Intro To Domain Theory for War

Adapted from The New Art of War: The Origins, Theory, and Future of Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2021)

Most warriors, policy makers, and strategists are only casually familiar with war theory and very few (if any) appreciate the difference between general war theory and sub-theories, such as domain theory and small wars theory. However, these connections and distinctions are important in comprehending the nuances of war as a phenomenon.

In the third chapter of The New Art of War, after having surveyed some of the most coherent and persuasive general theories of war in Chapter 2, I present and critique small wars theory and domain theories (of air and sea) for my readers, and I also outline how these theories relate back to the general theories. Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the content of significant past war theories -- by the likes of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Jomini, for example -- qualifies as land-centric domain theory.

As I point out in The New Art of War, domain theory is subordinate to general war theory, and must be consistent with the general theory while simultaneously offering unique insights into the character of war in its subject domain. In fact,

"The existence of domain sub-theory is partly a consequence of general war theory’s failure to satisfactorily incorporate all war’s domains. Using general theory as its foundation, sound domain theory must narrow its focus to the domain’s unique impacts on war’s character; explain, when possible, how warfare in that domain has evolved; identify abstract domain-centric principles; and finally, use those principles to outline the best ways to exploit the domain to advance the aims of war" (p. 167).

I've found in my study of existing domain theory -- by the likes of Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Slessor, and others -- that, by and large, domain theorists have attempted, without explicitly realizing it, to outline how domain-tailored forces (e.g., aircraft and ships) acquire access to the domain, gain awareness of what else is in the domain and what is happening there, and achieve freedom of action (e.g., sea control, command of the air, or air superiority). Access, awareness, and freedom of action are what I refer to as the "3 A's" of domain theory. Finally, the theorist must explain how achieving the "3 A's" accomplishes the aims of war.

For instance, Corbett asserted that navies play a significant (if not decisive) role in determining the outcome of wars by controlling sea lines of communication, which allows for the movement of expeditionary armies and supplies, and by denying the enemy's ability to project power against Britain across the sea. Douhet and Billy Mitchell went even farther by proposing that air forces would render armies and navies (and perhaps even war itself) obsolete by directly holding at risk everything bound to earth's surface (e.g., armies, navies, bases, cities, etc.) while essentially remaining invulnerable to anything except an opposing air force.

The following graphic illustrates some fundamental domain theory concepts.

Today, as we contemplate the characteristics and implications of more recent warfighting domains (e.g., space & cyberspace), we can use domain theory fundamentals to evaluate the validity and sufficiency of theoretical propositions related to them. For instance, what are the 3 A's of the cyber and space domains, and what role might they play in a future war? There are many variables to consider in answering this question; however, despite their disparate characteristics, our abstract domain theory concept quite tidily encompasses these additional domains (as depicted in the next graphic).

Now, having established the basics of domain theory, we are poised to answer the next important question -- "how do we put it to work?" The following graphic illustrates how each domain -- including the decisive, cognitive domain -- can be considered using each element of the domain theory model. It would seem to make sense that any "all-domain" theory of victory and subsequent strategy, should reference this model to aid organization and integration.

Since destroying the opponent's will to fight is the ultimate objective in war (not the destruction of "things") strategy and campaigning should be geared towards employing domain-aligned forces in a manner engineered from the beginning to influence the cognitive domain, i.e., to get the humans opposing us to give up the fight and accede to the new political reality articulated by our war aim. Furthermore, since the military is not the only instrument of power (IOP) at work during a war, strategists must also account for how non-military IOPs can work in concert with domain-related military IOPs.

Though this article has been only a cursory introduction to the concept of domain theory and the broader Unified Theory within The New Art of War, I hope that it fosters greater appreciation for the potential of domain theory to impact policy, strategy, and warfighting, and I also hope it stimulates greater curiosity regarding the role that a holistic and coherent general war theory can play in our ongoing discourse on security related topics.