ISWAPS Out of Area Campaign 2022/23

Nigerian jihadi group Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP ) has evolved significantly since splitting from Boko Haram.

In 2022 alone it has taken credit for 25% of Islamic State attacks worldwide, conducting 517 attacks in Nigeria out of 547 attacks in the Lake Chad region inflicting 1,589 deaths. Whilst the scale of these attacks is diminished such that towns and bases are no longer routinely captured, the scope has increased with a large number of attacks over a wider area.

Of interest in this instance are attacks that have taken place away from North East Nigeria (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa State), ISWAPs traditional area of operations.

We will seek to look at some of these attacks and other activities between March 2022 to March 2023 and develop an understanding.

Attacks in General -Situation:

There have been at least 25 attacks claimed by or attributed to ISWAP outside of North East Nigeria, with 2 main methods of attack; IEDs (33%) and small arms (67%). Geographically these attacks took place in 4 distinct areas of operations: Kogi State (including parts of Ondo and Edo), Jalingo in Taraba State, FCT area (encompassing FCT, Kaduna and Niger States) and Kano States.

Attacks in Detail– Key Factors and Deductions

Terrain Physical and Human: focus will be on Taraba State and the intersection between Kogi, Edo and Ondo States

Taraba State: lies on Nigeria’s eastern border with Cameroun, with Bauchi and Gombe States to the north west, Adamawa to the north east and east, Cameroun to the east and south, Benue to the south west and Plateau and Nasarawa to the west.

Terrain consists of mountains of up to 1,000m in the south and wooded, grassy savanna in the north. Numerous rivers cross the state including the River Benue flowing north east to south west.

Jalingo the capital in the north east corner of the state, is approximately 25km south of the River Benue on a flat savannah type terrain, bordered by the foothills of the Shebshi Mountains to the east and south with.

The town is bordered by/ bisected by the Mayo Gwoi and Lamurde Rivers to the west and north with the Ardo Kola LGA on the west bank of the river opposite Nukkai District which is on the western edge of Jalingo.

It is multi tribal with Fulanis, Mumuye, Mambila, Wurkuns, Jukun, Kuteb, Yandang, Ndola, Itcehn, Tigun and Jibu. Attacks in Taraba were all in Jalingo, mostly in the Ardo Kalo LGA, Kogi attacks were in Adavi, Okehi, Ajaokuta, Lokoja, Okene and Kabbah Bunu LGA

Edo, Ondo and Kogi State: Kogi State lies in Nigeria’s middle belt. there have been 13 attacks over a 12 month period in this area encompassing 3 states (Kogi, Edo and Ondo) within a roughly 40 km radius from Okene Town, Okene LGA, Kogi State with the exception of 2 attacks in the vicinity of Owo Town, Owo LGA, approximately 85km away. The population is mostly Egbira in Okene, Yoruba in Ondo, in Kabba, the local language is Owe a Yoruba dialect.

Okene Town is situated in Ubo River valley surrounded by. It has good road connections north, south east and west, sitting at the intersection of roads to Lokoja, Kabba, Ikare, Ajaokuta, Anchi. Okene is an Egbira town. This tribe and its sub tribes can be found in Kogi (Adavi, Ajaokuta, Okehi and Okene LGAs), FCT Nasarawa State (Toto LGA) and Edo State (known as the Etuno/ Igarra in Akoko Edo LGA). Egbira’s mostly practice Islam with a significant Christian minority.

