Israel's Intelligence Failure vis à vis 7 October 2023

The terrorist attack on Israeli citizens by the militant group Hamas was undoubtedly an attempt at instigating the wrath of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right coalition government, whose members including cabinet officials have frequently advocated in favour of expanding illegal settlements on Palestinian territories and advocated the racial extermination of Arabs, to name a few.

The facts of the 7 October 2023 tragedy and subsequent events is as follows:-

• More than a thousand Israeli citizens were killed, mostly innocent civilians, by Hamas operatives who infiltrated their country. GoPro footage retrieved from Hamas militants captured alive show vicious killings of the elderly, women and also children, with some footage even showing militants mocking and harassing Israeli children who were newly orphaned by their attack.
• Hamas' indiscriminate killings of non-combatants and abduction of Israeli citizens visibly prompted the Netanyahu government to take actions to reduce domestic pressure from citizens and political allies alike.
• The Netanyahu government decided to call the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) for punitive action against Hamas, falling short of targeted special forces operations to take out designated combat targets. What we see today is the executive decision to exercise indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against innocent Palestinians, particularly thousands of children .

The Netanyahu government machine has initiated a global media blitzkrieg to highlight the atrocities committed by Hamas, justifiably so, but in the process has focused almost exclusively on elements of the incident which are known since three decades. For example:-

• Hamas is a terrorist organisation.
• Hamas' aim is to kill Jews.
• Hamas receives moral, financial and materiel support from the Iranian regime.
• Hamas enjoys a relationship and open channel with the Emirate of Qatar and is perhaps patronised by its executive leadership.

One new addition to the global information narrative from Tel Aviv is that "Hamas = ISIS". While this may sound 'buzzworthy' and 'catchy', any serious intelligence analyst worth their salt will scoff at this assertion; not because Hamas and ISIS have no similarities (they have minor similarities) but because their organisational structures, operational paradigms and even their ulterior motives are radically divergent.

The obvious takeaway from this bloated propaganda, along side the continuous stream of incendiary statements from both Nentanyahu's cabinet, is to deflect the attention from the most important question.

• Is Hamas a terrorist organisation? This is not the relevant question, as the fact is well established.
• Is Hamas bent on killing all Jews? This too is not the relevant question as this is well known to the world at large.
• Has Hamas targeted civilians in the past? Surprisingly, this is also not relevant as historical records have confirmed the organisation's acts of terror against non-combat targets.

So what is the most important question?

Let's reframe it as such: Could Israel's security apparatus have pre-empted the 7 October 2023 'surprise' attack by Hamas?

Before we are able to reach an assessment, it is imperative to recollect some important facts:-

1. Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since World War II, having received $158 billion until end of February 2023. Please refer to Jeremy M. Sharp's insightful research report for the Congressional Research Service for details. Intelligence sharing has been the bedrock of Israel's cooperation since the Cold War, in the overall umbrella of West Asian (Middle Eastern) affairs.
2. Soon after the Hamas attack, Netanyahu posted a tweet (later retracted) in which he accused his security chiefs of 'misleading' him; their intelligence estimates had reportedly suggested that Hamas was "deterred and ready for a settlement". It was retracted under pressure from opposition politician and former IDF chief Benny Gantz who was brought in as 'War Minister', possible due to his previous experience of supervising Operation 'Guardian of the Walls' in the 2021 Israel-Palestine crisis as Defence Minister. Gantz had emphasised the policy of 'no going back ', similar to his recent remarks that Hamas will be completely wiped off before normalcy is returned; in the former case, the Israeli government had to cave in to pressure from the US and accept a peace treaty moderated by Egypt and Qatar.
3. Israel possesses one of the world's most advanced intelligence collection and processing technologies, not just through international funding but through its own remarkable indigenous Research & Development community which has pioneered development of niche capabilities in the TECHINT spheres (particularly Cyber Network Operations, SIGINT, OSINT and also IMINT). Israel's domestically-manufactured technologies are prized the world over, including the notorious Pegasus spyware manufactured by the NSO Group. These technologies, besides available to the external intelligence agency Mossad, are also accessible for the internal security service Shin Bet.
4. The Mossad has achieved operational gains against Hamas activists and leaders through infiltration in Palestine. Some of these include:-(a) 1993: Emad Akel, a senior military leader of Hamas, was killed by Israeli soldiers in disguise within Shujai'yya area of Gaza in 1993 based on a tip-off by Hamas leader Walid Hamdiya who was compromised by the Mossad. Hamdiya's role as a double agent and informant would later enable Israel to kill four other senior Hamas military leaders. He was subsequently captured by Palestinian police in 1995 and sentenced to death by a firing squad in 2002 .(b) 1996: Hamas' infamous bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash alias 'The Engineer' was killed by a cellphone bomb in Beit Lahia area of Gaza through a telephone call by his friend Osama Hamad's father (Kamal Hamad); Kamal was recruited by Israel against $1 million and US nationality.(c) 1997: Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal was almost killed by Mossad poisoning in the Jordanian capital of Amman but was purportedly saved by US pressure after Jordan's King Hussein expressed outrage on the incident. During his first term as Prime Minister, Netanyahu was pressurised by the Bill Clinton administration to save Mashaal; succumbing to pressure from Washington, Netanyahu sent then Mossad head Danny Yatom himself to take the antidote to Amman and supervise Mashaal's recovery. Netanyahu was advised against targeting Mashaal in any Arab country but went ahead anyway (Note: Yatom himself, in later interviews, discouraged the option of a ground offensive in Gaza to take out Hamas).(d) 2000: Target killing of Hamas activist Abbas Othman El-Oweiwi outside his family shop in Hebron, West Bank by the Mossad. Hamas activitist Hani Hussein Abu Bakra was shot dead by Israeli authorities at a checkpoint. The Palestinian version claims Hani was trying to reach his pocket to produce his identity documents while Israeli security personnel claimed he was trying to reach for his concealed pistol.(e) 2001: (i) Hamas activist Mahmoud Suleiman El-Madani was shot dead by target killers in Nablus, West Bank and received covering fire support from an IDF unit on Mount Gerizim. (ii) Hamas leader Omar Ahmed Sa'adeh was killed by missiles fired from Israeli gunship helicopters in Bethlehem, West Bank; his brother Izhaq Ahmed Sa'adeh and cousin Hamad Saleh Sa'adeh became collateral damage. The Ariel Sharon government termed the operation as a 'preventive attack' with reference to security of the Maccabiah Games. (iii) Salah Nour al-Din Khalil Darwouza was similarly killed by Israeli air missile strikes in Nablus, West Bank. The Sharon government claimed he planned bombing attacks on the French Hill and Netanya. (iv) Hamas officials Jamal Mansour and Jamal Salim Damouni were killed by helicopter-fired missiles in Nablus, West Bank while they were participating in a press conference. Five innocent civilians/ non-combatants were killed including children aged 5 and 8. (v) Hamas activists Amer Mansour Habiri and Aamer Mansour al-Hudairy were killed by helicopter-fired missiles in Tulkarm, West Bank. (vi) Hamas activists Amer Mansour Habiri and Aamer Mansour al-Hudairy were killed by helicopter-fired missiles in Tulkarm, West Bank. (f) 2002: (i) Yusif Suragji, head of Hamas' military wing Izzeddine al-Qassam Brigades in the West Bank, was killed in an IDF raid in Nablus along with three other members, (ii) Senior Hamas member Adli Hamadan alias Bakr Hamdan was killed by helicopter-fired missile in Khan Yunis, Gaza, (iii) Hamas' second-in-command in Jenin, Nazih Mahmoud Abu a-Saba', was killed by a car bomb in Jenin, West Bank, (iv) Hamas member Abdel Rahman Ghadal was killed by a missile strike on his home in Gaza, (v) Hamas activist, bomb-maker and a suicide attacks mastermind Qais Adwan was killed in a targeted special forces exercise by the IDF called Operation Defensive Shield; Qais' contemporaries Sa'ab Hassin Ahmed Alwad, Magdi Mohammed