Iran to be the next target? Does the end of the Axis of Resistance mean Tehran resorts to the nuclear option?
Cyril Widdershoven
Geopolitical disruptive thinker, focused on Commodities, Geopolitics, MENA and Security. Assessing investments, FDI, SWFs, Key-Stakeholders and power players in MENA, EastMed and Central Asia.
The ouster of Syrian dictator Bashir Assad has come as a surprise for some, as the so-called rebel forces, made up of a wide range of extremists, fundamentalists, and Kurdish forces, have been able to take over the country with the speed of light. After more than a decade of civil war and internal divisions, supported by Arab countries, Turkey, and even the West, the fate of Syria is unclear. One result, however, is clear: the Axis of Resistance (Iran-Syria-Hezbollah) is crumbling or even on life-support. With Syria removed from the Shi’a Crescent strategy of Iran, Tehran’s options to influence the Arab world have become limited. Iran’s leading military power base, the IRGC, has even left the country without engaging the opposition anymore. Its other main power base, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, is being crushed by the Israeli military at the same time. Without having any forward offensive base in the Levant able to influence or engage Israel or pro-Western regimes, the Iranian leadership is now forced to reassess its options, even looking at the growing internal opposition. The future is looking very bleak, but the Islamic extremist regime still holds cards that can shake the region on its fundamentals.
At present, Western analysts and politicians are very optimistic; the fact that the Assad regime has been removed after more than 50 years of ruling Syria is seen as a significant step forward. Former extremist groups, all on the terrorism lists of the USA, UK, and EU, are now seen as possible partners for future relationships. The latter is, however, based on assumptions, not actual hard-hitting facts or fundamental changes on the ground. While the current focus is on Syrian developments, Iran seems forgotten. The role of the Iranian regime and its need to keep enemies from its gates is not yet really being put in discussions on how to deal with a regime that has been hit hard the last year. The Israeli reaction to Hamas-Hezbollah and the military response to the Houthis has removed a vast part of the power base of the Iranians in the region. At the same time, Tehran’s military power inside of the country itself has been hit very hard by the last Israeli air attacks, which targeted the Iranian air defenses and several major research centers. Tehran is struggling at present, trying to regain the upper hand again. ?The options are meager, but one is still in the offing.
The fact that the UN nuclear watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported last week that Iran’s acceleration in its enrichment of uranium to close to bomb-grade is "solemn" has been snowed under by the Syrian implosion. Iran’s reaction to the IAEA report has been complete denial. ?Several military specialists have already warned that the nuclear enrichment levels are very close to military options. ?In a statement last Friday, Rafael Grossi, IAEA’s head, said that Tehran is accelerating its enrichment of uranium to up to 60% purity, approaching the about 90% level that is weapons-grade. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei stated a day later that Iran's nuclear program is carried out in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other safeguards in a "completely transparent manner and under the supervision of the IAEA." ?However, in a report by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the latter stated that current fissile material is enough to produce over 12 nuclear warheads. ?However, it emphasizes that Iran has not yet taken the final step toward weaponization. The DNA indicated that no military steps have been seen yet. At the same time, the report stated that Iran realizes that, based on the two Israeli attacks in the last months, its overall security posture is low. Extremist parts of the Iranian government are now opting for a nuclear deterrence.
The fall-out of the Syrian implosion, combined with the destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, a nuclear weapons option for Iran, is again on the table. Without holding specifics yet, Tehran seems to feel it needs a nuclear deterrent to counter not only Israel but, at the same time, any pressure of the new Trump Administration after January 2025. ?Both adversaries are at present assessing the regional situation, but potential military moves by either Israel or the USA are definitely on the table. Any open declaration by Tehran to step up its nuclear program will not be taken lightly. ?While Europe is dreaming about a new Iran Nuclear Deal, which is out of order to most others, and a potential diplomatic success of Brussels (supported by Germany and France), the real world, based on (neo-) realism geopolitical military strategies, is going the opposite way. Iran’s regime is crumbling; its former power position is destroyed, while its only other asset, Iraq or its Shi’a militias, is under severe pressure. For Tehran, the Russian unwillingness to support Assad again in Syria is a sign on the wall that the so-called Russian geopolitical power position is based on sand or maybe in Moscow’s views on potatoes (vodka). Putin’s former glory is gone, and the fact that Russia’s military is fully engaged and struggling in Ukraine is a dire sign for the Moscow-Tehran (and China) coalition. Iran’s only real power support is from extremist fringe groups or China. However, Beijing has not yet taken offensive military actions to support the Khamenei regime.
Without any real options on the table, the option of Iran becoming a nuclear-capable military power is a no-go area. If the appropriate actions are not taken, Tehran will be capable of controlling not only the Arabian/Persian Gulf. Still, it will have a weapon of mass destruction to push the region to a full-scale destructive war. The West should consider this before showing a willingness to discuss a new treaty with Tehran. The USA and Israel are looking at other options. ?For Bibi Netanyahu and almost all Israelis, a nuclear Iranian option is out of order. When the dust has settled in Syria, Iran will be targeted within days. Taking out known (and unknown) nuclear sites by Israel’s air force and special forces is no longer out of range. While Iran’s air defenses are wrecked, the airspace of Syria and Iraq is almost free of danger.