SO WHAT? Taraba’s proximity to the northeast (Gombe and Adamawa) makes contagion and the supply of equipment and expertise relatively easy. The terrain of Ondo, Edo and Kogi is interspersed with fast running rivers, forests, wooded hills and rocky hills making it ideal ground to conduct ambushes and withdraw rapidly as well as conceal camps with ample space for training and concealment. The area is also ethnically diverse allowing someone with local knowledge to conceal strangers relatively easily in built up areas. While Kogi Central is in Ebiraland, Akoko Edo is Esan and Owo is Yoruba, as is typical with such areas there is sufficient cross pollination around the area. It can be assumed that while the terrain of Ondo, Edo and Kogi is vast and difficult off road, for local people with local knowledge it will be relatively easy to traverse in the appropriate vehicle and also to blend into the ethnically diverse areas either to prepare, conduct attacks or recces or escape, while the security forces from the poorly equipped Federally recruited forces will be limited by low numbers, training and equipment to main roads and will not have knowledge of the language or area to spot someone out of place.

It is interesting that attacks in Taraba were concentrated around Jalingo. This would indicate that the cell was either based in or close to the city.

Targets: Majority of the attacks were on civilian targets (56%), with bars in Taraba and Kogi State as the main targets. The security forces (mainly police vehicle patrols and checkpoints, police stations) were the preferred targets. There were 3 deliberate large scale attacks against bespoke targets (train, prison, military holding facility)

SO WHAT? all the civilian target locations were areas where mass casualties could be inflicted and mostly utilized by people jihadis would be likely to target (Christians, alcohol drinkers etc). There doesn’t seem to have been a deliberate attempt to target or avoid particular tribes. It could be assumed the purpose of these attacks was to inflict mass casualties in order to frighten and intimidate the civilian population and influence other actors (the Government, local leaders, other jihadis etc). With two exceptions the security force targets were all small, low risk and isolated, that could be easily approached, isolated and attacked by larger forces. Police are most likely targeted due to the fact they are widely deployed, far dispersed with poor training and communications in relatively small size units which allows the enemy to use surprise and/or darkness to rapidly overwhelm them with relatively less resources. It could be assumed these targets were selected in order to, capture weapons, reduce the security bubble and intimidate and attrit the security forces.

Victims: 55% of the attacks were targeted at innocent civilians, who bore the brunt of those killed, wounded and abducted. The rest of the attacks were against the security forces with the police as the main target. The nature of some targets such as churches and bars appear to deliberately target Christians or non observant Muslims but the attacks show very little discrimination in victims. Muslims are killed, abducted and ransomed without prejudice as well as Christians. The targets of the Kaduna-Abuja train attack were middle class Nigerians irrespective of tribe or religion. The victims were maltreated and ransomed irrespective of tribe, religion or class. However despite maltreatment, the kidnappers made effort to keep them alive and extract maximum ransom for each victim

SO WHAT? The nature, timing and targeting of these attacks shows very little interest or inclination to minimize civilian casualties. It is difficult to assess the demographics of their victims. However little attempt is made to preserve life during attacks. It can be assumed that victims of mass casualty attacks were selected to ensure most of them would be considered legitimate targets to their target audiences of fundamentalist jihadis (i.e. Christians, non observant Muslims (alcohol drinkers) or the security forces). Kidnap for ransom targets were targeted at middle class Nigerians and foreigners in order to extract maximum financial gain.

Method of attack: IED and small arms attacks were the key methods of attacks of which IEDs were used exclusively in 36% of the attacks. From the lethality and placement of the devices used it is likely they were handheld devices (devices captured in Taraba were contained in bottles), with the exception of the VBIED at the Palace in Okene. No information has been released about the explosives used by the authorities but one could assume they were either homemade or commercial explosives due to comparatively low casualties (this could also be due to some devices being used outdoors where the explosions would not be amplified by walls etc). IEDs were also used as part of small arms attacks against the Wawa Cantonment, Owo, Kuje, Kaduan-Abuja Train and other targets. These also appear to be handheld devices (VBIED use was not reported), although it would appear larger devices were used in Wawa and Kuje. Although the method of detonation is not known, they were possibly detonated by timer or remotely. IEDs used in small arms attacks were most likely detonated manually, with a fuse

Small arms were used in the majority of the attacks and caused the most casualties. While the type of weapons used are not known from pictures it can be surmised that automatic, long barreled military weapons (rifles/ light/ medium machine guns) were used.