Hussein Blasme, Asraf Tamza Hamza Dragma, Mohammed Ahmed Tawfiq Qamil and Munkaz Mohammed Sa'id Soafta were also killed; the IDF also managed to capture other Hamas operatives Salim Mahmoud Salim Hajah and Billal Barghouti, (vi) Hamas military leaders Yasir Raziq and Amr Kufa were killed by helicopter-fired missiles in Rafah, Gaza by the Israeli Air Force; (vii) Senior Hamas bomb-maker Muhaned Taher alias 'Engineer 4' and his deputy Imad Draoza were killed by IDF naval commandos in Nablus, West Bank, (viii) Salah Shehada, head of Hamas' military wing in Gaza, was killed by Israeli aircraft rockets in his home along with his entire family, (ix) Nasser Asida, Hamas military wing head in the West Bank, was killed by the IDF, (x) Hamas military wing ringleader Assim Sawafta was killed by an undercover unit of the IDF army, (xi) Hamas operatives Shaman Hassan Subah and Mustafa Kash were killed by an IDF ambush near Jenin.And so on...
5. Successive Israeli governments since Hamas' creation, beginning with Yitzhak Rabin, have authorised intelligence-led and also IDF-led operations against Hamas; this includes senior leadership, mid-ranking field commanders commanders and also tactical operatives responsible for liaison and logistics coordination. An examination of the few examples above also shows the variety of methods available at Israel's disposal to deal with Hamas terrorism perpetrators: car bombs, cellphone bombs, helicopter-fired missile strikes, poisoning, targeted raids and special forces operations, to name a few. In his first stint as premier, Netanyahu was kept under reality check by his Mossad chief but chose to take a risk, resulting in a diplomatic impasse that risked straining ties with both Jordan and the US. A similar major gamble was undertaken during his second premiership when Hamas military wing co-founder Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was killed by a Mossad ring in Dubai, UAE (2010); in the aftermath of this operation, Netanyahu's government faced harsh reactions and measures from the governments of the UK, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Australia, Sweden, Luxembourg and Spain, to name a few. It remains uncertain whether the 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' of this operation was properly executed before the Mossad, led by Meir Dagan at the time, was tasked to it. In a 2018 interview to Ronen Bergman for his book Rise and Kill First, Dagan admitted to the poor operational planning and security for the Dubai operation. The global community had been exposed to the intricacies of Mossad's modus operandi.
6. Israel has been able to successfully penetrate the Iranian state also, sometimes combining these with friendly cyber operations support. The examples of Stuxnet (supported by the National Security Agency of US and purportedly in development since 2005 during the coalition government of Ariel Sharon/ Ehud Olmert) and assassination of seven high-profile Iranian nuclear scientists between 2007 and 2020 are a testament to Israel's foreign clandestine operations capabilities; it is believed that Stuxnet was authorised for deployment and the assassinations of Iranian scientists approved during the 33rd to 35th successive governments of Netanyahu (excluding the 2007 mysterious poisoning of Ardeshir Hosseinpour during Ehud Olmert's premiership which remains unattributed to the Mossad).
7. Former CIA officer Beth Sanner, who served as Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration to Presidents Donald Trump and Joseph Biden, proffered that Hamas may have chosen the 'old school' route to plan and execute their attacks; in essence, they went 'off the grid' to avoid detection and surveillance pickups. This theory was endorsed by Alon Arvatz, a former member of Israel's elite militar intelligence Unit 8200, who added that Hamas may have learned how to sidestep Israeli SIGINT systems. Both statements, if true, indicate that the Mossad has lost it HUMINT potential as it was during the 1990s. But is that the case?
8. The sample incidents and events confirm the Mossad's ability to infiltrate Hamas ranks, 'flip' senior leaders into double agents and even facilitate sophisticated cyber attacks + assassinations inside Iran using its network of agents inside Iran. These demonstrated capabilities are documented in the annals of history, so now a related question rises: Did Israel place an over-reliance on SIGINT to monitor Hamas activities and expend the bulk of its HUMINT power elsewhere, such as Iran? If so, it is still a failure to keep tabs on materiel and financial support networks that may be outgoing from within the Iranian mainland.
9. The Israeli government risks a predictable showdown from the north (Hezbollah in Lebanon) but the entry of Yemen-based Houthis launching missiles toward Eilat are unprecedented and pose a geostrategic dilemma for the maritime shipping industry and security forces in the Red Sea; Saudi Arabia (viz Patriot Missile Defence System ), the US (viz USS Carney ) and Israel (viz Arrow Air Defence System ) have intercepted multiple rockets launched from Yemen, opening a north-south theatre of hostility for the IDF.
10. Broadly, it would appear that the Netanyahu-led Israeli government's exaggerated response to Hamas' terrorism has been borne from politics playing on the sentiments of Israeli citizens than serious efforts to take out perpetrators through target killings which could leave space for the safe recovery of abductees. Officials who have previously negotiated the safe release of abductees and even families of current ones both have a severe lack of confidence on the Netanyahu government's intent to do so. Is it not telling that Netanyahu appointed Brigadier General (Retired) Gal Hirsch as hostage envoy, who is described as a 'megalomaniacal messianic'?

