Iran’s Supreme Leader in the Shadow of History
Down with Dictator, Be it Shah or the Mullah
Dictators, in their final throes, invariably attempt to mask their shattered aura of invincibility with hollow claims and pompous posturing. In previous decades, such theatrical displays might have temporarily emboldened the regime’s loyalists. Yet in today’s era of hyper-connectivity, these maneuvers quickly become fodder for public ridicule.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, whose authority has weakened following major strategic setbacks in Lebanon and the collapse of the Assad dynasty in Syria. In the face of unprecedented dissent from within his own circle, Khamenei strives to project power through bravado—yet the cracks in his regime are increasingly difficult to hide.
One day, Khamenei warns, “Be certain that if you persist with this course, you will lose power” (Jomhouri, November 27). Another day, he proclaims, “Bashar al-Assad’s fall is not only pivotal for Syria but will reverberate across the Middle East. Nowhere will the consequences be felt more acutely than in Iran, marking a strategic and military blow” (Ham-Mihan, December 22). A third voice from within his ranks laments, “Why couldn’t we, with 100,000 troops and billions spent, prevent Assad’s downfall? What became of ‘defending the shrines’? Was all that bloodshed in vain?” Meanwhile, a member of Qom’s Seminary Teachers’ Assembly has demanded accountability: “The regime has committed grave errors and must apologize to the people—no more cover-ups” (Ardestani, December 19).
Yet, the embattled “caliph” (Khamenei) continues to boast: “Where else in the world do you see such massive rallies 46 years after a revolution? On February 11, it’s ordinary people—not officials or armed forces—who flood the streets to celebrate!” (February 18, Tabriz uprising anniversary). These performances mirror the Shah’s last-ditch displays of legitimacy before his 1979 overthrow. Ten months prior to his downfall, state media boasted of a “400,000-strong rally of ‘the masses’” in Tabriz (April 10, 1978). But much like then, a chorus of dissidents compares the two regimes’ “death rattles,” noting how many elites are discreetly transferring assets abroad buying real state in California—“squeezed from the people’s bones”—anticipating a collapse.
Today, Khamenei’s shaky “Velayat-e Faqih” is further exposed by online revelations of corruption and the defection of key figures. In a recent speech, he expressed alarm at “soft threats: manipulating public opinion, sowing doubt in the regime’s ‘unshakable principles.’” Yet for many Iranians, especially those who recall the chants of “The Shah’s tyranny is doomed” decades ago, these principles have never been beyond question. As one defected IRGC commander recently admitted, referring to the failures in Syria, “We were hit hard, defeated—utterly crushed. The loss was devastating” (Pasdar-e Esbati-e Tabnak, January 9).
The parallels to the Shah’s downfall are haunting. Propaganda-laden spectacles and official rallies may obscure the truth for a while, but they cannot reverse the tide of skepticism and anger that grows when a regime’s authority is visibly fractured. In 1979, the Shah’s final attempts to muster public support ultimately failed amid widespread unrest and a sagging economy. Today, a similar combination of public discontent, economic hardship, and mounting calls for accountability from within the establishment suggests that Khamenei’s bluster may be wearing thin.
Crucially, however, Khamenei’s regime will not simply topple under its own weight. Coordinated resistance units on the ground have been key to accelerating the regime’s decline. Operating under the leadership of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), these cells are active in cities across the country, ready to mobilize citizens at the decisive moment. Their efforts are amplified by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which serves as the political wing of the resistance, championing a democratic vision for Iran’s future. In stark contrast to the decades-long grip of dictatorship—spanning from Reza Shah Pahlavi to Ali Khamenei—this opposition movement presents an alternative rooted in pluralism, civil liberties, and the sovereignty of the Iranian people.
Whether the Supreme Leader can maintain his grip on Iran remains to be seen. Historically, autocracies can linger if they retain sufficient means of repression. However, in an age when even the regime’s own officials question its actions, and where technology exposes every impropriety to the public, Khamenei’s claims of enduring popularity ring increasingly hollow.
Just as the Shah’s displays could not save him when the people recognized his vulnerability, Khamenei’s orchestrated rallies and stern warnings will not indefinitely shield him from the consequences of strategic failures, domestic discontent, and the accelerating pressure applied by organized resistance. From Qom’s clerical halls to the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard, there is now open talk of errors, apologies, and a collapsing order. If history is any guide, hollow shows of force cannot forever suppress the truth—or quell the will of a nation that has seen the power of collective dissent. This time, what began as isolated rumblings in the provinces could be the spark that ignites a new era, especially under the coordinated leadership of Maryam Rajavi, the president-elect of the organized opposition movement recognized by the PMOI/MEK and its political arm, the NCRI—offering a democratic alternative and a genuine break from the cycle of authoritarian rule.
References and citations: All references and citations are drawn from reporting by mojahedin.org. Used with permission.