SO WHAT: with the exception of large scale deliberate attacks such as at Wawa and Kuje, the cells appear lightly armed with weapons that can be easily obtained, hidden, created and moved. While the forests and hills of Kogi especially are ideal for caching weapons, it would appear the enemy values their mobility and is either not willing, able or ready to use larger weapons or mount larger attacks. The VBIED used at the end of the year thus appears to be a major step up in capability but not necessarily capacity.

Types of attacks: The attacks included kidnap for ransom (2), deliberate attacks with small arms/ small arms and IEDs (15), deliberate attacks with IEDS (8), assassination (1) and prison breaks (2)

SO WHAT? While the cell has chosen relatively low risk targets for their small arms attacks, this method is still more risky then remotely detonated IEDs. It can be surmised that small arms are preferred as these attacks in order to capture weapons and allow new fighters to gain confidence and experience

Casualties: up to 100 people have been killed, 51 wounded and 171 abducted.

Most casualties were caused by small arms (approximately 77) with the most lethal attack taking place in Owo, Ondo State with 41 dead and 50 wounded. In terms of victims the most significant attack was that on the Kaduna- Abuja train, with up to 168 people taken hostage, up to 9 people were killed and several wounded. IEDs have been less lethal killing up to 13 and wounding up to 52 people. If the single Owo attack is discounted, 78% of the casualties were in the Kogi/Edo/ Ondo axis. Kogi State saw the highest number of civilian and security force casualties.

As is unfortunately typical in Nigeria, these figures are approximate as exact casualty figures seem to be difficult to compile, much less a breakdown of the victim’s identity.

SO WHAT? It can be presumed from the tempo, volume and lethality of operations in Kogi (particularly Kogi Central) and its surroundings, this area constitutes this cells geographical, cultural and operational centre of gravity despite this, these casualties represent 0.1% of total fatalities inflicted by ISWAP in 2022 indicating that ISWAPs centre of gravity remains in the North East of Nigeria/ Lake Chad Basin area.

Attribution: ISWAP claimed 15 attacks via their Telegram Channel, 6 were attributed to them by the security forces. 53% were claimed 24 hours after the attack, 27% in 48 hours and the rest in 72 hours. Claims were generally backed up with photographs and claims of friendly losses, no mention is made of enemy losses.

SO WHAT? It can be argued that information exploitation is a key component of ISWAPs battle drills. The speed of their dissemination, level of detail (location, number of casualties) and the quality of the pictures indicates that they either have a dedicated photographer with them or designate a fighter to take photos and conduct a rapid assessment of friendly casualties and captured equipment. The information (presented with ISWAP branding) is processed and passed on to another element for preparation and rapid upload, indicating a close relationship with ISWAP main

Of interest however are those not directly claimed by ISWAP such as the attack on the church in Owo. This was attributed by the authorities to ISWAP, fairly rapidly with no confirmation, comment or denial from ISWAP. If it was an ISWAP attack (for the purpose of this paper it is assumed it is) the failure to claim it could indicate that they realized the high casualty count, especially of women and children of which very graphic pictures circulated, would be harmful to their narrative or possibly provoke a backlash or retaliation that would disrupt their support network. It can be presumed that ISWAP rapidly exploits their attacks in order to dominate the information space, confirm their actions and influence their target audiences.