There are multiple rhetorical statements coming from the coalition government of Israel and Hamas leaders which directly feeds into the extreme sentimentality that has overshadowed any serious attempts at analysing and then resolving the conflict. While the deaths of Israeli citizens and their welfare have been somewhat 'contained' (for now), there is a continuous and disproprortionate spike in the loss of innocent lives among ordinary Palestinians.

With the facts at hand (Israel's capabilities, past precedents of targeted operations etc), we now return to associated drivers of the core question:-

• Does Israel have experience penetrating Hamas rank and file to obtain HUMINT for targeted attacks? Answer: Yes.
• Does Israel have the technical resources and experience necessary direct focused SIGINT on Hamas members? Yes.
• Does Israel have the moral, financial and materiel support of the international community to counter what they believe is an 'existential threat' from Hamas? They have one superpower (the US), a vast majority of NATO members (the UK, Germany, France etc) and other partners such as India to support them, a support network much greater in scale than that enjoyed by the militant Hamas. There is one challenge though: A rising China's stand against Netanyahu government's indiscriminate use of force and mindfulness of the complexities surrounding the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.

It is very hard to digest that Israel's highly sophisticated intelligence apparatus was 'surprised' by the Hamas raid. Three possibilities that arise from such a scenario, if we take it at face value:-

1. Intelligence on Hamas' operational plans were available but may have been accorded low priority through the analytical channels in lieu of mirror imaging; analysts may have presumed that Hamas will be disinclined to join Palestinian Islamic Jihad's (PIJ's) rocket attacks on Israel because of many reasons including honouring the Egypt and Qatar-brokered peace treaty, risk upsetting Egypt's affairs in the Sinai, job losses for Gazans working in Israel, electricity dependence on Israel etc and the risk of being looked as a 'sidekick' of a PIJ that is heavily sustained by Iran.
2. Alternatively, Israel's intelligence may have accumulated early warning indicators with Netanyahu which may have been dubbed 'insignificant'. We now know that the CIA held a similar assessment and decided not to brief the White House on this.
3. The claim of Egypt's spy chief Major General Abbas Kamel that they shared relevant intelligence with Israel merely ten days before the attack have not merited due attention. Per the Egyptians, Netanyahu's cabinet has been focused too much on the West Bank and settler issues at the expense of Gaza. Israel's intelligence resources were perhaps insufficiently used to monitor Hamas activities (as Hamas does not operate in the West Bank) and may have led to what is called an 'intelligence blind spot'.

In a recent interview to PBS, former Mossad Director Efraim Halevy suggested an extremely cautious approach toward understanding current dynamics, decrying Netanyahu's unrealistic ambitions to achieve his so-called 'decisive victory'. Halevy fears, justifiably, that the obsession with a 'military victory' may not have thoroughly accounted for the post war rehabilitation and reconstruction of Gaza. He likened the intelligence failure on October 2023 to the Yom Kippur War but highlighted that while the latter was mostly military intelligence dealing with foreign (adversary) militaries, the failure to pre-empt such an incursion from within its neighbourhood raises questions.

Halevy is a witness to Netanyahu's fondness for high-risk gambles involving his security czars. At the time of the botched assassination attempt on Khaled Mashaal in Jordan, Halevy served as Ambassador of Israel to the EU and was called in by Netanyahu to manage the diplomatic crisis.

Now that we have a sufficient appraisal of facts in their historical context, the next question is even more relevant and political: With its historical experience in successful target killing of Hamas leaders, why did the Netanyahu-led Israeli cabinet instead opt for a brazen, all-out offensive subsuming thousands of innocent non-combatants in its midst?

These two questions should be singled out from the noise that continues to (dangerously) pump deflective rhetoric propounded by a Nakba-obsessed political government in Tel Aviv and Intifada-obsessed Hamas.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are mine alone and may not necessarily be supported by organisations and institutions I may be affiliated with.