Israel in Africa: Old and New Partners
Israel in Africa: Old and New Partners
The parties are seeking enhanced cooperation in trade, energy, food security, climate security, water security, agriculture, cyber security, and defense.
By?Alvite Ningthoujam July 20, 2023
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,208, July 20, 2023
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:?Israel is making a serious political-diplomatic effort to strengthen relations with African countries, particularly several key northern and sub-Saharan states. The parties are seeking enhanced cooperation in trade, energy, food security, climate security, water security, agriculture, cyber security, and defense. These efforts come at a time when Israel’s global diplomatic network is expanding significantly. The political realignments taking place in the Middle East could open up opportunities for trilateral or multilateral partnerships involving Israel, its African partners, and other like-minded countries from the region and beyond.
In Israel’s foreign policy calculus, Africa was and remains a vital continent with which it strives to strengthen cooperation and build new partnerships. Recent developments suggest that the Israeli government is reengaging with northern and sub-Saharan African countries in a host of key areas from trade to defense.
Israel had a strong presence in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, when it focused on training programs in agriculture, primary healthcare, joint economic enterprises, and trade. Israel sought at the time to secure the diplomatic support of African states during its conflict with the Arabs, and this remains a foreign policy objective for Jerusalem as its global diplomatic network expands.
African states began to reexamine relations with Israel following the Six-Day War of 1967, and almost all vestiges of Israeli-African cordiality ended with the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the resulting oil crisis. At that time, most African states (except for Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland) cut diplomatic ties with Israel. This reflected the political agenda of oil-rich Arab Gulf countries that used their political and economic clout to press African countries to isolate Israel politically.
Later, however, the 1978 Israel-Egypt Camp David Accord, the 1982 Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, and growing disappointment over unfulfilled Arab promises of economic assistance in the form of?cheap oil and financial aid?led to a recalibration of African strategies towards Israel. The need to remain neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to take part in Middle Eastern peace talks laid the groundwork for a reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Israel between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Since then, bilateral relations have existed, if lackluster (until recently). Israel now has diplomatic ties with?46 African countries?and has?12 embassies?on the continent.
The rising frequency of high-level reciprocal political visits and agreements has demonstrated a mutual interest in strengthening Israel-Africa ties. This is occurring at a time when more than half the world’s fastest-growing economies are in Africa, making it a sought-after?destination for international trade?and?investment?and a key market for goods and services for many countries, not just Israel. Israel is present in Africa in the fields of agriculture, water management, cyber technology, climate and food security, and the military-security domains.
Israel’s efforts to strengthen ties with African countries have been noticeable, particularly under the leadership of PM Benjamin Netanyahu. During his address to the?ECOWAS Africa-Israel Summit in Liberia (2017), he said,?“Israel is coming back to Africa, and Africa is coming back to Israel,”?and pushed to reestablish ties with old partners. The Israeli normalization with?Morocco of December 2020, which occurred during Donald Trump’s presidency, was a breakthrough. In 2022, both countries agreed to deepen cooperation in?trade and economics,?renewable energy (including rechargeable batteries), recycling, solar energy, the hydrogen economy, aerospace, and other sectors.
Chad, another Muslim-majority country, opened an embassy in Israel in?February 2023?following a rapprochement agreement in?2019. Security threats faced by both countries led to this reconciliation, and?Israel’s subsequent military assistance, including training, counterterrorism measures, and weapons sales, will likely deepen these ties.
In 2016, Netanyahu visited?Kenya?(and again in 2017), as well as Rwanda,?Ethiopia, and Uganda. In a reciprocal move, Kenyan president?William Ruto?visited Israel in May 2023, and during the visit the sides agreed to a greater collaboration in agriculture, trade, education, climate change security, tourism, and security/ defense.?Full normalization of ties?between Israel and Sudan was expected by the end of this year, but the emerging dynamics of the politico-security crisis in that northeastern African country could affect this normalization. Still, Israel is making unrelenting efforts to enhance its political ties with African states that have sizeable representations in fora like the UN.
As most African countries are currently undertaking infrastructural and economic modernization programs, it makes sense that they build partnerships with economic and technological giants like Israel. Over many years, Israel has developed some of the world’s best technologies pertaining to water, irrigation, agriculture, cyber, defense, and security. This technical prowess has led several African governments to shed past inhibitions and show some flexibility towards cooperating with Israel. Mounting problems regarding water and?food insecurity?in the region could lead to the?finding of collective solutions. Furthermore, Israel’s state-of-the-art water desalination technologies are being sought out by countries like?Morocco?and?Kenya?and will likely appeal to other African countries as well. Nigeria, an important country with whom Israel would like to advance ties, is especially interested in?entrepreneurial innovations and technologies.