Kano: presents an interesting conundrum, as per the timeline below there have been 2 explosions and 2 interceptions of IED making materials followed by an assassination. There have been no claims of responsibility for these attacks or direct attribution of responsibility by the authorities. The first explosion in/ around a chemical shop in Sabon Gari on 17/05/2022 was declared an accident (first gas then chemical explosion) by the authorities, however 2 days later a car chased by police and then abandoned in Kumbotso LGA was found to contain weapons, IED and explosive making materials. 2 weeks later another shop exploded in Kumbotso LGA, about 2 months later another car was intercepted with IEDs and IED components in the same area. This curious sequence of events culminated with the assassination of an Igbo trader and his friend in Kano 2 months later (which was explicitly claimed by ISWAP who described him as a Nigerian Army spy)

SO WHAT? If one viewed all of these events through a particular angle one could suggest there is circumstancial evidence to assume that a campaign was planned for Kano. Whether this was meant to be a terror campaign targeting public spaces or the security forces or a deliberate attack on a facility such as a prison is not clear. But the cell would seem to have been based in or around the Sabon Gari/ Kumbotso LGA area.

One could speculate that the first explosion was an accident in an IED making facility and the subsequent interceptions could have been due to the cell seeking to replenish lost stores with finished IEDs and bomb making materials. The unusual efficiency shown by the police could have resulted from them exploiting intelligence materials found at the scene to intercept surviving cell members. The loss of material and expertise could have led to the accidental detonation of IEDs or IED making materials in the final explosion.

The police after denying the first explosion on 17/05/2022 stated that they had arrested 2 Boko Haram suspects. As is typical with arrests by the Nigerian police, nothing further has been heard about this case.

If the intention was to create mass casualty attacks; then Sabon Gari (Strangers Quarter) with its plethora of churches and non Muslims would be the ideal target as it was in the previous 2015 campaign. Interestingly the owner of chemical shop where the first explosion took place was from Kogi State, however there is no evidence to suggest he was anything other than an innocent victim. Likewise, the murder of the Igbo trader and his friend in Kano who was described by ISWAP as a Nigerian Army spy. Specifically claiming this attack is unusual. It serves no wider purpose unless ISWAP was planning a campaign of targeted assassinations against Igbos or to provoke a reprisal. However, if there had been a successful security operation or failed business deal, that thwarted their campaign and this trader was believed to have been integral to that, the assassination and announcement make more sense.

Distribution: the attacks took place across 8 states and 4 geopolitical zones (North West, South South, North Centre (Middle Belt), South West). Majority of these attacks took place in the Middle Belt (Kogi, Taraba, FCT, Niger) mainly in Kogi State, with a single attack in the other . Attacks were evenly distributed around Kogi State affecting Adavi, Okene, Okehi, Ajaokuta, Kabbah Bunu and Lokoja Local Government Areas

SO WHAT? the wide geographical spread would strongly suggest that there are organic cells in at least 5 states (Taraba, Kogi, Kano, Kaduna, Niger). The high incidence of attacks in Kogi suggests this cell is particularly well lead and organized. The presence of ISWAP in the northeast is expected, thus contagion into Taraba makes sense. Considering the vast rural areas in Taraba, where insurgents could, mass, train, hide and move in peace, the decision to focus on an urban terror campaign is unusual

Summary

If we consider that the insurgents campaign very roughly goes through the stages of Plan-Prepare- Shape-Decisive Attack- Exploit, we can safely assume that in Kogi Central the Planning and Preparation stages are over.

We can presume this is the Shaping Phase, in which the enemy is attempting to create the conditions for a Decisive Action, thus while the attacks have had relatively low casualties or spoils they have been advertised prominently on social media, with fighters having their own show reel during ISIS global loyalty pledge. It is likely that including to the messaging on social media there is an information campaign being undertaken locally in the local languages using WhatsApp, SMS, Telegram, word of mouth, leaflets, radical preachers etc.

Thus the attacks on bars and patrols are likely to be propaganda of the deed attacks, seeking to attract, radicalize or motivate local recruits but also advertise to ISWAP HQ and ISIS that the cell was fully operational and possibly attract additional resources.