The only real force keeping the Israelis from taking advantage of the current situation is the inauguration of Donald Trump. While the Biden Administration will not hinder Israeli military actions, Trump’s power in January 2025 could be a significant support, including US military capabilities, and even a possible part-taker.? Arab countries, currently engaging Iran in regional security discussions, are also focusing on the Trump Administration's moves in 2025. While currently showing restraint in dealing with potential Iranian threats or a nuclear weapon, a hardline anti-Iran Trump Administration could be a significant factor in dealing with Iran, too, in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo. ?Arab regimes have witnessed Moscow's weakness in Syria. A possible wake-up call has happened in the heads of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed; the world has changed since October 7, 2023, and Israel has removed the Axis of Resistance and Russia from the Middle East. China’s involvement again is not relevant; Beijing’s firepower is still targeting closer to home, Taiwan. Security is not yet guaranteed by a commercially driven China, which does not yet have a real military or geopolitical power strategy. For the Arab world, security (as Mao stated, ‘comes out of the barrel of a gun’) is still in the hands of the USA, even in a multi-polar power or shifting economic alliances.
The balance of power is shifting dramatically. Israel’s military destruction of the total Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance and the removal of Russia from the Middle East/Levant has opened up opportunities to regain Western influence and stability. Iran, however, is looking at not only a potential regional confrontation but also could be facing internal unrest or even destabilization. ?Since the 1980s, Iran’s ruling extremist regime has been setting up a string of clients and conflicts, which removed part of the internal pressure of dealing with opposition. Even though several protest movements showed potential, the power structure of the regime was effective and brutal enough to quell all. Successes outside of Iran also put in place some additional support, as the IRGC and its cronies could show a growing Iranian power base. The latter has not only been removed but now is opening the routes to be the main target in the future.
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The need for proxies or even countries fighting the battles for the Khomenei-ideology-based fundamentalist regime has been clear for a long. As Ali Akbar Velayati, a key adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated before Assad and Syria, “the golden ring of the resistance chain in the region,” the latter now is a thing of the past. The forward deployed “resistance” to Israel and the USA has now gone. ?This time, Iran's chain of influence and power has been broken geographically.? Without Syria, in many Islamic theoretical discussions, the heartland of an Islamic Empire, the Iranian balloon, has exploded. To make things even worse, most proxies are without a direct military-financial lifeline. Hezbollah and the remains of Hamas are at the mercy of the new powers in play.? With Russia not even on the ground, Tehran must fall back on its domestic resources. ?
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Inside Iran, pressure is now building up. Until now, Iran’s vast international network, the show of force of its proxies, including the IRGC's involvement in significant financial and smuggling networks, was a sign of the growing validity of the religious leaders about the strength of the regime to their people. The impact of the loss of Gaza, Lebanon, and especially Syria is still unclear, but the infallibility of the religious leaders is weakened. At the same time, the IRGC and all other Iranian personnel, holding vast networks in Syria and Lebanon, are looking at a diminished power. Returning IRGC leaders, advisors, or other Iranian personnel to Iran will need to explain why they lost the game against Israel and the West. It even becomes more critical how they have lost against a Sunni-led force known to be anti-Iran. The Khamenei power elite and IRGC also need to address how they lost not only influence but also the tens of billions of dollars invested in these regimes. The latter will pop up in the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities as the opposition's battle cry occurred in 2022.
As indicated, Iran lost power in the region, but the latter is not pulling the rugs under the regime. With a nuclear option, Iran will still be able to force Arab countries to keep their cool. At the same time, the IRGC and proxies, especially in Iraq or Yemen, are still able to bring down Arab oil and gas infrastructure. The cyber-attacks on Aramco or the missile and drone attacks on Abqaiq are still playing a role in the Arab strategic mindset.
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How far Iran can quell internal dissent could be the primary crucial indicator of the future of the Islamic Republic. Instability is already visible in the main parts of the country or the power base of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. The bloody nose that the IRGC has received in Lebanon and Syria will also not be taken lightly. Possible pressure to change the position of the IRGC, its leadership, or the financial stranglehold of the Iranian economy could lead to either a weaker regime or a full-scale hardline clean-up of possible ‘reformist’ groups. The combination of ‘clear and present danger (Israel-US)’ and internal reactionary moves is, for all regime parties, the most threatening issue. An unstable and weakened Iran could opt for increased repression domestically while pushing for the Iranian “Bomb.”
?At the same time, looking at Syria, Iran’s regime is for sure assessing the option of an internal uprising. The dramatic changes in Gaza-Lebanon and now Syria could inspire Iranian opposition groups to combine forces, as was done in 1978. The principle of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ could now be an option to push the Khamenei regime out. ?Dictators, even religious leaders, don’t survive a crushing defeat 9 out of 10 times. As some have stated before, “Hamas's October 7 slaughter of over 1200 Israelis has been the precursor to a new Middle East”. After Israel fighting for survival, removing the heads of the Snakes, it could be now time for the last to be removed. A “Glorious Revolution 2.0” could be written if Iranians do it themselves. If not, two other Swords are already being sharpened.
For the Arab region, the developments have been unexpected and worrying. Just remember that Bashir Assad was reinvited to join the Arab world, even after slaughtering his people. The new Middle East is a power game of old and new forces. In most of them, Gulf Arabs are just bystanders. The role of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Egypt, especially Syria and Iran, is minimal. The end game will, however, be on their front doors. The impact will be on a scale that shatters their strategies, too. Taking sides is not a strength that has been witnessed in the Middle East in the last decades. Playing all sides was a significant game masterfully played. Their cards at present are very weak.
The other leading group in peril could be OPEC+. With a new power play in the Middle East and North Africa, as Russia’s influence is waning or even outright removed, all eyes should be on Washington and Israel. While not playing politics, the endgame with Iran and hardline actions towards China and Russia are on the horizon, so playing a waiting game could soon be over. Removal of Iran and Russia from the global market is an option OPEC’s Kingpins don’t want to talk about. Trump and Netanyahu, however, don’t have any inhibitions not to. Continuing support for Moscow or Beijing by OPEC leaders will not be a “Get of Jail Card” anymore. For oil prices, even if fundamentals are weak and financial markets are out of touch, an Endgame is Bullish, especially if OPEC doesn’t react.