As a preliminary step, Israel founded an initiative in 2020 called?IMPROVATE?with the aim of improving food security in Africa. The goal of the initiative is to “provid[e] a collaborative platform for governments and Israeli technology companies with expertise in finding solutions for a broad range of challenges.” It has begun similar assistance programs of supplying?agricultural needs, modern seeds, and pest control systems and equipment to eastern Africa, a region that has been threatened by an?acute food shortage?in recent years. This cooperation is imperative, as agriculture contributes significantly to the economy of sub-Saharan Africa.?Morocco?in the north and?Kenya?in the east?have explored the possibility of similar cooperation with Israel, which has provided technical expertise to mitigate climate-related challenges like drought and rapid?desertification?in the Sahara region even to countries that do not have diplomatic ties with Jerusalem. With its innovative tech skills, Israel is making a major contribution towards combating climate change in the region and is helping African states generate electricity using?clean energy sources?like solar.
In view of the unabated security threats coming from state and non-state armed actors in the?Sahel?region, which is an epicenter of terrorism and extremist activity, Israel and several African states will boost military-security cooperation. The scourge of terrorism remains a grave challenge to both Israel and Africa, necessitating an intensification of ties. In the past, Israel’s military connection was a striking feature of its ties with Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda, Ghana, and South Africa. Today, sub-Saharan Africa could emerge as a lucrative market for the Israeli arms industry (though limited for now). According to the?Stockholm International Peace Research Institute?(SIPRI), Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Nigeria, Rwanda, the Seychelles, South Africa, and Uganda received weapons from Israel during 2006-10, with?40%?of Israel arms exports going to African countries in 2014. In 2015-2016, Israel reportedly exported arms worth?$275 million?to African clients.?In 2021, Africa accounted for 3% of Israeli defense exports. This is crucial for Israel as it continues to search for markets for its armaments, security partnerships, and defense industry collaborations.
Israeli-African defense cooperation has made progress. In late 2021,?Israel and Morocco?signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formalizing intelligence-sharing, defense industrial cooperation, joint exercises, and arms sales. Similarly,?Kenya?and?Uganda (through an MoU)?decided in 2022 to reinvigorate defense ties with Israel. Beyond the traditional areas, cybersecurity cooperation is increasingly pivotal. In this area, the?Israel National Cyber Directorate?coordinates with its?Moroccan,?Kenyan?and Ugandan counterparts, among others. Israel’s involvement in building?cybersecurity infrastructures?in these countries, where digital attacks are escalating, will likely grow.
Notwithstanding these developments, Israel and its African partners are treading cautiously in the area of military-security cooperation (mostly related to arms supply). This is mainly due to constant monitoring by regional and international watchdogs, including media and human rights organizations, over weapons and security-related technology supplied by Israel to African regimes.
While there are efforts underway to strengthen bilateral ties, it remains politically challenging for Israel to establish cordial relationships with the continental body,?the African Union (AU). This is because several AU members are strongly anti-Israel. For instance, South Africa, which was once a staunch partner of Israel, has been critical of Jerusalem’s Palestinian policy. Algeria, too, is vehemently pro-Palestinian and has criticized the wave of normalizations between Israel and Arab countries. Israel’s attainment of “observer status” at the AU in?2021, which was suspended in?February 2023, was viewed negatively by these countries. As a result of this reality, Israel has had to work continuously towards amassing political support from other African countries. This is an opportune moment for Israel as there are growing convergences of political, economic, and strategic interests with several key African countries, facilitating an overall expansion of ties.
The winds of change sweeping across the wider Middle East (mostly the thawing of Israel-GCC ties) could also open avenues for trilateral and multilateral partnerships involving like-minded African states. GCC countries like Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have engaged in increasing economic, investment, and security activities in the sub-Saharan region in recent years. Israel’s normalization of relations with these Gulf countries should push them and the African states to explore collaborations in sectors like security, climate change, renewable energy, food security, and so on.
On a similar note, within the framework of multilateral diplomacy, countries like India could be brought in to cooperate on common issues and challenges in both the traditional and non-traditional security realms. For instance, Israel, India, and the UAE are jointly working on the creation of an?India-Middle East food corridor. This important initiative has the objective of increasing inter-regional connectivity and ensuring a smooth food supply chain. Such an arrangement could be extended to other spheres, including trade and commerce, healthcare, and renewable energy in the African region by bringing together investments from affluent Gulf states, Israeli technology, and Indian manufacturing skills. Additional countries might also wish to collaborate on the development of sustainable technologies.
For these endeavors to come to fruition, political and security stability are crucial. It is therefore essential that Israel keep up the momentum and strengthen its political ties with African countries, which could result in the expansion of overall relations. Israel should be forthcoming in providing economic as well as technological assistance to its African partners, which are developing their economies amid many challenges. Israeli stakeholders, both state and private, and the relevant ministries, particularly foreign, innovation, science and technology, defense, economics and industry, infrastructure, energy, and water should play proactive roles. Robust educational, cultural, and academic exchanges could also help boost mutual understanding of each other’s peoples, histories, and traditions. Further, regular strategic dialogues and consultations could prove beneficial. It is equally important that person-to-person connections be strengthened between the two sides. Israel and the aforementioned African countries possess the goodwill to make their ties as strong and comprehensive as they were in the past.
