Iran: The Successful Triad Member

Iran: The Successful Triad Member

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The American-led Western Order has seen its first significant adversary since its triumph in the Cold War in the emergence of a new “axis of evil,” the new “Triad” of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.? With the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons and an intelligence service with global reach and capabilities, Russia has traditionally taken the role of "first-among-equals" in any anti-American alliance.? This position has been increasingly questioned over the past twenty years with the reemergence of China as a significant world power and an economic colossus with the world's second-largest economy.?

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What has never been questioned is Iran's status as the junior partner in this alliance.? Typically characterized by a sclerotic government, questionable and often ineffective governance, and an economy ranked forty-second in the world compared to a population that is the seventeenth largest, Iran is viewed by most as middling-power attempting to use more powerful friends for a more advantageous position.? However, these generalizations could not be further from the truth, for recently, Iran has proven its indispensability to the “Triad” and has out-performed both Moscow and Beijing in attaining its foreign policy aims.

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Comparison One: Russia

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The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been nothing short of a foreign policy, political, and military disaster for Russia.? Initially touted as a “quick” and “limited” “special military operation” to protect ethnic Russians in eastern Ukrainian breakaway regions, the invasion has been devastating to the mythos of Russian military and diplomatic power.? The invasion illustrated significant deficiencies in the Russian military and exposed Russian armaments and weapons systems as antiquated and ineffective.? The shocking state of the capabilities of Russian weapons systems has caused numerous foreign militaries to reconsider and switch their military hardware from Russian to Western suppliers while forcing Moscow into the humiliating position of relying on imports from China, Iran, and North Korea.

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One of the primary goals of Russian foreign policy has been the containment and weakening of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.? The invasion of Ukraine has failed dismally in these aims.? The biggest strategic winner of the ongoing invasion has been the NATO alliance, which has not only rediscovered its raison d'etre but has added two (2) new competent members in Finland and Sweden and has provoked an overall increase in defense spending by all NATO members.? In addition, the European Union has demonstrated that it can survive without Russian energy exports and Russian consumers of EU-produced goods and services.? No matter the eventual outcome of Russia’s invasion, it has come at the expense of a public humbling of Russian military capabilities, discrediting of Russian-made military hardware, increased reliance on economic, monetary, and weapons assistance from its shrinking number of allies, a more assertive and self-sufficient European Union, increased enmity from countries who have seen their food prices skyrocket, and an invigorated and larger NATO.

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Comparison Two: China

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The quagmire of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised significant doubts about Beijing's long-held policy of reunification with the island of Taiwan.? Despite the impressive increase in the size and capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army over the past two decades, the PLA remains a relatively untested force, especially regarding the size of an operation that would be required to invade and hold Taiwan.? Continued replacements, changes, and reorganizations of the PLA’s leadership do not demonstrate Beijing's confidence in the supreme leadership of the armed forces or its abilities.?

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Yet, this ambiguity over both Beijing's ambitions over Taiwan and the growing assertiveness of the PLA has caused concern, worry, and panic throughout the Asia-Pacific region.? This is demonstrated by the AUKUS agreement, the US-Philippines-Japan triad, and recent bilateral security arrangements between the United States, India, and Vietnam.? In addition to the growing apprehension of China’s neighbours, anti-Sino opinions and attitudes have grown globally, especially in many recipients of Chinese funding, such as sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.? As more and more countries fall into a debt trap through the Belt-and-Road initiative, Beijing will be placed into the difficult decision of writing off uncollectable foreign debt at a significant cost to its economy or risk inflaming more anti-Sino sentiments by seizing collateral assets.

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Iran Successes:

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Primary proponent of anti-Americanism and anti-first world sentiment in the Near East

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No other state in the Near East has been as successful in spreading anti-American sentiment as the Islamic Republic of Iran.? Anti-Americanism, along with an associated anti-Western and anti-First World ideology, are central to the public persona of Iran and are actively promoted by Tehran.? While such sentiments have been prominent in the region since the birth of modern Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism in the 20th Century, in Iran, this has been at the forefront of domestic and foreign policy since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.? This has been legitimized by the 1979 occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran lasting four hundred forty-four days, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, and the 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing, all attesting Tehran’s capacity to inflict diplomatic, covert, and military assaults against the United States and her allies with limited repercussion.? The continued existence of the Islamic Republic in the face of significant diplomatic isolation and punishing economic sanctions is the most effective tool for cementing Tehran’s image as the bete noire of the American-led order and the champion of an aggrieved Islamic world.?

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?Destabilization operations

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While unable to directly control other Near Eastern states or impose its will, Tehran has successfully operated long-term destabilization operations within its neighbours and other potential rival states.? Founded in 1985 with the direct support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah has been a potent force in Lebanese politics.? Hezbollah, through its military and political wings, has been able to spread Iran's pan-Islamic, Islamic nationalist, anti-Western, and puritanical Shi'a doctrines throughout Lebanon, continuing to destabilize the politically fragile state and amplifying sectarian tensions.? Hezbollah, its Syrian branch, and the Syrian government have been the primary conduit of Iran's power and influence in the Levant and continue to ensure the loyalty of Beirut and Damascus to Tehran.

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Originally an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, founded in 1987, is an anomaly in Tehran's collection of non-state affiliates, as it is a Sunni Islamist group.? This fact alone testifies to Iran's ideological flexibility when it comes to utilizing non-state actors to fulfill its destabilization aims.? While primarily engaged in armed conflict with the State of Israel, the bete noir of Iran, Hamas continues to succeed in delegitimizing the West-Bank-based Palestinian Authority, funds militant movements in the Sinai Peninsula, and has a significant underground presence in Jordan.

