a single word: boring; yet they were boring despite the turbulence of the times, thus at the expense of opportunities for all Germany, the EU and the conservative movement.

With the chancellor unwilling to run for a fifth term in office, there was even a time that the two presumptive candidates for her post were Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, a politician so unwitty and lacking personal charm, so as to be nicknamed 'mini-Merkel', and Andrea Nahles, who managed to drag the Socialists to 15% in the polls, giving a chunk of its audience to the Greens, who were also emboldened firstly as they were the only credible progressive party in opposition and secondly due to a soar of calls for climate action and green energy transition.

The pandemic was a catalyst in German politics; at first, Mrs Merkel reigned supreme, due to her leadership credentials, peaking support for her CDU/CSU party at 40% in mid-2020. But after a couple of months, with the electorate growing tired of covid-generated restrictions and due to scandals conerncing the sluggish (especially in the beginning) vaccine rollout, the party fell to its pre-pandemic support level of around 30%. When the Christian Democrats picked Armin Laschet as the candidate for the chancellery instead of the much more charismatic Markus S?der and the Greens chose Annalena Baerbock, things seemed to twist; support for the CDU plunged to 25% while the eco-minded party soared to 22% or even more. At the end of June 2021, all scenarios seemed open: both the Christian Democrats and the Greens might win; the grand coalition might endure or give its place to 'black and green' coalition of the aforementioned parties, or even a Green-powered government might emerge.

Things have now changed. Laschet has proven to be too weak and was heavily influenced by the devastating and deadly floods that wrecked his home-state of North Rhine Westfallia making him extremely unpopular to voters in the German south-west. The Bavarians are unimpressed and unenthused due to their darling's, Markus S?der, remaining out of the centre stage. The Germans in the East are fed up with the CDU's leniency on immigration and at the industrial northwerstern states, the fear of a Laschet chancellery propped up by the Greens, scares voters. In Berlin, the pandemic related scandals loom the party. Thus, support for the CDU/CSU stands today at roughly 20%. On the other side of the aisle, Annalena Baerbock, who we thought of being the next chancellor, at some point, has proven to be disastrous; after faking out parts of her curriculum vitae, she has failed to address the concerns that her climate crisis rhetoric will wear off Germany's standing in global trade and will not cost to the economy and especially to blue-collar working class voters. The Greens seem too conservative for leftists and too aloof for the poor. Their appeal is concentrated in large city-centres and has failed to garner support in more rural areas or in Socialist strongholds in the West. Baerbock's inaccuracies concerning her credentials has cost her a personality cult. Her party now is found at approximately 17%.

All of this fuss has been tremendous news for the Social Democrats (SPD), who have unexpectedly revived, emerging from their 15% political exile to a descent 25% in recent polls. Their favourite for the chancellery, Olaf Scholz, has the most chances of succeeding Dr Merkel at the top job. This epic turnaround has nothing to do with Mr Scholz's personal charm but rather with the bitter failure of his opponents to run robust campaigns. Mr Scholz, who is currently vice-chancellor, can both appeal to middle and working-class people, as he hails from the centre-left, and to mediocre CDU supporters who seek stability. He can speak to both rural voters, adressing their concerns, and educated voters in the cities who have more progressive views, shared with the Social Democrats' manifesto.

Mr Scholz's rise to prominence strikingly resembles Mr Macron's. The president of France, a well-educated and well-mannered centrist, won the election in 2017, due in large part to the inability and failures of his opponents. Like Mr Scholz, Emmanuel Macron profited from the disillusionment of the conservative voter and the scandals that plagued the centre-right's candidate, Fran?ois Fillon, who was unable to reverse the bad optics. Both men came from parties that were seen as destined to fall in destitution. Both men were ministers for the Economy and were thought unlikely to lead their countries. As the popularity of Mr Fillon collapsed, Mr Macron's surged; the exact same with today's CDU and Mr Scholz. And as Mr Macron had to combat the far-left and far-right, so does Mr Scholz; the Grünen are thought to be politically inexperienced, radical and unfit for senior coalition partners in government. Die Linke, the leftist party of the country too. And the Alternative für Deutschland, the far-right outfit needs to be kept out of the centre stage. Similarly, in 2017 France, Mrs Le Pen was too radical, inexperienced and extremist to govern. Mr Melenchon, from La France Insoumise, was too much on the left in order to garner support from the political centre and, in the case of France, the Greens were not central in the country's politics. So, it may be said that what happened in France four years ago was a peculiar 'in dubio pro Macron'.?

As Mr Macron, Olaf Scholz is a competent technocrat with government experience, who has?roots in the centre-left and does not scare off neither conservatives nor progressives. He is pro business (just as Mr Macron) but has a climate agenda (yet nuanced in comparison with the Greens). He is pro-immigration but also pro-integration. He presents himself as the friendly face of the establishment (exactly as Mr Macron was branded), even copying Angela Merkel's hand gestures. If Mr Scholz wins, he will do so in a macronist way: as the comparatively more secure choice. But if he governs, he must outdo both his predecessor and his French executive counterpart. Times have changed and stakes are high; in the roaring twenties' EU, tough leadership will be needed.