Iran must pay for this attack on Israel

Jason M. Brodsky I 2 October 2024 I Spectator Australia

At age 85, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been risk-averse for much of his time in office. He has preferred to operate through proxies and partners like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis rather than directly engaging in combat with Israel and the United States. This is how he has survived. Since becoming supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei has pursued a gradual approach to eradicating the state of Israel by encircling it in a ring of fire to bleed it slowly.

His risk calculus has now changed, as shown by last night’s missile attack on Israel. According to Israeli officials, Iran launched around 200 missiles towards Israel, most of which were intercepted by Israeli aerial defences.

Khamenei was likely to have been emboldened by the lack of American deterrence in the region

Since Hamas’s massacre against Israel on October 7, 2023, Khamenei has carefully calibrated Tehran’s involvement in the regional conflict. He has armed, funded, guided, and supported Iran-aligned militias in the Middle East, but hesitated to put Iranian skin in the game.

Yet with Israel decimating Hamas militarily and severely degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities, this has weakened two important Iranian allies and undercut its grand strategy. This –?coupled with the killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the elimination of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah – drove Iran to conclude that its deterrence was dangerously evaporating. Hezbollah especially has been the Islamic Republic’s crown jewel – its existence is meant to not only serve as a tool to destroy Israel but also to deter it from striking Iran’s nuclear programme. Hezbollah has also been the model that Iran has sought to export to other countries where it is nurturing proxies.

When mulling over this missile attack, Khamenei was also likely to have been emboldened by the lack of American deterrence in the region. The Biden administration has consistently telegraphed its desire for de-escalation. Repeated US non-responses and its occasional underwhelming riposte to Iranian aggression likely drove Khamenei to conclude that the benefits were worth the risks of launching this attack. Khamenei will have wanted to show that Iran will respond to punishing attacks – a deterrence equation of direct revenge it established after Israel’s killing of IRGC Lebanon Corps Commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi in April. Khamenei will have known that an American retaliation on Iranian soil was unlikely and that the US government would seek to restrain Israel in an election year.

Not hitting Israel back would also be untenable for the regime’s brand and stability. Some Hamas leaders already held grudges against Tehran for not offering more support in its battle against Israel after the 7 October massacre. If Khamenei had decided not to hit Israel after a more important proxy, Hezbollah, was decapitated, that would risk undermining confidence within the Islamic Republic’s broader militia network. This would present both management and recruitment challenges, not to mention backlash at home from radical voices, especially within the IRGC.

This was likewise personal for Khamenei. Khamenei and Nasrallah were close and their relationship dated back to the 1980s. In later years, Nasrallah was a leading figure in coordinating Tehran’s broader proxy and partner network, especially after the death of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020 left a void.

In recent weeks, there has been a familiar debate within the Iranian system. Some voices –?affiliated with the new government of Masoud Pezeshkian –?were counselling restraint, viewing Israel’s operations as a trap to ensnare the regime in a war. They preferred to delay or shape the Iranian reprisals in a different way so as not to detract from its quest for sanctions relief from the United States, at a time when Iran’s economy is under stress. Others, including those in the IRGC, were bothered about Iran’s loss of deterrence and argued that it was urgent to reestablish it.

But the Pezeshkian government was never going to be a decisive player in these deliberations. While Pezeshkian was elevated to the presidency under the misleading label of being a ‘reformist’, he does not have enough standing in the system to make a substantive difference. He is not an insider in the Iranian military and security establishment, has a weak mandate, and the presidency is essentially an implementer and not a decision-maker when it comes to Iran’s foreign policy and regional strategy.

Pezeshkian’s primary role for Khamenei is serving as a frontman internationally. He is the smiling doctor who carries the brand of a ‘moderate’ to create the illusion for western diplomats that there is the possibility of a constructive relationship with Tehran. This in turn provides possible sanctions relief and space for the IRGC and its interests to entrap the United States and its allies in rounds of endless negotiations.

As for Israel, it cannot now let the second direct Iranian attack on the Jewish state since 1979 pass without a response. Iran’s attack yesterday was an escalation –? with even more missiles launched at Israel than in April. Additionally, Iran may have used new and sophisticated weapons in this attack. This, along with the number of impacts and damage, will inevitably produce an Israeli retaliation. This could include eliminating key Islamic Republic leaders; targeting energy infrastructure to cause economic pain; attacking military bases, Iran’s defence industries, and air defence systems; or striking its nuclear programme.

In the end, Tehran has set the region on fire since Hamas’s massacre in Israel on 7 October. It has unleashed its proxies and partners to attack Americans, Israelis, and international commerce. In the process, it has paid no meaningful price on its own soil. It is overdue for Khamenei to pay dearly.

Author: Jason M. Brodsky