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Iran’s support for the Houthi movement in Yemen is natural, as the Houthis are drawn from Yemen's Shi'a minority.? What is surprising to many has been the continued success of Houthi fighters against the Yemeni government and better-trained and equipped foreign fighters.? Tehran's continued military and financial support of the Houthis has allowed the Yemeni civil war to continue for nearly a decade, ensuring Yemen is a failed state.

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Since the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist regime, Iraq’s Shi’a minority has been able to exert a significant influence over Iraqi politics.? With direct and indirect support from Iran, Iraqi Shiites have been instrumental in the continuation of sectarianism, political instability, and the prevention of the emergence of a robust Iraqi state, which would threaten Iranian interests and influence.

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Bette noir of Saudi Arabia:

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While Tehran publicly declares the State of Israel to be its greatest advisory, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been locked in multi-decade cold war over Near Eastern hegemony.? Partially based on religious differences between the Sunni and Shi'a branches of Islam, the sectarian differences between Arab and Persian cultures and civilizations continue to fuel this rivalry.? Since the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1924, Saudi Arabia has replaced the Turkish state as the preeminent Sunni Islamic state of the Near East and acts as its champion.? This preeminence transitioned into quasi-hegemonic status during the latter half of the 20th Century.

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Iran has had notable successes in its long-running cold war with Saudi Arabia, both directly and indirectly.? Tehran directly engaged with Riyad in 2019 with coordinated drone attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais.? While the drone attacks were unsuccessful in creating any permanent damage to either facility or any significant disruption to the international energy markets, the attacks did cause a temporary reduction of 5.7 million barrels in daily production. They highlighted the inability of Saudi defense systems to identify and respond to drone attacks.

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The Yemeni Civil War has served as a proxy conflict between the Saudi-backed government of the Republic of Yemen and Iranian support of the Houthi rebels.? While Riyad was backed by eight other Arab governments and received logistical backing from the United States, the Yemeni Civil War quickly spiraled from a domestic conflict to a humanitarian disaster with violence spilling over the Saudi-Yemeni border.? Despite superior military hardware and US military training, Saudi Arabia has been unsuccessful in either ensuring a victory for Yemeni government forces or the ability to unilaterally enforce its will.?

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Coupled together, both the drone attacks and continued Yemeni civil war have called into question Riyad’s ability to project power, let alone defend itself, to the governments and citizenry of the Near East.? Thus Tehran continues to present itself as credible geo-political and military rival to a Saudi-led Near Eastern order.

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Paramount Israeli adversary and success against Gulf Monarchies

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While Saudi Arabia is ultimately Iran’s paramount rival in the Near East, Tehran is the State of Israel’s primary geo-political adversary.? Though Riyadh takes an agnostic stance towards the Jewish state publicly, the two countries have steadily increased their interactions and co-operation over recent decades.? That is not the case with Iran.? While the existence of Israel is at odds of the Islamic theocratic doctrines of Iran, Tehran’s hostility towards Israel further its aim as the champion against Zionism and the protector Muslims and the Arab world.? Despite notable Israeli intelligence and covert-operations against Iran, Iran remains the adversary most feared by the Israeli government.? Even with the Israeli “Iron Dome” affording a great deal of protection against a direct military attack, Tehran uses its proxies within the Levant to strike at Israeli soft-targets at will.? Loyal proxy and client non-state actors coupled with Israeli defensive responses continue to uphold Iran’s anti-Israeli narrative and continue to prevent any rapprochement between Israel and the Muslim world.

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Finally, Iran has been successful in driving a wedge between any unified consensus within the members of the Gulf Monarchies.? While the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain almost always fall in Riyadh’s camp on regional issues, both Kuwait and Oman maintain cordial relations with Tehran, openly co-operating when it is in their interest.? In addition to its Shi’a majority, Qatar shares the massive North Dome gas field with Iran insuring in friendly relations between the two states.? Tehran’s continued tolerance towards the divergent policies of the Gulf Monarchies ensures these wealthy states do not flex their oversized economic and political influence into a unified position regarding Iranian activity, trade, and influence.

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While Russia and China have attempted to frame themselves respectively as the paramount actor pushing back against the American-led Western order, the Islamic Republic of Iran has had the most notable successes achieving its foreign policy aims over the past forty years.? While Russia has entered into an armed conflict which has ended up emphasizing its military shortcomings and weaknesses to the international community and China has taken bold moves increasing tension and concern with its neighbours and partners, Iran has taken smaller sized moves which have paid spectacular dividends.? Focusing on sabotage operations and destabilization operations have forced Iran’s adversaries to respond, often a response which fails to attain the appropriate level of proportionality, running the risk of a response which appears too bellicose or too passive, and always to Tehran’s advantage.? Funding proxies against adversary states instead of direct actions not only allows for (weak) plausible deniability, but the advantage of local allies who have native knowledge and an enhanced nimbleness than conventional military response.

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However, all of these foreign policy successes are coming at an increasing cost to the Iranian regime.? The fiscal cost for the scale and scope of Iran’s foreign policy operations and machinations would be substantial for any medium-power middle-income state, for one subject to stringent international sanctions, the cost is substantial.? The economic drag of this ambitious foreign policy on Iran’s finances and economy is significant, increasing, and extremely visible to the population at-large.? The continued poor state of Iran’s domestic economy, coupled with persistently high rates of youth unemployment, is a pressure occupying more and more of the regime’s bandwith address and manage.? With a restive population growing its assertiveness in demanding economic and political reforms, the continued financial outflows to proxies and client states will be one that Iran will no longer be able to afford.? The Islamic Republic of Iran has punched above its weight on the international circuit for the past forty years, allowing Tehran to achieve more major foreign policy aims than Beijing or Moscow during the same period of time.? When it comes to power projection, a state’s greatest strengths can become great weaknesses in the long-run, for the current Iranian regime this is becoming true. ?

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