The Iraq War's Global Legacy: A 20-Year Retrospective

Twenty years ago, deafening explosions shook the foundations of Baghdad in what became the opening salvos of the United States-led invasion of Iraq. Convinced of the great threat that Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime posed to the free world, US President George W. Bush vowed to find and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to liberate the Iraqi people. Following the September 11 attacks and the subsequent US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq War was presented as yet another part of the “global war on terror” and a mission to promote democracy, human rights, and freedom in the Middle East.

Much has been written about the appalling intelligence failures and cognitive biases that led to the Iraq invasion and the years of terror, civil war, sectarian violence, political turmoil and foreign meddling that it brought in its wake. But the war also had major effects beyond local insurgencies and regional power-scrambling. The invasion of Iraq resulted in ideological and geopolitical shifts on a global scale that continue to shape the world we live in.

The end of the end of history

In his highly controversial 1989 essay "The End of History," political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously argued that the global spread of liberal democracy marked the culmination of humanity's ideological evolution – the ultimate form of government had been found. The subsequent end of the Cold War and the unravelling of socialist and communist regimes in Europe that came to a crescendo in the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union seemed to confirm Fukuyama’s thesis, particularly as the world witnessed their replacement with liberal democratic institutions. The spread of liberal democracy seemed to be an unstoppable force throughout the 20th?century’s final decade, and the Iraq invasion, confidently titled “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was supposed to continue this trend, adding yet another member to the ever-growing club.?

While the ground invasion was completed relatively swiftly, the ensuing phase of cautious optimism was short-lived as Iraq quickly turned into a quagmire, with the United States facing a prolonged insurgency, sectarian violence, and instability throughout much of the country. The US administration under President George W. Bush argued that by toppling Saddam Hussein and establishing a democratic government in Iraq, the country could serve as a model for other Middle Eastern nations and advance the cause of liberal democracy in the region. Unfortunately, these predictions have found little reflection in reality. Instead, the Iraq invasion and the pandemonium that it brought in its wake revealed the limits of U.S. power and the inability of liberal democracy to take root in a foreign country through military force alone.

The war resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and thousands of American soldiers, as well as the displacement of millions of people. It destabilised the entire region and provoked the rise of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The cost of the war is estimated to be over $2 trillion, making it one of the most expensive wars in American history. Moreover, the invasion caused a deep rift in American society, with a lot of people questioning the legitimacy of the war and the motives behind it, and many even calling for retrenchment and American isolationism.

Shattering the neo-conservative agenda of promoting liberal democracy abroad, the 2003 Iraq invasion constitutes a critical turning point that demonstrates the limitations of the Western liberal democratic model as a blueprint for nation-building in the Middle East. The failures of the Iraq War shook the "end of history" thesis, shattering the conviction that the universalisation of liberal democracy was inevitable. It also exposed the limitations of American power, the complexities of local politics, and the difficulty of imposing liberal democratic values on a foreign country.

What goes up must come down

Following the Second World War the Middle East, one of the world’s most strategically important regions, was in many ways up for grabs. With Great Britain’s empire rapidly unravelling and the Soviet Union failing to inspire Arab states to make firm commitments to the Eastern Bloc, America quickly stepped up to the plate. As a result, the United States’ power and influence in the Middle East was unrivalled throughout much of second half of the 20th?century.?

The United States quickly recognised the free world’s heavy dependence on Middle Eastern oil and began to employ its military, diplomatic and economic might, developing strong alliances with key regional actors. Substantially invested in maintaining regional stability, Washington eventually became involved in Middle Eastern conflicts and crises, from the Gulf War in the early 1990s to the Iraq invasion and beyond. Paradoxically, while this involvement was designed to maintain regional stability, the Iraq War and its failure to set in motion the creation of an independent, strong, democratic country has instead weakened the US position in the Middle East, emboldened regional rivals and gave rise to new security threats.

With the Soviet Union no more, the United States found itself as the sole global hegemon – and out of dragons to slay. Invigorated by its unrivalled position of power, Washington embarked on a quest to fight for worthy causes: upholding human rights, preventing genocide and promoting liberal democracy. The horrific and unprovoked attacks on America on 11 September 2001 added further altitude to the moral high ground that the United States became used to enjoying. Overconfident in its moral superiority, Washington launched the Iraq invasion against a backdrop of global protest and the lack of UN Security Council support – essentially rendering the Iraq invasion a violation of international law. President Bush attempted to counter his critics through the resounding successes of a “mission accomplished” – disarming Iraq, establishing a vibrant democracy in the heart of the Middle East, and promoting human rights. Unfortunately, he failed on all three accounts: Saddam Hussein had already destroyed almost all WMDs years before the invasion, political turmoil and unfolding sectarianism obstructed Iraq’s path to liberal democracy, and the pictures emerging from Abu Ghraib ultimately crushed the United States’ aura of moral superiority.