It is possible that this was why the Owo attack was not claimed, as the mass casualties would have brought negative publicity locally and internationally, curiously in 2019 there was a news report of an alleged plan to attack Owo, with fairly specific details of a planned attack on a bank and roads on 01/11/2019 (this did not take place)

A key objective of different elements of this campaign has been resources, financial, human and material. As is usual weapons are captured in attacks but the Kaduna -Abuja train kidnap alone would have generated significant funds through ransoms as would the the Ajaokuta abductions. Human resources were extracted with the Kuje prison break, an attempt to replicate this led to a defeat for the insurgents.

From July to September, attacks followed each other in 2-5 day patterns, with similar tactics (small arms attacks against isolated vehicles, checkpoints or police stations). These could again be presumed to be providing training for new recruits as well as creating a security gap and capturing arms and ammunition. The rainy season would have also ensured the roadsides were overgrown, providing cover for ambushes.

The church attack in Lokoja was claimed by ISWAP unlike Owo but this had relatively low casualties (2 people). It could be surmised that this caused less revulsion locally, thus ISWAP felt comfortable claiming it.

It is possible the cell was quiet until December due to the floods or due to other operational reasons (security force pressure, rest and recuperation, deploying to other sectors) until another ‘standard’ small arms attack on a checkpoint in Lokoja followed by the VBIED attack in Okene.

The Taraba cell appears to have been effectively disrupted with the June 2022 arrests, however proximity to the north east and the failure to capture other suspects means this theatre could be reactivated.

The FCT attacks appear to be a spill over from operations in Niger and Kaduna State, with targeted raids into the FCT for specific operations. Logic would detect that ISWAP has support networks in the FCT.

Kano remains a mystery.

Conclusion

There is sufficient evidence to conclude that ISWAP has several well developed and resilient cells beyond its traditional north east/ Lake Chad Basin Area of Operations.

These cells appear to be led by people local to these area, who have gained some operational experience and training (possibly fighting in the North East, Sahel or beyond) and returned home.

The main area of operations is in Ebiraland in the centre of Kogi State. The high number of operations, tempo and variety of attacks indicates there is a competent, well resourced cell, embedded in the community, it is unlikely that these cells have been significantly disrupted.

There is likely to be an expansion of operations in the coming months

Timeline

March 2022

28/03/2022- at approximately 19.45 an unspecified number of gunmen attacked the AK9 6.00pm train from Idu, Abuja- Rigasa, Kaduna between Rijana and Katari, Kachia LGA, Kaduna State with explosives and small arms killing between 9 and 14 people, with 168 people initially reported missing. 62 were featured in subsequent videos. None of these videos were branded nor released through ISWAP channels. The last 23 hostages were released around 4.00pm on 05 October 2022

April 2022

19/04/2022: an IED detonated in a bar in a market in Iware, Ardo Kola LGA, Taraba State killing between 3-6 people and wounding 19. ISWAP claimed the attack the via Telegram 21/04/2022 claiming to have attacked a collection of ‘infidel Christians’ and inflicted 30 casualties

22/04/2022: an IED concealed in a polythene bag and allegedly hidden by a woman detonated in Nukkai District, Jalingo, Taraba State at a drinking place near the District Heads home wounding between 9 and 11 people. ISWAP claimed responsibility the next day 23/04/2022

23/04/2022: gunmen attacked the police station at Ogaminana, Adavi LGA, Kogi State around 2.00am with small arms killing 3 policemen, burning 2 vehicles and the police station. ISWAP claimed the attack on 24/04/2022 claiming that 5 were killed

May 2022

10/05/2022: an IED detonated at a bar in Jalingo, Taraba State by 6 Brigade, Nigeria Army HQ around 9.00pm. No casualties were recorded. ISWAP claimed the attack the next day claiming to have damaged the facility and a vehicle

11/05/2022: an IED detonated at a beer parlour at Lewu Junction, Kabba, Kabba/ Bunnu LGA, Kogi State around 9.45pm killing up to 3 people. ISWAP claimed the attack on 12/05/2022

17/05/2022: An explosion near a school in Sabon Gari, Kano City, Kano State killed 9 and wounded 27 people. The NPF originally claimed it was a gas explosion, despite locals claiming it was caused by a suicide bomber, pretending to be a mad man. Subsequently they stated the explosion was due to the accidental combustion of chemicals being illegally stored and sold in the shop, stating they had recovered 5 x bottles of acids, 1 x jerrycan of mixed chemicals, 6.5 cartons of snuff and 5 x drums of polymer. The owner of the store was named as Michael Adejo.

