Iran and Israel : The difficulty of navigating between manoeuvring and confrontation

As a result of the nuclear terror, the stakeholders in the nuclear talks are again exploring putting differences with Iran in the ‘fridge’ and cut a provisional deal on reviving the JCPOA between the P5+1 countries and Iran.

Israel is strongly present in this equation. Recently, Israel hinted at its intention to conduct a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities if a deal is signed following the Vienna talks whose terms are not in the Israeli national security interests.

The European states are anxious about an Iranian-Israeli confrontation and the failure of the Vienna talks, and the nuclear, energy, and military implications of their failure.

The Biden administration is coming under Israeli and domestic pressures that restrict its ability to agree to Iran’s persistent conditions such as delisting the IRGC as a terror group, or providing Iran with guarantees that the United States will not unilaterally withdraw from the nuclear deal again in the future like Donald Trump had done. These steps are beyond the ability and mandate of the Biden administration, as some would be within the powers of Congress alone.

For its part the Islamic Republic of Iran is caught between its ruling ideology and the centrality of the IRGC in its economy, foreign policy, and regional behavior; and its need to sell its oil especially at a time when Europe is in dire need for alternative oil supplies before the embargo on Russian oil and gas goes into effect at the end of the year.

Provisional solutions are being discussed again to capitalize on what has been agreed so far and freeze contentious issues to deal with later. However, even with this approach there are obstacles and pitfalls. Yet one thing clear is that a final grand bargain, which crucially requires a US-Iranian deal, has become nearly impossible, prompting this search for provisional agreements.

In the meantime, the Iranian leadership is allowing itself room for constructive manoeuvring, coupled with threats of retaliation. Iran is showing flexibility in the region, affirming the importance of continuing talks with Saudi Arabia after the conclusion of a fifth unpublicized round, and expressing willingness for a public session. Iran also appears willing to facilitate the demarcation of Lebanese-Israeli maritime borders, as a good will gesture but also to highlight the Iranian influence over such issues crucial to the United States and Israel.

Strategically, Iran’s flexibility is represented by the possibility of agreeing to deferring the issue of the IRGC, focusing instead on getting the sanctions lifted in order to sell oil and relieve popular pressure on the regime. In other words, suspending the regime’s political ideology provisionally serves its interests and its survival through economic recovery. Oil revenues are crucial for reinforcing its ideology in the long run, so there is no harm in prioritizing them for now. This is part of the constructive manoeuvring policy, in the view of the regime in Iran.

However, Iran’s flexibility will not be open-ended. It is organically linked to the outcome of the Vienna talks whose bottom line is lifting the sanctions on Iran. It is also linked to the Israeli reaction to the putative Vienna deal. For this reason, Tehran is sending out both escalatory and conciliatory messages at the same time and making preparations.

Israel is giving cause for anxiety not just to Iran but also Europe and Russia. Relations between the latter and Israel now face a crisis, after Moscow decided to outsource Syria to Iran and exchanged warnings with Israel. Moscow has since sought to limit the damage, after Israel said there could be serious political consequences for Russian policies targeting Israel in Syria, Ukraine, and Russia itself as Moscow moved against the activities of the Jewish Agency. This week, an Israeli delegation went to the Russian capital for the first time since the crisis between the two countries started following a Russian move to ban the agency, which facilitates Jewish immigration to Israel. ?Israel said the closure of the agency’s offices in Russia is a serious matter that will have implications for the bilateral relationship. This was coupled by a leaked list of possible Israeli responses, while Israel’s Defence Minister Benny Gantz revealed Russian anti-aircraft batteries had fired at Israeli planes during a sortie over Syria in May.

More importantly, Israel sent Russia, the European powers, and the United States through unofficial channels warnings saying it was ready to conduct strikes on Iranian nuclear sites if these states sign up to an agreement in Vienna. This is a new development, because there’s an Israeli threat linked to signing the nuclear deal.

Europe is feeling a nuclear and energy terror as a result of Israel’s escalation and threat of direct action against Iran, with or without America’s consent. Israel has made it clear to the European states that freeing Iran from sanctions under a deal in Vienna would enable Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, a red line for Israel. Israel has also expressed distrust in the Biden administration’s and European promises not to allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

The nuclear terror felt in Europe has two aspects: One would be for the failure of the nuclear talks to lead to the intensification of the Iranian nuclear program. And another would be the Israeli response, which could turn the shadow war between Iran and Israel into a direct, conventional one on its doorsteps. Then there are the existential energy worries of Europe, in the wake of the decision to embargo Russian oil and gas, meaning the continent needs an alternative that could very well be provided by Iran should a nuclear deal be agreed.

For all these reasons, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell has engaged Iran looking for a way to resuscitate the Vienna talks through provisional arrangements that defer contentious issues and cement what has already been agreed, in the service of Iranian, European, and US interests. Borell is seeking a compromise on behalf of the EU and to some extent the US administration.

Iran has not closed the door to a compromise because it needs the money and also because it takes seriously the Israeli determination to carry out military action against it. Iran realizes the cost of war would be high despite its own escalation and military preparations against Israel.

Tehran knows that Russia is unable and unready to go to war on its side against Israel. It knows that in the event the situation devolves into an Iranian-Israeli military standoff, the Biden administration will not able to continue negotiations. It knows that in the event of war with Israel, the United States will have to side with Israel, the strategic alliance with whom is a US domestic issue.

Ultimately, navigating between constructive manoeuvring and a rude confrontation is a thorny affair especially in the midst of growing Israeli turbulence despite the confused US and European expeditions in the waters of the Middle East and the Gulf.