Dr. Alvite Ningthoujam is an Assistant Professor at the Symbiosis School of International Studies (SSIS), Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune, India. Prior to this, he served as Consultant (Strategic Affairs) at the National Security Council Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, New Delhi, India.
+++++++++++++
President Biden Is Failing to Secure Our Critical Supply Chains
The White House forgets our greatest economic vulnerability: our supply chains’ deep dependence on a regime that wants to weaken and ultimately overtake the United States.
by?Marco Rubio
Last year, with heavy earthmoving equipment behind him, President Joe Biden?proclaimed, “The future of the chip industry is going to be made in America.” His aspirational rhetoric was equal parts political opportunism and wishful thinking, fueled by the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, which authorized $53 billion in incentives for U.S. semiconductor manufacturing.
Perhaps there was reason for optimism. The president delivered his speech as Intel Corp. broke ground in rural New Albany, Ohio for a $20 billion chip fabrication plant. The construction alone would create 7,000 jobs, while the new “fabs” would employ 3,000 workers, each earning an average of $135,000 per year. But that happy day was not the end of the story; it was just the beginning.
Ten months later, just before Independence Day, the Chinese Communist Party struck back against U.S. industrial policy?by announcing new export controls?on gallium and germanium, set to take effect on August 1. These minerals are critical components in a host of advanced technologies, including semiconductors. Moreover, China corners the market on them. Business insiders?don’t hesitate to say?that Beijing’s export controls “will have an immediate ripple effect on the semiconductor industry.”
So much for that speech on the construction lot. When President Biden bragged about America’s economic future, it seems he forgot our greatest economic vulnerability: our supply chains’ deep dependence on a regime that wants to weaken and ultimately overtake the United States. This is unsurprising because the president has a decades-long track record of being wrong about China. Unfortunately, his naiveté—or whatever you want to call not learning a lesson in half a century—is infectious.
In April, when National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan tried to acknowledge the threat of Communist China, he?summed up?the appropriate response as “protecting our foundational technologies with a small yard and a high fence.” That’s a fun turn of phrase, but small yards with high fences don’t offer much protection if you have to go outside the yard for everything you need to maintain it. That is exactly what’s happening now.
In the case of chips, the Biden team assumed government subsidies and export controls on advanced technology would vault U.S. industry to the top. CHIPS Act subsidies will almost certainly increase our production capacity. But through an insane loophole, companies can also invest in China to build so-called “legacy” chips. The Biden administration’s export controls are similarly weak,?allowing?companies like Nvidia and Intel to sell China advanced chips to build its artificial intelligence sector. Meanwhile, Beijing’s controls on gallium and germanium show the Chinese Communist Party still wields lots of leverage—and isn’t afraid to use it.
U.S. innovation is important, but innovation alone won’t make our economy less reliant on our adversaries. At this moment, China?controls?63 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals and 85 percent of its mineral processing capacity. If Beijing cut us off, as it?cut off?Japan in 2010, we would be at China’s mercy. All our fancy factories and machines would be useless.
The same dynamic plagues the Biden administration’s “green transition” investments, especially those tied to the Inflation Reduction Act?(IRA). President Biden touts this law as an industrial policy aimed at creating jobs and increasing our economic resilience. Yet there are inherent flaws with the legislation that prevent that from occurring. For instance, because the IRA simply seeks to expand solar power in the United States without addressing Beijing’s grip on global solar panel supply chains, it is actively strengthening that grip, sending obscene quantities of cash to Chinese companies—even ones that profit from?Uyghur slave labor.
These missteps squander public trust. If we aren’t careful, they will destroy people’s faith in our ability to rebuild and reindustrialize our economy. That would be tragic because there’s a lot we can do to make America a manufacturing power again. And if we fail, the consequences for our national security will be dire. After all, gallium and germanium aren’t just essential to semiconductor manufacturing—they are also key components in weapon systems. Why would China’s communist overlords grant U.S. defense contractors access to these minerals in the event of a military standoff??They probably won’t. This should serve as a wake-up call to Washington and our defense contractors—some of which, like Raytheon, are naively?hoping China will play nice.??
What’s more, export controls on a handful of critical minerals barely scratch the surface of China’s economic leverage. Imagine the havoc Beijing could wreak by depriving America of pharmaceutical ingredients or the $100 billion’s worth of electrical machinery we import every year. The United States will not be safe until we act to eliminate these vulnerabilities.
To do so effectively, the Biden administration must move beyond end product-focused projects and begin securing critical supply chains from start to finish. Undeniably, this will be more difficult than throwing money at companies compromised by China. Nevertheless, it is what the American people need and deserve if they are to remain free and prosperous throughout the twenty-first century.
Marco Rubio is the senior U.S. senator from Florida. He is also the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
++++++++++
+++++++++++++++
The End++++++++++++