Issue 23: Void Banshee Targets Microsoft Vulnerability, 15 Million Trello Email Addresses Leaked and SEG URL Exploits
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Top Stories 19 July 2024:
Void Banshee Exploits Microsoft MHTML Vulnerability to Deliver Atlantida Stealer
Cybersecurity firm Trend Micro has reported that the advanced persistent threat (APT) group Void Banshee is exploiting a newly disclosed vulnerability in Microsoft's MHTML browser engine (CVE-2024-38112) to deploy the Atlantida information stealer. This activity was first observed in mid-May 2024.
How It Works:
Atlantida, influenced by open-source stealers like NecroStealer and PredatorTheStealer, extracts files, screenshots, geolocation data, and sensitive information from web browsers, Telegram, Steam, FileZilla, and cryptocurrency wallets. This exploitation method is similar to CVE-2021-40444, another MSHTML vulnerability used in previous zero-day attacks.
Void Banshee, known for targeting regions in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia for information theft and financial gain, has adapted quickly to incorporating proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits, often within minutes of their public release.
Immediately apply Microsoft's patch for CVE-2024-38112 to mitigate exploitation risks. Restrict executable content to further improve email security.
TLDR;
15 Million Trello Email Addresses Leaked Through Unsecured API
A threat actor has leaked over 15 million email addresses associated with Trello accounts, obtained using an unsecured API in January 2024. Trello, owned by Atlassian, is a popular project management tool. In January, BleepingComputer reported that a hacker named 'emo' was selling profiles of 15,115,516 Trello members on a hacking forum. Although most data in these profiles was public, the profiles included non-public email addresses.
The data was collected via an unsecured REST API that allowed anyone to query public information about a profile using Trello ID, username, or email address. Emo compiled a list of 500 million email addresses, fed it into the API, and created profiles for over 15 million users. Recently, emo shared the entire list on the Breached hacking forum for $2.32.
The exposed data includes email addresses and public Trello account information, such as the user’s full name. This information can be used in targeted phishing attacks and for doxxing. Atlassian confirmed the data was collected through a Trello REST API that has since been secured.
Unsecured APIs are increasingly targeted by threat actors to link non-public information with public profiles. In 2021, an API was exploited to link phone numbers to Facebook accounts, affecting 533 million users. In 2022, Twitter suffered a similar breach, and more recently, an unsecured Twilio API exposed phone numbers of 33 million Authy app users.
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Secure API's and perform regular audits to identify vulnerabilities and monitor suspicious traffic, as well as incorporate strict access controls to limit and monitor the users who can configure and modify API data.
TLDR;
Threat Actors Intensify Use of Encoded URLs to Evade Secure Email Filters
Secure email gateways (SEGs) are designed to protect organisations from malware, spam, and phishing. However, threat actors have found a way to exploit these systems by encoding or rewriting malicious URLs in emails. Security researchers from Cofense have observed a rise in such attacks, where SEGs allow these encoded URLs to pass through without proper vetting.
The issue, according to Max Gannon, threat intelligence manager at Cofense, is that some SEG products do not handle SEG-encoded URLs properly, often assuming them to be safe. This assumption may stem from either implicit trust in the URLs or from the scanning process trusting the domain of the SEG that encoded the URL.
SEG encoding involves rewriting URLs in outgoing emails to point to the SEG's own infrastructure. When a recipient clicks on the encoded link, the user is directed to the sender's SEG system, which checks the URL's safety before redirecting the user. These checks involve assessing the URL using reputation, blacklists, and signatures. However, this process can take days or even weeks, allowing malicious URLs to remain undetected and accessible in the meantime.
We recommend implementing improved URL scanning that does not solely rely on the domain of the encoding SEG. Monitor traffic from new or untrusted domains. Ensure employee training includes education on the risks of clicking on suspicious URLs.
TLDR;
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