With US credibility and legitimacy in the region in shatters and the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq finding less and less acceptance at home, subsequent administrations were far more constrained in wielding US power and influence in the Middle East. This became particularly obvious during the so-called Arab Spring and the events that followed it. America’s half-hearted intervention in Libya laid the foundation for a decade-long civil war with no end in sight; the United States’ “red line” did little to deter Syria’s Bashar al-Assad from using chemical weapons against his own people; and even a considerable US military presence in Iraq could not stop Iran, which remains one of Washington’s key adversaries, to significantly expanded its influence and power in the region. Iran's backing of Shia militias and political groups in Iraq has enabled it to extend its reach into the country's political and security institutions, and to create a "Shia crescent" that stretches from Iran to Lebanon – against diminishing resistance from the United States. Moreover, the fact that it was China, not the United States, that brokered the recent rapprochement and normalisation of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran is yet another indicator of the waning influence that the United States holds in the Middle East.

On the flip-side, one might argue that the diminishing US influence in the Middle East is not an accident at all. The first two decades of the 21st?century saw not only play out the destabilising results of the Iraq War – on the country and the region – but also the rise of a new rival, fuelled by America’s own efforts to liberalise global markets. China’s dependence on Middle Eastern resources has sky-rocketed at a time when American demand for oil has increasingly been met through domestic production, arguably reducing the United States’ investment in regional stability. Rather than dominating the Middle East, Washington might have come to the conclusion that it suffices to hold the power to disrupt the Middle East and its vital oil production.

The replacement of political Islam with Salafi-Jihadism

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic caliphate following the First World War brought about an era of Western dominance and arbitrary division to the Arab world, divisions that remained in place when colonialism came to an end in the years and decades following the Second World War. Young, weak Arab nations oscillating between Western notions of modernity and traditional values soon began searching for ideas that would unite its heterogenous populations and provide a common cause that reflected the Middle East’s unique history and culture.?

Arab nationalism and Arab socialism showed promise, but eventually failed in delivering their ambitious goals. In the 1970s, political Islam rose to prominence to replace its failing predecessors and quickly became an influential political ideology. Islamism seeks to establish Islamic law, or sharia, as the foundation of society and politics. It is based on the belief that Islam provides a comprehensive framework for all aspects of life, including politics and governance, and that the Islamic way of life should be the basis of political systems. Islamism as a political movement sought to bring about change in an incremental, constitutional, democratic manner, through activism and elections.

The rise of Islamism can be attributed to a number of factors, some systemic and gradual, others immediate and palpable. An example for the former might be the urbanisation of Arab countries that saw rural, often conservative populations settle in quickly expanding urban centres, markedly shifting the political landscape of many countries. Among the more immediate events one could count the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel – and the resulting exasperation in Arab countries, the burning of the US embassy in Islamabad, the siege of the Grand Mosque of Mecca, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, of particular importance, the Islamic revolution in Iran, which many came to see as a blueprint for a nation built on political Islam.

Throughout the 1980s Islamism became an increasingly dominant ideology among populations disillusioned with the Middle East’s authoritarian regimes. But once the latter realised the danger they were facing, they soon put an end to Islamist aspirations. By the early 1990s, most Islamist movements from Tunisia and Egypt to Syria and Saudi Arabia had either been crushed or suffered from severe crack-downs. The only places in which political Islam was advanced in the 1990s were those that experienced Islamist insurgencies, most notably the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

The events of the 1990s led the more radical among Islamist thinkers to a simple conclusion: Constitutional struggles to promote Islamism are doomed to fail. The only way to further their cause was through violence. Armed with these insights, a new ideology began to take hold, one that would soon shape events on a global scale: Salafi-Jihadism.

Initially, Salafi-Jihadism had only a handful of adherents hiding in faraway corners of the globe, writing manifests about the legitimacy and necessity of violent jihad, and drafting terror plots that would soon put their vitriolic words into newsworthy actions. However, even the monumental attacks on 11 September 2001 failed to inspire the sort of Salafi-Jihadist surge that al-Qaeda had hoped for. It was only the 2003 Iraq invasion and the ensuing chaos and sectarian violence that achieved what Osama bin Laden and his Salafi-Jihadist comrades had hoped for: Tens of thousands of young Arab men joining its call for violent Jihad. Constitutional Islamism had been replaced by violent Salafi-Jihadism, a trajectory that eventually led to the rise of ISIS and the – albeit temporary – re-establishment of the caliphate.

Conclusion

The 2003 Iraq invasion constitutes a critical turning point in global affairs. Liberal democracy is in decline and autocratic regimes feel – and act – emboldened by their new-found freedom of manoeuvre. The United States has become far less committed to the Middle East, and Americans have begun asking the question whether they should start treating Europe and the Pacific in a similar manner. For some, this will come as a relief; others will fear that the lack of a hegemon will lead to renewed global competition and the type of instability that the Middle East has already become accustomed to over the past 20 years.