19/05/2022: The Kano State Police Command stated it had intercepted a vehicle loaded with explosives coming from Jigawa State in Bubbugaje Quarters, Kumbotso LGA, Kano State. The vehicle was abandoned after a pursuit and reportedly contained 2 x AK 47s, 4 x AK 47 magazines, 1,08 x rounds of ammunition, 2 x pistol magazines and ‘explosive device materials’

29/05/2022: an IED detonated at Omofemi Bar, a beer parlour in Okepadi Quarters, Kabba, Kabba/ Bunnu LGA around 9.15pm. there were no casualties, ISWAP claimed the attack 30/05/2022, stating 12 people were wounded

June 2022

02/06/2022: an IED detonated at the Echane Festival in the market in Idoji, Okene LGA, Kogi State killing at least 2 people and wounding 12. ISWAP claimed the attack on Saturday 04/06/2022 stating 20 people were killed

02/06/2022: An explosion in Sheka Kwarshen Kwalta, Kumbotso LGA, Kano State wounded 20 people, demolished one building and starting a fire

05/06/2022: Gunmen attacked St Francis Catholic Church, Owo, Owo LGA, Ondo State with small arms and IEDS killing up to 41 people and wounding up to 58. The Gunmen reportedly fled in a stolen car. The Federal Government blamed the attack on ISWAP on 09/06/2022

16/06/2022: the Taraba State Police Command paraded a man alleged to have been responsible for the bombing of the bar in Nukkai and outside 6 Brigade. The suspect was an alleged hired killer and kidnapper Bala Usman (37) from Kebbi State who lived in Mutum Biyu, Gassol LGA, Taraba State. The suspect claimed he had several accomplices in his cell Yusuf, Sale and Kabiru, led by Abubakar Lawal from Kano State and Adulahi Garba. He was reportedly captured with 206 rounds of ammunition, 20 x bottles of sodium, 27 x IEDs contained in bottles, cables, lighters and 2 x rifles

23/06/2022: Gunmen attacked the Police Station at Eika-Ohizenyi, Okehi LGA, Kogi State with small arms and IEDs, around midnight killing 1 policeman and stealing 3 x AK 47s.??????????????????????????????????

July 2022

05/07/2022: Gunmen attacked Kuje Prison, Kuje, FCT with small arms and IEDs, killing 1 service person and 4 inmates and wounding 16 inmates. Approximately 879 out of 994 prisoners were freed. ISWAP claimed they carried out the attack in conjunction with Ansaru attack on 06/07/2023

21/07/2022: Kano State Police command intercepted a vehicle in Chiranchi Dorayi Quarters, Gwale LGA, Kano carrying 3 x AK 47s with 90 x rounds of ammunition, 3 x mobile phones and 4 x IEDs

25/07/2022: Gunmen ambushed a patrol from 7Bn, Guards Brigade on the outskirts of Bwari- Kubwa Road in the vicinity of Bwari Area Council, Abuja, FCT with small arms killing 8 and wounding 4. There is uncertainty as to whether the troops were ambushed in transit, whether this was a fighting patrol or a deliberate attack. The army claimed to have killed 30 enemy. There is no evidence for this claim

28/07/2022: Gunmen attacked an 102Bn checkpoint at Madalla, Suleja LGA, Niger State with small arms killing 2 soldiers. ISWAP claimed the attack on 30/07/2022

30/07/2022: Gunmen attacked a police unit in Ajaokuta, Ajaotuta LGA, Kogi State with small arms killing 8 people.

