Iran's regime digs in again, can its opponents do the same?

The overwhelming might of Iran’s internal security apparatus has ruthlessly suppressed the demonstrations which broke out in September 2022, following the death in custody of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini (GSN 1,161/6 , 1,157/24 , 1,155/6 ). The regime has dug in at home and abroad to protect the system of clerical rule, with hardliners as dominant as ever.

But the protests have continued despite this onslaught and the regime’s critics have found new ways to express their discontent, from widespread strikes (including in the Tehran bazaar, a bastion of the 1979 revolution), to cyberattacks on state banks and other institutions.

Token efforts to rein in the Guidance Patrol (Gast-e ersad) ‘morality police’ have been insufficient to create any thaw between the regime and its domestic opponents. Western governments that had been hoping to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal have found it harder to engage with a regime has been clamping down so hard on protestors. The JCPOA talks in Vienna are, at best, in intensive care.

Events to date suggest Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his clerical and military/security cohorts will not budge from their hard line to accommodate either local or international critics, as happened in the period before the original JCPOA deal. Given that, any significant political change will not come easily, even if apparent optimists like the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s son Reza Pahlavi believe constitutional change could follow.

On the international stage, Tehran’s burgeoning alliance with Russia – sealed even before Putin invaded Ukraine in February 2022, when President Ebrahim Raisi visited Moscow the month before – has been reflected in Iran’s supply of drones to bolster Russia’s depleted inventories (GSN 1,156/12 ). This has set back efforts to engineer any rapprochement with western powers which could ease the burden of sanctions on Iran. Instead, Tehran has preferred to align itself with Russia, China and other autocracies, while effectively shunning the West.

Meanwhile, attitudes in Europe have hardened, not least because of the wave of European citizens arrested in Iran, seemingly to be used as bargaining chips by Tehran. In December 2022, Germany cancelled its export credits and other incentives for trade with Iran. In January, the European Parliament voted to declare the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a ‘terrorist organisation’ (GSN 1,162/8 ).

Redoubling its position, Iran has been developing its offensive capabilities, unveiling drone-carrying ships and a cruise missile which IRGC Aerospace Force Brigadier Amirali Hajizadeh said could reach Israel (GSN 1,164/13 ). Hajizadeh also said on 28 February the IRGC was planning to kill former United States President Donald Trump and his secretary of state Mike Pompeo, in retaliation for the murder of IRGC Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 (GSN 1,095/1 ).

The Tehran regime still denies any intent to field a nuclear weapon, but the time needed to produce sufficient fissile material has shrunk markedly. US undersecretary of defence for policy Colin Kahl said on 28 February that centrifuges at Natanz could achieve this “within 12 days”. Tehran is doing what it can to stave off further critical resolutions at the International Atomic Energy Agency, offering some concessions to its chief Rafael Grossi when he visited Tehran in early March, but Kahl’s statement suggests there is little chance a meaningful nuclear deal can be revived.

The velayat-e faqih edifice shaken

In this context, Iranian protestors can expect continued rhetorical support from western leaders, but more practical assistance is unlikely – overt western support could undermine the credibility of the protest movement and attract retaliatory action from the regime. Instead, demonstrators will be largely left to their own devices – the question is to what extent they can act as a catalyst for a collapse in support for the clerical leadership.

Iranian leaders are aware of their lack of a popular mandate – as evidenced by falling voter turnout in presidential and other elections (GSN 1,129/3 ). But the regime is protected by the strength of the IRGC and Basij internal security apparatus, the extent of state patronage and the wider population’s general acquiescence. It is also able to talk up the threat of external enemies and appeal to nationalist sentiments.

What is more, the regime has successfully faced down large protest movements in the past – including the Green Movement following the disputed 2009 election which returned Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency for a second term and the sustained protests of 2017/18 (GSN 1,051/1 , 865/3 ).

But the latest protest movement appears to be different. The old pressure valve of recourse to mainstream reformists has been rejected, with many demonstrators calling for secular rule to replace the system of velayat-e faqih (governance of the Islamic jurist) introduced after the revolution.

The sense of crisis has been reinforced in other important areas, with hitherto dormant ethnic tensions being revived. Protests have been particularly intense in provinces in the Kurdish north-west, Baluchi-speaking and Sunni majority eastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan, and the Azeri-dominated provinces of Ardabil, West and East Azerbaijan.

In response, Tehran has struck targets associated with Iranian Kurdish militants in Kurdistan (GSN 1,156/12 ). Relations with Azerbaijan have turned hostile, leading Baku to close its embassy in Tehran, while talking up Azeri minority rights in Iran (GSN 1,163/10 , 1,160/7 ).

Adding to the tensions are social-economic pressures. Labour unrest is not uncommon, particularly in the oil sector, but disputes in recent months have affected a broad range of industries, including bakeries, oil, sugar and steel plants. Strikers have not only complained about pay and conditions, but also referenced the ‘Women, Life and Freedom’ slogan used in the wider protests, as well as anti-clerical themes.

With the economy under severe pressure, the government has little room for manoeuvre. Tehran daily Sazandegi was reportedly shut down on 20 February for highlighting the rising price of meat. The cost of bread is also said to be causing widespread distress. Inflation is estimated to be around 50%.

Summon the black swans

Iran’s leaders may be under unprecedented pressure, but this has not yet prompted any significant change in domestic or foreign policy, nor a return to the pragmatic nationalism that was a feature of past governments. Internal security forces appear able to maintain control, albeit at a high human cost.

The critical question is how long the regime can sustain itself, either before or after the death of Khamenei. While he is the ruling elite’s central figure, his health is known to be poor and there is no clear successor (GSN 1,122/17 , 1,024/14 ).

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