August 2022

01/08/2022: A joint DSS/ Army arrested suspects alleged to be ISWAP members who took part in the Owo attacks. Idris Abdulmalik Omeiza (aka Bin Malik) who was alleged to be the commander of the attack along with Momoh Otohu Abubakar, Aliyu Yusuf Itopa and Auwal Ishaq Onimisi. Omeiza was also accused of the attack on the police station the previous day in Adavi LGA

05/08/2022: Gunmen ambushed a bus carrying staff of West African Ceramics Ltd, Ajaokuta LGA, Kogi, State killing 2, drivers, 2 policemen and an Indian foreign worker. 3 Indians were also abducted and released 31/08/2022, there is no indication if a ransom was paid

09/08/2022: A joint DSS/ Army arrested 2 suspects alleged to be ISWAP members who took part in attacks on targets in Okene. Al Qasim Idris and Abdulhaleem Idris were arrested in Omialafara, Ose LGA, Ondo State.

September 2022

18/09/2022: an IED detonated near a bar at First Roundabout on the approach to Taraba State University, ATC, Ardo- Kola LGA, Jalingo around 8.30pm wounding up to 5 people

22/09/2022: Gunmen attacked a checkpoint on Ibillo- Igarra Road, in Akoko Edo LGA, Edo State with small arms destroying one vehicle and killing 1 person. ISWAP claimed the attack on 24/09/2022???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

23/09/2022: Gunmen attacked a police vehicle in Ipele, Owo LGA, Ondo State destroying a vehicle. ISWAP claimed it on 24/09/2022??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

24/09/2022: Gunmen murdered 2 x Igbo traders with small arms in their shop in Azubros Plaza, Sabon Gari, Kano Municipal LGA, Kano State. ISWAP claimed it 25/09/2022, claiming one of the traders Ifeanyi Elechukwu (a battery seller) was an Army spy.

October 2022

16/10/2022: Gunmen attacked a branch of the Celestial Church, Sarkin Numan, Felele, Lokoja, Kogi State, killing two persons and injuring several others. ISWAP claimed the attack on 18/10/2022

23/10/2022: The US, UK, Canada and Australia issued a warning of potential terror attacks in and around Abuja, 2 days later the US Government ordered the evacuation of non essential personnel from Nigeria .

29/10/2022: Gunmen attacked Wawa Cantonment, New Bussa, Borgu LGA, Niger State with small arms and IEDS around midnight losing 8 enemy killed and 3 wounded. In an apparent attempted prison break

December 2022

05/12/2022: ISWAP released a pledge of allegiance to the new ISIS leader from ISWAP Central Nigeria in a series of photographs as one of the 5 sub groups of ISWAP

21/12/2022: Gunmen attacked a police patrol along Agbaja Road, Lokoja, Lokoja LGA, Kogi State with small arms around 6.00am killing 2 policemen. ISWAP Claimed the attack 24/12/2023

29/12/2022: A VBIED detonated outside the Palace of the Ohinoyi of Ebiraland in Okene, Okene LGA, Kogi State around 9.00am killing 4 people. ISWAP claimed the attack on 02/01/2023 stating they were targeting President Buhari who was visiting the area.

January 2023

03/01/2023: The DSS stated they have arrested the commander of the ISWAP cell Abdulmumin Ibrahim Otaru (aka Abu Mikdad) and one other Saidu Suleiman that perpetrated the VBIED attack in Okene, attack on the Police Station in Eika Ohizenyi, Kuje Prison and abduction of Indians and murder of police men in Ajaokuta

February 2023

20/02/2023: Gunmen attacked the Local Government Administration in Okehi, Okehi LGA, Kogi State around 5.00pm, planting an explosive device which damaged the building (likely related to the elections)